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1967 MAY 17

PRIME MINISTER

Middle East (Policy)

(Israel/Arab War) Pt. 6

Part 6 ends:-

Wilton to F.O. 2498

29.7.67

Part 7 begins

Tel Aviv to F.O. 900

1.8.67

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet Documents

Reference	Date
OPD (67) 28th Meeting Minute 5	28 July 1967
CC (67) 53rd Conclusions, Minute 2	27 July 1967
CC (67) 50th Conclusions, Minute 2	20 July 1967
CC (67) 46th Conclusions, Minute 2	11 July 1967
CC (67) 46th Conclusions, Minute 1	11 July 1967
C (67) 123	7 July 1967
CC (67) 45th Conclusions, Minute 2	6 July 1967
JIC (67) (SA) 84	4 July 1967
KHV (67) 1st Meeting Minutes	3 July 1967
CC (67) 43rd Conclusions, Minute 2	29 June 1967
CC (67) 41st. conclusions, minute 3	22.6.67

The above-listed Cabinet documents, which were enclosed on this file, have been removed and destroyed.

Cabinet documents are the responsibility of the Cabinet Office. When released they are available in the appropriate CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES

Signed J. R. Green Date 2.1.97

JR Green
Prime Minister's Office
10 Downing Street

CYPHER/CAT A

FLASH FOREIGN OFFICE TO PARIS

TELNO 2031 19 JUNE, 1967 (E)

CONFIDENTIAL.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 2026.

FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY TO PRIME MINISTER.

THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION 18 JUNE.

FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF F.O. TELEGRAMS AS AT 0730 B.S.T. MONDAY.

JORDAN.
QUOTE THE BIG LIE UNQUOTE.

SAAD JUMA HAS TOLD H.M. AMBASSADOR THAT THE JORDANIAN DELEGATION AT THE U.N. HAD BEEN GIVEN ALL THE INFORMATION FROM AJLUN RADAR. HE ADDED THAT JORDAN HAD RESISTED EGYPTIAN PRESSURE TO ISSUE A CONDEMNATION OF U.K./U.S. COMPLICITY IN ISRAELS ATTACK. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD TOLD BOUMEDIENNE ON HIS RECENT VISIT THAT ISRAEL HAD RECEIVED NO HELP FROM THE U.K. OR U.S. FURTHER POINTS MADE BY SAAD JUMA WERE:
(I) KING HUSSEIN WAS PRESSING ARAB LEADERS FOR A SUMMIT ON OR BEFORE 24 JUNE IN KHARTOUM.
(II) THERE WOULD BE STRONG ARAB PRESSURE ON JORDAN TO SEVER DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. HOWEVER, JORDAN WISHED TO MAINTAIN ITS LINKS WITH THE WEST.

U.S. AND THE MIDDLE EAST.

2. THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY IN CHARGE OF THE U.N. IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAS TOLD HEAD OF CHANCERY IN WASHINGTON THAT (i) THE PRESIDENT MAY MAKE A MAJOR STATEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST DURING THE MORNING OF 19 JUNE.

/(II)

(II) DEPENDING ON (I) MR. GOLDBERG MAY SPEAK SECOND IN THE U.N.
(III) MR. RUSK WAS NOT GOING TO NEW YORK ON THE AFTERNOON OF 18 JUNE.

(IV) PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS HAD ALREADY BEGUN. (SISCO WOULD NOT BE DRAWN ON WHAT HAD PASSED SO FAR).

ISRAEL.

3. IN A PRESS INTERVIEW, EBAN MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:
(I) ISRAEL WOULD NOT RETURN TO THE ARMISTICE LINES, EVEN IF AN OVERWHELMING MAJORITY IN THE ASSEMBLY WERE TO VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THIS.
(II) ISRAEL WOULD PUT FORWARD SOLUTIONS THAT WERE REASONABLE AND HELD HOPES OF DURABILITY. ISRAEL ONLY WANTED SECURITY AND PEACE: THESE HAD HOWEVER TERRITORIAL IMPLICATIONS.

4. ISRAELI MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO HAS STATED THAT IF THERE IS NO TREATY BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARABS, THE FORMER WILL NOT GIVE UP ANY OF THE CONQUERED TERRITORY. IT WAS UNTHINKABLE THAT ANY OF QUOTE EASTERN ISRAEL UNQUOTE BE RETURNED TO JORDAN.

LIBYA.

5. MUNTASEIR, INFLUENTIAL COUSIN OF THE HEAD OF THE ROYAL DIWAN, MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS TO H.M. AMBASSADOR.
(I) IN SPITE OF QUOTE OUR FAULTS UNQUOTE WE WERE STILL TRUSTED MORE THAN ANY OTHER FOREIGNER. THEREFORE WE SHOULD ATTEMPT TO SAVE OUR NAME IN LIBYA AND THE ARAB WORLD.
(II) THE U.K. SHOULD, IN COUNTERING EGYPTIAN ACCUSATIONS, CEASE TO REFER TO THE QUOTE BIG LIE UNQUOTE, WHICH WAS AN AFFRONT TO THE ARABS.
(III) IF THE U.K. PLAYED ITS CARDS RIGHT NASSER WOULD DISAPPEAR IN A FEW MONTHS.
(IV) THE U.K. SHOULD UN-COMPROMISINGLY FOLLOW THE LINE IN THE ASSEMBLY, WHICH I TOOK IN MY SPEECH AT NOTTINGHAM. THE U.K.

/SHOULD

SHOULD NOT APPEAR TO BE FOLLOWING THE U.S.

(VX) THE ARABS WOULD NEVER UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES NEGOTIATE DIRECT WITH ISRAEL. THE ARABS MIGHT CONCEDE ISRAEL CONTROL OF TIRAN ON THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF AQUABA: ALSO INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF JERUSALEM.

SOSFA SENT 0855Z 19 JUNE

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION

EASTERN DEPT.

FOPA 012

F L A S H PARIS 2039 OF 19/6

CYPHER/CAT A

FLASH FOREIGN OFFICE TO PARIS

TELEGRAM NO. 2039 OF 19/6

CONFIDENTIAL.

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NUMBER 2088 OF 19/6

ADDRESSED TO F.O. TELEGRAM NO 2088 OF 19 JUNE REPTD FOR INFMN TO UKM IS NEW YORK AND MOSCOW.

MY TELEGRAM NO 2087: MIDDLE EAST.

RUSK HAS JUST TELEPHONED ME TO SAY THAT THE PRESIDENT IS NOT AT PRESENT PLANNING TO GO TO NEW YORK BUT THAT HE HIMSELF WILL BE THERE FROM TUESDAY MORNING FOR A FEW DAYS. HE WILL NOT HIMSELF SPEAK IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. THERE IS AT PRESENT NO SCHEDULE FOR A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND KOSYGIN.

SIR P DEAN/SOSFA GRPS 70 SENT AT 19/1649Z AL K

RECD AT 1649Z/19 PNMJ

Jsmel

PM 6

Mr. Palliser

SECRET

6

Record of a Discussion held at the
Grand Trianon, Versailles, on

MONDAY, 19th JUNE, 1967

at 11.00 a.m.

PRESENT:

The Rt. Hon. Harold Wilson, MP — Prime Minister

Sir Burke Trend

Mr. A.M. Palliser

President de Gaulle

M. Burin des Roziers

M. Andronikov

President de Gaulle welcomed the Prime Minister to the Grand Trianon and referred briefly to the circumstances in which the building had recently been redecorated and brought back into use.

The Prime Minister thanked the President for arranging to receive him in such attractive surroundings. He recalled that, when this meeting had been arranged (during his visit to Bonn for Dr. Adenauer's funeral), he had told the President that he would hope to discuss with him the whole international situation. Last time he had met the President they had been concerned to discuss British membership of the European Economic Community (EEC). But this was only one of the international issues which merited further consideration on this occasion. Moreover, since their last meeting the Middle East crisis had supervened and had created a further problem which required urgent examination. It was accidental that this crisis happened to coincide with their meeting; but it was fortunate that this had proved to be so.

President de Gaulle said that, when he had met Mr. Kosygin two days earlier (when Mr. Kosygin had passed through Paris on his way to the meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York), he had found him in a disturbed and uncertain frame of mind. Mr. Kosygin had purported to attach great importance to ensuring that Israel retreated from the positions which she had occupied, that she was condemned by the United Nations for her aggression and that the French Government should join the Soviet Government in pursuing these objectives. At the same time he had given the President the impression that he was far from clear in his own mind about the Soviet Government's real policy on the issue. For his part the President had not given Mr. Kosygin any clear indication of French policy in the matter.

The Prime Minister observed that Britain and France were in fact very close together in their basic approach to the problem of the Middle East; and it was essential that they should maintain this relationship in a situation which was now very dangerous. If the two Governments could link arms, they could perhaps prevent the crisis from becoming even worse. Their policies might have diverged a little in recent weeks; but fundamentally they were travelling the same road and it was clear that a great part of world opinion hoped that they would continue to do so. Both countries faced certain difficulties - some which they shared, others which were peculiar to one or other of them. The 1956 Suez episode was an embarrassment to both of them; and, although France had done much to allay the suspicions which that episode had created, both countries were still to some extent paying the price for their actions at that time. In the recent crisis the British Parliament had, on the whole, pressed the Government to take a rather partisan line; in fact, however, they had adopted, like the French Government, a strictly neutral attitude. In particular, they had followed the French example in maintaining an arms embargo until it was clear that this was no longer being universally applied.

A real and lasting peace in the Middle East would not be secured by speeches and declarations. It would only be achieved by the involvement of the four great Powers on the basis which the President himself had originally proposed and which had received the immediate support of the British Government. Moreover, this involvement must be arranged at the right time. Otherwise, although it might be possible to patch up an uneasy peace or truce by means of the normal diplomatic exchanges, this would represent no more than the lowest common denominator of agreement and would soon fall apart again under the great pressures which were still at work in the Middle East. And then the trouble would break out once more. But, if the four Powers - and not just two of them - were genuinely involved in the search for a settlement, it would be possible to tackle the whole problem in a constructive and imaginative way; and it might even be practicable to produce a solution which might last for a generation. Moreover, the four Powers might not only be able to devise a settlement but also play a useful part in guaranteeing it. In default of some safeguard of this kind Israel and the Arabs would continue to live in fear of each other; and this tension would perpetuate the risk that each side would try to anticipate the other by striking the first blow. The recent campaign had shown very clearly that, when both sides were fully armed with sophisticated weapons, it was the initial attack which decided the issue, perhaps in a matter of a few hours. It was for this reason that a settlement which was merely a patched up affair would always remain vulnerable to the continuing temptation to try to reverse it by a sudden strike; and it was only the four Powers who might provide some form of guarantee against this risk. This was presumably the thought which had been in the President's mind when he had made his original proposal for a four Power intervention.

President de Gaulle replied that the problem of Israel herself now mattered less than the grave international context within which one had to consider the Middle East situation - an international context which included such other problems as the war in Vietnam, the recent explosion of a Chinese thermo nuclear weapon and so forth. These factors would encourage certain Powers to stand out against any settlement in the Middle East. The world was now passing through a very dangerous period. Neither Britain nor France nor even the United States or the Soviet Union was any longer holding the reins - or likely to be able to do so for a considerable time. It was impossible to say how long this period would last or how it would end. But at the moment nobody was really in control of the situation. It was for this reason that he had originally suggested that the four Powers should act in concert. The purpose of this would have been for them to agree in declaring that they were opposed to a war between Israel and the Arabs and would condemn the side which struck first. Britain and the United States had endorsed this proposal for a four Power meeting; but the Soviet Union had refused to do so, although they might well now regret this decision. As a result, the war had broken out; and now we were entering a different period, in which many new factors would have to be taken into consideration as the consequences of the war spread further and further and became more clearly evident.

It was necessary to examine these consequences first in terms of their local implications in the Middle East and then in terms of their impact on the wider international scene. As regards the Middle East public opinion in France and doubtless in Britain too was apt to be sympathetic to Israel; and this was not unreasonable in the light of Jewish history over the last 2,000 years and the many sufferings of the Jewish people, including the massacres in the last war. Moreover, in France there was still a certain feeling of hostility towards the Arabs as a legacy of the Algerian war. On the surface, therefore, French public opinion had appeared to support Israel. But the French Government were determined to approach the problem dispassionately. It was the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union who had created the State of Israel. France had accepted this and had recognised the new State. Israel had taken root and flourished; and it was now a reality, with a considerable record of political, military and economic success. In 1956 there had been the Suez episode. He himself had not been in charge of French affairs at the time; and he therefore offered no comment on that incident now. Nevertheless, Britain and France had been forced to abandon the Canal, while Israel had improved her position to some extent; and, since the Algerian war was embittering French relations with the Arabs, the French Government at the time had made a very firm public declaration on the right of free passage into the Gulf of Aqaba. More recently, however, the situation had changed. In particular, the Algerian war had been brought to an end; and since then France's relations with the Arab States had improved. She was now on reasonably good terms with Egypt, Syria, the Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and the Arab States in North Africa. She was giving some of them (especially Algeria) considerable help with their programmes of economic development; and she was extending her cultural relations with them, notably with Egypt. In these circumstances there was no reason for the Government of France - or, he suggested, that of the United Kingdom - to ruin their relations with the Arabs merely because public

opinion felt some superficial sympathy for Israel because she was a small country with an unhappy history. It was for this reason that France had hoped that the situation in the Middle East might remain as it was and, while admittedly selling arms to Israel, had been careful to retain good relations with the Arabs at the same time. It was for this reason also that, when the situation became critical, France had said that whoever attacked first would be to blame. In fact, it was Israel which had attacked first; and it was Israel, therefore, which was in the wrong. Nevertheless, she had been very successful; and she had effected a drastic change in the balance of power in the Middle East. But the only result would be to make it more difficult than ever for the Arabs to accept this situation; and it might well prove to be the case that no lasting agreement could be achieved for perhaps another quarter of a century. In effect the two sides were still at war; and they would stay at war.

This was the problem which had to be related to the broader international context. Here the main consideration was the continuing effect of the war in Vietnam. This war dominated everything; and there could be no lasting peace in the world while it continued. If it were not for the war in Vietnam it would be possible for the four Powers to take up once again the reins of the situation in the Middle East. But their impotence in the Middle East would last for so long as the United States would not leave Vietnam, since so long as the United States remained in Vietnam the war in Vietnam would continue.and so long as the war continued the risk of its escalating to an internaticnal war would also continue. Now this situation had been further aggravated by the recent explosion of the Chinese thermo nuclear bomb - an event which so far from making the Soviet Union more disposed to contemplate a settlement would cause them to raise the stakes even higher and to abuse the United States even more stridently (as they were probably doing at that very moment in the General Assembly of the United Nations). The United States would be bound to react accordingly; and the rift between the two super Powers would become even deeper. Meanwhile, what had been the attitude of the British Government in this situation? For their part the French Government had said clearly, time and agair, that the United States should leave Vietnam. The United States paid no attention, of course, but, the longer they stayed there, the nearer would come the prospect of a general war. It was partly for this reason also that France had left NATO - i.e. to avoid being drawn into somebody else's war. The French were not so rich that they could afford to ruin themselves for this sort of reason; and they were too fond of life to be ready to die for this kind of cause. They would not go down this road with the United States.

Copy on Vietnam (Main file) Part 16.

The Prime Minister said that as regards Vietnam our own approach to the problem was admittedly rather different from that of the French Government. But we were entirely in agreement with them about the extent to which it was progressively poisoning international relations; and from the outset he himself had stressed the three main reasons for bringing the conflict to an end - namely, the horrible character of the war itself; the risk that it would escalate into a world-wide conflict; and the manner in which it was preventing any easing of the tension between the United States and the Soviet Union, which was essential in terms both of Europe and of the world as a whole.

He also endorsed President de Gaulle's remarks about the current position as between China and the Soviet Union. We must recognise the dynamic of the competitive situation which was now developing between the Soviet Union and China - not only in the Far East and the Middle East but also in Africa, where both Britain and France had many shared links and connections, which were all the stronger now that we had both put "colonialism" behind us. The relationship between the Soviet Union and China was now a critical factor in the international situation; and it would be foolish to try to exploit the tension between them. Both Britain and France had good relations with the Soviet Union; but neither country should seek to bring the Soviet Government more over to the side of the West by capitalising her differences with China. Many so-called "experts" in Russian affairs believed - quite wrongly - that the dissension between the Soviet Union and China would gradually drive the Russians into the Western camp. In fact, it merely made the situation more difficult for the Soviet Government; and we must appreciate their difficulty and take it fully into account in forming our own policies.

The President was right in saying that the British Government differed from the French Government in so far as they supported the United States in Vietnam. But what we were trying to do was simply to bring all the parties to the conference table. It had been our declared policy for the last two years that the United States bombing should cease, that the infiltration from North Vietnam to South Vietnam should aiso cease and that all the parties to the dispute should present themselves at the conference table. This was what we had consistently worked for; and President Johnson's Baltimore speech in April, 1965, had been a useful response to the influence we had been exerting. It was not true that we had automatically endorsed every action by the United States in Vietnam. A year ago we had dissociated ourselves from the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong; and more recently we had said that we would oppose any further escalation of the war. As lately as the previous February we had made the most strenuous efforts with Mr. Kosygin, during his visit to the United Kingdom, to bring about a conference during the Tet truce. That chance had been lost - most unfortunately, since it was the first time that the Soviet Union had really shown some concern to bring the parties together. No blame for this could be imputed to the United States, since there had never been the slightest sign that Hanoi would respond to their overtures. On the other hand, the Prime Minister had made clear to the House of Commons that he regretted we had not had more time at our disposal at a moment when a settlement might have been possible. Hanoi was

the real enigma. There were many questions which could be asked in this connection. For example, what was the relative influence of the Soviet Union and China in Hanoi? In which direction had this balance inclined in February? Was it true that, because the Chinese Government had been preoccupied with the problem of civil disorder at that moment, some sort of break-through might have been achieved? Had the situation deteriorated still further since February? If so, was this because China was now more assertive or simply because nothing had come of all our efforts for peace? To all these questions there was still no answer. At one point, about two years before, the Soviet Government had said that, if the United States would leave Vietnam, there was a good prospect of a final settlement. Thereupon, President Johnson had said publicly that the United States would leave in six months, once a just and honourable peace had been achieved. He had repeated to the Prime Minister only three weeks before that this was still his policy - that he would stop the bombing in return for a similar measure of de-escalation on the other side and that thereafter, when an honourable peace had been established, the United States would leave Vietnam within six months. All that was now needed was a sign from Hanoi. For our part we had no troops in Vietnam; nor were we sending arms for use in Vietnam; despite the fact that the Soviet Union, the other co-chairman of the Geneva Conference, was doing so.

The President was also right in claiming that the Vietnam situation was still poisoning international relations. But, although our approach to the problem was somewhat different from that of the French Government, we shared the same objective of policy and endorsed the French view that the problem should be resolved by the Vietnamese themselves as soon as the conditions which he had just described had been brought about. Moreover, we, like the French, felt that the ultimate solution must lie in a neutralisation of a large part of the area. Only in this way would the deterioration in the international situation which was resulting from the war in Vietnam be arrested. Otherwise, the only outcome would be a direct confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union; and that was the last thing that we wanted. Britain and France could hope to exert some influence in this situation, not because they had any great military power in the area but because they could both bring to bear on the problem considerable wisdom and experience which might enable them to make constructive proposals for a solution.

As regards the Middle East we intended to withdraw from Aden which would obtain its independence in a few months, despite the fact that King Faisal of Saudi Arabia had pressed us - admittedly before the Arab/Israel war had broken out - to accept a long-term commitment to provide military support for the successor regime. Similarly, in the Far East, we were thinking in terms of reducing our military presence very substantially, despite the opposition of the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore. These measures

were clear evidence of our conviction that our own position at a conference table was based no longer on military strength but on the accumulated experience which we could contribute to international discussions on a non-involvement in partisan conflicts which France, too, could claim.

President de Gaulle said that the Government of North Vietnam, especially Ho Chi Minh himself, would not yield. The future of their whole country was at stake; and, so long as the war continued at the present tempo, they could go on fighting indefinitely. They would only negotiate if the United States agreed to stop the bombing and to leave Vietnam within a specified period (perhaps two years) without any conditions. Then, but only then, the North Vietnamese would be ready to negotiate. Otherwise, there was no hope. It was impossible for the North Vietnamese to negotiate at present. The manner in which their country was being treated made it inevitable that they should regard any negotiation as no better than surrender; and, in any event, China would never agree that they should go to the conference table. It was clear, however, that the United States were not ready to stop the bombing or to leave Vietnam. Therefore, the war would go on, even if the United States put yet more troops into Vietnam. The situation was the greatest absurdity of the 20th century; and he could see no solution to the problem.

As regards the Middle East, the French Government had noted the British intention to withdraw from Aden; and as friends of Britain they welcomed this because they believed it would be to the advantage of the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, it was necessary to recognise that the real reason why the United Kingdom were involved in the Middle East at all was to be found in their basic relationship with the United States. All the United Kingdom's difficulties with the Arabs in the area - whether on oil or on the Canal - would not be eased by their withdrawal from Aden, simply because the Arab countries were now hostile to the United States as a result of American support for Israel and this hostility "rubbed off" on the United Kingdom by reason of the fundamental British link with Washington.

Similarly, as regards the Far East, the French Government understood and respected the commitments which the United Kingdom had in relation to Hong Kong and Singapore. But, here again, as soon as international tension developed and the United Kingdom were compelled to take one side or the other, they always chose the same side. To the French Government this was inexplicable, since it brought no benefit to the United Kingdom at all. The only realistic solution for Britain, as for France, was to have no external commitments. The United Kingdom, however, might not agree; if so, that would not affect France's friendship for her.

The Prime Minister replied that he did not fully understand the argument as regards the Middle East, at least in so far as the President seemed to be thinking in terms of rivalry or competition for oil concessions. Oil was not really a problem - the producing countries had to continue to sell it by one means or another. What was clear was that we could no longer ensure the supply of oil by purely military means - this had been proved by the Suez episode in 1956, when the only result of military intervention had been to stop the flow of oil! It was for this reason that we were gradually withdrawing our military presence from the Middle East - in an orderly way but as rapidly as we could.

Copy in Far East (Gen) (Defence) Part 5.

Hong Kong was a different case. It was in no sense a major base from which we controlled a great area. It was simply a kind of police outpost, where our presence happened to suit the Chinese commercially and we were also able to play a useful part in maintaining local order - not only in relation to the Communists in Hong Kong but also in relation to the supporters of Taiwan in the Colony. If the tension between these two parties ever flared up on a major scale, it could escalate in a very formidable way - perhaps even on the scale of a direct confrontation between the United States and China. There was nobody but ourselves to keep this situation under some sort of control. We managed to achieve this without having to sustain a major military effort; but there was no doubt about the value of our presence there. The last time there had been a really serious clash in Hong Kong (provoked by the Taiwan faction) about 60,000 dwellings had been destroyed in two days!

Singapore, on the other hand, was a major base and a clear symbol of a much wider relationship within the area as a whole. But there, too, we were already reducing our troops very rapidly - nearly 30,000 would have come home by next April. But, given the extent to which local employment was dependent upon the dockyard, running down the base in Singapore would create very serious economic problems for the local government. The situation would be like that which we had confronted in Malta earlier in the year, when we had been under heavy pressure to slow down the planned pace of our withdrawal. We should have to make every effort to find alternative employment in Singapore, e.g. by turning the dockyard over to civil use.

Since the Labour Government came into office in October, 1964, they had been almost continuously examining and reducing British military expenditure overseas. Very large economies had already been achieved; and we hoped to announce further savings in a few weeks' time. Apart from Hong Kong, the only countries in the Far East where we still maintained troops on a large scale were Malaysia and Singapore. Both these Governments, to say nothing of Australia, New Zealand and the United States, were vigorously opposing our planned withdrawals. But we were continuing to scrutinise our commitments and engagements in South East Asia, together with the related military deployments; and, whatever our final decision, we should do our best to ensure that the process of withdrawal would be conducted in an orderly way and would not create more problems than it would solve. The President would have no difficulty in imagining the pressures to which we were being subjected by the various interests which would be affected by our withdrawal. Nevertheless we were determined to take our own decision in this matter - a decision based on our assessment of the economic realities of our position and of our proper role in the world of the '70s.

President de Gaulle thanked the Prime Minister for his very clear exposition of United Kingdom policies and decisions in the Middle East and the Far East. The French Government understood very well the importance which the British Government attached to contracting their effort and expenditure overseas. But as regards the critical issue of the growing tension between the United States and the Soviet Union - both in the Middle East and in the Far East, where the situation had now been aggravated by the explosion of the Chinese thermo nuclear weapon -

the French Government did not yet see clearly where the United Kingdom's real sympathies lay. Even if Britain would not make up her mind now, she would be compelled, sooner or later, to choose between staying with the United States - and therefore siding with them in their quarrels - or leaving them. The French Government guessed that Britain had not yet decided, for reasons which they fully respected. The French Government themselves, however, had taken their decision. In both the Middle East and the Far East they had disengaged. United States disputes were not their disputes; and if these led the United States into wars, those too would not be France's wars. France had done this not from any hostility towards the United States but because she realised that, now that the United States were the greatest power in the world, they would behave as France and Britain themselves had behaved when they had occupied this position - i.e. they would consider only themselves and their own interests. For a country like France - and perhaps the United Kingdom? - this inevitably posed the basic question, whether to go on down the same road as the United States or not.

The Prime Minister said that the President's analysis failed to take account of the extent to which British policy enabled us to exert influence on the United States. The United Kingdom was not a satellite of the United States. Nor did the United States expect us to be. In many cases we pursued quite different policies and had different quarrels - in which they did not always support us. On the other hand, we could still exert a significant influence over them.

Moreover, in his view it was an over-simplification to draw a distinction between France and Britain simply in terms of their being willing or unwilling to be involved in a war. If ever a thermo nuclear war broke out, every country in the world would suffer. We had the duty to work for a reduction in tension and a de-escalation of the war. And British views and influence were of real value at a time when President Johnson was under constant pressure to escalate the conflict.

But the President was right in emphasising that the situation had been complicated by the Chinese explosion of a thermo nuclear weapon. This did not mean that China was, as yet, a major thermo nuclear power. But it underlined the importance of progressing as rapidly as possible towards an effective non-proliferation agreement. Otherwise, the Government of India might not be able to resist the pressure to develop an Indian nuclear capability. Both Britain and France might help in this connection if they would involve themselves more directly in the problem; and, even though we understood why the French Government were not prepared to sign a non-proliferation treaty, both countries should do all they could to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The same was true of the Middle East, in so far as the rising tension in that area, if it continued unchecked, might well lead Israel and, perhaps, Egypt to develop a nuclear capability. And this could lead eventually to the outbreak of a nuclear war, for which neither Britain nor France would carry any responsibility. This was an additional reason for seeking to reduce the tension in the Middle East

as rapidly as possible. It also underlined the historic importance of the President's proposal for an intervention by the four Powers, even though it was not easy at the moment to see how any move of this kind could be made in the circumstances which would certainly prevail in the United Nations during the forthcoming week. Probably, the parties to the dispute would have to be allowed to get some of the bitterness out of their systems by making inflamatory speeches before any real progress could be made.

At this point the meeting adjourned at 1 p.m. for luncheon.

After luncheon there was a further discussion for about half an hour on the possibility of a four Power Summit. During this discussion the Prime Minister said that he was not disposed to go to the United Nations unless President de Gaulle went also.

The President replied that he could see no point in going. Mr. Kosygin had told him that he did not intend to visit President Johnson in Washington: and he doubted if President Johnson would be willing to go to New York. No-one could predict how the situation would develop; but, despite Mr. Kosygin's inevitable need to strike attitudes in New York, he had received from him an almost physical impression of uncertainty and indecision. He was pretty sure that, if he saw President Johnson, he would receive exactly the same impression. In short, no-one was now really in charge of the situation; and it was only when the lessons of the disastrous conflict between Israel and the Arabs had really sunk in that it would be possible - always assuming that general war had not broken out in the interval - to approach the question of a settlement in rational terms. And this would take a very long time.

The Prime Minister observed that the Foreign Secretary's speech on the previous Saturday had made it clear that we should not favour a settlement which allowed either side to make territorial gains as a result of the war.

President de Gaulle replied that, even so, it was inconceivable that Israel would now give up what she had won - except under the pressure of full-scale war.

The Prime Minister said that this was a negative view of the situation. A more positive approach would be to work for a sclution whereby all Arab States would recognise Israel's right to exist and her right to enjoy freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran - while at the same time the Arabs would receive satisfaction of their claims as regards the settlement of the refugees.

President de Gaulle replied that this might be so; but any such settlement lay a long way ahead.

The Prime Minister said that time would not necessarily wait as long as that. Inflamed passions must first be given an opportunity to exhaust themselves; and this would admittedly take a little time. Even so, the great Powers should already be pleading the cause of sanity and calm reason; and the Foreign Secretary's speech at the United Nations would be couched in these terms. This posture would not be very acceptable to those who were pro-Arab by temperament; it was only a month ago that we had been bending all our efforts to improve our relations with the Arabs. Now, however, we must try to hold the balance evenly between the conflicting parties. Above all, we must not allow ourselves to be swept along by events. Where would France be today if the President had allowed his actions to be determined by events in June, 1940? It might not yet be the moment to take a firm stand. But that point must come. Otherwise, the United States and the Soviet Union would be in a position to dictate to the rest of the world - both as regards the settlement in the present instance and as regards other international problems in the future. This would be unacceptable; and Britain and France, therefore, must not abdicate their right to influence events, however bleak the outlook might be. At the right moment, neither too soon nor too late - they must speak up and play a decisive part, before events got out of hand and ran headlong downhill.

CYPHER/CAT A

FLASH FOREIGN OFFICE TO PARIS

TELNO. 2040 19 JUNE 1967 (E.)

CONFIDENTIAL

MY TELEGRAM NO 2031.

FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY TO PRIME MINISTER.

THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION 19 JUNE (SUMMARY OF F.O.TELEGRAMS AT 1800 BST).

UNITED NATIONS.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL MEETS TODAY TO RENEW THE MANDATE OF THE U.N. FORCE IN CYPRUS. IT IS NOT EXPECTED TO CONSIDER ANY ASPECT OF THE MIDDLE EAST QUESTION.

2. THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY MET AT 3.30 P.M. (B.S.T.) TO START ITS DEBATE ON THE MIDDLE EAST. MR KOSYGIN SPOKE FIRST, FOLLOWED BY MR. GOLDBERG.

3. MR RUSK HAS TOLD H.M. AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON THAT HE WILL BE IN NEW YORK ON TUESDAY MORNING FOR A FEW DAYS. HE WILL NOT SPEAK IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. MR. RUSK ALSO SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD NOT BE GOING TO NEW YORK AND THAT THERE WAS NO SCHEDULE FOR A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND KOSYGIN.

LIBYA.

4. H.M. AMBASSADOR HAS BEEN TOLD BY SADIQ MUNTASSIR THAT THE KING HAD CONSIDERED ABDICATION LAST WEEK, AS IS HIS CUSTOM WHEN UNDER STRESS.

5. THE KING HAS DONATED £4 MILLION TO SYRIA, £6 MILLION TO JORDAN AND £10 MILLION TO UAR.

6. A TUNISIAN DELEGATION HAS ARRIVED IN LIBYA BEARING A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA TO THE KING.

SUEZ CANAL.

7. THE EVACUATION OF PASSENGERS FROM THE FOUR BRITISH SHIPS STRANDED IN THE GREAT BITTER LAKE CONTINUES. THE FIRST PARTY IS

/EXPECTED

EXPECTED TO ARRIVE IN LONDON BY THIS AFTERNOON.
OIL
8. BRITISH AND U.S. FLAG TANKERS ARE LOADING WITHOUT DIFFICULTY AT BAHRAIN, KUWAIT OIL EXPORTS, LIMITED ONLY BY TANKER AVAILABILITY ARE RUNNING AT 1.1 MILLION BARRELS A DAY.

SOSFA SENT 1747Z/19 JUNE

FO/CO/WH/DISTRIBUTION
EASTERN DEPT.

PPPPP

Extract from a record of a conversation between the Prime Minister and the President of France at the Grand Trianon, Versailles, on Monday, 19th June, 1967 at 4.00 p.m.

SECRET

The Middle East

President de Gaulle said that he had just received some agency reports of the speech made that day by President Johnson. Naturally the American President spoke as if everything depended on him and on him alone; basically he seemed to reject the view that Israel had been responsible for the conflict and laid the blame on those who had suspended freedom of passage through the Gulf of Aqaba. This was tantamount to holding the UAR responsible, even if President Johnson did not say so explicitly. President Johnson said that he was ready to work for a general agreement but he spoke only in terms of the United States.

The Prime Minister said that it was not very profitable to analyse the responsibility for the outbreak of war. The situation of conflict was constantly present and could flare up again from either side at any time.

Conclusion

The Prime Minister expressed his gratitude to President de Gaulle for the time he had devoted to their talks. They had discussed world affairs in the widest sense and without seeking to burke any of the issues. He wondered whether it might be useful, if the President agreed, for them to meet again briefly the following morning to review any overnight developments.

President de Gaulle said he would be glad to do this. In sum, the period where the ambitions of Britain and those of France were opposed to each other was now over. The only question in his mind was to establish whether the respective positions of the two countries were now becoming sufficiently close to enable us to concert our policies on the great questions confronting us in Asia, the Middle East and Europe. He believed that Britain and France were less far apart than they had been and certainly much closer than ten years previously. But they were not yet the same. All the questions he and the Prime Minister had discussed came back to that point. Britain was evolving - a process which France had perhaps already completed or might still be completing. This process did not in his view take the two countries in different directions; but it was not yet leading them in the same direction. This was the conclusion he drew from their talks. And he believed that the talks had been of great importance. This conclusion was both encouraging to France but also led her to remain still very cautious. He hoped the Prime Minister would forgive him for speaking with such frankness but he wished to disclose his thinking completely. At the same time, he believed more than ever before that it was in their common interest that he and the Prime Minister should remain in as close and direct a personal contact as possible.

The Prime Minister said he would welcome this. He could agree with much of the President's assessment. But his conclusion was that the need was less for caution than for moving ahead rapidly together. He certainly agreed that they should keep in close personal touch. This could be done through the diplomatic channel: both Britain and France were excellently represented in their respective capitals. But he hoped they could exchange personal messages at more regular intervals,

especially on the issues they had been discussing. They could start from a basic position of complete understanding of each other's attitude; and it would be especially valuable to keep in the closest touch over the Middle Eastern problem. He thought that they were both agreed that nothing particularly useful could result from either of them going to New York at that juncture; their representatives there could deal satisfactorily with the debate. But if the proceedings in New York looked like moving to a polarisation of attitudes then, at the right moment, they might, either separately though acting in harmony, or preferably acting together, be able to make a decisive intervention. They should keep in touch on the timing of this. Naturally he was not saying that he would not in any circumstances go himself to New York if the President did not do so, nor would he expect a similar undertaking from the President. But if circumstances changed it might be that they should both go. They should therefore keep in touch both in London and Paris and at the United Nations with the purpose so far as possible of depolarising the situation.

Attitude towards the Press

The Prime Minister and the President had a brief exchange about the extent of the guidance to be given to the Press.

The meeting ended at 6.45 p.m.

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F L A S H WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2Ø91

TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE

19 JUNE 1967

ADDRESSED TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 2Ø91 OF 19 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION FLASH TO UKMIS NEW YORK AND PRIORITY TO MOSCOW PARIS AND TEL AVIV AND SAVING TO AMMAN.

M.I.P.T.: PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S SPEECH: MIDDLE EAST.

AND NOW FINALLY LET ME TURN TO THE MIDDLE EAST AND TO THE TUMULTOUS EVENTS OF THE PAST MONTH. THOSE EVENTS HAVE PROVED THE WISDOM OF FIVE GREAT PRINCIPLES OF PEACE IN THE REGION. THE FIRST AND THE GREATEST PRINCIPLE IS THAT EVERY NATION IN THE AREA HAS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO LIVE AND TO HAVE THIS RIGHT RESPECTED BY ITS NEIGHBOURS. FOR THE PEOPLE OF THE MIDDLE EAST THE PATH TO HOPE DOES NOT LIE IN THREATS TO END THE LIFE OF ANY NATION. SUCH THREATS HAVE BECOME A BURDEN TO THE PEACE, NOT ONLY OF THAT REGION BUT A BURDEN TO THE PEACE OF THE ENTIRE WORLD. IN THE SAME WAY NO NATION WOULD BE TRUE TO THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER OR TO ITS OWN TRUE INTERESTS IF IT SHOULD PERMIT MILITARY SUCCESS TO BLIND IT TO THE FACT THAT ITS NEIGHBOURS HAVE RIGHTS AND ITS NEIGHBOURS HAVE INTERESTS OF THEIR OWN. EACH NATION THEREFORE MUST ACCEPT THE RIGHT OF OTHERS TO LIFE.

2. SECOND THIS LAST MONTH I THINK SHOWS US ANOTHER BASIC REQUIREMENT FOR SETTLEMENT. IT IS A HUMAN REQUIREMENT - JUSTICE FOR THE REFUGEES. A NEW CONFLICT HAS BROUGHT NEW HOMLESSNESS. THE NATIONS OF THE MIDDLE EAST MUST AT LAST ADDRESS THEMSELVES TO THE PLIGHT OF THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN DISPLACED BY WARS. IN THE PAST BOTH SIDES HAVE RESISTED THE BEST EFFORTS OF OUTSIDE MEDIATORS TO RESTORE THE VICTIMS OF CONFLICT TO THEIR HOMES OR TO FIND THEM OTHER PROPER PLACES TO LIVE AND WORK. THERE WILL BE NO PEACE, THOUGH, FOR ANY PARTY IN THE MIDDLE EAST UNLESS THIS PROBLEM IS ATTACKED WITH NEW ENERGY BY ALL AND CERTAINLY PRIMARILY BY THOSE THAT ARE IMMEDIATELY CONCERNED.

3. A THIRD LESSON FROM THIS LAST MONTH IS THAT MARITIME RIGHTS MUST BE RESPECTED. OUR NATION HAS LONG BEEN COMMITTED TO FREE MARITIME PASSAGE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS AND WE ALONG WITH OTHER NATIONS WERE TAKING THE NECESSARY STEPS TO IMPLEMENT THIS PRINCIPLE WHEN HOSTILITIES EXPLODED. IF A SINGLE ACT OF FOLLY WAS MORE RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS EXPLOSION THAN ANY OTHER, I THINK IT WAS

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THE ARBITRARY AND THE DANGEROUS ANNOUNCED DECISION THAT THE STRAITS OF TIRAN WOULD BE CLOSED. THE RIGHT OF INNOCENT MARITIME PASSAGE MUST BE PRESERVED FOR ALL NATIONS.

4. AND FOURTH THIS LAST CONFLICT HAS DEMONSTRATED THE DANGER OF THE MIDDLE EASTERN ARMS RACE OF THE LAST TWELVE YEARS. HERE THE RESPONSIBILITY MUST REST NOT ONLY ON THOSE IN THE AREA BUT ON THE LARGER STATES OUTSIDE THE AREA. WE BELIEVE THAT SCARCE RESOURCES COULD BE USED MUCH BETTER FOR TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. WE HAVE ALWAYS OPPOSED THIS ARMS RACE AND OUR MILITARY SHIPMENTS TO THE AREA HAVE CONSEQUENTLY BEEN SEVERELY LIMITED. NOW THE WASTE AND THE FUTILITY OF THE ARMS RACE MUST BE APPARENT TO ALL THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD AND NOW THERE IS ANOTHER MOMENT OF CHOICE. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FOR ITS PART WILL USE EVERY RESOURCE OF DIPLOMACY AND EVERY COUNCIL OF REASON AND PRUDENCE TO TRY TO FIND A BETTER COURSE.

5. AS A BEGINNING I SHOULD LIKE TO PROPOSE THAT THE UNITED NATIONS IMMEDIATELY CALL UPON ALL OF ITS MEMBERS TO REPORT ALL SHIPMENTS OF ALL MILITARY ARMS INTO THIS AREA AND TO KEEP THOSE SHIPMENTS ON PAR FOR ALL THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD TO OBSERVE. THIS, THE CRISIS, UNDERLINES THE IMPORTANCE OF RESPECT FOR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ALL THE STATES OF THE AREA. WE REAFFIRMED THAT PRINCIPLE AT THE HEIGHT OF THIS CRISIS. WE REAFFIRM IT AGAIN TODAY ON BEHALF OF ALL. THIS PRINCIPLE CAN BE EFFECTIVE IN THE MIDDLE EAST ONLY ON THE BASIS OF PEACE BETWEEN THE PARTIES. THE NATIONS OF THE REGION HAVE HAD ONLY FRAGILE AND VIOLATED TRUCE LINES FOR TWENTY YEARS. WHAT THEY NOW NEED ARE RECOGNISED BOUNDARIES AND OTHER ARRANGEMENTS THAT WILL GIVE THEM SECURITY AGAINST TERROR AND DESTRUCTION IN WAR. FURTHER THERE JUST MUST BE ADEQUATE RECOGNITION OF THE SPECIAL INTERESTS OF THREE GREAT RELIGIONS IN THE HOLY PLACES OF JERUSALEM.

6. THESE FIVE PRINCIPLES ARE NOT NEW BUT WE DO THINK THEY ARE FUNDAMENTAL. TAKEN TOGETHER THEY POINT THE WAY FROM UNCERTAIN ARMISTICE TO DURABLE PEACE. WE BELIVE THERE MUST BE PROGRESS TO ALL OF THEM IF THERE IS TO BE PROGRESS TOWARD ANY. THERE ARE SOME WHO HAVE URGED THAT AS A SINGLE SIMPLE SOLUTION, AND IMMEDIATE RETURN TO

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THE SITUATION AS IT WAS ON JUNE 4. AS OUR DISTINGUISHED AND ABLE AMBASSADOR, MR ARTHUR GOLDBERG, HAS ALREADY SAID, THIS IS NOT A PRESCRIPTION FOR PEACE, BUT FOR RENEWED HOSTILITIES. SO CERTAINLY TROOPS MUST BE WITHDRAWN, BUT THERE MUST ALSO BE RECOGNIZED RIGHTS OF NATIONAL LIFE - PROGRESS IN SOLVING THE REFUGEE PROBLEM - FREEDOM OF INNOCENT MARITIME PASSAGE - LIMITATION OF THE ARMS RACE - AND RESPECT FOR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY.

7. BUT WHO WILL MAKE THIS PEACE WHERE ALL OTHERS HAVE FAILED FOR TWENTY YEARS OR MORE? CLEARLY THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT MUST BE THE PARTIES TO THE PEACE. SOONER OR LATER IT IS THEY, WHO MUST MAKE A SETTLEMENT IN THE AREA. IT IS HARD TO SEE HOW IT IS POSSIBLE FOR NATIONS TO LIVE TOGETHER IN PEACE IF THEY CANNOT LEARN TO REASON TOGETHER. BUT WE MUST STILL ASK, WHO CAN HELP THEM? SOME SAY IT SHOULD BE THE U.N. SOME CALL FOR THE USE OF OTHER PARTIES. WE HAVE BEEN FIRST IN OUR SUPPORT OF EFFECTIVE PEACE-KEEPING IN THE U.N., AND WE ALSO RECOGNISE THE REAL VALUES TO COME FROM MEDIATION.

8. WE ARE READY THIS MORNING TO SEE ANY METHOD TRIED, AND WE BELIEVE THAT NONE SHOULD BE EXCLUDED ALTOGETHER. PERHAPS ALL OF THEM WILL BE USEFUL AND ALL OF THEM WILL BE NEEDED. SO I ISSUE AN APPEAL TO ALL TO ADOPT NO RIGID VIEW ON THESE MATTERS. I OFFER ASSURANCE TO ALL THAT THIS GOVERNMENT OF OURS, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES WILL DO ITS PART FOR PEACE IN EVERY FORUM , AT EVERY LEVEL, AT EVERY HOUR.

9. YET THERE IS NO ESCAPE FROM THE FACT THAT THE MAIN RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PEACE OF THE REGION DEPENDS UPON ITS OWN PEOPLES AND ITS OWN LEADERS OF THAT REGION. WHAT WILL BE TRULY DECISIVE IN THE MIDDLE EAST WILL BE WHAT IS SAID AND WHAT IS DONE BY THOSE WHO LIVE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THEY CAN SEEK ANOTHER ARMS RACE IF THEY HAVE NOT PROFITED FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF THIS ONE IF THEY WANT TO. BUT THEY WILL SEEK IT AT A TERRIBLE COST TO THEIR OWN PEOPLE - AND TO THEIR VERY LONG-NEGLECTED HUMAN NEEDS. THEY CAN LIVE ON A DIET OF HATE - THOUGH ONLY AT THE COST OF HATRED IN RETURN. OR THEY CAN MOVE TOWARD PEACE WITH ONE ANOTHER.

/10. THE

10. THE WORLD THIS MORNING IS WATCHING, WATCHING, FOR THE PEACE OF THE WORLD BECAUSE THAT IS REALLY WHAT IS AT STAKE. IT WILL LOOK FOR PATIENCE AND JUSTICE - IT WILL LOOK FOR HUMILITY- AND MORAL COURACE. IT WILL LOOK FOR SIGNS OF MOVEMENT FROM PREJUDICE AND THE EMOTIONAL CHAOS OF CONFLICT - TO THE GRADUAL, SLOW SHAPING OF STEPS THAT LEAD TO LEARNING TO LIVE TOGETHER AND LEARNING TO HELP MOULD AND SHAPE PEACE IN THE AREA AND IN THE WORLD.

11. THE MIDDLE EAST IS RICH IN HISTORY, RICH IN ITS PEOPLE, AND IN ITS RESOURCES. IT HAS NO NEED TO LIVE IN PERMANENT CIVIL WAR. IT HAS THE POWER TO BUILD ITS OWN LIFE, AS ONE OF THE PROSPEROUS REGIONS OF THE WORLD IN WHICH WE LIVE. AND IF THE NATIONS OF THE MIDDLE EAST WILL TURN TOWARD THE WORKS OF PEACE, THEY CAN COUNT WITH CONFIDENCE UPON THE FRIENDSHIP, AND THE HELP OF ALL THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. IN A CLIMATE OF PEACE, WE HERE WILL DO OUR FULL SHARE TO HELP WITH A SOLUTION FOR THE REFUGEES. WE HERE WILL DO OUR FULL SHARE IN SUPPORT OF REGIONAL COOPERATION. WE HERE WILL DO OUR SHARE AND DO MORE, TO SEE THAT THE PEACEFUL PROMISE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY IS APPLIED TO THE CRITICAL PROBLEMS OF DESALTING WATER AND HELPING TO MAKE THE DESERT BLOOM.

12. OUR COUNTRY IS COMMITTED - AND WE HERE REITERATE THAT COMMITMENT TODAY - TO A PEACE THAT IS BASED ON FIVE PRINCIPLES:

— FIRST, THE RECOGNISED RIGHT OF NATIONAL LIFE,

—SECOND, JUSTICE FOR THE REFUGEES,

—THIRD, INNOCENT MARITIME PASSAGE,

—FOURTH, LIMITS ON THE WASTEFUL AND DESTRUCTIVE ARMS RACE,

—AND FIFTH, POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY FOR ALL.

/13. THIS

13. THIS IS A TIME NOT FOR MALICE, BUT FOR MAGNANIMITY: NOT FOR PROPAGANDA, BUT FOR PATIENCE: NOT FOR VITUPERATION, BUT FOR VISION. ON THE BASIS OF PEACE, WE OFFER OUR HELP TO THE PEOPLE OF THE MIDDLE EAST. THAT LAND, KNOWN TO EVERYONE OF US SINCE CHILDHOOD AS THE BIRTHPLACE OF GREAT RELIGIONS AND LEARNING, CAN FLOURISH ONCE AGAIN IN OUR TIME. AND WE HERE IN THE UNITED STATES SHALL DO ALL IN OUR POWER TO HELP MAKE IT SO.

F O PASS PRIORITY MOSCOW 148 PARIS 179 TEL AVIV 51 AND SAVING AMMAN 9.

SIR P DEAN

SENT AT 1643Z/19 JUNE
RECD AT 1643Z/19 JUNE

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW AND TEL AVIV REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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EASTERN DEPT.

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AT

SECRET

COPY NO. 42

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELNO 2104 19 JUNE, 1967

SECRET.
ADDRESSED TO UK MISSION NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 282 OF 19 JUNE
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO FOREIGN OFFICE, MOSCOW.
MIDDLE EAST.
FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY ON ARRIVAL.

MEMBERS OF MY STAFF AND I HAVE, DURING THE WEEKEND AND TODAY, BEEN TRYING TO FIND OUT AS MUCH AS WE CAN ABOUT THE U.S. ATTITUDE TO AND PLANS FOR THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATE. THIS HAS NOT BEEN EASY SINCE, AS I REPORTED EARLIER, THERE HAS BEEN GREAT UNCERTAINTY IN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ABOUT THE LINE TO TAKE AND EVERYBODY FROM RUSK DOWNWARDS HAS EITHER BEEN CLOSETTED WITH THE PRESIDENT OUTSIDE WASHINGTON OR DRAFTING PASSAGES FOR HIS SPEECH. EVEN MORE THAN USUALLY MIDDLE EAST POLICY IS BEING FORMED IN THE WHITE HOUSE: VERY FEW PEOPLE KNOW WHAT IT IS AT ANY ONE TIME AND IT CHANGES CONTINUALLY. I HAVE, HOWEVER, SEEN HELMS (CIA), CHESTER COOPER AND, MOST RECENTLY, MCGEORGE BUNDY ALL AND PARTICULARLY THE LAST OF WHOM ARE WELL IN: WE HAVE ALSO CONTACTED OTHER OFFICIALS.

2. I SEND THESE RATHER SCRAPPY RESULTS IN THE HOPE THAT THEY MAY BE OF SOME ASSISTANCE TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN TAKING THE TEMPERATURE AND IN ANY DISCUSSIONS HE MAY HAVE WITH RUSK OR OTHER FOREIGN MINISTERS, BEFORE HE MAKES HIS SPEECH.

3. ATTITUDE OF AND CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION:

THERE HAVE BEEN NO QUOTE HOT LINE UNQUOTE CONTACTS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND KOSYGIN SINCE THE FIGHTING STOPPED. LLEWELLYN THOMPSON SAW DOBRYNIN ON 15 JUNE AND DREW HIS ATTENTION TO THE STATEMENT INDICATING THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS WILLING TO MEET KOSYGIN. DOBRYNIN SAID HE HAD NO INFORMATION ABOUT KOSYGIN'S PLANS AND DID NOT KNOW WHETHER HE WOULD BE ABLE TO QUOTE FIT IN UNQUOTE A MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT. DOBRYNIN WAS EQUALLY RESERVED IN HIS TALK WITH RUSK ON 16 JUNE. HE DID HOWEVER ADMIT TO THOMPSON AND RUSK THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD SERIOUSLY OVER-ESTIMATED THE CAPABILITIES OF THE UAR AND UNDER-ESTIMATED THOSE OF ISRAEL. (CIA CONFIRM THIS). SINCE THE MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN, THE AMERICANS HAVE BEEN WAITING FOR A SIGNAL FROM THE RUSSIANS IN NEW YORK. (THE CIA THINK THAT THE PRESENT SOVIET AIM IS SIMPLY TO MINIMISE THEIR LOSSES, WHILE THEY

/.....MAY WANT

MAY WANT TO IMPROVE THEIR POLITICAL STANDING HERE AND THERE, E.G. SYRIA, THEY ARE NOT AIMING AT ESTABLISHING ANY KIND OF POLITICAL HEGEMONY). THOMPSON WHO IS NOW IN NEW YORK HAS BEEN ASKED TO STAY IN THE U.S. UNTIL THE END OF THIS WEEK.

4. THE RECORDS OF THE DOBRYNIN/RUSK/THOMPSON CONVERSATIONS ARE NOT COMPREHENSIVE AND OTHER MORE SENSITIVE SUBJECTS MAY HAVE BEEN LEFT OUT. ON VIETNAM, DOBRYNIN HAD NOT (NOT) BEEN OBNOXIOUS AND HAD SAID THAT QUOTE VIETNAM IS OUR GREATEST PROBLEM UNQUOTE, BUT IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER QUOTE OUR UNQUOTE MEANT THE RUSSIANS OR THE RUSSIANS AND THE AMERICANS JOINTLY. (SEE ALSO PARAGRAPH 8 BELOW).

5. I HAVE TRIED TO FIND OUT WHAT THE RUSSIANS AND AMERICANS MAY HAVE SAID TO EACH OTHER IN THE PAST TWO WEEKS OVER THE QUOTE HOT LINE UNQUOTE AND WHAT EFFECT THIS MAY HAVE HAD ON SOVIET ACTIONS (F.O. TELEGRAM NO. 6842 - NOT TO ALL). THE ANSWER ALMOST CERTAINLY IS THAT THE QUOTE HOT LINE UNQUOTE WAS VERY LITTLE USED EVEN DURING THE FIGHTING (EXCEPT WHEN THE PRESIDENT GOT ON TO KOSYGIN ABOUT U.S. AIRCRAFT TAKING OFF WHEN THE U.S. SIGNALS SHIP WAS ATTACKED). MCGEORGE BUNDY, WHO IS PROBABLY IN THE BEST POSITION TO KNOW, TOLD ME TODAY THAT NOTHING WAS SAID ON EITHER SIDE ON THE QUOTE HOT LINE UNQUOTE WHICH WAS AT ALL OUT OF THE USUAL AND WHICH COULD NOT EQUALLY WELL HAVE BEEN SAID BETWEEN RUSK AND GROMYKO. THE PRESIDENT SEEMS TO HAVE PUT VERY LITTLE PRESSURE ON THE RUSSIANS DURING THE FIGHTING AND THE RUSSIANS SHOWED HARDLY ANY RESPONSE, EXCEPT JUST AT THE END WHEN THEY INDICATED THAT THEY MIGHT BE ABLE TO INFLUENCE THE SYRIANS TO STOP FIGHTING NEAR DAMASCUS.

6. GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATE:

ACCORDING TO THE AMERICANS, THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH HAD BEEN DELIBERATELY MILD AND STATESMANLIKE IN ORDER TO CONTRAST WITH KOSYGIN'S EXPECTED ROUGH LINE: HE HAD INDEED BEEN VERY ROUGH. I ASKED MCGEORGE BUNDY WHETHER HE HAD ANY PERSONAL IDEAS WHICH HE THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL FOR ME TO PASS ON TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR CONSIDERATION FOR HIS SPEECH. BUNDY SAID THAT, SPEAKING PURELY PERSONALLY, HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO CONTINUE TO ATTACK QUOTE THE BIG LIE UNQUOTE WHICH WAS STILL A GREAT OBSTRUCTION TO REDUCING THE TEMPERATURE. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WOULD ALSO WELCOME

/.....SUPPORT

SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL THAT FUTURE ARMAMENTS SHIPMENTS TO THE MIDDLE EAST SHOULD BE PUBLICLY LISTED. HE SAID THAT THIS WAS A SHIFT IN THE U.S. POSITION WHICH HAD HITHERTO BEEN TO KEEP QUIET ABOUT SUCH SHIPMENTS. IN THE NEW SITUATION HOWEVER, PUBLICITY WOULD BE UNAVOIDABLE AND IT WOULD ONLY BE POSSIBLE FOR THE U.S. TO MAKE ANY FURTHER NECESSARY RE-SUPPLY SHIPMENTS AND TO CONTINUE WITH THE SUPPLY OF EQUIPMENT, FOR INSTANCE TO SAUDI ARABIA, BY JUSTIFYING THIS PUBLICLY WITH REFERENCE TO SHIPMENTS FROM THE SOVIET UNION. (THE CIA BELIEVE THE RUSSIANS HAVE NO INTENTION OF RE-ESTABLISHING A POSITION OF MILITARY STRENGTH. THE AIRLIFT OF MIGS IS NO MORE THAN AN INEXPENSIVE GESTURE). BUNDY SAID THAT A FIRM LINE ABOUT THE NEED TO DO SOMETHING POSITIVE FOR THE REFUGEES WOULD BE VALUABLE BUT HE SUGGESTED THAT CARE SHOULD BE TAKEN ABOUT JERUSALEM SINCE QUOTE WE ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO DELIVER UNQUOTE.
7. ON THE GENERAL LINE, BUNDY SAID THAT THERE WERE TWO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN POSITIONS: THE BRITISH STOOD TO LOSE MUCH MORE IN OIL AND MONEY THAN THE AMERICANS IF THE ARABS AS A WHOLE TURNED NASTY: ALSO THE U.S. MUST STAY WITHIN THE FOUR CORNERS OF THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT AND HAD PROBABLY TO TAKE MORE ACCOUNT OF STRONG ZIONIST FEELING THAN WOULD BE THE CASE IN BRITAIN. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES BUNDY SUGGESTED THAT IT WAS PROBABLY MORE IMPORTANT FOR US THAN IT HAD BEEN FOR THE AMERICANS TO MAKE CONCILIATORY GESTURES (QUOTE OFFER BONES UNQUOTE) TO THE MODERATE ARABS THAN TO BE FULLY LOGICAL ABOUT THE APPARENT JUSTICE OF SOME PARTS AT LEAST OF THE ISRAELI CASE. HE THOUGHT WE OUGHT PERHAPS TO BE QUITE DECISIVE, FOR INSTANCE, ABOUT WHAT NEEDED TO BE SAID TO PRESERVE OUR OIL AND FINANCIAL STAKE IN KUWAIT AND HE COMMENTED THAT IN FACT THE LOSS BY US OF THIS STAKE WOULD BE FOR FINANCIAL REASONS ALMOST EQUALLY UNPALATABLE TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. HE HOPED THAT WE WOULD NOT SAY ANYTHING WHICH WOULD INDICATE OUR WILLINGNESS TO VOTE FOR UNILATERAL AND UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL BY THE ISRAELIS NOR AMOUNT TO UNRESERVED CONDEMNATION OF ISRAELI ACTION. HE THOUGHT THAT THE RIGHT LINE MIGHT BE TO REGRET VERY DEEPLY ALL THE ACTIONS WHICH HAD BEEN TAKEN FROM THE INITIAL PROVOCATION BY THE ARABS TO THE FINAL EXPLOSION AND ITS RESULTS.

/.....HOWEVER IT

HOWEVER IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S SPEECH SHOULD NOT GO SO FAR AS TO PULL OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS APART ON A RESOLUTION AND ANY WORDS USED TO DISAPPROVE OR CONDEMN ISRAELI ACTION SHOULD NOT INVOLVE US TOO FAR ON HOW WE MIGHT VOTE ON ANY RESOLUTION. SUBJECT TO THIS, BUNDY THOUGHT IT RIGHT AND REASONABLE THAT, IN THE INTERESTS OF PRESERVING OUR OWN VITAL INTERESTS IN THE ARAB WORLD WE SHOULD GO SO FAR TOWARDS PLACATING THE MODERATE ARABS AS OUR OWN PUBLIC OPINION WOULD ALLOW.

8. VIETNAM:

I KNOW FROM MY CONVERSATIONS WITH THE AMERICANS THAT THEY ARE TRYING TO FIND SOME WAY IN WHICH, IF THERE IS A MEETING BETWEEN KOSYGIN AND THE PRESIDENT, VIETNAM AND THE MIDDLE EAST COULD BE LINKED SO THAT PROGRESS COULD BE MADE ON BOTH. THEY ARE FINDING THIS A VERY DIFFICULT PROBLEM, ONE REASON BEING THAT THEY STILL DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT CAN, PARTICULARLY IN PRESENT CONDITIONS, REALLY BE TRUSTED TO DELIVER HANOI.

9. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF THE NAMED SOURCES OF THIS INFORMATION COULD BE KEPT OUT OF ANY CONVERSATIONS WHICH MAY TAKE PLACE IN NEW YORK. BUNDY IN PARTICULAR IS NATURALLY PLAYING HARD TO GET IN THESE DAYS AND I DO NOT WANT TO FRIGHTEN HIM OFF.

F O PASS MOSCOW 150.

SIR P. DEAN

SENT AT 20/0115Z
RCVD AT 20/0115Z

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION.]

PRISEC (F.O.)

FOPA 01220 FLASH PARIS TELEGRAM NUMBER 2052 OF 20 JUNE 1967.

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON

TELNO 2105

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

19 JUNE 1967.

TOP SECRET.

YOUR TELNO 6842: SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

PLEASE SEE MY TELNO 282 TO UKMIS NEW YORK.

2. I AM SURE YOUR WILL UNDERSTAND THAT THE DETAILED CONTENT OF WHAT HAS PASSED IS BEING VERY CLOSELY GUARDED FOR BOTH PRACTICAL AND PROTOCOL REASONS. WE HAVE CHECKED EVRYWHERE WE CAN AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT, THE WHITE HOUSE AND C.I.A. AND IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT IN FACT VERY LITTLE OF SUBSTANCE PASSED ON THE HOT LINE. IF I HEAR ANY BORE I WILL OF COURSE LET YOU KNOW BUT I DO NOT THINK YOU CAN COUNT ON MY DOING SO.

CCN PARA 2 WA SURE YOU

SIR P. DEAN

SOSFA

GROUPS 86 *****

SENT AT 20/0540Z MCH

RECD AT 20/05412 FCW

EN CLAIR

FLASH U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 1411 19 JUNE 1967
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1411 OF 19 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON.

MIDDLE EAST.

FOLLOWING ARE EXTRACTS FROM KOSYGIN'S STATEMENT IN THE ASSEMBLY THIS MORNING.

QUOTE

FAITHFUL TO THE PRINCIPLE OF RENDERING AID TO THE VICTIM OF AGGRESSION AND SUPPORTING THE PEOPLES WHO FIGHT FOR THEIR INDEPENDENCE AND FREEDOM, THE SOVIET UNION HAS RESOLUTELY COME OUT IN DEFENCE OF THE ARAB STATES. WE WARNED THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL BOTH BEFORE THE AGGRESSION AND DURING THE WAR THAT IF IT HAD DECIDED TO TAKE UPON ITSELF THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR UNLEASHING A MILITARY CONFLICT, THAT GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE TO PAY IN FULL MEASURE FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS STEP. WE STILL FIRMLY ADHERE TO THIS POSITION.

WHERE THE QUESTION IS ONE OF WAR AND PEACE, OF PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES, THERE MUST NOT BE A PLACE FOR POLITICAL ZIGZAGS. IT DOES OF COURSE HAPPEN, THAT TO SOLVE THIS OR THAT PROBLEM THE STATES CHART SEVERAL POSSIBLE ROUTES. BUT IN SUCH MATTERS AS THE ONE CONSIDERED NOW BY THE EMERGENCY SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO THE RESOLUTE CONDEMNATION OF THE AGGRESSOR AND THOSE FORCES THAT STAND BEHIND HIM, NO ALTERNATIVE TO THE ELIMINATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE AGGRESSION. THERE IS NO OTHER WAY TO BRING ABOUT THE CESSATION OF THE AGGRESSION AND REIN IN THOSE WHO MIGHT WISH TO EMBARK ON NEW ADVENTURES IN THE FUTURE.

ONE MAY ASK, WHY THE SOVIET UNION IS SO RESOLUTELY OPPOSING ISRAEL? HOWEVER, GENTLEMEN, THE SOVIET UNION IS NOT AGAINST ISRAEL--IT IS AGAINST THE AGGRESSIVE POLICY PURSUED BY THE RULING CIRCLES OF THAT STATE.

IN THE COURSE OF ITS FIFTY-YEAR HISTORY, THE SOVIET UNION HAS REGARDED ALL PEOPLES, LARGE OR SMALL, WITH RESPECT. EVERY PEOPLE ENJOYS THE RIGHT TO ESTABLISH AN INDEPENDENT NATIONAL STATE OF ITS OWN. THIS CONSTITUTES ONE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE POLICY OF THE SOVIET UNION. IT IS ON THIS BASIS THAT WE FORMULATED OUR ATTITUDE TO ISRAEL AS A STATE, WHEN WE VOTED IN

/1947

1947 FOR THE U.N. DECISION TO CREATE TWO INDEPENDENT STATES, A JEWISH AND AN ARAB ONE, IN THE TERRITORY OF THE FORMER BRITISH COLONY OF PALESTINE. GUIDED BY THIS FUNDAMENTAL POLICY THE SOVIET UNION WAS LATER TO ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL.

WHILE UPHOLDING THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES TO SELF-DETERMINATION, THE SOVIET UNION JUST AS RESOLUTELY CONDEMNS THE ATTEMPTS BY ANY STATE TO CONDUCT AN AGGRESSIVE POLICY TOWARDS OTHER COUNTRIES, A POLICY OF SEIZURE OF FOREIGN LANDS AND SUBJUGATION OF THE PEOPLE LIVING THERE.

UNQUOTE

QUOTE

WE WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONSISTENT AND FAIR IN ESTIMATING ISRAEL'S POLICY, IF WE DID NOT DECLARE WITH ALL CERTAINTY THAT IN ITS ACTIONS ISRAEL HAS ENJOYED OUTSIDE SUPPORT FROM CERTAIN IMPERIALIST CIRCLES. MOREOVER, THESE POWERFUL CIRCLES MADE STATEMENTS AND TOOK PRACTICAL ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT HAVE BEEN INTERPRETED BY ISRAELI EXTREMISTS SOLELY AS DIRECT ENCOURAGEMENT TO COMMIT ACTS OF AGGRESSION.

FOR EXAMPLE, HOW ELSE COULD ONE QUALIFY THE FACT, THAT ON THE EVE OF THE ISRAELI AGGRESSION A PLAN WAS URGENTLY DEVISED IN THE UNITED STATES AND UNITED KINGDOM (AND THIS WAS WIDELY REPORTED IN THE PRESS) OF ESTABLISHING AN INTERNATIONAL NAVAL FORCE TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR UPON THE ARAB STATES? HOW ELSE COULD ONE QUALIFY THE MILITARY DEMMONSTRATIONS BY THE AMERICAN SIXTH FLEET OFF THE COAST OF THE ARAB STATES, AND THE BUILD-UP OF THE BRITISH NAVY AND AIR FORCE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND RED SEA AREA, OR THE INCREASE OF MODERN ARMS AND AMMUNITION DELIVERIES FOR THE ISRAELI ARMY?

THE INCITEMENT CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE ARAB STATE AND THEIR LEADERS WAS PROMOTED ESPECIALLY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WEST GERMANY. IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, IN PARTICULAR, IT WAS ANNOUNCED THAT DISCRIMINATORY FINANCIAL MEASURES AGAINST THE ARAB STATES HAD BEEN INTRODUCED. RECRUITMENT OF SO-CALLED VOLUNTEERS FOR ISRAEL STARTED IN SEVERAL WEST GERMAN CITIES.

UNQUOTE

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QUOTE

WHAT IS THE ATTITUDE OF THE U.S. AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENTS TO THE ISRAELI CLAIMS? ACTUALLY, THEY ARE PROMOTING THE AGGRESSOR HERE AS WELL. IN WHAT OTHER WAY CAN THE AGGRESSOR INTERPRET THEIR POSITION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WHICH BLOCKED THE ADOPTION OF THE PROPOSAL ON AN IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI TROOPS BEHIND ARMISTICE LINES? THE WORDS IN SUPPORT OF POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES COMING LAVISHLY FROM THE U.S. REPRESENTATIVES CAN HAVE SENSE ONLY IF THOSE WHO UTTER THEM WOULD IN NO UNCERTAIN WAY REJECT THE TERRITORIAL CLAIMS OF THE AGGRESSOR AND FAVOUR AN IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS.

BY PUTTING FORWARD A PROGRAMME OF ANNEXATION, ISRAEL SEEMS TO HAVE COMPLETELY LOST THE SENSE OF REALITY AND HAS EMBARKED ON A VERY DANGEROUS PATH. ANY ATTEMPT TO CONSOLIDATE THE RESULTS OF AGGRESSION IS BOUND TO FAIL. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THE UNITED NATIONS WILL REJECT ATTEMPTS TO IMPOSE ON THE ARAB PEOPLES A SETTLEMENT THAT MIGHT JEOPARDIZE THEIR LEGITIMATE INTERESTS AND HURT THEIR FEELINGS OF SELF-RESPECT. TERRITORIAL CONQUESTS, IF THEY WERE RECOGNISED BY VARIOUS STATES, WOULD ONLY LEAD TO NEW AND PERHAPS LARGER CONFLICTS. CONSEQUENTLY, PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST WOULD REMAIN ILLUSORY. SUCH A SITUATION CANNOT BE PERMITTED TO ARISE, AND ONE MAY REST ASSURED THAT THIS IS NOT GOING TO HAPPEN. ATTEMPTS TO CONSOLIDATE THE FRUITS OF AGGRESSION WILL IN THE LONG RUN BACKFIRE AGAINST ISRAEL AND ITS PEOPLE.

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QUOTE

THE ISRAELI AGGRESSION HAS RESULTED IN PARALYSING THE SUEZ CANAL, AN IMPORTANT WATERWAY WHICH HAS BEEN TRANSFORMED BY THE INVADERS INTO A BATTLE FRONT LINE. THE SOVIET UNION VOICES A CATEGORIC DEMAND THAT THE ISRAELI FORCES SHOULD BE IMMEDIATELY REMOVED FROM THE SHORES OF THE SUEZ CANAL AND FROM ALL OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES.

ONLY THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM THE SEIZED TERRITORIES MAY CHANGE THE SITUATION IN FAVOUR OF A DETENTE AND THE

/CREATION

CREATION OF CONDITIONS FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

IS IT NOT CLEAR THAT UNLESS THIS IS DONE AND THE FORCES OF THE ISRAELI INVADERS ARE EVICTED FROM THE TERRITORY OF ARAB STATES, THERE CAN BE NO HOPE OF SETTLING OTHER UNSOLVED PROBLEMS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

THOSE WHO UNLEASHED WAR AGAINST THE ARAB STATES SHOULD NOT CHERISH HOPES THAT THEY COULD DERIVE SOME ADVANTAGES FROM THIS. THE UNITED NATIONS, CALLED UPON TO SERVE THE CAUSE OF PRESERVING PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, MUST USE ALL ITS INFLUENCE AND ALL ITS PRESTIGE IN ORDER TO PUT AN END TO AGGRESSION.

IN ITS DEMAND TO CONDEMN AGGRESSION AND WITHDRAW TROOPS FROM THE SEIZED TERRITORIES OF THE U.A.R., SYRIA AND JORDAN, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT PROCEEDS FROM THE NEED TO MAINTAIN PEACE NOT ONLY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. IT SHOULD NOT BE FORGOTTEN THAT THERE ARE MANY REGIONS IN THE WORLD WHERE THERE ARE BOUND TO BE THOSE EAGER TO SEIZE FOREIGN TERRITORIES, WHERE PRINCIPLES OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND RESPECT FOR THE SOVEREIGNTY OF STATES ARE FAR FROM BEING HONOURED. UNLESS ISRAEL'S CLAIMS DO NOT RECEIVE A REBUFF TODAY, TOMORROW A NEW AGGRESSOR, BIG OR SMALL, MAY ATTEMPT TO OVERRUN THE LANDS OF OTHER PEACEFUL COUNTRIES.

UNQUOTE

QUOTE

THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT RECOGNISE THE TERRITORIAL SEIZURES OF ISRAEL. TRUE TO THE IDEALS OF PEACE, FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE OF ALL PEOPLES, THE SOVIET UNION WILL UNDERTAKE ALL MEASURES WITHIN ITS POWER BOTH IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND OUTSIDE THIS ORGANISATION IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THE ELIMINATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF AGGRESSION AND PROMOTE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A LASTING PEACE IN THE REGION. THIS IS OUR FIRM AND PRINCIPLED COURSE. THIS IS OUR JOINT COURSE TOGETHHER WITH OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES.

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QUOTE

THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS DELEGATION ARE READY TO WORK TOGETHER WITH OTHER COUNTRIES, WHOSE REPRESENTATIVES HAVE ASSEMBLED IN THIS HALL. THEY ARE READY TO WORK TOGETHER WITH ALL OTHER STATES AND

DELEGATIONS IN ORDER TO ATTAIN THIS CLAIM.

MUCH DEPENDS ON THE EFFORTS OF THE BIG POWERS. IT WOULD BE GOOD IF THEIR DELEGATIONS AS WELL FOUND COMMON LANGUAGE IN ORDER TO REACH DECISIONS MEETING THE INTERESTS OF PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE INTERESTS OF UNIVERSAL PEACE.

UNQUOTE

LORD CARADON

SENT 1753Z/19 JUNE

RECD 1753Z/19 JUNE

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FLASH U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 1412 19 JUNE 1967

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1412 OF 19 JUNE

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW.

MIDDLE EAST.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SOVIET DRAFT RESOLUTION INTRODUCED THIS MORNING IN THE ASSEMBLY.

''THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

STATING THAT ISRAEL, BY GROSSLY VIOLATING THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND THE UNIVERSALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, HAS COMMITTED A PREMEDITATED AND PREVIOUSLY PREPARED AGGRESSION AGAINST THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, SYRIA AND JORDAN, AND HAS OCCUPIED A PART OF THEIR TERRITORY AND INFLICTED GREAT MATERIAL DAMAGE UPON THEM,

NOTING THAT IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF ALL HOSTILITIES AND A CEASE-FIRE OF JUNE 6, JUNE 7 AND JUNE 9, 1967, ISRAEL CONTINUED TO CONDUCT OFFENSIVE MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST THE AFORE-SAID STATES AND EXPANDED ITS TERRITORIAL SEIZURES,

NOTING FURTHER THAT ALTHOUGH AT THE PRESENT TIME HOSTILITIES HAVE CEASED, ISRAEL CONTINUES THE OCCUPATION OF THE TERRITORY OF THE U.A.R., SYRIA AND JORDAN, THUS FAILING TO CEASE THE AGGRESSION AND CHALLENGING THE UNITED NATIONS AND ALL PEACE-LOVING STATES,

REGARDING AS INADMISSIBLE AND ILLEGITIMATE THE PRESENTING BY ISRAEL OF TERRITORIAL CLAIMS TO THE ARAB STATES, WHICH PREVENTS THE RESTORATION OF PEACE IN THE AREA,

1. RESOLUTELY CONDEMNS THE AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS OF ISRAEL AND THE CONTINUING OCCUPATION BY ISRAEL OF A PART OF THE TERRITORY OF THE U.A.R., SYRIA AND JORDAN, WHICH CONSTITUTES AN ACT OF AGGRESSION:

2. DEMANDS THAT ISRAEL SHOULD IMMEDIATELY AND WITHOUT ANY CONDITION WITHDRAW ALL ITS FORCES FROM THE TERRITORY OF THOSE STATES TO POSITIONS BEYOND THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINES, AS STIPULATED IN THE GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS, AND SHOULD RESPECT THE STATUS OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONES, AS PRESCRIBED IN THOSE ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS:

/3. ALSO

3. ALSO DEMANDS THAT ISRAEL SHOULD RESTITUTE IN FULL AND WITHIN THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE PERIOD OF TIME ALL THE DAMAGE INFLICTED BY ITS AGGRESSION UPON THE U.A.R., SYRIA AND JORDAN, AND THEIR NATIONALS, AND SHOULD RETURN TO THEM ALL SEIZED PROPERTY AND OTHER MATERIAL ASSETS:

4. APPEALS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO UNDERTAKE ON ITS PART IMMEDIATE EFFECTIVE MEASURES IN ORDER TO ELIMINATE ALL CONSEQUENCES OF THE AGGRESSION COMMITTED BY ISRAEL.''

F.O. PASS IMMEDIATE MOSCOW 180.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT 1710Z/19 JUNE

RECD AT 1710Z/19 JUNE

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IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1416 19 JUNE
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1416 OF 19 JUNE
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, TEL AVIV AND SANTIAGO.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 1412 :
MIDDLE EAST.

IMMEDIATELY AFTER THIS MORNING'S MEETING OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY A GROUP OF DELEGATES MET, INCLUDING ITALY, IRELAND, AUSTRIA, JAPAN AND SEVERAL LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES. AMBASSADOR PINERA OF CHILE WHO ATTENDED THE MEETING, WAS DEPUTED TO TELL ME WHAT HAD TAKEN PLACE AND TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH ME ON BEHALF OF THE GROUP.

2. THIS GROUP WHICH DECIDED TO CONTINUE WORKING TOGETHER ESTIMATED THAT THERE WAS LESS THAN 50 VOTES FOR A SOLID ARAB-SOVIET LINE AND A LOOSER GROUP OF A LARGER NUMBER IN FAVOUR OF A REASONABLE RESOLUTION (INCLUDING MOST WESTERN NATIONS AND THE LATIN AMERICANS AND POSSIBLY 15 AFRICANS - MOST ASIANS WERE FOLLOWING THE INDIAN LINE).

3. THE GROUP HAD ALREADY DISCUSSED THE INGREDIENTS OF SOME ALTERNATIVE TO THE SOVIET RESOLUTION. MOST OF THE IDEAS (STILL VERY TENTATIVE) WHICH AMBASSADOR PINERA MENTIONED TO ME SEEMED TO ME ON THE RIGHT LINES.

4. HE SAID THAT THE GROUP INTENDED TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE FRENCH AND AMERICANS AND OURSELVES BUT DID NOT SUGGEST

/.....THAT

THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL SHOULD JOIN THE GROUP AT THIS STAGE. HE PROMISED TO KEEP ME FULLY INFORMED AND I SAID THAT I WOULD LOOK FORWARD TO A FULLER DISCUSSION WITH HIM VERY SOON.

FO PASS MOSCOW NO. 181, TEL AVIV NO. 194 AND SANTIAGO NO. 21.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT 200014Z
SENT AT 200030Z
RCVD AT 200030Z

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW AND TEL AVIV REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS AND TO PARIS.]

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IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1419

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
19 JUNE

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1419 OF 19 JUNE
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, TEL AVIV AND SAVING TO AMMAN AND JEDDA.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 1405 :
EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

THE ASSEMBLY MET AT 10.55 A.M. THIS MORNING TO BEGIN SUBSTANTIVE CONSIDERATION OF ITS AGENDA (THE LETTER OF 13 JUNE FROM MR. GROMYKO TO U THANT).

2. KOSYGIN (USSR) THEN SPOKE (VERBATIM EXTRACTS SENT IN MY TELEGRAM NO. 1411). HE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH NO HOSTILITIES WERE BEING WAGED IN THE MIDDLE EAST AT PRESENT, THE SITUATION REMAINED SERIOUS. THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD FAILED TO DISCHARGE ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CHARTER, AND ISRAELI FORCES CONTINUED TO OCCUPY TERRITORIES IN EGYPT, SYRIA AND JORDAN. FOR THIS REASON, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD DECIDED TO BRING THE MATTER BEFORE THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, WHICH HAD THE DUTY TO RIGHT AN IN-JUSTICE AND AVERT A FURTHER DISASTER. FOR IF A NEW WORLD WAR STARTED IT WOULD INEVITABLY BE NUCLEAR. THIS WAS INDISPUTABLE, EXCEPT BY ''CERTAIN STATES'' WHO COULD NEVER CEASE INTERFERING IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF INDEPENDENT PEOPLES. THEIR NAVAL FLEETS PLIED THE SEAS THOUSANDS OF MILES FROM THEIR OWN SHORES: NOT INFREQUENTLY IT WAS THE BIG POWERS WHO WERE BEHIND AGGRAVATIONS OF THE SITUATION. THIS HAD BEEN THE CASE IN THE ARAB/ISRAEL FIGHTING. FURTHERMORE, FOR NEARLY THREE YEARS THE UNITED STATES HAD BEEN CARRYING OUT DIRECT AGGRESSION AGAINST THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE. THE U.S. MUST LEAVE VIETNAM AND WITHDRAW ALL ITS FORCES. THE FIRST STEP WAS TO STOP THE BOMBING UNCONDITIONALLY. NO GENERAL STATEMENTS WOULD BE CONVINCING UNLESS THIS HAPPENED. CUBA, THE CONGO, THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC ANL THE SUPPRESSION OF COLONIAL PEOPLES ELSEWHERE WERE SIGNS OF A ''FAR FROM PEACEFUL'' POLICY.

3. IN EUROPE THE PRINCIPAL CONCERN OF THE SOVIET UNION HAD

/.....BEEN THE

BEEN THE PREVENTION OF ANOTHER WORLD WAR BROUGHT ABOUT BY REVANCHISTE FORCES. THESE WERE ROOTED IN WEST GERMANY, WHICH SOUGHT A REVISION OF ITS 1945 BORDERS. THE SOVIET UNION WARNED THAT ANY SUCH REVISION WOULD BE DISASTROUS. IN THE MIDDLE EAST EVENTS SHOULD BE LOOKED AT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GENERAL INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. THE MAIN FEATURES OF ISRAELI/ARAB RELATIONS HAD BEEN INCREASING ISRAELI ATTACKS ON HER NEIGHBOURS SINCE LAST YEAR. THE SECURITY COUNCIL CENSORED ISRAEL FOR A LARGE SCALE MILITARY ACTION AGAINST JORDAN IN NOVEMBER, 1966. ON APRIL 7 THE ISRAELIS ATTACKED SYRIA. WIDER MILITARY ACTION WAS THREATENED BY ESHKOL, WHO WAS AUTHORISED BY HIS PARLIAMENT TO CARRY OUT MILITARY ACTIONS AGAINST HER ARAB NEIGHBOURS. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD HAD INFORMATION THAT A SWIFT STROKE AGAINST SYRIA WAS PLANNED FOR THE END OF MAY. ON 5 JUNE THE CHARTER HAD BEEN FLOUTED, AND AFTER THE CEASE-FIRE CALLED ON 6 JUNE ISRAEL WIDENED HER AGGRESSIVE OPERATIONS ON TWO FRONTS. THE CATEGORIC DEMAND BY THE COUNCIL ON 9 JUNE FOR A CEASE-FIRE WAS ALSO IGNORED. STATES HAD HAD TO SEVER DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BEFORE MILITARY ACTION CEASED.

4. IN RECENT DAYS EVIDENCE HAD COME IN OF FURTHER ATROCITIES AND VIOLENCE COMMITTED IN SINAI, GAZA AND ON THE WEST BANK. THE SOVIET UNION HAD WARNED THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT BEFORE AND DURING THE WAR THAT IF IT DECIDED TO UNLEASH A MILITARY CONFLICT, IT WOULD HAVE TO PAY IN FULL MEASURE FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS STEP. KOSYGIN THEN JUSTIFIED THE SOVIET POLICY OF RECOGNISING ISRAEL IN THE FIRST PLACE. THIS HAD BEEN DONE BECAUSE EVERY PEOPLE ENJOYED THE RIGHT TO ESTABLISH AN INDEPENDENT NATIONAL STATE OF ITS OWN. IT WAS THE AGGRESSIVE POLICY OF EXTREMIST RULING GROUPS IN ISRAEL WHICH HAD LED HER POLICY ASTRAY, WITH SUPPORT FROM ''CERTAIN IMPERIALIST CIRCLES''. HE IMPLIED THAT THESE INCLUDED THE U.S. AND U.K. WHO HAD PLANNED TO SET UP AN INTERNATIONAL NAVAL FORCE TO BRING PRESSURE ON THE ARAB STATES.

5. WHAT WAS THE ATTITUDE OF THE U.S. AND U.K. GOVERNMENTS TO

/.....THE ISRAELI

THE ISRAELI CLAIMS? THEY HAD SUPPORTED ISRAEL'S POSITION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY BLOCKING THE PROPOSAL FOR AN IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI TROOPS BEHIND THE ARMISTICE LINES. BUT ANY ATTEMPTS TO CONSOLIDATE AGGRESSION WOULD FAIL. THE ISRAELI AGGRESSION HAD PARALYZED THE SUEZ CANAL, AN IMPORTANT WATERWAY. THE SOVIET UNION DEMANDED THAT ISRAELI FORCES BE IMMEDIATELY REMOVED FROM THE CANAL AND FROM ALL OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES. THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT RECOGNISE ISRAEL'S TERRITORIAL SEIZURES. NO STATE COULD REMAIN ALOOF FROM THE PROBLEM PROPOSED FOR DISCUSSION BY THE EMERGENCY SESSION: IF THEY DID, THE ONLY POSSIBLE OUTCOME WOULD BE A BIG WAR, INTO WHICH ALL STATES WOULD BE DRAWN. SMALL ''LOCAL'' WARS COULD GROW INTO BIG MILITARY CONFLICTS.

6. THE SOVIET UNION WAS READY TO WORK WITH OTHER COUNTRIES TO ATTAIN JUSTICE AND PEACE FOR THE AREA. MUCH DEPENDED ON THE EFFORTS OF THE BIG POWERS. IT WOULD BE GOOD IF THEIR DELEGATIONS COULD FIND COMMON LANGUAGE TO REACH DECISIONS MEETING THE INTERESTS OF PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. CONCLUDING, HE TABLED THE DRAFT RESOLUTION (MY TELEGRAM NO. 1412 REFERS).

7. SEE MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.

FO PASS MOSCOW NO. 183, PARIS NO. 182, TEL AVIV NO. 196 AND SAVING TO AMMAN NO. 72 AND JEDDA NO. 50.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT 2002252
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IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1420 19 JUNE

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSD TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 1420 OF 19 JUNE

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW PARIS, TEL AVIV AND SAVING TO JEDDA, OTTAWA AND COPENHAGEN.

MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM.

EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

EBAN (ISRAEL), SPEAKING SECOND, SAID THAT THE MAIN CAUSE OF THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS HAD BEEN THE RECURRENT AND DEEPENING THREAT TO ISRAEL'S EXISTENCE, SECURITY AND SOVEREIGNTY. ALL OTHER FACTORS AND ARGUMENTS WERE SECONDARY. BETWEEN 14 MAY AND 5 JUNE THIS YEAR, THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS LED AND DIRECTED BY NASSER AND WITH SOVIET SUPPORT AND ENCOURAGEMENT HAD PREPARED AN AGGRESSIVE ASSAULT TO ELIMINATE ISRAEL BY FORCE. EBAN THAN GAVE AN HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE GROWTH OF TENSION IN THE REGION SINCE MARCH, 1957, WHEN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY PASSED A RESOLUTION ESTABLISHING U N E F. UNTIL MAY OF THIS YEAR. HE QUOTED EXTENSIVELY FROM ARAB LEADERS' STATEMENTS SEEKING TO SHOW WHERE PROVOCATION HAD LAIN. THESE BECAME MORE OUTSPOKEN AS THE STOCK OF ARAB ARMAMENTS GREW. BY MID-MAY THIS YEAR, EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN SOURCES HAD CONVINCED THEMSELVES THAT AN ISRAELI TROOP CONCENTRATION ON THE SYRIAN BORDER HAD TAKEN PLACE, AND THAT AN INVASION WAS BEING PLANNED. THOUGH THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAD OFFERED RECIPROCAL INSPECTION AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE U.N. HAD ASCERTAINED FROM HIS OWN SOURCES THAT NO MILITARY BUILD-UP EXISTED, PROGRESS DOWN THE SLIPPERY SLOPE HAD BEGUN. EGYPTIAN FORCES MASSED IN SINAI. ON 18 MAY THE EGYPTIANS CALLED OFFICIALLY FOR THE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF U N E F. U THANT AGREED, WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL OR TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY: WITHOUT CARRYING OUT PROCEDURES LAID DOWN BY HAMMARSKOLD: WITHOUT LISTENING TO PROTESTS FROM SOME MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL: WITHOUT REFERENCE TO ISRAEL, WHOSE VITAL INTERESTS WERE THREATENED: AND WITHOUT SEEKING SUCH DELAY AS WOULD ALLOW OTHER MEASURES TO BE CONCERTED. HIS ACTION WAS DISASTROUSLY FAST, EVEN BEARING IN MIND THE COMPULSIONS WORKING ON U THANT. EBAN CLAIMED IT HAD A

/TRAUMATIC

''TRAUMATIC EFFECT'' ON ISRAEL, WHOSE SECURITY COULD NEVER LIE ON SUCH FRAGILE FOUNDATIONS AGAIN.

2. COMMENTING ON THE 1957 DECLARATION OF FREE AND INNOCENT PASSAGE THROUGH THE GULF OF AQABA, EBAN SAID THAT THE PRINCIPLE THEREIN ENUNCIATED HAD IN TEN YEARS BECOME A REALITY, CONSECRATED UNDER DOZENS OF FLAGS. ISRAEL'S ECONOMIC FUTURE LARGELY DEPENDED ON THIS RIGHT: BLOCKADE, IMPOSED BY ARMED FORCE AS IT WAS AFTER 23 MAY WAS BY DEFINITION AN ACT OF WAR. AFTER IMPOSITION OF THE BLOCKADE, THE QUESTION OF WHO FIRED THE FIRST SHOT WAS ''MOMENTOUSLY IRRELEVANT''. IN OPPOSING THE BLOCKADE THE ISRAELIS HAD MERELY ACTED IN SELF-DEFENCE AS THEY WERE ENTITLED TO DO UNDER ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER. FROM 24 MAY TO 5 JUNE THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD CONDUCTED A DESULTORY DEBATE, IN WHICH THE SOVIET AND BULGARIAN DELEGATES HAD SAID THEY SAW NO NEED TO DISCUSS THE MIDDLE EAST AT ALL.

3. EBAN GLOSSED OVER THE FIGHTING FROM 5 TO 10 JUNE. HE READ OUT A DETAILED LIST OF SOVIET ARMS PROVIDED TO EGYPT SINCE 1955. HE POINTED TO THE ''CONSTANT ESCALATION'' OF THE SOVIET ARMS PROGRAMME TO THE ARAB WORLD, DESCRIBING THIS AS A MAJOR FACTOR LEADING TO THE WAR. THE RUSSIANS HAD ALSO EGGED THE ARABS ON WITH INACCURATE REPORTS OF ISRAELI INTENTIONS AND ALLEGED EXPANSIONISM: FOR INSTANCE, THE INFORMATION GIVEN MOSCOW ON 19 MAY TO EGYPTIANS PARLIAMENTARIANS, SUGGESTING THAT AN ISRAELI ATTACK ON SYRIA WAS IMMINENT. EBAN RECALLED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD CAST FIVE VETOES IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL SINCE 1954, WHENEVER THERE WAS A PROSPECT OF THE ARABS BEING CENSURED FOR THREATENING ISRAEL'S EXISTENCE. THE UPSHOT WAS THAT ISRAEL HAD LITTLE CONFIDENCE LEFT IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S ABILITY TO DISCHARGE ITS ROLE IN THIS DISPUTE. THE RESOLUTION TABLED IN THE ASSEMBLY BY KOSYGIN WAS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE: IT WAS THE SOVIET UNION WHO SHOULD BE CONDEMNED FOR THEIR IRRESPONSIBILITY SINCE AT LEAST 1957.

4. EBAN ENDED BY SAYING THAT THE ASSEMBLY SHOULD NOW ENUMERATE A SERIES OF PRINCIPLES FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF A NEW FUTURE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. A LASTING PEACE SHOULD BE BASED ON FRANK

/ AND

AND LUCID DIALOGUES BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EACH OF HER NEIGHBBOURS WHO HAD ATTEMPTED TO OVERTHROW HER SOVEREIGNTY. THE ARABS AND ISRAEL MUST NEGOTIATE FREELY LOOKING TOWARDS A '' NEW MEDITERRANEAN FUTURE''. IN THIS, JORDAN MIGHT HAVE A PORT ON THAT SEA. COMMUNICATIONS, INCLUDING AIR ROUTES AND PIPE LINES MIGHT BE RESTORED THROUGHOUT THE REGION INSTEAD OF LYING FRACTURED. THE NEGEV COULD BECOME A BRIDGE NOT A WEDGE. RESOURCES LYING ACROSS NATIONAL FRONTIERS COULD BE JOINTLY EXPLOITED. JERUSALEM, NOW UNITED AGAIN, WOULD HAVE THE SANCTITY AND IMMUNITY OF ALL THE HOLY PLACES RESTORED BY ISRAEL. BUT THE ROAD TO ALL THSE GAINS WAS THAT OF RECOGNITION, DIRECT CONTACT, TRUE COOPERATION AND PEACEFUL CCO-EXISTENCE. THE PROSPECT OF A NEGOTIATED PEACE WAS LESS REMOTE THAN IT MIGHT SEEM, PROVIDED THE GREAT POWERS AND THE U.N. HELPED REMOVE THE REGION FROM THE SCOPE OF GLOBAL RIVALRIES AND RESPECTED ISRAEL'S ''INDEPENDENT QUEST'' FOR PEACE AND SECURITY.

5. GOLDBERG (UNITED STATES) IN EXERCISE OF RIGHT OF REPLY POINTED OUT THAT HE WAS NOT MAKING A DETAILED STATEMENT IN REPLY TO MR. KOSYGIN. THE AMERICAN POSITION HAD BEEN STATED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES THIS MORNING AND HE (GOLDBERG) WOULD MAKE HIS FULL STATEMENT TOMORROW. HIS GOVERNMENT'S PURPOSE WAS TO NARROW THE DIFFERENCES WITH THE USSR TO SECURE PEACE IN THE WORLD FOR POSTERITY. HE THEREFORE REGRETTED THAT MR KOSYGIN SHOULD HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THE UNITED STATES INCITED, ENCOURAGED AND PROMOTED ISRAEL INTO CONFLICT WITH THE ARAB STATES. ON THE CONTRARY, EVERY EFFORT TO PREVENT A CONFLICT HAD BEEN TAKEN AND, ONCE THE CONFLICT HAD STARTED, TO END IT. THEN REFERRING TO KOSYGIN'S STATEMENT ON VIET NAM HE INVITED HIM TO COOPERATE WITH EITHER THE SECURITY COUNCIL OR THE SIGNATORIES TO THE GENEVA AGREEMENT TO TRY TO BRING ABOUT PEACE IN THIS EVENT.

6. I THEN SPOKE IN EXERCISE OF RIGHT OF REPLY (TEXT SENT SEPARATELY).

7. BAROODY (SAUDI ARABIA) SPOKE IN EXERCISE OF RIGHT OF REPLY. HE REFERRED TO EBAN'S STATEMENT THAT THE ARAB LEADERS HAD ANNOUNCED MANY TIMES THAT THEY WOULD DESTROY ISRAEL. HE POINTED OUT THAT KING FEISAL HAD SAID THAT ZIONISM COULD NOT CONTINUE TO

/ EXIST

UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 1420 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

EXIST IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE DREW A DISTINCTION BETWEEN WESTERN ORIENTED POLITICAL ZIONISM AND THE JEWISH PEOPLE AND JUDAISM. NO ARAB LEADER COULD SURVIVE IF HE ACCEPTED THE FORMER BUT ALL ARABS ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE LATTER.

8. THE PRESIDENT ADJOURNED THE MEETING AT 1330 HOURS LOCAL TIME AS THERE WERE NO MORE SPEAKERS FOR TODAY. HE ANNOUNCED THAT THE NEXT MEETING OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WOULD TAKE PLACE AT 1030 HOURS ON TUESDAY, 20 JUNE.

FOREIGN OFFICE PLEASE PASS MOSCOW NO 184 PARIS NO 183 TEL AVIV NO 197 AND SAVING TO JEDDA NO 51 AND COPENHAGEN NO 39.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT 0502/20Z
RECD AT 0502/20Z

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CYPHER/CAT-A-
IMMEDIATE PARIS TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 638 19 JUNE 1967

CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 638 OF 19 JUNE
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO UKMIS NEW YORK AND PRIORITY
TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW TEL AVIV AMMAN AND SAVING TO UKDEL NATO.

WHEN THE PRIME MINISTER DISCUSSED THE MIDDLE EAST WITH PRESIDENT DE GAULLE THIS MORNING, THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT MR. KOSYGIN, THOUGH CLEARLY VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND ITS POSSIBLE REPERCUSSIONS, SEEMED NEVERTHELESS BENT ON PURSUING THE PROPAGANDA WAR AND TO BE DETERMINED TO SECURE THE CONDEMNATION OF ISRAEL AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL FROM THE ARAB TERRITORIES WHICH SHE HAD OCCUPIED. HE HAD URGED THAT FRANCE SHOULD SUPPORT THE SOVIET UNION AT THE UNITED NATIONS IN PURSUING THESE AIMS, BUT THE PRESIDENT HAD LEFT HIM UNCERTAIN ABOUT FRENCH INTENTIONS. THE PRESIDENT SAID KOSYGIN STRUCK HIM AS A WORRIED MAN BEING CARRIED ALONG BY THE TIDE.

2. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE SHOULD KEEP TOGETHER IN THE PRESENT DANGEROUS SITUATION. HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT WERE TRYING, LIKE THE FRENCH TO AVOID TAKING SIDES: BY COOPERATING TOGETHER WE MIGHT PREVENT THE SITUATION DETERIORATING FURTHER: AS GENERAL DE GAULLE HIMSELF HAD ARGUED, THE KEY TO THE SITUATION LAY IN FOUR POWER INVOLVEMENT AT THE RIGHT TIME. WITHOUT THIS AN UNEASY TRUCE MIGHT PERHAPS BE ARRANGED FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, BUT THIS WOULD BE BASED ON LOWEST COMMON DENOMINATOR OF AGREEMENT AND FIGHTING WOULD BE BOUND TO BREAK OUT AGAIN IN DUE COURSE. WITH FOUR POWER INVOLVEMENT, ON THE OTHER HAND, A SETTLEMENT MIGHT BE ACHIEVED WHICH WOULD LAST FOR A GENERATION. SUCH A SETTLEMENT WOULD

/.....PROBABLY

PROBABLY NEED SOME KIND OF FOUR POWER ENDORSEMENT TO AVOID THE RISK OF A PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE, WHICH WAS EVEN GREATER NOW THAT THE ADVANTAGE OF GETTING IN FIRST HAD BEEN SO CONVINCINGLY DEMONSTRATED.

3. WHILE ACCEPTING THAT FOUR POWER AGREEMENT WAS PROBABLY NECESSARY IF THERE WERE TO BE ANY LASTING MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT, PRESIDENT DE GAULLE WAS GLOOMY ABOUT THE PROSPECTS OF ACHIEVING THIS. THE PRESENT WORLD SITUATION AND ESPECIALLY THE EFFECTS OF THE VIETNAM WAR WERE SUCH THAT THE FOUR POWERS WOULD PROBABLY NOT REACH ANY EFFECTIVE UNDERSTANDING OR CONTROL EVENTS. FRANCE HAD INDEED PROPOSED FOUR POWER DISCUSSIONS AT AN EARLIER STAGE OF THE CRISIS BUT THE RUSSIANS HAD TURNED THIS DOWN - THOUGH THEY MIGHT COME TO REGRET HAVING DONE SO. AS WAR HAD BROKEN OUT, HOWEVER, AND HAD LEFT A LEGACY OF BITTERNESS WHICH WOULD MAKE IT EVEN LESS EASY THAN BEFORE FOR THE ARABS TO ACCEPT ISRAEL AS A STATE AND IN VIEW OF MR. KOSYGIN'S LIKELY ATTITUDE, PRESIDENT DE GAULLE SAW LITTLE LIKELIHOOD OF A SETTLEMENT FOR A VERY LONG TIME OR OF ANYTHING MUCH THAT BRITAIN, FRANCE OR THE OTHER MAJOR POWERS COULD DO ABOUT IT. THE PRIME MINISTER SUGGESTED THAT THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A PERIOD WHILE THE SLANGING MATCH CONTINUED AND TEMPERS WERE ALLOWED TO COOL, BUT THAT INTERVENTION AT THE RIGHT TIME, I.E. NOT TOO EARLY AND NOT TOO LATE, COULD LEAD TO A MORE PERMANENT SOLUTION. THERE WAS NO NEED FOR US TO FOLLOW THE EXAMPLE OF THE GADARENE SWINE.

4. AT THE AFTERNOON MEETING THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER AGREED THAT IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES THERE WOULD BE NO POINT IN THEIR ATTENDING THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATE IN PERSON BUT THAT THEY WOULD KEEP IN CLOSE AND CONTINUING TOUCH ABOUT THE SITUATION.

FO PASS IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK 53 PRIORITY WASHINGTON 189 MOSCOW 54 TEL AVIV 14 AMMAN 8.

SIR P. REILLY

SENT AT 19/2110Z
RECD AT 19/2117Z

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW, TEL AVIV & AMMAN REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS.]

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EN CLAIR
IMMEDIATE U.K. MISSION NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1427
UNCLASSIFIED

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
20 JUNE 1967

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO 1427 OF 20 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW PARIS TEL AVIV AND SAVING TO JEDDA OTTAWA AND AMMAN.

M.I.P.T.: EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION.
FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF U.S. DRAFT RESOLUTION TABLED TODAY:
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

BEARING IN MIND THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A CEASE FIRE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AS CALLED FOR BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN ITS RESOLUTIONS 233, 234, 235 AND 236 (1967),
HAVING REGARD TO THE PURPOSE OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO BE A CENTER FOR HARMONIZING THE ACTIONS OF NATIONS,

1. ENDORSES THE CEASE-FIRE ACHIEVED PURSUANT TO THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND CALLS FOR ITS SCRUPULOUS RESPECT BY THE PARTIES CONCERNED:
2. DECIDES THAT ITS OBJECTIVE MUST BE A STABLE AND DURABLE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST:
3. CONSIDERS THAT THIS OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE ACHIEVED THROUGH NEGOTIATED ARRANGEMENTS WITH APPROPRIATE THIRD PARTY ASSISTANCE BASED ON:
(A) MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF THE POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ALL COUNTRIES IN THE AREA, ENCOMPASSING RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES AND OTHER ARRANGEMENTS, INCLUDING DISENGAGEMENT AND WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES, THAT WILL GIVE THEM SECURITY AGAINST TERROR, DESTRUCTION AND WAR:

/(B)

(B) FREEDOM OF INNOCENT MARITIME PASSAGE:
(C) JUST AND EQUITABLE SOLUTION OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM:
(D) REGISTRATION AND LIMITATION OF ARMS SHIPMENTS INTO THE AREA:
(E) RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT OF ALL SOVEREIGN NATIONS TO EXIST IN PEACE AND SECURITY.

4. REQUESTS THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO KEEP THE SITUATION UNDER CAREFUL REVIEW.

F O PASS MOSCOW 186 PARIS 185 TEL AVIV 199 AND SAVING TO JEDDA 53 AMMAN 74.

LORD CARADON

SENT 2359Z/20 JUNE
RECD. 0116Z/21 JUNE

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CYPHER/CAT A
FLASH FOREIGN OFFICE
TELNO 2054

TO PARIS
20 JUNE 1967. (Eastern)

CONFIDENTIAL.

FOR MOBERLY IN PRIME MINISTER'S PARTY.

MIDDLE EAST.

FOLLOWING ARE MAIN POINTS IN FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAMS UP TO 0630 BST TUESDAY, OTHER THAN MATERIAL ON MR. KOSYGIN'S AND PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S SPEECHES REPEATED TO PARIS LAST NIGHT, (UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAMS 1411 AND 1412 AND 1419 AND WASHINGTON TELEGRAM 2091).

ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS CONFERENCE AT KUWAIT.

KUWAIT FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL HAS TOLD EMBASSY THAT NO CONCLUSIONS HAD BEEN REACHED AND TIME HAD BEEN OCCUPIED BY STATEMENTS BY EACH MINISTER OF HIS COUNTRY'S POSITION. ALGERIANS HAD SOUGHT WITHOUT SUCCESS DECISIONS ON FOUR POINTS OF PRESSURE ON THE WEST (OIL EXPORTS, STERLING AND DOLLAR BALANCES, MILITARY BASES, AND DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS).

JERUSALEM.
2. OUR AMBASSADOR TEL AVIV REPORTS THAT AS A RESULT OF REPRESENTATIONS MADE BY BRITISH AND U.S. GOVERNMENTS ISRAEL GOVERNMENT HAS DECIDED NOT REPEAT NOT TO GO AHEAD WITH LEGISLATION FOR ANNEXATION OF JERUSALEM.
3. GENERAL BULL HAS NOT YET RETURNED TO GOVERNMENT HOUSE.

UNITED NATIONS.
4. ITALY, AUSTRIA, IRELAND, JAPAN AND SOME LATIN AMERICANS HAVE FORMED A GROUP TO WORK TOGETHER. CHILEAN REPRESENTATIVE HAS TOLD LORD CARADON THAT THEY ESTIMATE THAT THERE ARE LESS THAN 50 VOTES FOR A SOLID ARAB/SOVIET LINE AND A LOOSER GROUP OF A LARGER NUMBER IN FAVOUR OF A REASONABLE RESOLUTION (INCLUDING MOST WESTERN NATIONS, LATIN AMERICANS AND POSSIBLY 15 AFRICANS). MOST ASIANS

WERE FOLLOWING INDIAN LINE. THEY WILL KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH US, AMERICANS AND FRENCH.

SOSFA

SENT 0625Z 20 JUNE

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SECRET

Record of a Discussion held at the
Grand Trianon, Versailles, on

TUESDAY, 20th JUNE, 1967

at 9.30 a.m.

PRESENT:

The Rt. Hon. Harold Wilson, MP Prime Minister	President de Gaulle
Sir Burke Trend	M. Burin des Roziers
Mr. A.M. Palliser	M. Andronikov

President de Gaulle said that he assumed that the Prime Minister would need to say something about his visit in the House of Commons that afternoon.

The Prime Minister replied that he had a television interview later in the day, together with several Parliamentary Questions. But he would deal with these very briefly by means of a merely factual description of the subjects which he had discussed with the President. Where necessary he would indicate the British position without purporting to describe the President's own views.

As regards the situation in the Middle East, he had studied the reports which had come in over-night. It was clear that the most intractable problem remained the apparent impossibility of arranging a personal meeting between President Johnson and Mr. Kosygin. Mr. Kosygin was not prepared to leave New York for this purpose; President Johnson was not willing tc go to New York. It was very unfortunate that the deadlock on policy had now been reinforced by this deadlock on procedure. If anything, the situation seemed even less helpful than it had been on the day before.

President de Gaulle again recalled that Mr. Kosygin had told him, during his visit to Paris, that, if President Johnson asked him to go to Washington to meet him, he would refuse.

He agreed with the Prime Minister that, as a result, the United States and the Soviet Union were locked in a confrontation which might last a very long time indeed. There was no prospect of any accommodation between them; and all that could be seen ahead was a continuing situation of latent war in the Middle East and a perpetuation of the cold war between the United States and Soviet Union for an indefinite time. There was little, if anything, that Britain and France could do to improve this situation. For their part, the French Government would maintain a position in which they were associated with neither the Soviet Union nor the United States. It was quite clear, however, that it was useless to look to any bilateral arrangement between the two Great Powers for a solution; and the French Government were therefore resigned to a long period of international frustration and impotence.

The Prime Minister agreed that no meeting confined to Soviet and United States representatives could deal with the situation. It was equally true, however, that direct negotiations between the Arabs and Israel offered no prospect of a solution.

President de Gaulle emphatically agreed.

The Prime Minister said that both President Johnson and Mr. Kosygin had hinted at the possibility of direct discussions of this kind. But this was crying for the moon.

President de Gaulle agreed. The Government of Israel had similarly thought that, after their military victory, they could begin to talk to at least some of the Arab States, e. g. Jordan. But they were quite wrong.

The Prime Minister concurred. To think in terms like this was like saying how pleasant it would be if there had been no war. It was a totaliy unrealistic approach. In these circumstances it was more important than ever that, as the President had said the previous afternoon, President de Gaulle and he should keep in close personal touch to see whether they could help in any way.

President de Gaulle said that it was conceivable that after a long period of difficulty and recurrent clashes (which might perhaps be on a serious scale) it would become possible to revive the original French project of a concert of the four Powers. But we were not at this point yet; and we might have to wait some time for it. For their part, the French Government, even though not pursuing the idea for the moment, had not given it up. But, if they were to keep it alive, they would need not to compromise their position in any way in the interval.

The Prime Minister said that in present circumstances he did not intend to go to the United Nations; and he assumed that the President was of the same mind. But it might be helpful if they had a further personal exchange of views after, say, a week. They could then consider whether it would be desirable - and practicable - for them to visit New York. It could be very damaging if Mr. Kosygin left the United Nations without our having taken any intiative. On the other hand, if the situation in a week's time was as grim and unyielding as it was now, there would be no point in trying to mount such an initiative.

President de Gaulle agreed that he and the Prime Minister should keep in close touch and reconsider the situation in a week's time. But it was quite clear that nothing would, in fact, have happened by then, except a lot of bitter speeches and recriminations on both sides. He noted that in that case the Prime Minister would not wish to go to New York. Nor would he himself; nor would M. Pompidou.
Mr. Couve de Murville was now in New York and would be speaking on Thursday; but his remarks would be mostly generalities. Thereafter, Kosygin would return from New York at some point or other, having built up a group of supporters among those who would always be willing to support him and whom he could leave behind him; the General Assembly would, as always, presumably produce some vague formula to cover the situation; and, even if this crystallised in a Resolution - and it was unlikely that the necessary two-thirds majority would be secured - it was certain to be almost wholly meaningless.

The Prime Minister said that the President might well be right in this forecast of developments. If there was to be a four Power meeting, this must be regarded as the ace of trumps, (at this point, President de Gaulle interjected - "Or war"); and an ace of trumps could be played only once. It must therefore not be played at too early a stage in the game; and the right course would be to review the situation again in a week's time and at intervals thereafter to see whether it had reached, either by improvement or by deterioration, the point at which the critical card might be played to the best effect. He feared that there was a long, hot summer in prospect.

President de Gaulle said that M. Pompidou was due to visit the Soviet Union early in July and that Mr. Kosygin had indicated that he would be returning from New York in time to receive him. This would in practice be no more than a courtesy visit; but it was clear that the Soviet Government wanted to keep close to the French Government; and this could do nothing but good. As for the United States, President Johnson did not consult France about anything; nor indeed did the French Government consult him.

The Prime Minister observed that, between them, the British and French Governments must try to keep the world's leading statesmen in play. The British Government had had several very useful exchanges with the Soviet leaders; and both they and the French Government must be ready to use their influence with the Soviet Government in whatever way seemed best. He himself was due to pay a return visit to Moscow some time later in the year. It was for Mr. Kosygin to indicate when this would be convenient; but it was likely to be later rather than sooner.

If he was right in forecasting a long hot summer, there were at least two people who must try to keep cool! He had greatly appreciated the President's hospitality during this visit and the very useful exchange of views which they had had. He hoped to keep in close personal touch with the President, both on the Middle East and on all the other problems which they had discussed.

President de Gaulle replied that it was he who must thank the Prime Minister for having made the visit so pleasant. He had greatly enjoyed the meeting and believed that it had been of real value for him to have thus exchanged views with the Prime Minister. It was now clear that the British and French Governments were not in opposition on any subject. He greatly hoped that it would be possible for them to continue to draw closer together; and, if it proved to be possible, it would clearly be desirable. Certainly, that would be the wish of the French Government. The road ahead might be long; but we had already made progress towards the fundamental rapprochement between the two countries. That was his own clear interpreation of the outcome of the present meeting.

The Prime Minister replied that it was his interpretation also. It was only if we could draw closer together - both in personal terms and in institutional terms in relation to all the issues which they had discussed on the previous day - that we should be able to remedy our present impotence to deal with the great problems of the world.

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Prime Minister

Middle East Situation 20 June

(Summary of F.O. telegrams)

25/6

United Nations

The Security Council debate on 19 June was exclusively concerned with the **renewal** of the Mandate of the U.N. force in Cyprus which was approved unanimously.

2. The Assembly yesterday heard Mr. Kosygin make a harsh attack on Israel and on Western. and, in particular, U.S. support for her. He introduced a Resolution condemning Israel aggression, calling for Israel withdrawal behind the armistice lines and respect for the armistice agreements and demanding reparations from Israel for the damage inflicted on the Arab States. Lord Caradon and Mr. Goldberg exercised their right of reply to charges of indirect collusion and of using delaying tactics on Israel's behalf in the Security Council. Mr. Eban defended the Israel cause for a negotiated peace, whilst strongly criticising ~~Israel's response~~ Soviet irresponsibility in supporting the Arabs.

3. Although Mr. Kosygin's speech took a hard line there were passages in it which could be interpreted as hinting at a readiness to work more genuinely for a solution. The Chilean Representative has given Lord Caradon, on behalf of an ad hoc group of delegates from such states, an estimate that there are less than 50 votes for a solid Arab/Soviet line and that there is a looser group constituting a larger number in favour of a reasonable solution. The Chilean Representative also said that the group had discussed tentatively the agreements of an alternative solution; Lord Caradon's impression is that they are working along the right lines. The group intend to keep in touch with the French, Americans and ourselves but are not

/These passages were no doubt aimed primarily at the uncommitted States.

/suggesting

suggesting that the permanent members of the Security Council should join them at this stage.

4. The Assembly was to reconvene at 3.30 p.m.(B.S.T.) today.

Jerusalem

5. H.M. Consul General reports that the Israel authorities have issued passes to the Consular Corps which permit unrestricted travel in the New City and on the West Bank.

6. The old city has been "heavily looted" and Government House "sacked" by the Israelis.

7. The Military Governor of the West Bank reports that life in the towns is nearly back to normal and that the Arab population has been allowed freedom of movement since 19 June.

Aden

8. Aden Radio, quoting "reliable sources", has reported that 400 South Arabians recruited by the Egyptians for the South Arabian Liberation Army were killed, wounded or missing on the Sinai front.

Suez Canal

9. The French Embassy in Cairo have made unsuccessful representations to obtain the release of the single French ship in the Canal. Further representations are being considered but the French are not sanguine of their success.

Oil

10. The Kuwait Oil Company have been obliged to reduce production because of a shortage of tankers.

Lebanon

11. Internal Situation The city remains tense with the military posted at all key points. Business is at a low ebb

/and

and unemployment growing. The Lebanese Government is impervious to the domestic situation; it is pre-occupied with Arab and U.N. affairs. There remains the possibility of internal disorders and rioting.

U.S.A. and the Middle East

12. President Johnson's Speech At the end of his speech on the Middle East situation, President Johnson declared that the U.S. was committed "to a peace based on five principles"

(i) the recognised right of national life;

(ii) justice for the refugees;

(iii) innocent maritime passage;

(iv) Limits on the wasteful and destructive arms race;

(v) political independence and territorial integrity for all.

U.S.S.R. and the Middle East

13. The Minister of Foreign Trade has denied that Russian oil is being sold to either the United Kingdom or to Israel.

Eastern Department,
Foreign Office

Visited PRO.

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF KUWAIT AT THE HOTEL CARLYLE, NEW YORK AT 3.00 p.m. TUESDAY 20 JUNE

PRESENT:

The Rt. Hon. George Brown, M.P.	Shaikh Sabah al Ahmed
Mr. T. F. Brenchley	Sayed Rashid al Rashid
Mr. D. G. Crawford	

Shaikh Sabah, after thanking Mr. Brown for receiving the new Kuwaiti Ambassador in London, stressed the importance which Kuwait attached to its long-standing and friendly relations with the United Kingdom. He asked that the United Kingdom should demonstrate friendship and support for the Arabs now that they were in difficulties. Kuwait had shown her friendship by not cutting off relations as other Arab states had done and the allegations made of American and British armed support for Israel had not been believed by the Kuwait Government. Shaikh Sabah hoped that these allegations could be put on one side, and Kuwait had advised other Arab countries that this should be done. Referring to the cutting off of oil supplies Shaikh Sabah asked Mr. Brown to understand the psychology of the Arab world. The emotional situation in Kuwait had made matters very difficult for his Government and they had believed that the temporary suspension of oil supplies would not hurt Britain too much and at the same time would allow Kuwait to demonstrate that it was doing its duty to the Arab world. Moreover, if Kuwait had not taken this action there would have been a grave risk that the oil installations would have been sabotaged and it was after representations from Kuwait that President Nasser had restrained the Arab people from damaging oil installations. He particularly asked that the United Kingdom would now call for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied areas. If this were done its effect in the Arab world would be marked. It would allow a fresh start in relations between Britain and the Arabs.

2. Mr. Brown thanked Shaikh Sabah for his frankness and said that in his statement to the Assembly he would attempt to establish for Britain a position which any Arab politician of reason and not fanatically concerned with aggression against Israel would understand. It was a decision which he hoped that he as a Westerner and Shaikh Sabah as a Middle Easterner could sustain. After describing his long acquaintance with and admiration for Kuwait, Mr. Brown said he wanted to maintain a good relationship, but not at the price of being blackmailed. The cutting off of oil could only be regarded as a breach of commercial faith and if it happened again it would certainly oblige Britain to look elsewhere for its supplies. Given that there were other sources of oil, notably Iran, who wished to increase production, and that there was natural gas available and nuclear power, it would not be possible for Britain to ignore these alternatives if there were no assurances of regular supplies from Kuwait.

/3.

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3. As for the present situation, he personally had opposed the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 but twenty years later and after three wars there was nothing that anybody could do about reversing that position. Some day the Arabs would have to reconcile themselves to Israel and in the meantime Nasser should not be allowed to destroy Anglo/Kuwaiti relations. They were based on a sound business relationship which was of even greater advantage to Kuwait than to Britain. While politically we would do our best to make matters easier for the Kuwaitis, they would have to persuade other Arabs that they were living in the latter part of the twentieth century.

4. Shaikh Sabah expressed his appreciation and said that he recognised the importance of the business relationship. Kuwait's motive in calling the meeting of Arab Foreign Ministers had been to urge them to take a more realistic attitude towards the present Middle East situation. Kuwait was determined to play a role of reason, but to achieve this first and foremost the Israelis must withdraw.

5. Mr. Brown said that it was impossible to ask for withdrawal before certain practical steps had been taken. There had to be an effort to solve the refugee problem, to establish U.N. mediation, and to strengthen UNTSO. Then withdrawal might be considered, together with the Israeli conditions for such withdrawal which would clearly include safeguards for the Straits of Tiran. Mr. Brown then asked at what stage would oil supplies be resumed.

6. Following an uncertain reply Mr. Brown said if oil supplies were not resumed then we could not talk business and Britain would have to look elsewhere for its supplies. Politics could not be divorced from business. If he could not obtain any undertakings about the oil then the political position might change. The vital point and the only one which could avoid difficulties was for the oil supplies to be resumed immediately. Kuwait had broken faith by cutting the supplies, despite the reasons given by Shaikh Sabah, and at least there should have been discussion between us before the decision to cut had been taken.

7. In reply Shaikh Sabah said that Kuwait was in need of the United Kingdom's friendship more than anything else and the stand which Mr. Brown took in the Assembly would allow him to persuade his Arab colleagues that this was the true British position. On oil he hoped to be able to give Mr. Brown the assurances he sought after the United Kingdom's statement had been made and before Mr. Brown left New York.

EN CLAIR

IMMEDIATE U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1453 20 JUNE 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO 1453 OF 21 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW PARIS TEL AVIV AND SAVING TO JEDDA OTTAWA AND AMMAN.

MY TELNO 1438: EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION.

THE ASSEMBLY CONTINUED CONSIDERATION OF ITS AGENDA THIS AFTERNOON. MGONJA (TANZANIA) SAID THAT THE U.N. AND ITS COMMITTEES HAD GATHERED CONSIDERABLE EVIDENCE SHOWING THE CLOSE LINKS BETWEEN CAPITALIST EXPLOITATION AND QUOTE WORLD IMPERIALISM UNQUOTE AS PRACTISED BY SOME POWERS. THE POWERS AND INTERESTS WHICH SUSTAINED PORTUGUESE COLONIALISM IN AFRICA AND THE RACIST REGIMES IN RHODESIA AND SOUTH AFRICA ALSO SUPPORTED TERRITORIAL AGGRANDIZEMENT AND QUOTE OMINOUS ADVENTURES UNQUOTE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. RECENT EVENTS IN THAT REGION COULD NOT BE SEPARATED FROM THE CONFLICTS IN VIETNAM AND THE THIRD WORLD. TANZANIA HAD RECOGNISED ISRAEL AND MAINTAINED CORDIAL RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB STATES. THE RECORD SHOWED THAT SINCE HER CREATION ISRAEL, FAITHFUL TO THE INTERESTS OF INTERNATIONAL IMPERIALISM, HAD REPEATEDLY MENACED THE SECURITY OF HER NEIGHBOURS. THE EVENTS OF EARLY JUNE THIS YEAR WERE PART OF THE SAME PATTERN. IT WAS NOW AN OPEN SECRET THAT THE MOVEMENT OF U.S. AND BRITISH MILITARY FORCES IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND THE RED SEA, WHETHER BY ACCIDENT OR DESIGN, HAD SERVED AS A COVER-UP FOR ISRAELI AGGRESSION. THE TIMING OF THESE MOVEMENTS WAS AN OPEN THREAT TO THE ARAB COUNTRIES AND AN ACT OF INTIMIDATION AND MOBILIZATION IN FAVOUR OF ISRAEL.

2. SMALL STATES, PARTICULARLY THOSE IN AFRICA, ASIA AND LATIN AMERICA SHOULD NOTE THIS USE OF MILITARY FORCE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF TERRITORIAL EXPANSION. IT WAS AN INSTRUCTIVE EXAMPLE TO IRREDENTIST STATES. THERE WERE ALREADY SUGGESTIONS THAT SMITH, VORSTER, AND SALZAR MIGHT PURSUE SIMILAR COURSES VIS A VIS INDEPENDENT AFRICAN STATES. IN HIS STATEMENT THE ISRAEL REPRESENTATIVE NOWHERE ADMITTED WHO STRUCK THE FIRST BLOW, BUT IT WAS CLEAR FROM THE RECORD. TANZANIA HAD REACHED THE CONCLUSION THAT ISRAEL HAD AGGRESSED AGAINST THE ARAB STATES, WITH THE HELP AND COLLUSION OF

/ COLONIALIST.....

COLONIALIST AND IMPERIALIST POWERS. HIS GOVERNMENT CONDEMNED THE OUT-MODED POLICY OF TERRITORIAL GAINS THROUGH CONQUEST. THE ASSEMBLY COULD EITHER STAND ALOOF OR, TRUE TO THE U.N. CHARTER, CONDEMN ISRAEL AND CALL ON HER IMMEDIATELY TO WITHDRAW TO THE POSITIONS HELD BEFORE 5 JUNE. HE APPEALED TO ISRAEL TO CO-OPERATE WITH THE U.N. AND ENSURE THAT HER BOUNDARIES WERE NOT A QUOTE TEMPORARY PHENOMENOM WHICH EXPANDED WITH THE PASSAGE OF TIME UNQUOTE. THERE WAS A REAL DANGER THAT OTHERS MIGHT WISH TO FOLLOW ISRAEL'S EXAMPLE. ISRAEL SHOULD IMPLEMENT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION ON ARAB REFUGEES FROM PALESTINE: MAKE GOOD THE DAMAGE INFLICTED ON THE ARABS: AND CEASE TO INTIMIDATE INNOCENT CIVILIANS AND PRISONERS OF WAR. THE ARAB PEOPLE HAD JUST EXPERIENCED A TEMPORARY SET BACK IN THEIR STRUGGLE, WHICH WAS PART OF THE UNIVERSAL REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT, BUT THEY WOULD WIN IN THE END.

3. MAHGOUB (SUDAN) SAID THAT THE ASSEMBLY HAD BEEN CONVENED TO PASS JUDGEMENT ON ONE OF ITS MEMBERS. ISRAEL HAD ATTACKED BRUTALLY, WITH SYMPATHY AND SUSTENANCE FROM THOSE WHO CREATED HER. ISRAEL'S CLAIMS OF JUSTIFIED RETALIATION WERE UNFOUNDED. EGYPT'S SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE STRAITS OF TIRAN WAS INCONTESTABLE, AND SHE WAS PERFECTLY WITHIN HER RIGHTS TO PREVENT THE PASSAGE OF SHIPS BELONGING TO A COUNTRY WITH WHICH SHE WAS AT WAR.HE CAST THE USUAL DOUBTS ON THE LEGALITY OF ISRAEL'S CONTROL OF THE PORT OF EILAT. THE ARAB STATES HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO STAND TOGETHER. SINCE ISRAEL HAD ALREADY ATTACKED SYRIA ON 7 APRIL, THE BLOCKADE COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED TO BE THE PRIME CAUSE OF THE WAR, BUT MERELY AN EXCUSE FOR THE ISRAELIS TO EMBARK UPON PREMEDITATED AGGRESSION TO QUOTE TEACH THE ARABS A LESSON UNQUOTE. ISRAEL'S ACTS COULD NOT BE DEFENDED BY THE TERMS OF THE U.N. CHARTER SINCE MEMBER STATES WERE ONLY EMPOWERED TO RESORT TO THE USE OF FORCE IN THE INTERESTS OF SELF DEFENCE (ARTICLE 51).

4. REFERRING TO THE GREAT POWERS, HE SAID THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM IN SPITE OF ITS PROTESTATIONS OF INNOCENCE, SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT. DENIALS OF COLLUSION HAD BEEN HEARD BEFORE IN 1956. THE UNITED STATES WAS COMMITTED TO PROTECT ISRAEL. THEIR

/ POLICY.....

POLICY WAS INCONSISTENT: IF THE U.S. WERE COMMITTED TO THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE AREA, THEY WOULD HAVE HAD NO DIFFICULTY IN VOTING FOR THE SOVIET RESOLUTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL CONDEMNING ISRAELI AGGRESSION.

5. ZAHEDI (IRAN) SAID THAT THE MAIN QUESTION BEFORE THE ASSEMBLY WAS WHETHER IT HAD THE RESOURCES AND WILL TO GUARANTEE THAT THE RELATIONS OF STATES WERE NO LONGER TO BE GOVERNED BY WAR, AND THAT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEM WOULD BE SETTLED ON THE BASIS OF RESPECT FOR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. IRAN' POLICY WAS THAT ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE MADE WHEREBY ARAB TERRITORY CAPTURED BY ISRAEL IN THE WAR SHOULD BE RELINQUISHED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. PRUDENCE WOULD DICTATE TO ISRAEL THAT IT WAS URGENT TO QUIT. ZAHEDI THEN COMMENTED THAT IT WAS ODD THAT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD HAVE BEEN CALLED INTO EMERGENCY SESSION TO DEAL WITH THIS CRISIS, AFTER ALL THE CLAIMS MADE ABOUT THE WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO TACKLE THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY. THE WORLD SHOULD BE GRATEFUL THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD ACHIEVED A CEASEFIRE BUT THIS CAME TARDILY ENOUGH, AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WAS NOW FACED WITH A MUCH MORE DIFFICULT TASK. IRAN HAD OFFERED TO PLACE PERMAMENT PEACE-KEEPING FORCES AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE U.N. BUT THE OFFER HAD NOT BEEN TAKEN UP. THE CEASE FIRE MUST BE FOLLOWED BY IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORY, AND IT WAS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ASSEMBLY TO CALL FOR THIS.

6. MORO (ITALY) SUMMARIZED HIS GOVERNMENT'S VIEWS ON MIDDLE EAST PROBLEMS, THE BEST COURSE TO BE FOLLOWED TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT OF THEM, AND THE PART WHICH THE U.N. SHOULD BE CALLED UPON TO PLAY. THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM CONCERNED THE WOUNDED AND THE NEW REFUGEES. MORE BASIC PROBLEMS DEPENDED ON THE ASSEMBLY'S REAFFIRMATION OF THE RIGHT TO POLITICAL INDEPENDANCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF MIDDLE EAST STATES. WITHIN THAT FRAMEWORK CAME DISENGAGEMENT AND WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS: AND A JUST TERRITORIAL SETTLEMENT WHICH WAS FREELY ACCEPTED BY THE PARTIES, AND PERMANENT. WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS WAS NECESSARY BUT INSUFFICIENT. OTHER LONG TERM PROBLEMS WHICH MUST BE FACED INCLUDED THE REFUGEES, THE GUARANTEEING OF INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS AND FREE ACCESS TO THE HOLY PLACES. IT WAS NOT YET TIME

/ TO OFFER.....

TO OFFER SPECIFIC SOLUTIONS OR FORMULAS: FIRST MUST COME RECOGNITION OF EACH OTHER'S EXISTENCE BY THE ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL. AS REGARDS THE ROLE OF THE U.N. THIS SHOULD BE PRIMARILY POLITICAL AND THEREAFTER ECONOMIC. HIS GOVERNMENT SAW THE U.N. PLAYING A FOURFOLD ROLE. IT SHOULD GET A PLEDGE FROM THE POWERS NOW ENGAGED IN THE SEARCH FOR DISARMAMENT THAT THEY WOULD AVOID AN ARMS RACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST SECONDLY, THE U.N. SHOULD PROVIDE THE FIRST MEETING GROUND FOR THE PARTIES. THE INDIAN PROPOSAL OF APPOINTING A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE U.N. WITH THE TASK OF ASSISTING IN REDUCING TENSIONS AND RE-ESTABLISHING PEACEFUL CONDITIONS WAS USEFUL, WHILE THE U.K. REPRESENTATIVE HAD SUGGESTED THE DESPATCH OF A MEDIATOR. THESE POINTS SHOULD BE EXPLORED BY THE INTERESTED PARTIES AS WELL. THIRDLY THE U.N. SHOULD PLAY A PART IN SETTLING REGIONAL PROBLEMS WHICH AFFECTED THE INTERESTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. FOURTHLY THE U.N. SHOULD DEAL WITH THE PROBLEMS OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND REHABILITATION: AND FINALLY IT SHOULD DRAFT A BROAD PLAN FOR THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE WHOLE REGION.

7. CHAGLA (INDIA) SAID THAT THE FACT THAT ISRAEL HAD STRUCK THE FIRST BLOW WAS INCONTROVERTIBLE. THE FOUNDATION OF A LASTING PEACE COULD ONLY BE BASED UPON TOTAL, IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORY

8. THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT DEPLORED THE ATTACKS ON THE INTEGRITY OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNEF. ON THE STRAITS OF TIRAN, THE U.A.R. GOVERNMENT HAD ALWAYS MAINTAINED THAT IT WAS PART OF ITS TERRITORIAL WATERS. THE U.A.R. WAS NOT PARTY TO ANY AGREEMENT RECOGNISING THE GULF OF AQABA AS AN INTERNATIONAL WATERWAY, AND IT COULD NOT THEREFORE BE ESTABLISHED UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW THAT THERE WAS A RIGHT OF FREE PASSAGE. THERE WAS THEREFORE QUOTE NO WARRANT FOR ASSETTING THAT THIS WAS A RIGHT WHICH COULD BE ENFORCED BY THE ARBITRAMENT OF ARMS UNQUOTE.

9. INDIA WAS SECOND TO NONE IN DESIRING A RETURN TO PEACE IN THE AREA, BUT A PEACE BASED ON CERTAIN CARDINAL PRINCIPLES. IT SHOULD BE RECOGNISED THAT IT WAS NOT OPEN TO A COUNTRY TO START A WAR MERELY BECAUSE IT FELT THAT A THREAT TO ITS SECURITY EXISTED. IF

/ SUCH A.....

SUCH A THREAT WAS THOUGHT TO EXIST, THE CHARTER PRESCRIBED VARIOUS COURSES OF ACTION TO ACHIEVE A SOLUTION THROUGH PEACEFUL MEANS. THE CONCEPT OF A PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE OR PREVENTIVE WAR WAS CONTRARY TO THE SPIRIT OF THE CHARTER. THE ONLY PERMISSIBLE RECOURSE TO MILTARY INTERVENTION WAS UNDER THE TERMS OF ARTICLE 51, WHICH COULD NOT BE SAID TO APPLY IN THE PRESENT INSTANCE. CHAGLA SUMMARISED BRIEFLY THE IDEAS SET OUT BY THE INDIAN DELEGATE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 9 JUNE, AND CONCLUDED BY EMPHASISING THAT NONE OF THESE IDEAS COULD BE SINGLED OUT FOR APPLICATION WITHOUT RELATING THEM TO THE FIRST IMPORTANT STEP, WHICH WAS WITHDRAWAL.

1Ø. THE ASSEMBLY THEN ADJOURNED UNTIL 1Ø.3Ø A.M. TOMORROW.

F O PASS MOSCOW 191 PARIS 19Ø TEL AVIV 2Ø7 AND SAVING TO JEDDA 58 AMMAN 79

LORD CARADON

SENT AT Ø324 22 JUNE
RECD AT Ø324 22 JUNE

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CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1449 21 JUNE 1967

CONFIDENTIAL.
ADDRESSED TO TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NUMBER 206 OF 21 JUNE
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO FOREIGN OFFICE.
FOLLOWING FOR AMBASSADOR FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY.
MR. BROWN HAD AN HOUR'S MEETING WITH EBAN AND GOLDA MEIR THIS EVENING. THE ISRAELIS PROFESSED TO HAVE BEEN SURPRISED BY TWO POINTS IN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY'S ADDRESS TO THE ASSEMBLY THIS MORNING. THESE WERE THE PASSAGE ON JERUSALEM AND HIS PROPOSAL FOR A HIGH LEVEL UNITED NATIONS PERSONALITY IN THE AREA. ON JERUSALEM EBAN SAID THAT THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT ONLY INTENDED TO DO AT A PRACTICAL LEVEL THOSE THINGS WHICH WOULD UNIFY THE CITY WITHOUT ANNEXING IT. HE ARGUED THAT THE FOREIGN SECRETARY'S SPEECH WOULD MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR HIS GOVERNMENT TO KEEP TO THIS LINE IN FACE OF THE PRESSURE FROM EXTREMISTS. ON THE UNITED NATIONS PERSONALITY THE ISRAELIS' OBJECTIONS WERE VAGUE. IT WAS IMPLICIT HOWEVER THAT THEY FELT A UNITED NATIONS PRESENCE WOULD HINDER THEIR AIM OF GETTING DIRECT TALKS WITH THE ARABS.
2. THROUGHOUT THE CONVERSATION GOLDA MEIR, WHO ADMITTED TO BEING AMONG THE QUOTE HAWKS UNQUOTE, TOOK AN AGGRESSIVE AND IRRIDENTIST LINE. EBAN WAS MORE CONCERNED WITH DERIVING PRACTICAL BENEFITS FROM THE PRESENT SITUATION.
3. MRS. MEIR IS RETURNING TONIGHT TO ISRAEL WHERE SHE WILL UNDOUBTEDLY TRY TO ENCOURAGE THE HAWKS. IT WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR YOU TO COUNTER HER ACTIVITIES DIRECTLY BUT MR. BROWN THINKS YOU MAY BE ABLE TO MAKE SOME DISCREET USE OF THE MARKED DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE ATTITUDES OF MRS. MEIR AND EBAN AS THEY WERE EXPRESSED IN TODAY'S CONVERSATION.
4. FULL RECORD FOLLOWS BY BAG.
F O PASS TEL AVIV.

LORD CARADON.

SENT AT 0336 22 JUNE
RECD AT 0336 22 JUNE

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COPY NO.

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1458

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
21 JUNE 1967

CONFIDENTIAL.
FOLLOWING FOR PALLISER AND SIR D. ALLEN FROM MAITLAND.

UP TO NOW THE FOREIGN SECRETARY'S TIME HAS BEEN FULLY TAKEN UP WITH HIS SPEECH AND VARIOUS BILATERAL TALKS. AS MR. BROWN SAID IN HIS MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER, THE SPEECH THIS MORNING WAS GENERALLY VERY WELL RECEIVED. MEMBERS OF FRIENDLY AND NON-ALIGNED DELEGATIONS HAVE SAID THAT IT CONTAINED THE MOST CONSTRUCTIVE SET OF PROPOSALS IN THE DEBATE SO FAR. ALTHOUGH THE IRAQIS AND SUDANESE IN THEIR TALKS WITH THE FOREIGN SECRETARY ARE STILL TAKING A RATHER CRITICAL LINE, SOME OF THE OTHER ARAB DELEGATIONS HAVE CONFESSED VERY PRIVATELY THAT THE ARABS AS A WHOLE ARE PLEASED AND IN PARTICULAR WITH THE PASSAGE ON JERUSALEM. SOME OF THEM HAVE CONTRASTED THE FOREIGN SECRETARY'S SPEECH WITH GOLDBERG'S WHICH THEY DID NOT MUCH LIKE, BUT THERE MAY OF COURSE BE AN ELEMENT OF WEDGE-DRIVING IN THIS. THE ISRAELIS ARE A BIT UPSET ABOUT THE JERUSALEM PASSAGE AND OVER THE STRONG RECOMMENDATION IN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY'S SPEECH FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A HIGH LEVEL UNITED NATIONS PERSONALITY IN THE AREA. THIS OF COURSE INTERFERES WITH THEIR OWN IDEA OF LETTING THE ARABS STEW IN THEIR OWN JUICE UNTIL THEY ARE READY FOR DIRECT TALKS.

2. IT HAS EMERGED FROM OTHER BILATERALS THAT A NUMBER OF DELEGATIONS ARE NOW THINKING IN TERMS OF WORKING TOWARDS A RESOLUTION SOMEWHERE BETWEEN THE SOVIET AND AMERICAN DRAFTS. THE DANES, RUMANIANS AND LATIN AMERICANS ARE BEAVERING AWAY AT THIS. THESE EFFORTS ARE STILL, HOWEVER, FAR FROM COORDINATED AND IT IS LIKELY THAT NOTHING GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE CAN EMERGE UNTIL AT LEAST THE MIDDLE OF NEXT WEEK AND THEN THERE MAY BE MORE THAN ONE VERSION. APART FROM THE COMMUNISTS AND OF COURSE THE ARABS, THERE IS LITTLE ENTHUSIASM FOR A RESOLUTION CONDEMNING ISRAEL OUT OF HAND. BUT THERE IS SOME DANGER OF A RESOLUTION DEMANDING IMMEDIATE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, FOLLOWED PERHAPS BY TALKS ON OTHER ASPECTS AFTERWARDS BUT WITHOUT ANY GRATIFICATION WHICH MIGHT MAKE IT ACCEPTABLE TO THE ISRAELIS. AT THIS STAGE THERE IS NO SIGN OF ANYTHING BEING PUT ON PAPER WHICH WOULD HAVE THE BALANCE, PRACTICALITY AND COMPREHENSIVENESS WHICH WILL BE REQUIRED IF

/ THIS.....

THIS ASSEMBLY IS TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH THE SITUATION NOW FACING THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

3. AFTER TWO FULL DAYS HERE WE ARE FAIRLY CERTAIN THAT THE ASSESSMENT WE MADE BEFORE WE LEFT OF PRESENT SOVIET TACTICS IS RIGHT. EVERYONE REGARDS THEIR PERFORMANCE HERE AS A PROPAGANDA EXERCISE CONDUCTED WITH CONSIDERABLE RUTHLESSNESS. KOSYGIN PERSONALLY HAS BEEN ADROIT ENOUGH TO ADOPT A MODERATE TONE. RUSK AND HIS PEOPLE, WITH WHOM THE FOREIGN SECRETARY HAD A GOOD SESSION LAST NIGHT, AGREE WITH THIS ASSESSMENT.

4. THE FOREIGN SECRETARY HAD AN APPOINTMENT TO SEE KOSYGIN TODAY BUT THIS WAS CANCELLED BY THE RUSSIANS FOR WHAT WE ARE ASSURED ARE GENUINE TIMETABLE DIFFICULTIES. KOSYGIN HAS POSTPONED HIS DEPARTURE FOR TWO DAYS AND IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER THE RUSSIANS OFFER A FRESH APPOINTMENT.

5. THIS MORNING THE FOREIGN SECRETARY RECEIVED AN INVITATION TO WASHINGTON FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON. WE ARE GOING DOWN TOMORROW TO WASHINGTON IN THE PRESIDENT'S PLANE FOR WHAT IS CALLED A QUOTE FAMILY LUNCH PARTY UNQUOTE WITH KRAG AND MORO AND FANFANI. ACCORDING TO PRESENT PLANS THE FOREIGN SECRETARY WILL HAVE HALF AN HOUR WITH THE PRESIDENT BEFORE LUNCH. WHEN WE GET BACK IN THE AFTERNOON MR. BROWN HAS AN INFORMAL MEETING WITH FAWZI.

6. ON FRIDAY LORD CARADON IS GIVING A LUNCH FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO MEET MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. COUVE IS GIVING A DINNER IN THE EVENING FOR SOME NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS. BEYOND THAT OUR PLANS ARE UNCERTAIN.

7. THE FOREIGN SECRETARY WAS VERY GLAD TO HAVE THE FULL ACCOUNT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S TALKS WITH DE GAULLE GIVEN IN FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO 3170. THIS WAS MOST INTERESTING.

8. P.U.S. CONCURS.

LORD CARADON.

SENT AT 0457 22 JUNE
RECD AT 0457 22 JUNE

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PRISEC (F.O.)

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But see the attached file of the same date from Bonn — "per pouch per mail"....

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE PARIS
TELEGRAM NO.645

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
21 JUNE 1967

CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO.645 OF 21 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON AND SAVING TO STOCKHOLM BONN ATHENS ROME OSLO RAWALPINDI WARSAW PRAGUE SOFIA THE HAGUE BRUSSELS UKMIS GENEVA OTTAWA AND CAIRO.

MY TELEGRAM NO.633.

SUEZ CANAL.

THE QUAI D'ORSAY TELEPHONED TO GIVE US DETAILS OF A REPORT RECEIVED FROM CAIRO AFTER THE FRENCH CONSUL-GENERAL HAD PAID A VISIT TO ISMAILIA.

THE CONSUL-GENERAL SAW TWO DREDGERS WHICH HAD BEEN BURNT AND SUNK SOUTH OF ISMAILIA AND ARE COMPLETELY BLOCKING THE PASSAGE AT THAT POINT. HE WAS TOLD BY THE EGYPTIAN AUTHORITIES THAT THE CANAL WAS BLOCKED BETWEEN ISMAILIA AND PORT SAID BY A RAILWAY BRIDGE WHICH HAD COLLAPSED INTO THE CANAL. HE WAS ALSO TOLD THAT ONE SHIP AND SEVERAL BARGES, ALL LOADED WITH CEMENT, HAD BEEN SUNK NEAR SUEZ, COMPLETELY BLOCKING THE SOUTHERN EXIT. HE WAS TOLD BY THE MILITARY AND CIVIL AUTHORITIES AT ISMAILIA THAT NO ATTEMPT WOULD BE MADE TO RE-OPEN THE CANAL UNTIL A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED, AND THAT EVEN THEN THE RE-OPENING WOULD REQUIRE TWO MONTHS' WORK.

FOREIGN OFFICE PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK 54 AND WASHINGTON 191 AND SAVING TO STOCKHOLM 26 BONN 182 ATHENS 5 ROME 175 OSLO 22 RAWALPINDI 3 WARSAW 7 PRAGUE 6 SOFIA 3 THE HAGUE 181 BRUSSELS 151 UKMIS GENEVA 86 OTTAWA 20 AND CAIRO 4.

SIR P. REILLY.

SENT AT 1315Z/21 JUNE
RECD AT 1315Z/21 JUNE

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IMMEDIATE PARIS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 648 21 JUNE 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 648 OF 21 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW TEL AVIV UKMIS NEW YORK SAIGON AND PEKING.

STATEMENT BY GENERAL DE GAULLE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND VIETNAM.

GENERAL DE GAULLE MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT AT A MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS IN PARIS ON 21 JUNE (THE TEXT WAS ISSUED TO THE PRESS IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS BY AN OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN): BEGINS:

THE SPIRIT AND THE SUBSTANCE OF WAR ARE SPREADING ANEW OVER THE WORLD. ONE CONFLICT CONTRIBUTES TO THE INSTIGATION OF ANOTHER. THE WAR UNLEASHED IN VIETNAM BY AMERICAN INTERVENTION, THE DESTRUCTION OF LIFE AND PROPERTY TO WHICH IT GIVES RISE, THE BASIC FUTILITY WHICH IS ITS CHARACTERISTIC HOWEVER POWERFUL THE MEANS EMPLOYED MAY BE AND HOWEVER TERRIBLE THEIR EFFECTS, CANNOT FAIL TO EXTEND THE TROUBLE, NOT ONLY ON THE SPOT BUT ALSO FAR AWAY. HENCE THE ATTITUDE OF CHINA AND HER HASTY ARMAMENT. HENCE, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL SEQUENCE WHICH LED UP TO THE STRUGGLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

FRANCE HAS OPPOSED THE WAR IN VIETNAM AND THE FOREIGN INTERVENTION WHICH IS THE CAUSE OF IT. SHE HAS FROM THE BEGINNING MAINTAINED THAT THIS CONFLICT CAN BE ENDED ONLY IF THE UNITED STATES UNDERTAKE TO WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES WITHIN A FIXED PERIOD.

FRANCE HAS OPPOSED THE WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST, MOST CERTAINLY, SHE CONSIDERS IT JUST THAT EACH OF THE STATES IN QUESTION, AND NOTABLY THAT OF ISRAEL, SHOULD BE ABLE TO LIVE. SHE THEREFORE DISAPPROVED THE THREATS TO DESTROY ISRAEL WHICH ISRAEL'S NEIGHBOURS HAD BEEN BRANDISHING, AND SHE RESERVED HER POSITION WITH REGARD TO THE HANDICAP IMPOSED UPON THAT STATE IN THE MATTER OF NAVIGATION IN THE GULF OF AQABA. BUT FRANCE ALSO CONDEMNS THE OPENING OF HOSTILITIES BY ISRAEL.

IN ORDER TO PREVENT FIGHTING, THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT PROPOSED THAT THE FOUR GREAT POWERS SHOULD CONCERT TOGETHER

/ JOINTLY

JOINTLY TO OPPOSE RESORT TO ARMS. AT THE SAME TIME, THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT LET IT BE KNOWN TO EACH OF THE TWO PARTIES THAT THEY WOULD PLACE IN THE WRONG THE ONE WHO SHOULD FIRST OPEN FIRE. TODAY, FRANCE DOES NOT ACCEPT AS ESTABLISHED (NE TIENT POUR ACQUIS) ANY OF THE CHANGES WHICH HAVE BEEN BROUGHT ABOUT ON THE GROUND BY MILITARY ACTION. FROM THE MOMENT THAT WAR BROKE OUT IN THE MIDDLE EAST, HOWEVER, FRANCE HAS CONSIDERED THAT THERE IS NO CHANCE OF ARRIVING AT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN THE PRESENT WORLD SITUATION UNLESS A NEW WORLD FACTOR EMERGES. THIS FACTOR COULD AND SHOULD BE THE ENDING OF THE WAR IN VIETNAM, BY SETTING A TERM TO FOREIGN INTERVENTION. IF ONE DAY THE OPPORTUNITY WERE TO OFFER FOR THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE, FRANCE WOULD NATURALLY NOT FAIL TO SEIZE UPON IT AS FAR AS SHE WAS CONCERNED. IN ORDER THAT SHE SHOULD BE ABLE AT THAT MOMENT TO ACT EFFECTIVELY, IT IS NECESSARY THAT FRANCE SHOULD STICK TO THE POSITION SHE HAS ALREADY ADOPTED IN THE INTERESTS OF THE WHOLE WORLD. ENDS.

F O PASS PRIORITY WASHINGTON 193 MOSCOW 56 TEL AVIV 15 UKMIS NEW YORK 56 SAIGON 28 AND ROUTINE PEKING 9.

SIR P REILLY

SENT 1840Z/21 JUNE 1967
RECD 1841Z/21 JUNE 1967

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PRIORITY TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 670 21 June 1967

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Addressed to F.O. telegram No. 670 of 21 June
Repeated for information to:
U.K. Mission New York.

Following is text of statement made by Prime Minister Eshkol at Sharm es Sheikh on 20 June.

At this site where hate and aggression against us reached its peak forcing us to defend ourselves, from this place where evil started, I again state to our neighbours my readiness to meet with each one of the Arab leaders to discuss permanent peace. My words do not stem out of arrogance. I would not like somebody to believe that I am saying this because I am in a position of strength, but out of desire to forget the past and to prevent tests of strength, in the future, out of a deep longing to serve jointly the entire region and to renew the days of prosperity when Jews and Arabs contributed together towards human culture. Some years ago, during a comparatively quiet period, I put forward a similar suggestion to the President of Egypt, but my words were then received with mockery. At this historic hour, here in Sharm el Sheikh I renew my appeal and I am ready to meet for peace talks with our nearest neighbour, with President Nasser, with King Hussein and with other Arab leaders, at any time and at any place. Perhaps this time I should add at any place - on land or on sea. The Middle East has a great future only through peace and joint endeavour. We should not miss the opportunity. Let no one think that it is possible to put the clock back. We are here in order not to retreat from the eternal goal of the Jewish people. Let us therefore march together towards a permanent peace and security. I am against a settlement which calls for an Armistice Agreement I speak about permanent peace and the creation of such security conditions under which one party will not be afraid of the other. I therefore appeal for cooperation in all fields - Economic, Cultural and Spiritual, for the common contribution towards the prosperity of our peoples and the entire world.

F.O. pass U.K. Mission New York No. 135.

Mr. Hadow Sent 1600Z 21 June
Recd 1907Z 21 June

[Repeated as requested]

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PRIORITY FOREIGN OFFICE TO BRUSSELS

TEL NO.1046 21 JUNE 1967 (V)

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ADDRESSED TO BRUSSELS TELEGRAM NUMBER 1046 OF 21 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 956 OF 9 JUNE: SUEZ CANAL.

THE BELGIAN AMBASSADOR TOLD THE MINISTER OF STATE, MR. THOMSON, ON 15 JUNE THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WERE IN PRINCIPLE PREPARED TO ORGANISE AN INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO GET THE CANAL OPEN, SUBJECT TO THE VIEWS OF THEIR AMBASSADOR IN CAIRO. WE HAVE HEARD NO MORE ABOUT THIS FROM HIM. WE SHOULD THEREFORE BE GRATEFUL, IF YOU SEE NO OBJECTION, IF YOU WOULD ENQUIRE OR ASK THE BELGIANS WHETHER THEY HAVE HEARD FROM THEIR AMBASSADOR IN CAIRO AND HOW THIS MATTER NOW STANDS.

SOSFA SENT 0850Z 22 JUNE

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION:
N.E.A.D.

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The Middle East Situation 21 June

Summary of F.O. telegrams

Refugees

Jordan Preliminary analysis of the census of refugees taken by the Jordan Government and UNRWA indicate that between 200,000 and 250,000 persons have applied for registration as refugees. However the Jordan Director of UNRWA believes that the final total of "genuine" refugees from the West Bank will be around 100,000 of whom 80,000 previously had refugee status on the West Bank.

2. The Jordan Government have not as yet managed to organise the proper coordination of the collection and distribution of relief supplies.

3. Sinai and Gaza The State Department quoting Israel sources has said that there are about 500,000 civilians in Sinai and Gaza. These, except for 5,000 able to care for themselves, are being looked after by UNRWA, CARE and the Israel Government.

Saudi Arabia

4. King Feisal told the Egyptian Ambassador at a reception for Heads of Diplomatic Missions that the allegation of Anglo/American air intervention on the side of Israel was untrue. He vigorously refuted the allegation in detail in spite of the Egyptian Ambassador's insistence that it was true.

United Nations

5. The debate in the Assembly has continued. The Foreign Secretary is to speak today (4 p.m. B.S.T.). The list of speakers is to close on Friday morning, 23 June.

Oil

6. A First Secretary in the Spanish Embassy in Washington

/has

has stated that Spain has made a recent agreement with the Soviet Union to purchase Russian crude oil to make up for the present failures in Arab supplies.

Eastern Department

21 June, 1967

Foreign Office
London S.W.1

21 June, 1967.

Dear Michael,

I attach an advance text of the Foreign Secretary's speech to the General Assembly today. I understand that the text as delivered varied only slightly from the enclosed version.

I will let you have a correct version as early as possible tomorrow.

Yours ever,
Derek.

A. M. Palliser, Esq., CMG,
10 Downing Street.

INTRODUCTION

THIS EMERGENCY SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY HAS MET TO DISCUSS VERY GRAVE PROBLEMS. WE HAVE TO DISCUSS WITH GREAT URGENCY THE PROBLEMS CAUSED BY THE WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

2. WE ARE DEALING WITH POLITICAL PROBLEMS BUT WE MUST NOT FORGET THAT POLITICS INVOLVE HUMAN BEINGS. WE ARE CONCERNED WITH THE FATE OF TENS OF THOUSANDS OF ORDINARY MEN AND WOMEN WHO HAVE SUFFERED FROM THE WAR. THIS IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN ALL THE RESOLUTIONS IN THE WORLD.

3. ALL COUNTRIES MUST BEAR A MEASURE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PROBLEMS WHICH NOW BESET US. ATTEMPTS HAVE BEEN MADE IN THE PAST TO REACH A SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. BUT FOR A LONG TIME WE HAVE GIVEN UP THESE ATTEMPTS. FOR THE LAST TEN YEARS THERE HAS BEEN AN UNEASY CALM BROKEN AT FREQUENT INTERVALS BY FRONTIER INCIDENTS AND CONFLICTS. WE HOPED THAT PEACE MIGHT BE MAINTAINED BY THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE. BUT WE WERE BROUGHT FACE TO FACE WITH PROBLEMS THAT WE COULD NO LONGER IGNORE. THIS IS THE BACKGROUND AGAINST WHICH OUR DISCUSSIONS HAVE TO TAKE PLACE.

Uniting for Peace

4. THAT IS WHY WE HAVE THIS EMERGENCY SESSION OF THE ASSEMBLY. WE HAD SOME DOUBTS WHETHER IT WAS RIGHT TO BRING OUR PROBLEMS BEFORE THE ASSEMBLY WHILE THEY WERE STILL BEING CONSIDERED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL. BUT THE PLAIN FACT WAS THAT WE WERE PREVENTED FROM MAKING PROGRESS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. N.B. X

THEREFORE WE MUST HOPE THAT SOME REAL PRACTICAL RESULTS WILL EMERGE FROM THIS MEETING OF THE ASSEMBLY. WE NEED TO CONCERN OURSELVES WITH PRACTICAL PROBLEMS. THERE ARE GATHERED HERE THE REPRESENTATIVES OF MOST COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD AND THE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD ARE WAITING TO SEE WHAT WE DO. WE MUST NOT DISAPPOINT THEM. WE MUST ALL REMEMBER THAT HAPPENED IN THE LAST YEARS OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. WE MUST DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO ENSURE THAT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS DOES NOT FOLLOW THE SAME ROAD AS THE LEAGUE.

Emphasis on Practical Tasks

(1)

5. I MUST SAY THAT WE HAVE ALL BEEN SUBJECTED HERE TO AN AMAZING AMOUNT OF DOUBLE TALK.

6. I HAVE READ VERY CAREFULLY THE SPEECH WHICH MR. KOSYGIN MADE ON MONDAY. I WAS SORY I WAS NOT HERE TO LISTEN TO HIM.

7. HE MADE A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC CHARGES AGAINST THE UNITED KINGDOM. I WANT TO ANSWER THESE ONE BY ONE.

3 Reply to Kosygin

8. FIRST HE SAID - AND I QUOTE HIS WORDS - ''ISRAEL HAS ENJOYED SUPPORT FROM CERTAIN IMPERIALIST CIRCLES----- THESE POWERFUL CIRCLES MADE STATEMENTS AND TOOK PRACTICAL ACTION WHICH MIGHT HAVE BEEN INTERPRETED BY ISRAEL EXTREMISTS AS DIRECT ENCOURAGEMENT TO COMMIT ACTS OF AGG ESSION''. IN THIS CONTEXT HE REFERRED TO THE MOVEMENT OF BRITISH NAVAL AND AIR FORCES TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR UPON THE ARAB STATES.

9. I NOTICE THAT MR. KOSYGIN DID NOT SAY THAT THERE WAS DIRECT PARTICIPATION BY BRITISH FORCES IN THE FIGHTING. HE KNOWS THAT THIS CANNOT POSSIBLY BE TRUE. HE COULD HAVE VERIFIED THE FACTS FROM HIS OWN SOURCES. THERE WERE, AFTER ALL, CONSIDERABLE SOVIET NAVAL FORCES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AT THIS TIME.

10. THOSE WHO PUT AROUND THESE FALSEHOODS MUST HAVE KNOWN THAT THEY WERE TOTALLY UNTRUE. NEVERTHELESS, THROUGHOUT THE FIGHTING, THEY WERE REPEATED OVER AND OVER AGAIN BY CAIRO RADIO AND BY OTHER RADIO STATIONS ALL OVER THE MIDDLE EAST.

11. I DOUBT IF THERE IS ONE PERSON IN THIS HALL TODAY WHO NOW ACCEPTS ANY OF THESE ALLEGATIONS. WE HAVE SAID THAT WE WOULD WELCOME INVESTIGATION BY THE UNITED NATIONS AND THIS OFFER STILL STANDS. THE LOG BOOKS OF THE SHIPS CONCERNED ARE AVAILABLE FOR INSPECTION IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. ?

12. WE GREATLY REGREAT THE DAMAGE WHICH THESE FALSE CHARGES HAVE DONE TO OUR RELATIONS WITH OUR ARAB FRIENDS. NOW THEY CAN BE SEEN TO BE WITHOUT FOUNDATION I HOPE THAT WE CAN RE-ESTABLISH ONCE AGAIN OUR OLD FRIENDLY RELATIONSHIPS WITH THESE ARAB STATES.

13. NOW LET ME TURN TO OTHER CHARGES WHICH MR. KOSYGIN HAS MADE. HE IMPLIED THAT WE HAD CAUSED DELAYS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT BY FAILING TO GIVE OUR ASSENT TO A DECISION PROMPTED BY THE EMERGENCY WE WERE PROMOTING AN AGGRESSOR. AGAIN NOTHING COULD BE FURTHER FROM THE TRUTH. IF MR. KOSYGIN WILL READ THE RECORDS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOR THE WEEKS BEFORE THE FIGHTING TOOK PLACE, HE WILL BE REMINDED THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM URGED THE COUNCIL TO TAKE ACTION TO AVOID A CRISIS. THE WHOLE AIM OF OUR POLICY WAS TO TRY TO PREVENT AN ISSUE, WHICH WE KNEW TO BE HIGHLY INFLAMMABLE, FROM DEVELOPING INTO WAR. IF WE COULD HAVE GOT THE SUPPORT OF THE SOVIET UNION AT THAT TIME, WE MIGHT NOT NOW BE FACED WITH OUR PRESENT GRAVE PROBLEMS. IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE OUTBREAK OF THE FIGHTING WE WERE AMONG THE FIRST TO URGE THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD CALL FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE. IT WAS NOT WE WHO DELAYED THAT CALL UNTIL THE SECOND EVENING OF THE WAR.

4-Power Talks?

14. AS YOU WILL SEE THERE WAS MUCH IN MR. KOSYGIN'S SPEECH WITH WHICH I PROFOUNDLY DISAGREE, BUT I HAVE NOT BEEN LOOKING OUT FOR DIFFERENCES. I WANT TO FIND SOME COMMON GROUND WITH HIM. WE CERTAINLY SHARE HIS VIEW THAT, WHEN QUESTIONS OF PEACE AND WAR ARE INVOLVED, NO STATE SHOULD REMAIN ALOOF. AT THE END OF HIS SPEECH MR. KOSYGIN SAID AND AGAIN I QUOTE : ''MUCH DEPENDS ON THE EFFORTS OF THE BIG POWERS. IT WOULD BE GOOD IF THEIR DELEGATIONS------ FOUND COMMON LANGUAGE IN ORDER TO REACH DECISIONS MEETING THE INTERESTS OF PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE INTERESTS OF UNIVERSAL PEACE.'' THIS COULD BE A VERY INTERESTING STATEMENT. I WOULD LIKE MR. KOSYGIN TO TELL US EXACTLY WHAT HE MEANT BY THIS. I FOUND THE STATEMENT RATHER HARD TO UNDERSTAND. COULD HE TELL ME, OR BETTER STILL COULD HE TELL THE ASSEMBLY, WHAT HE HAS IN MIND? I WILL SET OUT IN MY SPEECH WHAT I THINK SHOULD BE DONE. WILL MR. KOSYGIN TELL ME, OR THE ASSEMBLY, WHETHER HE IS PREPARED TO DISCUSS THESE SAME PROPOSALS WITH US.

3

15. BEFORE THE FIGHTING BROKE OUT I SAID IN THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT THAT AS A PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL [redacted] HAD A DUTY TO SUPPORT EFFORTS TO KEEP THE PEACE EVERYWHERE. I MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE REGARDED THE UNITED NATIONS AS PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR PEACE-KEEPING. I REPEAT WHAT I SAID THERE. WE HAVE HAD LONG-STANDING TIES OF FRIENDSHIP WITH ALL THE ARAB STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND ALSO WITH ISRAEL. IF I MAY SPEAK PERSONALLY FOR A MOMENT, I HAVE FOR A LONG TIME FELT A DEEP CONCERN FOR THESE COUNTRIES. OUR FRIENDSHIP WITH THEM HAS, I BELIVE, BEEN OF GREAT MUTUAL VALUE IN THE PAST. IT IS MY DESIRE TO SEE IT RENEWED AND STRENGTHENED IN THE FUTURE: AND I FOR ONE WILL WORK FOR THAT PURPOSE.

(4)

British Non-Involvement

16. THE ATTITUDE OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IS CLEAR. WE WANT THE AREA TO BE AT PEACE. WE RECOGNISE THAT PEACE DEMANDS THE GREATEST POSSIBLE MEASURES OF JUSTICE IN ITS POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS. AND ON THIS FOUNDATION THE PROGRESS OF ITS PEOPLES, ESPECIALLY OF THOSE WHOSE NEED IS GREATEST, MUST BE BASED.

17. I NOW WANT TO SET OUT CERTAIN PRINCIPLES WHICH I BELIVE SHOULD GUIDE US IN STRIVING COLLECTIVELY FOR A LASTING SETTLEMENT.

18. CLEARLY SUCH PRINCIPLES MUST DERIVE FROM THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER. ARTICLE 2 OF THE CHARTER PROVIDES THAT ''ALL MEMBERS SHALL REFRAIN IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STATE''. HERE THE WORDS ''TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY'' HAVE A DIRECT BEARING ON THE QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL, ON WHICH MUCH HAS BEEN SAID IN EARLIER SPEECHES. I SEE NO TWO WAYS ABOUT THIS, AND I STATE THIS VERY CLEARLY. IN MY VIEW WAR SHOULD NOT LEAD TO TERRITORIAL AGGRANDISEMENT.

19. REPORTS SUGGEST THAT ONE PARTICULAR POINT MAY BE OF SPECIAL URGENCY. THIS CONCERNS JERUSALEM. I CALL UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL NOT TO TAKE ANY STEPS IN RELATION TO JERUSALEM WHICH WOULD CONFLICT WITH THIS PRINCIPLE. I SAY VERY SOLEMNLY TO THAT GOVERNMENT THAT, IF THEY PURPORT TO ANNEX THE OLD CITY OR LEGISLATE FOR ITS ANNEXATION, THEY WILL BE TAKING A STEP WHICH WILL ISOLATE THEM FROM WORLD OPINION.

20. HAVING MADE CLEAR MY STAND ON THIS ISSUE, I GO ON TO RECOGNISE THAT IN ALL THIS BOTH THE ARABS AND ISRAEL HAVE MATTERS TO RAISE WHICH THEY ARE ENTITLED TO FEEL MUST BE HEARD AND TREATED WITH RESPECT. AND WE IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ALSO HAVE OUR LEGITIMATE INTERESTS WHICH MUST SIMILARLY BE RESPECTED.

21. WHAT ARE SOME OF THESE MATTERS? FIRST, THERE ARE THE INTERESTS AND WELFARE OF THE REFUGEES. THIS VERY SERIOUS PROBLEM HAS BEEN WITH US FOR A LONG TIME. THE PROBLEM HAS BEEN MADE MORE DIFFICULT BY WHAT HAS HAPPENED IN THE LAST FEW WEEKS. IT NOW REQUIRES A GREAT INTERNATIONAL EFFORT TO ALLEVIATE THE PROBLEM. I SHALL HAVE SOMETHING MORE TO SAY ABOUT THIS IN A MOMENT.

4b Refugees

22. SECONDLY, ANY SETTLEMENT MUST RECOGNISE THE RIGHT OF ALL STATES IN THE AREA TO EXIST. IN TRUE DIGNITY AND REAL FREEDOM, INCLUDING THE ABILITY TO EARN THEIR LIVING IN ASSURED PEACE. I UNDERSTOOD THIS TO BE THE VIEW OF MR. KOSYGIN AND I HOPE MY UNDERSTANDING WAS CORRECT.

4c Territorial Integrity

23. THIRDLY, THERE MUST BE RESPECT FOR THE RIGHT OF FREE AND INNOCENT PASSAGE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS FOR THE SHIPS OF ALL NATIONS. THERE IS TOO THE IMMEDIATE PRACTICAL PROBLEM OF GETTING THE SUEZ CANAL CLEARED. ONCE THIS THIS IS DONE THIS GREAT INTERNATIONAL WATERWAY MUST BE REOPENED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THIS IS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO VERY MANY COUNTRIES REPRESENTED IN THIS ASSEMBLY.

4d Innocent Passage

(6)

24. FOURTHLY - AND NOW I COME TO A REALLY CRITICAL POINT - IF THE COUNTRIES OF THE MIDDLE EAST ARE TO LIVE TOGETHER IN PEACE AND DEVELOP THEIR RESOURCES, THEY MUST BE FREED FROM THE PRESSURES WHICH HAVE DRIVEN THEM TO WASTE THEIR RESOURCES IN AN ARMS RACE. OBVIOUSLY NO GOVERNMENT CAN RESIST THESE PRESSURES IF ITS NEIGHBOURS ARE NOT DOING THE SAME. THE PROBLEM IMPOSES RESPONSIBILITIES NOT ONLY ON THE GOVERNMENT IN THE AREA BUT ALSO ON THE POWERS WHO ARE AT PRESENT SUPPLYING ARMS. IT IS THEREFORE IMPERATIVE THAT WE WHO SUPPLY ARMS LIMIT AND CONTROL WHAT WE DO. AND IT IS ALL THE MORE IMPERATIVE SINCE NEW COUNTRIES ARE COMING INTO THE BUSINESS OF SUPPLYING ARMS TO THE MIDDLE EAST. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT AN AGREEMENT ON ARMS LIMITATION SHOULD BE CONCLUDED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

4d Arms Limitation

25. I NOW COME TO THE IMMEDIATE PRACTICAL THINGS WE CAN AND MUST DO. I SHALL FIRST SAY A WORD ABOUT HUMANITARIAN ACTION AND WILL THEN COME TO BROADER POLITICAL ACTION BY THE UNITED NATIONS ITSELF.

Practical Steps

26. FIRST, WE MUST DEAL AT ONCE WITH THE PROBLEM OF DISPLACEMENT. THE AFTERMATH OF WAR IS ALWAYS FULL OF TRAGEDY AND WE HAVE ALL BEEN DISTRESSED BY THE SUFFERING CAUSED TO THOSE IN THE AREAS WHERE FIGHTING HAS TAKEN PLACE. I DO NOT THINK ANYBODY EXPECTS A FINAL SETTLEMENT TO BE REACHED DURING THIS ASSEMBLY. IT IS GOING TO TAKE TIME. MEANWHILE OUR MOST URGENT THOUGHTS SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE POPULATIONS WHICH HAVE SUFFERED AND ARE STILL SUFFERING FROM THE UPHEAVAL OF WAR.

5 a Emergency Relief

IT IS IMPERATIVE, IF FEELINGS ARE NOT TO BE FURTHER INFLAMED AND A SETTLEMENT MADE STILL MORE REMOTE, THAT THE ARAB COMMUNITIES WHOSE LANDS HAVE BEEN OVERRUN SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO STAY WHERE THEY ARE - OR TO RETURN IF THEY HAVE FLED AND WISH TO COME BACK. WE CANNOT ALLOW THESE PEOPLE TO SUFFER FURTHER AND WE CANNOT ALLOW WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO THEM TO RESULT IN A FURTHER ESCALATION OF THE ALREADY INTRACTABLE REFUGEE PROBLEM. WE MUST EXPRESS THIS INTENTION IN ANY RESOLUTION WE PASS.

27. BUT THIS WILL NOT BE ENOUGH. WE MUST IN THE MEANTIME LOSE NO TIME AT ALL IN BRINGING RELIEF TO THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN DRIVEN OUT OF THEIR HOMES AND WHO HAVE SUFFERED DIRECTLY FROM THE FIGHTING. THIS PROBLEM HAS BEEN TACKLED ENERGETICALLY BY MANY VOLUNTARY RELIEF AGENCIES WHICH ARE DOING MAGNIFICENT WORK.

British Contribution to Emergency Relief

28. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAVE SENT A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO THE RELIEF PROGRAMME ADMINISTERED BY UNRWA. BY THE END OF THIS YEAR, WE SHALL HAVE CONTRIBUTED 100 MILLION DOLLARS SINCE 1950 TO THE UNRWA PROGRAMME - 14 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL OF ALL GOVERNMENTAL CONTRIBUTIONS. IN PARTICULAR, AS A CONTRIBUTION TO THE PRESENT EMERGENCY, WE ARE MAKING A SPECIAL GRANT TO UNRWA OF 1/2 MILLION DOLLARS, IN ADDITION TO OUR NORMAL CONTRIBUTION.

29. WE HAVE ALSO PRODUCED SUBSTANTIAL RELIEF IN KIND AT VERY SHORT NOTICE, INCLUDING BADLY NEEDED BLANKETS AND MEDICINES. WE HAVE TOLD THE JORDAN GOVERNMENT THAT WE WILL MAKE A GRANT TO THEM OF 500 THOUSAND POUNDS TO BE SPENT ON AGREED REHABILITATION AND RECONSTRUCTION WORK IN JORDAN. I AM NOT SAYING ALL THIS IN ORDER TO BOAST OR TO SAY THAT WE ARE BETTER THAN ANYONE ELSE. I AM SIMPLY SAYING THESE THINGS BECAUSE THEY ARE THE PRACTICAL THINGS WHICH CAN BE DONE NOW. IF ANY MEMBER OF THE UNITED NATIONS HAS NOT DONE ANYTHING YET, THEY CAN START TODAY.

See Gen's Special Rep.

5b

30. BUT WHEN WE HAVE DONE ALL WE CAN TO RELIEVE SUFFERING, IT IS STILL OUR MAIN TASK IN THIS ORGANISATION TO KEEP THE PEACE. THERE CANNOT BE ANY GREATER ISSUE FOR THE UNITED NATIONS AND THIS BRINGS ME TO THE MAIN RECOMMENDATION I WANT TO MAKE. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SHOULD NOMINATE A REPRESENTATIVE, WHOSE STANDING SHOULD BE UNCHALLENGED, TO GO AT ONCE TO THE AREA. HE SHOULD HAVE A PROPER STAFF AND FULL FACILITIES. HE SHOULD ADVISE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE WHOLE CONDUCT OF RELATIONS ARISING FROM THE CEASE-FIRE AND THE SUBSEQUENT KEEPING OF THE PEACE ON THE FRONTIERS. HIS TASK WOULD BE BOTH TO REPORT TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND TO PLAY AN ACTIVE PART IN RELATIONS WITH ALL THE PARTIES IN THE AREA ITSELF.

31. THE FIRST TASK OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPRESENTATIVE WOULD BE TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS IN CONSULTATION WITH THE CHIEF STAFF ABOUT THE WORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANISATION. MAY I SAY AT ONCE THAT THE WHOLE WORLD COMMUNITY HAS EVERY REASON TO FEEL AND EXPRESS THE SINCEREST ADMIRATION AND GRATITUDE FOR WHAT THE PRESENT U.N.T.S.O. TEAM HAS DONE UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF GENERAL ODD BULL. GENERAL BULL HAS IN CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE GREATEST DANGER AND DIFFICULTY CONDUCTED HIS OPERATIONS WITH OUTSTANDING COURAGE AND EFFICIENCY.

(Tribute to UNTSO)

32. IT SEEMS CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT GENERAL BULL COULD DO WITH URGENT REINFORCEMENT OF BOTH MEN AND MATERIAL. I SUGGEST THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SHOULD BE AUTHORIZED TO RECRUIT AND DESPATCH AT ONCE ANY EXTRA PERSONNEL WHOM GENERAL BULL MAY NEED. HE WILL ALSO NEED BETTER COMMUNICATIONS AND THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL SHOULD ALLOW HIM WITHOUT DELAY TO RE-OCCUPY THE HEADQUARTERS FROM WHICH HE WAS EXCLUDED DURING THE FIGHTING ROUND JERUSALEM.

33. THIS OPERATION AND ITS EXPANSION SHOULD BE CONDUCTED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE NEW REPRESENTATIVE TO BE APPOINTED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. BUT THIS OPERATION ONLY DEALS WITH THE CEASE-FIRE AND THE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH FOLLOW IMMEDIATELY FROM DISENGAGEMENT. THERE IS THE MUCH BIGGER AND MORE LASTING PROBLEM OF FUTURE PEACEKEEPING IN THE AREA. IT IS CLEAR THAT FOR THIS A NEW FORM OF U.N. MILITARY PRESENCE WILL BE NECESSARY WHICH WILL GIVE REALITY TO THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE IN AN AREA WHICH MAY WELL BE TROUBLED FOR SOME TIME TO COME. ONE OF THE MOST URGENT DUTIES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPRESENTATIVE SHOULD INMM ADVISE THE U.N. ON THE FORM WHICH A FUTURE UNITED NATIONS PRESENCE SHOULD TAKE. NEEDLESS TO SAY IT SHOULD BE SET UP IN A FORM WHICH SETS OUT PRECISELY THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH IT OPERATES.

5c

New UN presence

34. THE WORLD LOOKS TO US NOW TO DO MORE THAN STATE PRINCIPLES AND LONG-TERM OBJECTIVES. WE BELIEVE THAT THE PRINCIPLES FOR A SETTLEMENT WHICH I HAVE SET OUT TODAY WILL GAIN INCREASING ACCEPTANCE AND SUPPORT. BUT THAT WILL NOT BE ENOUGH. WHAT EVERYONE WISHES TO SEE, WHAT EVERYONE EXPECTS NOW, WHAT IS DESPERATELY REQUIRED, IS SOME IMMEDIATE, POSITIVE, PRACTICAL ACTION. IT IS TO THAT PURPOSE THAT WE HAVE TO SET OUR MINDS.

PERORATION

35. WHAT EVER WE ACHIEVE IN STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, IT IS BY THE ACTION WHICH FOLLOWS OUR MEETING HERE THAT WE WILL BE JUDGED.

36. IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT I HAVE MADE THE PROPOSALS I HAVE FOR MORE EFFECTIVE UNITED NATIONS ACTION - ACTION FOR DEALING WITH DISTRESS, FOR PREVENTING CONFLICT, FOR LAYING THE FOUNDATION OF A JUST SETTLEMENT WE MUST MOVE NOW TO MEET THE DESPERATE NEED.

37. SELDOM HAS THE U.N. FACED SUCH A CRISIS AND SUCH A CHALLENGE. ITS WHOLE FUTURE, ON WHICH WE ALL DEPEND, COULD TURN ON ITS ABILITY TO HANDLE THIS SITUATION. I SPEAK AS ONE WHO HAS FOR ALL MY POLITICAL LIFE HAD FAITH IN THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND SUBSEQUENTLY IN THE UNITED NATIONS. AT THIS MOMENT I CONFESS TO A DESPERATE ANXIETY ABOUT THE FUTURE.

38. AS I SPEAK NOW IN THIS EMERGENCY SESSION I FEEL THAT THE FUTURE OF THE ORGANISATION IN WHICH WE HAVE PUT OUR TRUST IS IN PERIL. AND I AM COMPELLED BY THE STRENGTH OF MY CONVICTION - A CONVICTION WHICH IS SHARED, I AM SURE, BY COUNTLESS PEOPLE IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES ROUND THE WORLD - A CONVICTION THAT THE LONGINGS OF THE WORLD DEPEND ON WHAT WE NOW DECIDE.

39. SOME OF US REMEMBER THAT WE HAVE WALKED THIS ROAD BEFORE. WE HAVE SEEN ONCE BEFORE IN OUR LIVES THE COLLAPSE OF AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION, THE FAILURE OF AN INTERNATIONAL IDEAL. WHAT IS MORE, AS WE MEET THERE WE CANNOT FORGET THAT EVEN IN THE LAST FEW DAYS NEWS HAS COME OF NEW DANGERS ON A SCALE WHICH WE CAN SCARCELY IMAGINE AND A NEW THREAT TO HUMAN SURVIVAL. THESE DANGERS AND THREATS GIVE NEW URGENCY TO ALL WE DO HERE.

Chinese H Bomb.

40. IF WE IN THE UNITED NATIONS FAIL NOW, IF WE FAIL TO MEET THIS CHALLENGE, IF WE FAIL TO ACT NOW, IF WE FAIL TO TAKE POSITIVE AND PRACTICAL ACTION BEFORE WE DISPERSE, WE SHALL HAVE FAILVED ALL THOSE WHO DEPEND ON US.

41. I HAVE TRIED TO SUGGEST THE PRACTICAL WAYS IN WHICH WE MIGHT START TO RESOLVE THE ISSUES WE FACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. BUT IF WE FAIL TO TAKE THE STRAIGHTFORWARD ACTIONS OPEN TO US, WE MUST CONSIDER THE CONSEQUENCES. I AM NOT THE ONLY MAN IN THIS ASSEMBLY WITH CHILDREN AND GRAND-CHILDREN. IF WE FAIL IN AN AREA AS DANGEROUS AS THIS, THE CHANCES OF THE WORLD, AND OUR CHILDREN AND GRANDCHILDREN, GOING UP IN A MUSHROOM CLOUD MUST BE ENORMOUS.

--END--

EN CLAIR AND BY BAG

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO CERTAIN MISSIONS

GUIDANCE NO. 129 7 JUNE, 1967 (IPG)

UNCLASSIFIED

ALLEGATIONS OF BRITISH INVOLVEMENT IN MIDDLE EAST WAR.

SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAS NOT SO FAR REPEATED THESE ALLEGATIONS WHICH ORIGINATE FOR THE MOST PART FROM CAIRO. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS SILENCE IS THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE WELL PLACED TO KNOW THAT THE ALLEGATIONS ARE LIES BECAUSE SHIPS FROM THEIR MEDITERRANEAN SQUADRON WERE ALWAYS CLOSE ENOUGH TO BRITISH AND AMERICAN CARRIERS WHEN AT SEA TO KNOW THAT NO OPERATIONS WERE BEING CARRIED OUT

SOSFA/CROSEC SENT 1444Z 7 JUNE

BY TELEGRAPH:

ANKARA	STOCKHOLM	BAGHDAD	TRIPOLI	RAWALPINDI
ATHENS	VIENNA	BAHRAIN	BENGHAZI	DACCA
BONN	MOSCOW	BEIRUT	TUNIS	COLOMBO
BRUSSELS	U.K.MIS.NEW YORK	JEDDA	ADDIS ABABA	KUALA LUMPUR
COPENHAGEN	B.I.S. NEW YORK	JERUSALEM	DAKAR	SINGAPORE
THE HAGUE	WASHINGTON	KUWAIT	CAPE TOWN	ACCRA
OSLO	BUENOS AIRES	TEHRAN	JOHANNESBURG	LAGOS
PARIS	CARACAS	TEL AVIV	OTTAWA	KAMPALA
U.K.DEL.NATO	MEXICO CITY	ALGIERS	CANBERRA	NAIROBI
ROME	RIO DE JANEIRO	CAIRO	WELLINGTON	LUSAKA
BELGRADE	ADEN	KHARTOUM	NEW DELHI	VALLETTA
BERNE	AMMAN	RABAT	KARACHI	NICOSIA

[ALL IMMEDIATE]

BANGKOK
TOKYO

[ALL PRIORITY]

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J.I.P.G.D.

EN CLAIR AND BY BAG

F L A S H FOREIGN OFFICE AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO CERTAIN MISSIONS.

GUIDANCE NO. 128 6 JUNE 1967 (JIPGD)

UNCLASSIFIED

FOLLOWING IS PRESS RELEASE ISSUED BY FOREIGN OFFICE ON 6 JUNE.

MIDDLE EAST

QUOTE HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT ARE SHOCKED BY REPORTS EMANATING FROM THE MIDDLE EAST AND CARRIED BY OFFICIAL NEWS MEDIA THAT PLANES FROM A BRITISH AIRCRAFT CARRIER HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN THE FIGHTING. THIS A MALICIOUS FABRICATION. THERE IS NOT A GRAIN OF TRUTH IN IT. IT IS THE POLICY OF HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT TO AVOID TAKING SIDES IN THIS CONFLICT AND TO DO EVERYTHING THEY CAN TO BRING ABOUT A CEASE FIRE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. AS STATED BY THE FOREIGN SECRETARY YESTERDAY IN THE HOUSE, ALL BRITISH FORCES IN THE AREA HAVE THE STRICTEST INSTRUCTIONS NOT TO BECOME INVOLVED IN ANY WAY.

2. MEASURES TO INTERUPT THE NORMAL FLOW OF OIL SUPPLIES OR TO CLOSE THE SUEZ CANAL TO SHIPPING ARE THEREFORE TOTALLY UNJUSTIFIED.

3. URGENT STEPS ARE BEING TAKEN IN LONDON AND IN THE CAPITALS OF ARAB STATES TO CORRECT THESE MIS-REPRESENTATIONS UNQUOTE.

SOSFA/CROSEC SENT 1142Z/6 JUNE 1967

BY TELEGRAPH:

ANKARA
ATHENS
UKMIS NEW YORK
BIS NEW YORK
WASHINGTON
AMMAN
BAGHDAD
BAHRAIN
BEIRUT
DAMASCUS
JEDDA
H.C. ADEN
ADDIS ABABA

[ALL IMMEDIATE]

JERUSALEM
KUWAIT
TEHRAN
TEL AVIV
ALGIERS
CAIRO
KHARTOUM
RABAT
VALLETTA
NICOSIA
TRIPOLI
BENGHAZI
TUNIS
OTTAWA
CANBERRA
WELLINGTON
NEW DELHI
RAWALPINDI

[ALL FLASH]

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SSSSS

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Cypher/Cat. A

PRIORITY DAR ES SALAAM TO : OFFICE

Telno. 632 12 June 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Commonwealth Office telegram No. 632 of
12 June
Repeated for information to Ottawa (for DEA) and
Nairobi (for Specrep)

Middle East.

My telegram No. 631.

From the tone of Nyerere's telegrams to Nasser and other evidence, it seems that he believes the story of Anglo-American assistance to Israel. The United States Ambassador is away. The Chargé tells me he sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the text of the United States invitation to the United Nations to inspect aircraft carriers. This is unlikely to cut much ice in State House, moreover and one of our Canadian colleagues who spoke recently to Nyakyi gained the impression that the latter still believed the collusion story.

2. I understand that Joan Wicken may be trying to dispel Nyerere's illusions, but I doubt if there is much we can do to help.

3. Israel Ambassador who went on leave in May returned here on 3 June, but is still queuing to see the President. He believes that purpose of Khalil's visit (my telegram No. 613) was to ask Nyerere to sever relations with Israel, but that this was not a serious risk.

4. Pundak told me also that he had spoken to Kamaliza about the Nuta telegram and managed to embarrass him about its tone.

C.O. pass routine Ottawa 223.

Mr. Wilson Sent 0719Z/12 June 1967
Recd 0720Z/12 June 1967

[Repeated as requested]

CO/FO/WH DISTRIBUTION

M.E.W. & U.N. Dept.

sssss

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

Les.

Prime Minister.

Would it be worth
getting a quick ai
view to Jonas
Wichen (e.g. Jun
Nocion) saying
what a lie it is?

14/6.

WICKEN Joan

MICHAEL PALLISER

I have received the attached reply from Joan Wicken and I think you should look at it. I shall have to reply as I am a friend, but I shall need some guidance from you on it.

Marcia

6.9.67

Telegrams: "CABINET", DAR ES SALAAM.
Telephone: 23265.
In reply please quote:

Ref. No. .....

PRESIDENT'S OFFICE,
THE STATE HOUSE,
P.O. BOX 9120,
DAR ES SALAAM,
TANGANYIKA.
Tanzania.

26th August, 1967.

Dear Marcia,

I have just received your letter of 30th June as it came by sea mail, and the Suez Canal is closed!

I don't think the President ever believed the story that the British and Americans sent aircraft to help the Israelis during the fighting, and his messages to Nasser were certainly not intended to imply that he did. When he talked of Nasser telling the truth to his people, he was talking of Nasser's explanation of the extent of the disaster and of his personal acceptance of blame when he offered his resignation. But it is true that the President's rejection of the story was not as automatic as you would have hoped, or as would have been the case two years ago. You say that, with a Labour Government in office for whom the whole Suez approach has always been anathema, you hoped your friends would see this story for the lie which I agree it was. Truly, Marcia, I don't think that the P.M. realises the extent to which Tanzania's trust has been destroyed by his Rhodesian policies. The sad truth is that there is now almost no automatic trust in a Labour Government. People here are confused and uncertain; as well as deeply hurt. For it is felt that those who would sell out in Rhodesia would sell out anywhere.

I know that you will feel upset by this statement and deny that there has been a sell out in Rhodesia. But the way it looks here is that Britain is searching for a face-saving operation, and that she does not really care at all about the principle involved. The "Tiger" proposals are felt to be a classic example of this, and the more recent re-opening of discussions simply adds fuel to the fire. I myself still find the prospect of a sell out unbelievable, but I cannot answer the accumulated evidence and the complete failure to do anything about Rhodesia so I simply hang on like the man in Shaw's "St. Joan", who was pulled up to Heaven by a hair, and I feel that I am suspended by it with no firm ground under my feet anywhere.

Moreover, I am sure that you will be feeling that you ask me questions about the Middle East and I reply on Rhodesia, but the truth is that the things are connected in people's emotions here, and, of course, Britain's sympathy with Israel was felt to imply a complete lack of understanding of the Arabs' case. Julius does have sympathy with the Israeli need to exist as a sovereign state, but at the time of the Suez crisis he took the line that the world was hearing all about the Israeli case and nothing about the Arab case. In addition, there was a feeling that Britain and America were very much hoping that Nasser would be pulled down by these events, and the reaction was therefore to go on his side. It is believed that he is a socialist and that, despite Nasser's continual verbal attacks on Israel, the physical attacks have always been by Israel.

Mrs. Marcia Williams,
10, Downing Street,
LONDON.

This is not a very coherent explanation of Julius's stand on the Arab/Israeli dispute, but I suspect that this has in fact become clearer to you since you wrote your letter than it was in the first place. The truth of the matter is that emotions are very much involved in this, and the nationalist emotion was one of sympathy and loyalty to Egypt despite agreement that Israel must be allowed to exist. The Arab opposition to Israel is understood; it has been put to me in the following terms - that if the Jews had accepted Joseph Chamberlain's offer of Uganda as their national homeland, there would still be a nationalist opposition to them, although that was more than 60 years ago. Therefore it must be understood that a long time will have to pass before the Arabs can acquiesce in the existence of the State of Israel, even though we ourselves do accept it and do support Israel's right to exist.

Incidentally, I am now worried about Tanzania's relations with the Commonwealth as well, because of the decision not to invite Tanzania to the Commonwealth Defence Conference, combined with the statement that this was because we had a Chinese mission here. The reaction to this was pretty sharp! The fact that the Canadians are training our officers and our Air Wing, and the fact that, incidentally, we do not have a Chinese mission on the Mainland at any rate, simply added to the fury. I know that a formal protest has been sent by Uganda, and that you are unlikely to get a formal protest from Tanzania. But this simply indicates that Tanzania does not have diplomatic relations with Britain, and that the attitude is almost becoming "what do you expect". This is an attitude which does not yet lead to indifference, because there is still hope that the situation could be reversed. But this was supposed to be a Commonwealth Conference, and Tanzania is still a member of the Commonwealth. She have continued to send representatives to Commonwealth Conferences even when they have been held in London; this is the first one to which we have not been invited.

My own feeling about this is that this is a British conference and not a Commonwealth conference, but this is a subtle distinction as it is being called a Commonwealth Conference, and subtleties of this nature are not much appreciated! In any case that distinction doesn't help me to feel better about such nonsense.

If this letter sounds somewhat disheartened, it simply reflects my state of mind. The only decent thing that has happened in relations between Tanzania and Britain over the last 18 months has been the British Government's refusal to protest against the nationalisation measures. This did give me new heart and, as I am complaining so much, I would like to record that fact. But when you come to think about it, the idea that a socialist government's refusal to protest about our nationalisation should be regarded as a good and positive thing is a pretty good indication of the demoralised state of my mind!

I suppose the day will come when we can write cheerful letters to each other. I wish it would come soon, but Rhodesia is in the way.

Yours sincerely,

Joan

MRS. WILLIAMS

The attached is self-explanatory. Would you like to write personally about this to Joan Wicken? If so, are you happy to do it on your own or do you need any material for it? I attach 2 Foreign Office guidance telegrams which may be of some help.

No 128 6.6.67

and 129 7.6.67

June 21, 1967

PRIME MINISTER

Michael

Here it is [illegible] a few extra words. [illegible] for [illegible] etc. [illegible]

Nancy.

Here you are for signature – do you want us to send it off for you – a fair charge on public funds!

And in a plain or a No 10 envelope?

Michael P.

October 18, 1967

I am sorry to have been so long in replying to your letter of August 26. But by the time it arrived we were already getting into the pre-Conference period and we have, in fact, only just returned from the Conference - which went, as you may have seen, extraordinarily well.

I was only too glad that you spelt out so frankly the various problems, as you feel they strike Julius, in our relationship and in the field of foreign policy generally. All of us here realise how much everything revolves around Rhodesia, so far as our friends in Africa are concerned; and I shall try to say something about this in a moment. But first I should just like to say a bit in reply to what you wrote on the Middle East and on the Commonwealth.

I know that during the Middle East crisis the Government were consistently misrepresented as having taken sides in the dispute - for Israel and against the Arabs. But in practice, our efforts were concentrated initially (and unfortunately without success) on stopping a war and, later, on trying to get a reasonable settlement. We all knew that the withdrawal of UNEF and Nasser's closing of the Straits of Tiran to Israel shipping would be regarded by the Israelis as justifying a war. This was why we worked so hard at that time not, as you say people thought in Tanzania, to topple Nasser (and George Brown

made this absolutely clear in the House on May 21) but to try to get some international guarantee of free passage through the Straits adequate to restrain the Israelis from resorting to war. In doing this, we took a calculated risk, knowing that our action would be misunderstood and that the Arabs would be furious with us. In fact, of course, it was those same Arabs who suffered most when the fighting we had tried so hard to prevent finally broke out. Likewise, since the end of the war, we have firmly endorsed the principle that there should be no territorial aggrandisement by Israel from it and that Israeli forces should withdraw from occupied territories. But equally, we have tried to convince the Arabs that they must be prepared to concede Israel's right to existence and that they must therefore end their claims to belligerency. In fact, as you may have seen more recently in the press, it is clear that many of the more sensible Arabs are now moving towards a more moderate position; and with Nasser in particular there seems a good chance of our getting back into a friendly working relationship. I am sure that no one would welcome this more than Julius himself. Of course, we realise the emotional involvement of many African countries with the kind of nationalism personified so far by Nasser; and, despite what some people think or say, we ourselves sympathise with this too. But we also think it only right that our friends in Africa should support the simple justice of Israel's claim to an independent and secure existence.

Now for the so-called Commonwealth Defence Conference (or, to give it its proper name - Exercise Unison 67) which you mention towards the end of your letter. Frankly, the references to Tanzania made by the Director of the Exercise at his press

conference on August 17 were plain nonsense - as indeed were his references to Uganda. The real point here is that this is a biennial exercise run by the British Defence Ministry and it is a specifically British rather than a Commonwealth exercise. This does not of course mean that Commonwealth countries are not involved in it: indeed one of its purposes is to enable our Chief of Defence Staff to discuss certain problems with Commonwealth colleagues. But the point is that these problems are related primarily to the United Kingdom's own defence effort and not to that of the Commonwealth countries concerned and the Exercise itself is not a Commonwealth occasion such as, say, a meeting of Commonwealth Ministers or senior officials. The reason why Tanzania was not invited this year was solely because this was a British occasion and there had been a breach in diplomatic relations between us. It had nothing whatever to do with the Chinese Mission or anything like that. Naturally Tanzania will continue to be invited to specifically Commonwealth occasions as she has been in the past. This being said, the current breach in relations with Tanzania is a cause of deep regret to us all, and to no one more than to Harold. I only hope that Julius will before long feel able and willing to resume relations.

But this of course brings me round full circle to Rhodesia and to what you say about this in effect poisoning our whole relationship with Julius and his Government. Of course we realise how many people in Africa there are who are deeply worried about Rhodesia and the apprehensions they express about the British Government's position - though very few of them, and particularly of our Commonwealth

friends, have carried their feelings to the length of breaking with us as Julius did. I can only tell you that I think these apprehensions are very unfair and based upon fears, for which there really is no justification at all, of what the British Government might do rather than on what they have in fact done or intend to do. Doubters should really look at the record. We have in fact done far more than any other country - including the Commonwealth countries in Africa - to try to bring the rebel regime to heel and to help those, such as Kenneth Kaunda and the Zambians, who have themselves been affected by the rebellion. I know that this is no more than our plain duty and that Julius and others would have liked us to act more drastically. I will not go into all the reasons why this has not been feasible. But the point is that, given the limitations on our freedom of action, we really have done our utmost to do our duty. What is more we have not compromised our principles and, as Harold made clear in a B.B.C. television programme a few days ago, he has no intention whatever of being a party to any departure from them. He utterly rejects the suggestion that "we do not really care" - and I can assure you from my personal experience and knowledge of him how genuine this is. Indeed he feels a good deal of bitterness that some of his Commonwealth colleagues, for whom he has great personal regard and esteem, should be so unwilling to give him and the Government the benefit of such doubt as they may have and apparently succumb so easily to the temptation to project on to us - and on to him personally - their own fears and frustrations. The British Government have no intention of "giving up" or of "selling out" in Rhodesia. I only wish we

could manage to persuade our friends in Africa of the truth of this and I do beg you to do what you can to convince your friends at least that it is so.

Miss Joan Wicken

[redacted]chael Palliser

Many thanks for having the letter typed for us.

I think Marcia would like to write in some "best wishes" at the end.

Ella
17.10.67

T193/67

CONFIDENTIAL

Draft

To: Mrs. Gandhi From: The Prime Minister

Thank you for your letter about the recent events in the Middle East. My colleagues and I share the concern you express and are acutely conscious of the need to achieve peace and stability in this crucial area.

Throughout the crisis our efforts have been directed solely towards this end, and we have used all our influence both in private and in public to urge restraint on everyone concerned. Our initial assessment, of which you were aware from the diplomatic representations we made in India as elsewhere, was that whatever judgements might be made on all the many short and long term factors in the situation, the withdrawal of the U.N. force and the closure of the Gulf of Aqaba would, if nothing was done, inevitably give rise to war. Our view of the gravity of the situation created proved wellfounded, though our efforts to ~~prevent an~~ avert the outbreak of hostilities were misrepresented.

Since the fighting started we have given our full support to the efforts of the Security Council in bringing the war to an end. And we shall continue to give whatever assistance we can to the work of the U.N. in alleviating the suffering caused by the war - and we have already arranged for the provision of emergency supplies to Jordan - and in maintaining the effectiveness of the cease-fire. Nor will we hesitate to condemn in strong terms any breach of the cease-fire by any of the countries concerned.

We in Britain have been shocked and disappointed to learn that, despite our stringent care in maintaining complete

/neutrality

neutrality throughout the conflict, lies and distortions alleging an involvement on our part have been put about and have gained some currency. Such fabrications can serve only to impede the cause of peace, and I hope that you and your Government will help to counter these malicious slanders and to urge on all the Middle Eastern countries the need to acknowledge the true facts of the case.

I would particularly value your advice and help about the Suez Canal. As you know, movement through the Suez Canal was forbidden on 6 June. The U.A.R. authorities are reported to have stated both that the Canal is blocked by ships sunk by Israeli action and that movement through the Canal will not be permitted so long as Israeli forces remain on the East Bank. In any case, we have no information that any action is being taken to re-open it to navigation. This is I think an unacceptable situation. We, like you, rely heavily on the Canal. A hold-up, particularly a protracted one, can only damage international trade. It must have a particularly serious effect on your supplies of wheat, and as the major user of the Canal we too are damaged by its closure. Our information is incomplete, and we should be grateful for anything you can tell us. We would like to keep in close touch with you and other countries concerned with this problem, and I hope that you will use your influence to try to get the normal working of the Canal restored.

As I see it, a durable peace in the Middle East will only come about if both the Arabs and the Israelis acknowledge that they must co-exist with one another; and that co-existence implies a balance of mutual obligations as well as rights.

/A

A settlement, if it is to bring lasting peace and a real basis for the prosperity of all the peoples in the area, must be based on the principles of the U.N. charter, and in particular on rejection of the use of force to solve disputes, and on recognition of the territorial integrity and political independence of states. No lasting Middle East settlement can be imposed by force: and ~~one contribution to a settlement must be the recognition that war should not lead to territorial aggrandisement.~~ there will need to be satisfactory guarantees of the security of the countries concerned, and fair treatment for all the refugees. The achievement of a settlement will I fear be a long and difficult process. But the past few weeks have shown that it will only be possible by patient pursuit and negotiation. We ourselves will strive, as I am sure you will, to bring about an atmosphere in which such negotiations will be possible.

On its own

Prime Minister.

? Approve draft letter as amended.

21/6

R22

CONFIDENTIAL

Commonwealth Office
S.W.1

21 June, 1967

Dear Michael,

Messages from President Ayub and
Mrs. Gandhi about the Middle East Crisis

I enclose draft replies which the Prime Minister may like to send in reply to the messages he has received from President Ayub (Rawalpindi telegram No. 624 of 14 June attached) and Mrs. Gandhi (letter from the Acting Indian High Commissioner of 11 June attached) about the Middle East crisis.

The drafts have been cleared with the Foreign Office.

President Ayub is understood to have sent similar messages to Mr. Kosygin, President Johnson and General de Gaulle. Mrs. Gandhi also wrote to other leaders, but we have not seen the texts of these messages.

Yours,

Oliver.

(O.G. FORSTER)
Private Secretary

A.M. Palliser Esq., C.M.G.,

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT

T192/67

To: The President of Pakistan. From: The Prime Minister

Thank you for your message about the Middle East. You will know that we share with you a sense of grave anxiety over the events of the last few weeks and a hope that out of the present tragedy some fair and permanent settlement can be achieved.

Throughout the crisis we have worked unceasingly for peace and have urged restraint on all the countries involved. It was clear to us from the start that, whatever judgements might be made on all the short and long term factors in the situation the withdrawal of the U.N.Force and the closure of the Straits of Tiran were likely to provoke a war. Our view of the gravity of the situation so created regrettably proved in the event to be well founded.

When the fighting broke out we maintained a strict neutrality and exerted all our efforts in the Security Council and elsewhere to achieve a cease-fire. In spite of this our motives were misrepresented and we have been falsely and scandalously accused of being in some way involved in supporting Israel. I ~~venture to hope~~ that you will use your great influence in countering these ~~malicious slanders~~ and in urging on the countries concerned the need to recognise the true facts of the case.

As for the future, it is not yet clear how the search for a settlement, in the U.N. and elsewhere, will proceed. What is clear is that a true and permanent settlement will only come about by negotiation, and it is obvious that many weeks of consultation lie ahead. We for our part will do all we can

create an atmosphere of calm and objectivity in which constructive proposals for peace can be put forward. It seems to me that whatever settlement emerges from the present crisis must be based on an acknowledgment by the Arabs and the Israelis that they have to co-exist; and that such co-existence involves a balance of obligations towards one another as well as of rights. We remain, as we have always been, opposed to the use of force to solve disputes. And we recognise that ~~one contribution towards a~~ any acceptable settlement must ~~be the recognition that war should not lead to territorial aggrandisement~~ both accept the legitimate interests of our countries in the area; and, in particular, must make some provision for dealing with the refugee problem.

I know that you will do everything, as we will, to urge restraint and to work for peace. I confidently hope that your own prestige and influence with the Arab countries will be used to encourage them to reduce tension and ~~will~~ to bring about an equitable and lasting settlement.

SUBJECT

PRIME MINISTERS

PERSONAL TELEGRAM

SERIAL No. ...T184/67.....

No 10 Downing St.

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NO 1459

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY NO.....

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

22 JUNE 1967

FOLLOWING FOR PRIME MINISTER FROM FOREIGN SECRETARY.

I DELIVERED MY SPEECH TO THE ASSEMBLY ACCORDING TO OUR UNDERSTANDING. IT SEEMED TO GO DOWN WELL GENERALLY.

2. I AM HAVING SOME TROUBLE WITH PARTICULAR ARABS, NOTABLY THE IRAQIS AND THE SUDANESE, BUT I AM HOLDING TO MY POSITION IN MY TALKS WITH THEM. I ALSO HAD SOME TROUBLE WITH GOLDA MEIR. I AM NOW IN THE POSITION YOU AND I KNOW SO WELL. NEITHER SIDE THINKS WE HAVE DONE THE RIGHT THING.

3. I INTEND TO STICK STOLIDLY TO MY POSITION. YOU MAY WELL GET SOME PLAY-BACKS IN LONDON AND I HOPE THAT YOU WILL STAND BY ME.

LORD CARADON.

SENT 22/1022Z

RECD 22/1023Z

[COPIES SENT TO NO.10 DOWNING STREET]

PRISEC (F.O.)

CONFIDENTIAL

BUA.

Confidential

Mr Pallser. Foreign Sec
Cameron

DRAFT REPLY to Mr Shinwell's PQ (22 June).

The House will by this time have read reports of the Foreign Secretary's speech at the General Assembly of the United Nations yesterday. I am placing a full text of the speech in the Library of the House. The Foreign Secretary was expressing certain principles, drawn from the Charter of the United Nations, on which our general approach to a solution of the Arab/Israel conflict is based. He was not of course attempting to put forward any detailed proposals for an eventual settlement.

Text telegraphed to Foreign Secretary 12.50.

HJ Abbott
22/6.

Confidential

Note for Supplementary

JERUSALEM

The Foreign Secretary was saying that the Israel Government should undertake unilateral action by legislating for the annexation of the Old City of Jerusalem. But he was not of course pre-judging any final settlement. Our wellknown position on the status of Jerusalem, which has been maintained over many years, is that pending a final agreed settlement we do not recognise claims to sovereignty over the area designated for internationalisation in the General Assembly Resolution of 9 December, 1949.

Text telegraphed to Foreign Secretary.

27/6

Full Text of the Speech by the Secretary of State,
the Rt. Hon. G. Brown, M.P., to the General Assembly
of the United Nations: 21 June, 1967

1. Mr. President.

This emergency session of the General Assembly has met to discuss very grave problems. We have to discuss with great urgency the problems which have been caused by the war in the Middle East.

2. We are dealing with political problems. Let us not forget that politics involve and are about human beings. We are concerned with the fate of hundreds of thousands of ordinary men and women who have suffered from this war. This is more important than all the Resolutions in the world.

3. All countries must bear a measure of responsibility for the problems that now beset us. Attempts have been made in the past to reach a settlement in the Middle East. But for a long time we have given up these attempts. For the last ten years there has been an uneasy calm broken at frequent intervals by frontier incidents and conflicts. We all hoped that the peace might be maintained by the United Nations Emergency Force. But we have been brought face to face with problems that we can no longer ignore. This is the background against which our discussions have to take place.

4. What is the reason for this emergency session of the Assembly? Her Majesty's Government had some doubts whether it was right to bring our problems before the Assembly while they were still being considered by the Security Council. But the plain fact was that we were prevented from making progress in the Security Council because of the threat of the veto. Therefore we must hope that some real practical results will emerge from this meeting of the Assembly. I suggest therefore that we need to concern ourselves with practical problems. There are gathered here the representatives of most countries of the world and the people of the world are waiting to see what we can do. We must not disappoint them. We must all remember what happened in the last years of the League of Nations. We must do everything we can to ensure that the General Assembly of the United Nations does not follow the same road as did the League.

5. And I must say in all frankness I think we have all been subjected here to an amazing amount of double talk.

6. I read very carefully the speech which Mr. Kosygin made on Monday. I was sorry that because of Parliamentary business in my own country I could not be here to listen to him.

7. He made a number of specific charges against the United Kingdom. I heard them repeated yesterday and I want to answer these one by one

8. First he said - and I quote his words - "Israel has enjoyed support from certain imperialist circles ... these powerful circles made statements and took practical action which might have been interpreted by Israel extremists as direct encouragement to commit acts of aggression". In this context he went on to refer to the movement of British Naval and Air Forces to bring pressure to bear upon Arab States.

9. I notice that Mr. Kosygin did not say that there was direct participation by British Forces in the fighting. He knows that this cannot possibly be true. He can verify and no doubt has verified the facts from his own sources. There were, after all, pretty considerable Soviet Naval Forces in the Mediterranean at this time.

/10.

10. Those who put around these falsehoods must have known - must now know - that they were and are totally untrue. Nevertheless, throughout the fighting and since they were repeated over and over again by Cairo Radio and by other radio stations all over the Middle East.

11. I doubt if there is one person in this hall today who accepts any of these allegations. We for our part have said that we would welcome investigation by the United Nations and this offer still stands. We have taken an unprecedented step. We have placed the log books of our ships in the Library of the House of Commons and they are there now for consultation by anybody who wishes to consult them.

12. Her Majesty's Government, and I myself especially, deeply regret the damage which these false charges have done to our relations with our Arab friends. Now that they are seen to be without foundation I hope that we can re-establish once again our friendly relationship with these Arab States.

13. May I turn to other charges which Mr. Kosygin made? He implied that we had caused delays in the Security Council. He also suggested that by failing to give our assent to a decision prompted by the emergency we were promoting an aggressor. Once again nothing could be further from the truth. If Mr. Kosygin will read the records of the Security Council for the weeks before the fighting took place, he will be reminded that the United Kingdom urged the Council to take action to avoid a crisis. The whole aim of our policy was to try to prevent an issue, which we knew to be highly inflammable, from developing into war. If we could have got the support of the Soviet Union at that time, we might not now be faced with our present grave problems. Immediately after the outbreak of the fighting we were among the first to urge that the Council should call for an immediate cease-fire. It was not we who delayed that call until the second evening of the war.

14. As you see there was much in Mr. Kosygin's speech with which I profoundly disagree, but I have not been looking out for differences. I want to find some common ground with him. We certainly share his view that, when questions of peace and war are involved, no State should be or can remain aloof. At the end of his speech Mr. Kosygin said and again I quote: "Much depends on the efforts of the Big Powers. It would be good if their delegations ... found common language in order to reach decisions meeting the interests of peace in the Middle East and the interests of universal peace." This could be a very interesting and very challenging statement. I would like Mr. Kosygin to tell us exactly what he means by this statement. I found the statement a little hard to understand. Would he tell me, or better still would he tell the Assembly, what he has in mind? I will set out in what I have to say this morning what I think should be done. Will Mr. Kosygin tell me, or the Assembly, whether he is prepared to discuss these same proposals with us.

15. May I turn to the British position? Before the fighting broke out I said in the British Parliament that as a permanent member of the Security Council we had a duty to support efforts to keep the peace everywhere. I made it clear that Her Majesty's Government regarded the United Nations as primarily responsible for peace-keeping. I repeat here what I said there. We have had long-standing ties of friendship with all the Arab States of the Middle East, and also with Israel. If I may speak personally for a moment, I have for a long time felt a very deep concern for these countries. Our friendship with them has, I believe, been of great mutual value in the past. It is my desire to see it renewed and strengthened in the future: and I for one will work for that purpose.

/16.

16. The attitude of the British Government is clear. We want the area to be at peace. We recognize that peace demands the greatest measures of justice in its political arrangements. And on this foundation the progress of its people, especially of those whose need is greatest, must be based.

17. I would like, if I may, to set out certain principles which I believe should guide us in striving collectively for a lasting settlement.

18. Clearly such principles must derive from the United Nations Charter. Article 2 of the Charter provides that "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or the use of force against the territorial integrity or the political independence of any State". Here the words "territorial integrity" have a direct bearing on the question of withdrawal, on which much has been said in previous speeches. I see no two ways about this, and I state our position very clearly. In my view, from the words in the Charter, war should not lead to territorial aggrandisement.

19. Reports suggest that one particular point may be of special urgency. This concerns Jerusalem. I call upon the State of Israel not to take any steps in relation to Jerusalem which would conflict with this principle. I say very solemnly to the Government of Israel that, if they purport to annex the Old City or legislate for its annexation, they will be taking a step which will not only isolate them from world opinion, but will also lose them the sympathy that they have.

20. Having made clear my stand on this issue, I go on to recognize that in all this both the Arabs and Israel have matters to raise which they are entitled to feel must be heard and must be treated with respect. And we in the international community also have our legitimate interests which must similarly be respected.

21. First, there are the interests and welfare of the refugees. This very serious problem has been with us for a very long time. The problem has been made more difficult by what has happened in the last few weeks. We have fallen down so badly on this problem in the past that we cannot live with it any more. It now requires a great international effort to alleviate the problem. I shall have something more to say about this in a moment.

22. Secondly, any settlement must recognize the right of all States in the area to exist. In true dignity and real freedom, and that must include the ability to earn their living in assured peace. I understood this to be the view of Mr. Kosygin and I hope my understanding was correct.

23. Thirdly, there must be respect for the right of free and innocent passage through international waterways for the ships of all nations. There is too the immediate practical problem of getting the Suez Canal cleared. Once it is done this great international waterway must be reopened as soon as possible. This is of vital importance to very many countries represented in this Assembly.

24. Fourthly - and now I come to a critical point - if the countries of the Middle East are to live together in peace and develop their resources, they must be freed from the pressures which have driven them to waste their resources in an arms race. Obviously no Government can resist these pressures if its neighbours are not doing the same. The problem imposes responsibilities not only on the

/Government

Government in the area but also on the Powers who are at present supplying arms. The latter, and of course it includes us, should reach an agreement as soon as possible. Already new countries are coming into the business of supplying arms to the Middle East. It is imperative that an agreement on arms limitation should be concluded as soon as possible.

25. I now come to the immediate practical things we can and must do. I shall say if I may a word about humanitarian action and then come to political action which the United Nations itself might take.

26. First, we must deal at once with the problem of displacement. The aftermath of war is always full of tragedy and we have all been distressed by the suffering caused to those in the areas where fighting has taken place. I do not think anybody expects a final settlement to be reached during this Assembly. Such a final settlement is going to take time. Meanwhile our most urgent thoughts should be given to the populations which have suffered and are still suffering from the upheaval of war. It is imperative, if feelings are not to be further inflamed or a settlement made still more remote, that the Arab communities whose lands have been overrun should be allowed to stay where they are - or to return if they have fled and wish to come back. We cannot allow these people to suffer further and we cannot allow what has happened to them to result in a further escalation of the already intractable refugee problem. We must express this intention in any Resolution we pass.

27. But this will not be enough. We must in the meantime lose no time at all in bringing relief to those who have been driven out of their homes and who have suffered directly from the fighting. This problem has been tackled energetically by many voluntary relief agencies which are doing magnificent work.

28. The British Government have sent a major contribution to the relief programme administered by UNRWA. By the end of this year, we shall have contributed 100 million dollars since 1950 to the UNRWA programme - 14 percent of the total of all governmental contributions. In particular, as a contribution to the present emergency, we are making a special grant to UNRWA of ½ million dollars, in addition to our normal contribution.

29. We have also produced substantial relief in kind at very short notice, including badly needed blankets and medicines. We have told the Jordan Government that we will make a grant to them of half a million pounds to be spent on agreed rehabilitation and reconstruction work in Jordan. I am not saying all this in order to boast or to say that we are better than anyone else. I am simply saying these things because they are the practical things which can be done now. If any member of the United Nations has not done anything yet, they can start today.

30. But when we have done all we can to relieve suffering, it is still our main task in this Organization to keep the peace. There cannot be any greater issue for the United Nations and this brings me to the main recommendation I want to make. I believe that the Secretary-General should nominate a representative, whose standing should be unchallenged, to go at once to the area. He should have a proper staff and full facilities. He should advise the Secretary-General on the whole conduct of relations arising from the cease-fire and the subsequent keeping of the peace on the frontiers. His task would be both to report to the Secretary-General and to play an active part in relations with all the parties in the area itself.

/31.

31. The first task of the Secretary-General's representative would be to make recommendations in consultation with the Chief of Staff about the work of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. May I say here that the whole world community has every reason to feel and express the sincerest admiration and gratitude for what the present U.N.T.S.O. team has done under the leadership of General Odd Bull? General Bull has in circumstances of the greatest danger and difficulty conducted his operations with outstanding courage and efficiency.

32. It seems clear, however, that General Bull could do with urgent reinforcement of both men and material. I suggest that the Secretary-General should be authorized to recruit and despatch at once any extra personnel whom General Bull may need. He will also need better communications and the Government of Israel should allow him without delay to re-occupy the Headquarters from which he was excluded during the fighting round Jerusalem.

33. This operation and its expansion should be conducted under the direction of the new representative to be appointed by the Secretary-General. But this operation only deals with the cease-fire and the arrangements which follow immediately from disengagement. There is the much bigger and more lasting problem of future peacekeeping in the area. It is clear that for this a new form of United Nations military presence will be necessary which will give reality to the preservation of peace in an area which may well be troubled for some time to come. One of the most urgent duties of the Secretary-General's representative should immediately advise the United Nations on the form which a future United Nations presence should take. Needless to say it should be set up in a form which sets out precisely the conditions under which it operates.

34. As I said earlier, the world looks to us now to do more than state principles and long-term objectives. My Government believe that the principles for a settlement which I have set out today will gain increasing acceptance and support. But that will not be enough. What everyone wishes to see, what everyone expects now, what is desperately required, is some immediate, positive, practical action. It is for that reason that I have made the proposals that I have for more effective United Nations action.

35. Whatever we achieve in statement of principles, it is by the action which follows our meeting here that we will be judged.

36. This is the purpose of the proposals that I have made for more effective United Nations action - action for dealing with distress, for preventing conflict, for laying the foundation of a just settlement we must move now to meet the desperate need.

37. Seldom has the United Nations faced such a crisis and such a challenge. Its whole future, on which we all depend, could turn on its ability to handle this situation. I speak as one who has for all my political life had faith in the League of Nations and subsequently in the United Nations. At this moment I confess to a desperate anxiety about the future.

38. As I speak now in this emergency session I feel that the future of the Organization in which we have put our trust is in peril. And I am compelled by the strength of my conviction - a conviction which is shared, I believe, by countless people in different countries round the world - a conviction that the longings of the world depend very much on what we now decide.

/39.

39. Some of us remember that we have walked this road before. We have seen once before in our lives the collapse of an international organization, the failure of an international ideal. What is more, as we meet there we cannot forget that even in the last few days news has come of new dangers on a scale which we can scarcly imagine and a new threat to human survival. These dangers and threats give new urgency to all we do here.

40. If we in the United Nations fail now, if we fail to meet this challenge, if we fail to act now, if we fail to take positive and practical action before we disperse, we shall have put in peril all those who depend on us.

41. I have tried to suggest the practical ways in which we might start to resolve the issues which face us in the Middle East. But if we fail to take the straightforward actions open to us, we must consider the consequences. I am not the only man in this Assembly with children and grand-children, daughters and grand-daughters. If we fail in an area as dangerous as this, the chances of the world, and our children and grandchildren going up in a mushroom cloud must be enormous.

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IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1467
UNCLASSIFIED

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
22 JUNE 1967

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 1467 OF 22 JUNE
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW PARIS TEL AVIV
OTTAWA AND SAVING TO JEDDA.
MY TELNO 1453: EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION.
FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF M. COUVE DE MURVILLE'S SPEECH THIS
MORNING.
2. THE ASSEMBLY WAS MEETING IN SERIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES ON THE
INITIATIVE OF ONE OF ITS MEMBERS, BUT WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE
OVERWHELMING MAJORITY, INDEED ALL BUT UNANIMITY, OF THE
MEMBERSHIP. WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST HAD STOPPED BUT IT HAD NOT
CONCLUDED. THE REGION FACED A DEEP CRISIS WHICH MIGHT RECUR
AT ANY MOMENT: UNLESS THE SITUATION WAS COMPLETELY ALTERED, THE
LIKELIHOOD OF WAR MIGHT DRAG ON INDEFINITELY. ANY WAR WAS SHOCK
AND TRIAL FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THE ENTIRE WORLD
REACTED TO IT, ESPECIALLY AS IT KNEW AND FELT THAT ANOTHER
DEPLORABLE CONFLICT HAD GONE ON FOR YEARS ELSEWHERE. WHAT HAPPENED
IN THE MIDDLE EAST HAD A DIRECT PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL
RELATIONSHIP TO THE DETERIORATING SITUATION IN SOUTH EAST ASIA.
3. IT WAS NORMAL THEREFORE THAT THE WORLD SHOULD WANT TO DISCUSS
THE WAR, EXPRESS ITS FEELINGS, GIVE ADVICE. IF CONCLUSIONS COULD
NOT BE REACHED, GENERAL GUIDE LINES SHOULD BE LAID DOWN, AND THIS
WAS THE PROPER ROLE FOR THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. IT WAS CLEAR THAT
INTERNATIONAL OPINION WOULD BE IMPORTANT IN FORMULATING FUTURE
ACTION: THE JURIDICAL POSITION UNDER WHICH THE ASSEMBLY HAD MET
WAS LESS IMPORTANT. ACTION, ON THE OTHER HAND, IF CALLED FOR FROM
THE UN WOULD BE FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO AUTHORISE. COUVE
HAD NO DOUBT THAT THERE WOULD BE MANY OCCASIONS IN THE NEAR
FUTURE WHEN THE COUNCIL WOULD BE CALLED ON TO DELIBERATE AGAIN
AND VOTE, AS IN PAST WEEKS.
4. THE WORLD NOW FOUND ITSELF FAR FROM THE TIME, LITTLE OVER A
FORTNIGHT AGO, WHEN THE PROBLEM WAS SIMPLY ONE OF FREEDOM OF
NAVIGATION IN THE GULF OF AQABA. THAT CONTROVERSY HAD BEEN

/OVERTAKEN, AND

OVERTAKEN, AND WAR HAD OPENED THE DOOR TO QUOTE ALL THE DEVILS UNQUOTE. FIRST OF ALL WAS THE PROBLEM OF THE REFUGEES FOR WHOM A SECOND EXODUS HAD BROUGHT FURTHER TRIBULATION. IT NOW PLACED NEW DUTIES ON THE ENTIRE WORLD, NOT ONLY ON THE GOVERNMENT TO WHOM THE FORTUNE OF WAR HAD GIVEN IMMEDIATE RESPONSIBILITY. THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD NOT FAILED TO TAKE NOTE OF THIS PROBLEM, BUT THIS HAD ONLY BEEN A FIRST STEP WHICH SHOULD BE FOLLOWED BY EFFECTIVE ACTION. POLITICALLY, THE POSITION WAS EVEN GRAVER SINCE THE AGE OLD PROBLEMS HAD COME UP TOGETHER AND HAD BECOME MORE DIFFICULT OF SOLUTION. YET THE BASIC FACTS WERE THE SAME. IT WAS STILL A QUESTION OF JEWS AND MUSLIMS HAVING TO LIVE SIDE BY SIDE IN PEACE, TOLERANCE AND SELF RESPECT. IT WAS TO THEIR INTEREST, INDEED THEIR DUTY TO DO SO: IT WAS ALSO THE INTERST OF ALL OTHER NATIONS. IN NO PART OF THE WORLD WAS THE TRUISM QUOTE PEACE IS INDIVISIBLE UNQUOTE MORE APT. THE VIETNAM WAR ADDED TO THE CONFUSION BECAUSE IT INVOLVED AND HEIGHTENED THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN TWO MAJOR POWERS.

5. LOOKED AT OBJECTIVELY, THE TEMPTATION TOWARDS ESCALATION OF THE CONFLICT HAD BEEN AVOIDED. A GENERAL WAR WOULD CERTAINLY SOLVE NO PROBLEMS BUT THE DIVISIONS BETWEEN CERTAIN GREAT POWERS WERE MORE ACUTE THAN EVER AND THE BASIC ELEMENT IN THE SITUATION. FRANCE HAD ALWAYS ADVOCATED RESTRAINT AND LOOKED FOR WAYS OF PERSUADING BOTH SIDES TO ADOPT IT. WHEN PASSAGE THROUGH THE STRAITS OF TIRAN WAS BEING DISCUSSED, FRANCE HAD REPEATEDLY SAID THAT A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT MUST BE REACHED, EVEN IF THIS WAS ONLY A MODUS VIVENDI IN DEFAULT OF A PROPER AGREEMENT. FRANCE STILL THOUGHT THAT A DISCUSSION ON THIS ISSUE WAS NOT IMPOSSIBLE, WITH THE HELP OF COURSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. PERHAPS THE FOUR PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ACTING TOGETHER MIGHT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PLAY A USEFUL ROLE, BUT MATTERS HAD NOT TURNED OUT LIKE THAT. THE PARTIES HAD HAD RECOURSE TO WAR. COUVE THEN RECALLED THE STATEMENT THAT FRANCE WOULD OPPOSE ANY STATE WHICH RESORTED TO ARMS FIRST.

6. THE SITUATION NOW WAS MUCH WORSE. THREE GREAT POWERS HAD SEVERED RELATIONS WITH ONE OR OTHER OF THE PARTIES INVOLVED,

/AND THE

Rot's a bit much – we and the U.S. haven't done any severing – the Arabs have!

AND THE ELEMENTS OF AN INDEFINITE CONFLICT WERE PRESENT. ISRAEL WAS OCCUPYING PARTS OF THE U.A.R. JORDAN AND SYRIA, AND THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT, QUOTE BASING ITSELF ON ITS MILITARY EXPLOITS AND REFUSING ANY INTERVENTION BY THE U.NM OR OTHER THIRD PARTIES UNQUOTE HAD DECLARED IT WANTED TO ENTER INTO DISCUSSIONS WITH EACH ARAB STATE CONCERNED SEPARATELY. IT COULD HARDLY BE IMAGINED THAT ARAB STATES WHICH FOR TWENTY YEARS HAD REFUSED TO NEGOTIATE WITH ISRAEL WOULD NOW BE MORE WILLING TO NEGOTIATE, AFTER THE LATEST SHOCK. ANY DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE OPPOSING PARTIES WAS ALMOST INCONCEIVABLE BUT WAR COULD NOT PROVIDE ANY SOLUTION, AND THIS WAS THE BASIC POSITION OF FRANCE. ARABS AND JEWS MUST LIVE TOGETHER IN THE REGION, AS THEY HAD FOR MANY CENTURIES: THIS WAS WHY ONE SIDE COULD NOT IMPOSE CONDITIONS ON THE OTHER. NO FAIT ACCOMPLI AFFECTING THE TERRITORIAL BOUNDARIES AND THE STATUS OF THE POPULATIONS COULD BE ACCEPTED. ONLY A FREELY NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT, ACCEPTED BY ALL THE PARTIES AND UNDERWRITTEN BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, COULD, ONE DAY, SOLVE THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED.

7. FRANCE WAS AWARE THAT SUCH A SOLUTION WAS BY NO MEANS NEAR. IT WAS FOR THE WORLD COMMUNITY TO TAKE THE FIRST STEP, ABOVE ALL IT WAS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THOSE STATES WHOM THE CHARTER RECOGNISED AS HAVING PARTICULAR RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF SECURITY. ALL KNEW MOREOVER THAT NOTHING COULD BE DONE WITHOUT THESE POWERS, AGAINST THEIR WISHES, OR AGAINST THE WISHES OF ONE OF THEM. COUVE FINISHED BY REPEATING THAT EVERYTHING HAD TO BE VIEWED GLOBALLY. AS LONG AS THE WAR IN VIETNAM CONTINUED THERE WAS NO PROSPECT OF PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. SHOULD THE VIETNAMESE WAR END IN THE CONDITIONS WHICH FRANCE HAD SO OFTEN OUTLINED - AN EVENT WHICH WOULD REQUIRE A COURAGEOUS AND FRUITFUL DECISION BY A MAJOR POWER - NEW PROSPECTS WOULD OPEN UP.

F O PASS MOSCOW 195, PARIS 194, TEL AVIV 211 AND SAVING TO JEDDA 59.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT 2110Z 22 JUNE
RECD AT 2111Z 22 JUNE

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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I M M E D I A T E PARIS
TELEGRAM NUMBER 655

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
22 JUNE 1967

C O N F I D E N T I A L

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 655 OF 22 JUNE AND RFI PRIORITY TO WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK AND MOSCOW AND SAVING TO TEL AVIV AND UKDEL NATO.

FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 648 - FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY.

GENERAL DE GAULLE'S STATEMENT OF 21 JUNE REFLECTS THE SOMBRE MOOD IN WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER FOUND HIM AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS WEEK. HE FEELS THAT THE DANGER OF WAR IS SPREADING.

2. IT IS ALSO THE MOST ANTI-AMERICAN STATEMENT HE HAS YET MADE. THE AMERICAN WAR IN VIETNAM IS PRESENTED AS THE ROOT OF ALL THE EVILS WHICH ARE PLAGUING THE WORLD TODAY, INCLUDING THE MIDDLE EASTERN CRISIS, THE INTRANSIGENCE OF THE CHINESE AND THEIR SPEEDY PRODUCTION OF AN H BOMB.

3. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE GENERAL PREPARED THIS STATEMENT IN THE LIGHT OF HIS APPRECIATION OF SOVIET, BRITISH AND AMERICAN ATTITUDES DERIVED FROM HIS TALKS WITH MR. KOSYGIN AND THE PRIME MINISTER, AND FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S SPEECH ON MONDAY. HE SEEMS TO HAVE TAKEN CARE TO SAY NOTHING WHICH RUNS COUNTER TO SOVIET POLICY PRONOUNCE-MENTS, ALTHOUGH HIS CONDEMNATION OF THE ISRAELIS IS LESS HARSH THAN THAT OF MR. KOSYGIN. THE GENERAL RECOGNISES ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST AND HE DOES NOT UPHOLD ARAB CLAIMS WITH REGARD TO NAVIGATION IN THE GULF OF AQABA. BUT NEITHER OF THESE POINTS CONTRADICTS WHAT MR. KOSYGIN SAID IN NEW YORK. THE QUAI D'ORSAY ARE TELLING DIPLOMATS TODAY THAT THE GENERAL BLAMES ISRAEL MUCH MORE THAN THE ARABS FOR WHAT HAS HAPPENED AND THAT HIS STATEMENT SHOULD BE INTERPRETED IN THIS LIGHT. HE IS SAID TO FEEL RESENTMENT AGAINST THE ISRAELIS FOR FLOUTING HIS ADVICE NOT TO STRIKE THE FIRST BLOW.

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PARIS TELEGRAM NO. 655 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

4. I THINK THAT THE GENERAL'S STATEMENT WAS ALSO PREPARED WITH AN EYE TO ITS EFFECT ON THE INTERNAL POLITICAL SCENE. HE WILL HOPE THAT HIS ARGUMENT THAT THOSE WHO ARE WITH HIM ON VIETNAM CANNOT BE AGAINST HIM ON THE MIDDLE EAST WILL RALLY SUPPORT FROM SOME LEFT-WINGERS WHO HAVE BEEN CRITICAL OF HIS LACK OF SYMPATHY FOR ISRAEL. HE MAY ALSO HOPE TO COMPLICATE THE TASK OF THE UNDERLINE FOLLOWING FOUR WORDS FEDERATION DE LA GAUCHE, WHICH IS PRO-ISRAEL, AND THE COMMUNISTS, WHO HAVE ADOPTED A SLIGHTLY MODIFIED VERSION OF THE SOVIET POSITION, IN ARRIVING AT A COMMON ATTITUDE TOWARDS FOREIGN AFFAIRS. THE COMMUNISTS NOW FIND THEMSELVES CLOSER TO THE GENERAL THAN TO THEIR SOCIALIST ALLIES ON THE TWO MOST CRITICAL FOREIGN POLICY PROBLEMS OF THE DAY. THE DIFFICULTY WHICH THE GENERAL MAY FACE IS WITH THE NUMEROUS MEMBERS OF THE GROUPS SUPPORTING THE FIFTH REPUBLIC WHO ARE PRO-ISRAEL. NO DOUBT HE HOPES THAT PARTY DISCIPLINE WILL KEEP THEM MORE OR LESS IN LINE.

5. TO SUM UP, THE GENERAL HAS TAKEN ANOTHER STEP TOWARDS COMPLETE DISSOCIATION OF FRANCE FROM AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND VIETNAM FRANCE IS MUCH CLOSER TO SOVIET VIEWS THAN TO THOSE OF ANY OF HER WESTERN ALLIES. WHEN ONE LINKS HIS LATEST DECLARATION WITH HIS STATEMENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER THAT HE PULLED FRANCE OUT OF NATO IN ORDER TO AVOID BEING INVOLVED IN THE CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN POLICY IN VIETNAM ONE IS BOUND TO WONDER WHETHER HE IS NOT NOW PREPARING FRENCH OPINION FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AS WELL. X

FO PSE PASS PRIORITY TO WASHINGTON 194 UKMIS NEW YORK 57 MOSCOW 57 AND SAVING TO TEL AVIV 2.

SIR P REILLY

SENT 2136 22 JUNE
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[REPETITION TO MOSCOW REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS.]

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X - yes. This thought crossed my mind as he was speaking.

CONFIDENTIAL

Extract from Hansard 22.6.67.

grounds of the law of divorce, a matter within the sphere of his Department and involving legislation, without this being the policy of the Government? Is this the new streamlined administration that we were promised?

The Prime Minister: Is it an extremely refreshing proposal. It has been widely recognised for many years that reforms in this area, as in so many others, are not matters for party controversy—for Government policy—but rather are matters which should come up in this House usually by Private Member's Bills. In this particular case, we shall need the work of the Law Commission, which is at present discussing this with the Bishop of Exeter's Committee. It was perfectly appropriate and right that my noble and learned Friend, since this could not be a Government question, should help to stimulate further discussion by the speech that he made.

UNITED NATIONS (FOREIGN SECRETARY'S SPEECH)

Q9. **Mr. Shinwell** asked the Prime Minister what Government decisions have been taken to enable the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to explain British policy on the Middle East at the United Nations Assembly.

The Prime Minister: The House will by this time have read reports of my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary's speech at the General Assembly of the United Nations yesterday. I am placing a full text of the speech in the Library of the House. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary was expressing certain principles, drawn from the Charter of the United Nations, on which our general approach to a solution of the Arab-Israel conflict is based. He was not, of course, attempting to put forward any detailed proposals for an eventual settlement.

Mr. Shinwell: But is my right hon. Friend aware that what the Foreign Secretary did at the United Nations Assembly was to indulge in a sustained criticism of the Israeli Government, including threats if the Israeli Government failed to carry out a certain policy? Was he representing the policy of the Government, and, if so, was he taking sides for the first time? Was he representing the declared view of right hon. and hon. Members in this Assembly?

The Prime Minister: My right hon. Friend was representing the policy of the Government. He was not taking sides. It is my view—and my right hon. Friend's Question has confirmed this—that there has been some misunderstanding and misinterpretation of what my right hon. Friend said. What he was trying to do, and what he said, was to lay down the principle that all the matters to which he referred were for decision in the eventual settlement. When he referred to Israel on this particular point, he was warning Israel——

Mr. Shinwell: Warning?

The Prime Minister: Yes, warning Israel against taking any immediate unilateral action, for example, formal annexation of a quasi-legal character or by legislation to harden and make permanent their grip on the territory which they had captured. He felt, and I should have thought that the House would feel, that if this were done it would prejudice the prospects of a satisfactory all-round settlement at which we should all be aiming and which could have very great advantage for Israel as well as for other countries.

Mr. Heath: But the Foreign Secretary's use of the phrase that there must be no "territorial aggrandisement" of any kind following the recent conflict has been widely interpreted, certainly in this country, as meaning that Israel must go back exactly to the *status quo* before the recent conflict. Would not the Foreign Secretary be better advised to continue to urge that there should be negotiations between the two sides to achieve a reasonable and permanent settlement which would provide security for Israel as well as a peaceful, prosperous existence for the Arab countries?

The Prime Minister: Yes. He was, of course, pressing for negotiations—and when the text of the whole speech and not parts of it have been reported this will be clear—not necessarily between the two sides. This would be valuable if it could be achieved; it might not be realistic. There are other possibilities, including four-Power talks and discussions at the United Nations. But my right hon.

and sponsored by the Ministry of Technology, at which other Departments were represented. Follow-up action from that conference is now proceeding.

Mr. Hugh Fraser: Would the right hon. Gentleman look at this Question in a wider field? Would he not agree that the time has really come for a much wider investigation of the whole question of sea use, of marine technology, marine science, and of getting someone to look at it from outside the Department?

The Prime Minister: This is absolutely right, and it was one reason why we set up the super-co-ordinating committee in the matter of scientific research. I said at that time that there were some scientists who felt that, compared with the vast amounts we were spending on space, a million or two spent on marine geology might give us much more value, in real terms as well as scientific terms. Certainly this whole matter should be looked at, and is being looked at.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: Is not this a case in which the Prime Minister might well be doing something, instead of just wringing his hands?

The Prime Minister: Yes, and in this, as in all other matters, we are. I do not remember the right hon. Gentleman paying any attention to sea-bed technology —I am not sure if he even knew what it was.

ARMS SALES AND FOREIGN POLICY (STUDY)

Q6. **Mr. Hooley** asked the Prime Minister if he will instruct the Secretary of State for Defence and the Foreign Secretary to prepare a study relating to the United Kingdom comparable to the Staff Study on Arms Sales and Foreign Policy prepared for the use of the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, a copy of which has been sent to him.

The Prime Minister: No, Sir. The factors governing the export of armaments are kept constantly under review, and each application to export defence equipment is carefully considered on its merits.

Mr. Hooley: Does the Prime Minister recall saying that the Labour Government would concentrate on the export of the munitions of life rather than the munitions of death? Will he not agree that, even in the crudest economic terms, the export of arms may not give a good yield?

The Prime Minister: In terms of the export of peaceful munitions, of the kind quoted, our aid programme is a fulfilment of that. On the sale of defence arms, we are very anxious to conclude a world agreement, particularly banning private sales of arms, which cause so much harm in areas of tension, and to reach agreement on an arms export control system with the countries concerned. When we have raised this with, for example, the Soviet Union, we have not received very much encouragement, but we shall keep on trying.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Is the Prime Minister aware that when we put Questions in this House about where the arms are sent we are told that it is the practice not to disclose this? In view of the fact that people believe that arms have been sent to both sides in the Middle East conflict, does he not think that it is time that we knew where the arms were sent?

The Prime Minister: It is the practice not to give details about individual arms sales. I certainly agree with what I think is my hon. Friend's feelings, that we ought to get, if we can—and this should be part of a settlement in the Middle East—a comprehensive arms control agreement. It is no good that it should be just binding on us—it should be binding on all those countries which have been supplying arms to the Middle East.

LORD CHANCELLOR (SPEECH)

Q7. **Mr. Boyd-Carpenter** asked the Prime Minister whether the public speech of the Lord Chancellor at Brighton on 5th May about changes in the law relating to divorce represents the policy of Her Majesty's Government.

The Prime Minister: No, Sir. My noble and learned Friend emphasised that he was expressing a personal view, and was not speaking on behalf of the Government.

Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: Is it not a novel procedure for a member of the Cabinet to advocate a complete change in the

Extract from Hansard 22.6.67.

Friend's reference to " territorial aggrandisement " in his speech was a warning against the idea that boundaries could be settled just by military action. The boundaries have to be settled by an all-out settlement. This settlement could be of the greatest value in giving security all round if, for example, as it most certainly should—[*Interruption.*]—this is a very serious question and hon. Members should treat it with the seriousness which it deserves—if, for example, such a settlement as most of us have urged in the House were to include for the first time recognition of the right of Israel to her existence, security through international waterways for her goods as well as, of course, dealing with some of the security anxieties both ways and with the problem of refugees. This is a very valuable prize. Nothing should be done short term to make it more difficult.

Mr. Sydney Silverman: Does my right hon. Friend still subscribe to the policy of not supplying arms to the Middle East at all? If he does, how does he reconcile that with the proceedings between President Nasser and the President of the Soviet Union in Cairo yesterday?

The Prime Minister: As my right hon. Friend made clear to the House before he went to New York, while we did have a temporary embargo to all parties, while we were inquiring whether other countries would do the same, the fact that we could not get assurances of this kind, for example, from the Soviet Union, led us to end the embargo and to resume our previous practice and judge each case on its merits.

Mr. Thorpe: Since the Government have attached some moral significance to remaining neutral in what many regard as a highly controversial issue, may we know why the Foreign Secretary made his remark about " territorial aggrandisement " at a time when Russia continues to supply arms to the Egyptians and when no Arab State has agreed to negotiate with the Israeli Government? Are we to take it that this is a new definition of " neutral " which is more neutral to one side than to the other?

The Prime Minister: I do not accept that for a moment. I believe, as many hon. Members believe, that we shall not get a settlement advantageous to Israel if it is asserted that whatever has been seized in the war should automatically become part of the permanent frontiers. Israel and everyone in the Middle East have a lot more to gain from a settlement in which these matters are settled by negotiation. My right hon. Friend felt that it was right to say this because of the immediate danger of the chance of such a settlement being prejudiced by action such as legislation in the Knesset incorporating certain territories on a legal, although challengeable legal, basis into the territory of Israel.

Mr. Paget: May I ask my right hon. Friend three questions? First, do we recognise that a state of war exists between Israel and the Arab nations? Secondly, if that be so, is not the supply of arms to the belligerents a clear breach of neutrality? Thirdly, does not a breach of neutrality of that sort justify an end to the cease-fire?

The Prime Minister: I do not think that it would be helpful if I were to try to answer those questions, because they all proceed from the first question about the legal status as to whether there is a state of war or not. Before getting into that very difficult field, I should like notice of the question and indeed to have it put either to my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General or to the Foreign Secretary. I do not think that it would be right to rush into these very difficult matters, because it might cause further difficulty.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home: The Foreign Secretary seems to have tried to define in New York the frontiers which Israel should observe in future as a result of the war. Is not that very unwise? It may be, as the Prime Minister said, that the Foreign Secretary did not mean to say this. Therefore, may we have the full text of his speech placed in the Library so that we may judge and return to these matters in future?

The Prime Minister: I confirm what I said in my main Answer. I am placing the full text of the speech in the Library. The right hon. Gentleman is right that one should study the full speech. But my right hon. Friend was not attempting to define the frontiers, the boundaries, the borders of these States. These must be matters for an international settlement. He was saying that they cannot be just

unilaterally declared as a result of the fighting, but that there must be discussions, and he was wanting to make proposals which would help to get a solution by avoiding further unilateral action at this time.

Sir B. Janner: Does my right hon. Friend realise that the manner in which the speech was made at the United Nations indicated that an attempt would be made to deal with Jerusalem alone first and that the speech has deeply shocked everybody, particularly in view of the fact that for the first time in 19 years members of all religions are able to practise in their Holy Places? In those circumstances, will my right hon. Friend take into consideration the fact that Israel is the only nation which so far has been and is able to make that possible in the Holy City?

The Prime Minister: I can assure my hon. Friend that in New York my right hon. Friend, neither by what he said nor by the manner in which he said it tried to lay down from Britain's point of view, still less internationally, what the future status of Jerusalem should be. What he was saying was that the Israel Government should not undertake unilateral action now by legislating for the annexation of the old City of Jerusalem. He was not prejudging any final settlement. I certainly take, as most hon. Members will what my hon. Friend says about opening up all the Holy Places of free religions for those who adhere to them. This is an extremely important and historic development. Certainly it is of fundamental importance. But proposals which one knows were going on for immediate legislation on the old City might have prejudiced a final settlement, created much more bitterness and made a reasonable final settlement much more difficult.

Mr. Shinwell: On a point of order. In view of the unsatisfactory reply—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."]—in view of the thoroughly unsatisfactory reply, and in the absence of an early debate, I give notice that I propose to raise the matter of the Foreign Secretary's speech at the United Nations at an early date.

Several Hon. Members *rose*——

Mr. Speaker: Order. We are ten minutes past Question Time.

30 Q 44

RAILWAYS (CONTINENTAL FREIGHT TERMINAL, STRATFORD)

Mr. Edward M. Taylor (*by Private Notice*) asked the Minister of Transport if she will make a statement on the present situation in the London Rail Freight Depots.

The Minister of Transport (Mrs. Barbara Castle): As regards the industrial dispute, I have nothing to add to the answer I gave to the hon. Member on Monday, 19th June, 1967.—[Vol. 748, col. *183*.]

I hope that hon. Members will not press questions on this—[HON. MEMBERS: "Why not?"]—and so possibly render more difficult the already delicate industrial relations matters with which the Board is dealing. I am, of course, being fully informed of developments.

The Government are keeping a close watch on the effect of the present industrial action on food and other supplies and will do whatever is necessary to mitigate its effects. There is at present some inconvenience, which the Railways Board and I regret, but there is no immediate problem in ensuring the supply of food for the London area.

The Board has, of course, had to refuse to accept perishable traffic, which because of the industrial action it cannot handle, despite the unfortunate effects that the loss of this traffic may have on railway revenues and employment both now and in the future.

Mr. Edward M. Taylor: Would the Minister agree that at the root of this pointless strike, which is serving only to damage the prospects of railwaymen's jobs and drive traffic away from the railways, there is a vital principle? Can the right hon. Lady give a categorical assurance that there will be no sell-out on the principle of free enterprise participation in this terminal operation in fact of what is largely unofficial and Luddite pressure?

Mrs. Castle: I made my position perfectly clear in my reply to the hon. Member's Question on Monday, and I do not intend to add to it.

Mr. Murray: Without prejudicing my right hon. Friend's request that this matter

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DRAFT TELEGRAM

TO U.K. MISSION, NEW YORK

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

FOLLOWING FOR FOREIGN SECRETARY FROM PRIME MINISTER

This is the further telegram I promised at the end of my earlier message. Meanwhile, George Thomson will have told you of the reactions of some of our colleagues to your speech yesterday and of the very widespread feeling in the Parliamentary Party, particularly against what you said about Jerusalem. On the latter point, Barnett Janner tried unsuccessfuly to put a P.N.Q. down to me; and in any case I have to answer a Question of Manny's, which will certainly spark off a flood of supplementaries about the speech.

As you say in your message, we are bound to be attacked from both sides.

One of the difficulties here has been that what you said in your speech about Jerusalem, and the way it was linked to the reference to Article 2 of the Charter, have been taken here (particularly by those who sparked violently last night as the first reports came over the tickers) as implying a firm commitment to Israeli withdrawal from the old City (and by extension, from the other areas they occupied during the fighting). I know that this was not your intention, that all you were trying to do was to lay down the principles ~~on which any~~ eventual settlement ~~would have to be based~~ and warning Israel not to take any immediate

measures that would look like unilateral ~~legalisation~~ of their potential claims - in short, as we and our colleagues noted on June 15, ~~that~~ "we must be seen publicly to be opposed to any extreme proposals which Israel might put forward following her victory".

You can rely on me to say nothing this afternoon to imply the slightest disagreement between yourself, fighting your difficult battle in New York, and your colleagues in their Cabinet Room armchairs in London. But I shall probably need to underline the correct interpretation of what you said in New York, while being careful to avoid saying anything further to complicate our relations with the Arabs - not an easy task, but I will do my best.

Meanwhile, we all agreed this morning that Foreign Office background briefing should be directed to the same purpose; and there was a general feeling that, now that you had made your speech with its full statement of Government policy, the less said publicly either here or in New York the better. I know that, in the difficult situation you have to cope with, this will have a slightly ironic ring. But you have seen enough of the feelings of certain of our colleagues in earlier meetings to know that this is a difficult position to hold with them. George Thomson and I are doing our best, and Jim, Denis and Patrick all spoke up firmly for leaving you to play the hand, within the framework agreed by us all, without the boat being rocked in London. We shall continue to take this line, and I am confident we can hold it.

But you know as well as I the strength of the feelings - and the pressures behind the scenes here.

Approved by the Prime Minister and sent to F.O. for despatch.

DW
22/6.

June 22, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

3 days' work!

22/6

The Middle East Situation: 22 June

(Summary of F.O.telegrams)

United Nations

Attention in the Assembly is still mainly directed to the statements of the Foreign Ministers. Behind the scenes moves are in a preliminary stage. The Latin Americans, who are well coordinated, are in touch with some 20 African and 2 Asian delegations (Japan and Burma) as well as with the Western Europeans. They believe that there could be 70 to 75/voces for a compromise Resolution but recognise that many might be tempted to abstain if this Resolution were controversial. The draft would have to be explicit about withdrawal while avoiding condemnation. It would take until the end of next week to get it agreed and to assure it of a reliable majority. A new group (all non-aligned supporters of the Arab position but significantly including Nigeria) has now been formed. It is said to be aiming at making the Soviet Resolution more acceptable. An amended Soviet Resolution seems likely to be the most dangerous competitor to a Latin American/Western European/moderate Afro-Asian compromise draft.

2. Mr. Kosygin has told Mr. Martin (Canada) that he will stay two more days in New York instead of returning to Moscow on 21 June as planned. He had not yet decided whether or not to see President Johnson. Mr. Martin urged him to do so. Mr. Kosygin also said that the key issue was that of Israel withdrawal. This alone would permit negotiations to start.

3. Sir Leslie Glass has asked a French representative in

/New York

New York whether General de Gaulle's statement yesterday implied that the French were now prepared to work for the condemnation of Israel by the Assembly. He was told that M. Couve de Murville had been asking himself the same question and would be telephoning the General to find out what was in his mind.

U.K. U.S. France. Germany

4. The four principal western Ambassadors in Moscow have jointly assessed that the Russians are completely prisoners of the Arabs and at a loss to know how to proceed. They had moved to the Assembly mainly in order to spread responsibility and to gain time. They realised however that they stood little chance of receiving a two-thirds majority for any part of their Resolution except possibly that which concerned withdrawal. The Ambassadors could not see how the Russians were going to extricate themselves from the resultant impasse. They were convinced, however, that the Russians continued to wish to avoid Great Power military involvement in the area. Russian acknowledgment of Israel's right to exist provided the only other common ground between us and them.

5. On departing to the United Nations from Lagos, Chief Enahoro said Nigeria would support any majority demand for Israel withdrawal to pre war territorial positions if Israel were proved to be the aggressor.

West Bank

6. The Manager of Barclays Bank in Jaffa has told H.M. Ambassador in Tel Aviv that the replacement of dinars on the West Bank by Israel pounds was imminent.

Eastern Department

22 June, 1967.

Subject

3 A

PRIME MINISTER'S
COPY NO....

SECRET

PERSONAL TELEGRAM

SERIAL No. T186/67.....

CYPHER/CAT A

F L A S H FOREIGN OFFICE TO UKMIS NEW YORK

TELNO 3219 22 JUNE 1967 (P.S.)

SECRET.

ADDRESSED TO U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TELEGRAM NUMBER 3219 OF 22 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON.

FOLLOWING FOR SECRETARY OF STATE FROM PRIME MINISTER.

THIS IS THE FURTHER TELEGRAM I PROMISED AT THE END OF MY EARLIER MESSAGE. MEANWHILE, GEORGE THOMSON WILL HAVE TOLD YOU OF THE REACTIONS OF SOME OF OUR COLLEAGUES TO YOUR SPEECH YESTERDAY AND OF THE VERY WIDESPREAD FEELING IN THE PARLIAMENTARY PARTY, PARTICULARLY AGAINST WHAT YOU SAID ABOUT JERUSALEM. ON THE LATTER POINT, BARNETT JANNER TRIED UNSUCCESSFULLY TO PUT A P.N.Q. DOWN TO ME: AND IN ANY CASE I HAVE TO ANSWER A QUESTION OF MANNY'S, WHICH WILL CERTAINLY SPARK OFF A FLOOD OF SUPPLEMENTARIES ABOUT THE SPEECH.

AS YOU SAY IN YOUR MESSAGE, WE ARE BOUND TO BE ATTACKED FROM BOTH SIDES.

ONE OF THE DIFFICULTIES HERE HAS BEEN THAT WHAT YOU SAID IN YOUR SPEECH ABOUT JERUSALEM, AND THE WAY IT WAS LINKED TO THE REFERENCE TO ARTICLE 2 OF THE CHARTER, HAVE BEEN TAKEN HERE (PARTICULARLY BY THOSE WHO SPARKED VIOLENTLY LAST NIGHT AS THE FIRST REPORTS CAME OVER THE TICKERS) AS IMPLYING A FIRM COMMITMENT TO ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE OLD CITY (AND BY EXTENSION, FROM THE OTHER AREAS THEY OCCUPIED DURING THE FIGHTING). I KNOW THAT THIS WAS NOT YOUR INTENTION,

/THAT ALL

SECRET

THAT ALL YOU WERE TRYING TO DO WAS TO LAY DOWN THE PRINCIPLES THAT ALL THESE MATTERS WERE FOR DECISION IN THE EVENTUAL SETTLEMENT AND THAT MEANWHILE YOU WERE WARNING ISRAEL NOT TO TAKE ANY IMMEDIATE UNILATERAL ACTION BY FORMAL ANNEXATION OR LEGISLATION TO HARDEN AND MAKE PERMANENT THEIR GRIP ON TERRITORY THEY HAD CAPTURED - IN SHORT, AS WE AND OUR COLLEAGUES NOTED ON JUNE 15, QUOTE WE MUST BE SEEN PUBLICLY TO BE OPPOSED TO ANY EXTREME PROPOSALS WHICH ISRAEL MIGHT PUT FORWARD FOLLOWING HER VICTORY UNQUOTE.

YOU CAN RELY ON ME TO SAY NOTHING THIS AFTERNOON TO IMPLY THE SLIGHTEST DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN YOURSELF, FIGHTING YOUR DIFFICULT BATTLE IN NEW YORK, AND YOUR COLLEAGUES IN THEIR CABINET ROOM ARMCHAIRS IN LONDON. BUT I SHALL PROBABLY NEED TO UNDERLINE THE CORRECT INTERPRETATION OF WHAT YOU SAID IN NEW YORK, WHILE BEING CAREFUL TO AVOID SAYING ANYTHING FURTHER TO COMPLICATE OUR RELATIONS WITH THE ARABS - NOT AN EASY TASK, BUT I WILL DO MY BEST.

MEANWHILE, WE ALL AGREED THIS MORNING THAT FOREIGN OFFICE BACKGROUND BRIEFING SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO THE SAME PURPOSE: AND THERE WAS A GENERAL FEELING THAT, NOW THAT YOU HAD MADE YOUR SPEECH WITH ITS FULL STATEMENT OF GOVERNMENT POLICY, THE LESS SAID PUBLICLY EITHER HERE OR IN NEW YORK THE BETTER. I KNOW THAT, IN THE DIFFICULT SITUATION YOU HAVE TO COPE WITH, THIS WILL HAVE A SLIGHTLY IRONIC RING. BUT YOU HAVE SEEN ENOUGH OF THE FEELINGS OF CERTAIN OF OUR COLLEAGUES IN EARLIER MEETINGS TO KNOW THAT THIS IS A DIFFICULT POSITION TO HOLD WITH THEM. GEORGE THOMSON AND I ARE DOING OUR BEST, AND JIM, DENIS AND PATRICK ALL SPOKE UP FIRMLY FOR LEAVING YOU TO PLAY THE HAND, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK AGREED BY US ALL, WITHOUT THE BOAT BEING ROCKED IN LONDON. BUT SOME EX-DOVES ARE

/NOW

NOW PRO-ISRAEL HAWKS. WE SHALL CONTINUE TO TAKE THIS LINE, AND I AM CONFIDENT WE CAN HOLD IT.

BUT YOU KNOW AS WELL AS I THE STRENGTH OF THE FEELINGS - AND THE PRESSURES BEHIND THE SCENES HERE.

(WASHINGTON ONLY)

PLEASE PASS ABOVE MESSAGE TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE, IN CASE IT MISSES HIM IN NEW YORK.

SOSFA SENT 1529Z/22 JUNE 1967

[COPIES SENT TO NO. 10 DOWNING STREET]

P R I S E C (F. O.)

Subject

PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL TELEGRAM 3B

SERIAL No. 1188/67

SECRET COPY NO....

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE U.K. MISSION NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1461

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
22 JUNE 1967

SECRET.
FOLLOWING FOR PRIME MINISTER FROM FOREIGN SECRETARY.
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TELEGRAM AND YOUR ENCOURAGEMENT. SEEN FROM HERE I SIMPLY CANNOT UNDERSTAND WHAT OUR COLLEAGUES ARE BEEFING ABOUT SO FAR AS YESTERDAY'S SPEECH IS CONCERNED. ALL MY CONTACTS, WHICH WENT ON ALL THROUGH THE DAY YESTERDAY, AND THE NEWSPAPERS HERE TOOK AND TAKE A QUITE DIFFERENT LINE FROM THAT WHICH SOME PEOPLE SEEM TO BE TAKING AT HOME. OF COURSE THE ISRAELIS ARE ANNOYED AND I HAD A PRETTY DIFFICULT MEETING WITH GOLDA MEIR. ON THE OTHER HAND EBAN TOOK A MUCH MORE REASONABLE LINE. ALL OUR ADVISERS HERE, BOTH PERMANENT AND THOSE WITH ME, BELIEVE WE ARE PURSUING THE RIGHT LINE AND YOU MIGHT LIKE TO REMIND ONE OR TWO OF MY COLLEAGUES THAT IT WAS THE LINE THEY WERE MOST CONCERNED ABOUT BEFORE AND DURING THE FIGHTING.
YOU MAY LIKE TO KNOW THAT ONE OF THE ADVISERS HERE, WHEN HE HEARD ABOUT THE LINE-UP OF CABINET SAID, QUOTE GOOD GOD, THAT WAS THE ARMY THAT COULD NOT BE SEEN FOR DUST AT THE CRITICAL MOMENT UNQUOTE.
I HOPE THE SITUATION WON'T CAUSE YOU TOO MUCH TROUBLE. I WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH YOU AGAIN WHEN I SEE HOW THINGS DEVELOP IN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO.

LORD CARADON

SENT 1515Z 22 JUNE 1967
RECD 1515Z 22 JUNE 1967

[COPIES SENT TO NO.10 DOWNING STREET].

P R I S E C(FO):

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20.10.75

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PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL TELEGRAM

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SERIAL No. T.907/67 COPY NO.

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE U.K. MISSION NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NO. 1476
SECRET
DEDIP

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
22 JUNE 1967

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 3219.
FOLLOWING FOR PRIME MINISTER FROM SECRETARY OF STATE.
THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGES.

2. I UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEM ONLY TOO WELL AND INDEED REALISED IT FROM THE BEGINNING. AS LONG AS YOU CAN HOLD THE POSITION I WILL DO THE SAME HERE.

3. BETWEEN OURSELVES SOME OF OUR COLLEAGUES WILL BE GETTING A FLEA IN THE EAR WHEN I GET BACK.

LORD CARADON

SENT 0054Z/23 PLS
RECD 0054Z 23 JUNE

[COPIES PASSED TO NO. 10 DOWNING STREET]

PRISEC (F.O.

SECRET

No 10 Downing St

Subject

PRIME MINISTER'S

CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONAL MESSAGE

COPY NO. RAM

SERIAL No. ....T189/67.....

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 1475 22 JUNE 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

FOLLOWING FOR PRIME MINISTER FROM FOREIGN SECRETARY.

I AM NOW IN THE AEROPLANE ON THE WAY BACK TO NEW YORK TO SEE KOSYGIN. I HAVE GIVEN PAT DEAN AN ACCOUNT AND HE WILL BE SENDING YOU A TELEGRAM ON THAT BASIS.

2. OUR TEXAN FRIEND COULD NOT HAVE BEEN KINDER. I HAD AN HOUR ALONE WITH HIM BEFORE LUNCH AND OTHERS WERE KEPT WAITING. HE CLEARLY ATTACHES THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE TO US KEEPING TOGETHER. I CAN TELL YOU MORE ABOUT IT WHEN I SEE YOU. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS SIMPLY TO SAY THAT HE IS STILL VERY MUCH OUR FRIEND.

LORD CARADON

SENT 0052Z/23 PLS

RECD 0052Z 23 JUNE

[COPIES PASSED TO NO. 10 DOWNING STREET]

PRISEC (F.O.)

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE U.K. MISSION NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1488

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
23 JUNE 1967

SECRET.
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO 1488 OF 23 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO MOSCOW WASHINGTON TEL AVIV PARIS.

MY TELNO 1483: SECRETARY OF STATE'S CALL ON MR. KOSYGIN.

PERMANENT UNDER SECRETARY CALLED ON MR. RUSK'S SPECIAL ASSISTANT THIS MORNING, IN MR. RUSK'S ABSENCE IN WASHINGTON, AND GAVE HIM A BROAD OUTLINE OF SECRETARY OF STATE'S TALK WITH MR. KOSYGIN ON 22 JUNE ON LINES OF MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE.

2. MR. WALSH EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THIS ACCOUNT OF MR. KOSYGIN'S VIEWS ON THE MIDDLE EAST, WHICH HE SAID FOLLOWED CLOSELY THE LINE TAKEN BY MR. KOSYGIN IN HIS TALKS WITH MR. RUSK OVER THE LAST TWO DAYS. P.U.S. WAS SHOWN A TELEGRAM REPORTING A TALK ON 22 JUNE, OF WHICH THE MAIN POINT OF INTEREST WAS KOSYGIN'S INSISTENCE THAT THE QUESTION OF QUOTE WHAT SHOULD WE STRIVE FOR? UNQUOTE WAS THE ONE FOR WHICH HE WANTED TO FIND THE ANSWER: IF THIS COULD BE DECIDED, ALL OTHER MATTERS WOULD QUOTE FALL INTO PLACE UNQUOTE.

3. IN THE SAME CONVERSATION KOSYGIN HAD SHOWN FLEXIBILITY ON THE QUESTION OF MARITIME RIGHTS (WHICH HE HAD SUGGESTED SHOULD PERHAPS BE DEALT WITH BY SOME SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS SIMILAR TO THE MONTREUX CONVENTION) BUT HAD SHOWN THE SAME INSISTENCE ON IMMEDIATE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AS HE HAD WITH SECRETARY OF STATE. MR. RUSK HAD TOLD KOSYGIN, ON THE BASIS OF AN EARLIER TALK WITH EBAN, THAT HE DID NOT THINK ISRAEL HAD ANY INTEREST IN RETAINING TERRITORY IN EGYPT AND SYRIA.

4. MR. WALSH TOLD P.U.S. THAT THE AMERICANS HAD KEPT IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE RUMANIANS WHO HAD TOLD THEM THAT THE PRESIDENT'S FIVE POINTS WERE FUNDAMENTALLY THE SAME AS THEIR OWN POSITION THOUGH THERE WERE LIMITS ON THEIR ABILITY TO SAY SO PUBLICLY. P.U.S. GAVE MR. WALSH A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF SECRETARY OF STATE'S TALK WITH RUMANIAN PRIME MINISTER LAST NIGHT (SEE SEPARATE RECORD).

5. IN SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION, MR. GOLDBERG TOLD P.U.S. THAT IT /WAS

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U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO.1488 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

WAS CLEAR TO THE AMERICANS FROM PRIVATE SOURCES (WHICH WE DOUBT) THAT THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO THE U.N. HAD BEEN GUILTY OF SERIOUS MISREPORTING ON THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION HERE AND HAD LED THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT TO BELIEVE THAT THEY WOULD GET A CLEAR MAJORITY IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOR THE SOVIET DRAFT RESOLUTION. IN THIS CONNECTION, MR. GOLDBERG SAID THAT THE FRENCH AFRICANS, AND IN PARTICULAR THE SENEGALESE, HAD TOLD THE AMERICANS THAT THEY DISAGREED STRONGLY WITH THE LINE TAKEN BY PRESIDENT DE GAULLE.

6. SEE M.I.F.T. (NOT TO ALL).

F O PASS MOSCOW 200 TEL AVIV 218 PARIS 199

LORD CARADON

SENT 23/1738Z
RECD 23/1740Z

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED].
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CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1501

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
23 JUNE 1967

SECRET.
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 1501 OF 23 JUNE
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW AND PARIS.

JOHNSON/KOSYGIN MEETING.

MR. RUSK ASKED THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO CALL THIS EVENING ON HIS RETURN FROM GLASSBORO. HE SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT AND KOSYGIN HAD MET FOR TWO HOURS ALONE, AND HE KNEW LITTLE OF WHAT HAD PASSED. ON THE MIDDLE EAST, IT SEEMED FROM RUSK'S ACCOUNT THAT KOSYGIN HAD BEEN AS RIGID AS HE WAS YESTERDAY WITH THE FOREIGN SECRETARY. AT THE LAST MOMENT, KOSYGIN HAD UNEXPECTEDLY ASKED FOR A FURTHER MEETING. THIS HAS BEEN ARRANGED FOR SUNDAY.
2. RUSK HAD NOT HAD A FULL ACCOUNT FROM THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF AND WAS THEREFORE NOT IN A POSITION TO ASSESS IT. HE HAD THE IMPRESSION HOWEVER THAT NON-PROLIFERATION WAS THE ONLY PROMISING SUBJECT.
3. PLEASE PASS COPY TO PALLISER AT NO.10.

O PASS MOSCOW 205 AND PARIS 203.

LORD CARADON.

SENT 0613 24 JUNE
RECD 0615 24 JUNE

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[REPETITION TO MOSCOW REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO UKMIS NEW YORK
TELNO 3265 23 JUNE, 1967 (EASTERN)

CONFIDENTIAL.
ADDRESSED TO UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NUMBER 3265 OF 23 JUNE
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO AMMAN, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON,
AND JERUSALEM.

THE ISRAEL AMBASSADOR CALLED ON MR. THOMSON ON 22 JUNE ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM HIS GOVERNMENT TO EXPRESS CONCERN ABOUT THE FOREIGN SECRETARY'S SPEECH AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND TO SEEK SOME CLARIFICATION ABOUT BRITISH POLICY PARTICULARLY ON THE QUESTION OF JERUSALEM.
2. MR. THOMSON SHOWED MR. REMEZ THE FULL TEXT OF THE SPEECH WHICH HE HAD NOT PREVIOUSLY SEEN, AND POINTED OUT THAT THE REFERENCES TO JERUSALEM AND TO TERRITORIAL AGGRANDISEMENT WERE BALANCED BY CLEAR STATEMENTS THAT ANY SETTLEMENT MUST RECOGNISE THE RIGHT OF ALL STATES IN THE AREA TO EXIST IN PEACE AND ALSO THE RIGHT OF PASSAGE FOR SHIPS OF ALL NATIONS THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS. MR. THOMSON WENT ON TO EXPLAIN THAT THE REFERENCE TO TERRITORIAL AGGRANDISEMENT DID NOT MEAN THAT FRONTIER ADJUSTMENTS WERE PRECLUDED AS A PART OF AN EVENTUAL SETTLEMENT, BUT THAT IT STATED THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE, WHICH WAS IMPORTANT TO ISRAEL ALSO, THAT FRONTIERS SHOULD NOT BE CHANGED BY THE USE OF FORCE UNILATERALLY. MR. THOMSON SAID THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S REMARKS ON JERUSALEM D'D NOT MEAN THAT WE WERE NECESSARILY ADVOCATING A RETURN TO THE SITUATION AS IT WAS BEFORE THE FIGHTING, BUT IT DID INDICATE OUR VIEW THAT IN THEIR OWN INTERESTS THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT APPEAR TO PRE-JUDGE THE FUTURE OF JERUSALEM IN ADVANCE OF A GENERAL SETTLEMENT. IF THEY WERE ONLY STATING A NEGOTIATING POSITION THAT WAS ONE THING, BUT WE HAD UNDERSTOOD THEY WERE CONTEMPLATING

/LEGISLATIVE

LEGISLATIVE ACTION TO PRESENT THE WORLD WITH A FAIT ACCOMPLI AND THAT WAS QUITE ANOTHER THING. MR. REMEZ THEN ARGUED NOT VERY PLAUSIBLY THAT THE UNIFICATION OF JERUSALEM SHOULD BE REGARDED AS A FRONTIER RECTIFICATION RATHER THAN AS TERRITORIAL AGGRANDISEMENT.

3. IN FURTHER DISCUSSION MR. REMEZ ASKED WHY MR. BROWN HAD FOUND IT NECESSARY TO ISSUE A PUBLIC WARNING OF THIS KIND TO ISRAEL IN THE UNITED NATIONS AT A TIME WHEN, AS IT APPEARED, WE WERE ALREADY AWARE THAT ISRAEL WAS NOT PROCEEDING WITH ANY PLANS FOR THE FORMAL UNIFICATION OF JERUSALEM. MR. THOMSON SAID THAT WE HAD NO DEFINITE ASSURANCES FROM THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT THAT THEY WERE NOT PLANNING SOME MEASURE OF THIS KIND AND HE ASKED WHETHER MR. REMEZ WAS READY TO GIVE SUCH AN ASSURANCE. MR. REMEZ WAS UNABLE TO DO SO.

4. MR. REMEZ SUGGESTED THAT THE QUESTION OF JERUSALEM AND ANY WARNING TO ISRAEL COULD HAVE BEEN MORE SUITABLY EXAMINED IN PRIVATE BETWEEN MR. BROWN AND MR. EBAN. MR. EBAN HAD BEEN KEEN TO HAVE SUCH A TALK BUT HAD BEEN PUT OFF. MR. THOMSON POINTED TO THE PRESSURES ON MR. BROWN'S PROGRAMME SINCE HIS ARRIVAL IN NEW YORK OWING TO HIS HAVING HAD TO STAY BACK HERE FOR THE ADEN STATEMENT, BUT HE UNDERTOOK TO SEE THAT MR. BROWN WAS INFORMED OF THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT'S VIEWS ON THIS.

5. MR. THOMSON MADE THE POINT THAT ALL THE PROCEEDINGS IN NEW YORK MUST BE SEEN IN THE LIGHT OF MR. KOSYGIN'S INTENTION TO MOUNT AN AGGRESSIVE PROPAGANDA OPERATION THERE. HE POINTED ALSO TO H.M.G.'S RESOLUTE REFUSAL TO JOIN IN THE CONDEMNATION OF ISRAEL AS AGGRESSOR IN CONTRAST TO THE FRENCH DESPITE THE SERIOUS DAMAGE TO BRITISH INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

SOSFA

SENT 1749Z 23 JUNE

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Telegraphed to Chequers
SH
24/6.

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A
PRIORITY WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2145

TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE
DATED 23 JUNE 1967

CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 2145 OF 23 JUNE
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION PRIORITY TO UKMIS NEW YORK AMMAN TEL AVIV JEDDA MOSCOW AND NEW DELHI.

MIDDLE EAST

GENE ROSTOW TOLD ME THIS MORNING THAT HE THOUGHT THE PROCEEDINGS AT THE UNITED NATIONS WERE LIKELY TO GO ON FOR SOME TIME. WHILE THERE WAS A DEFINITE DANGER THAT THINGS MIGHT CRYSTALLIZE IN THE WRONG WAY, IN HIS VIEW THERE WERE AT LEAST THREE POSITIVE FACTORS IN THE PRESENT SITUATION:

(I) THE TURKS AT THE UNITED NATIONS HAD BEEN APPROACHED BY SOME ARAB REPRESENTATIVES (HE DID NOT SEEM TO KNOW WHICH) WHO APPEARED WILLING TO ADOPT A RELATIVELY MODERATE POSITION:

(II) THE ISRAELI POSITION WAS ALSO MUCH MORE MODERATE THAN THE AMERICANS HAD AT FIRST THOUGHT: THEY WERE FOR EXAMPLE MAKING MINIMAL TERRITORIAL CLAIMS ON THE SYRIAN FRONTIER AND WERE ONLY ASKING FOR AN ASSURANCE OF THE DEMILITARIZATION OF THE HIGH GROUND JUST INSIDE SYRIA:

(III) OPINION AMONG PALESTINIAN ARABS SEEMED TO BE FLOWING IN THE DIRECTION OF SOME SORT OF SEPARATE AGREEMENT WITH THE ISRAELIS ALTHOUGH WHETHER THESE GENERAL SENTIMENTS WOULD BE TRANSLATED INTO POLITICAL ACTION WAS STILL UNCERTAIN.

2. KING HUSSEIN WAS NOW COMING TO NEW YORK AND, AS ROSTOW SAW IT, EVERYTHING DEPENDED ON HIM. IF THE PALESTINIANS AND KING HUSSEIN COULD WORK OUT SOME SOLUTION OF THEIR OWN WHICH COVERED:

/(II) REFUGEES

(I) REFUGEES
(II) JERUSALEM,
THERE WAS A CHANCE OF GETTING THE WHOLE ARAB/ISRAELI PROBLEM OUT OF THE RUT IN WHICH IT HAD LAIN FOR SO LONG.

3. ROSTOW SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD EXPRESSED A WILLINGNESS TO SEE KING HUSSEIN DURING HIS VISIT. BUT IF KING HUSSEIN WERE UNABLE TO COME TO WASHINGTON, MR. RUSK MIGHT SEE HIM IN NEW YORK

4. ROSTOW REMARKED THAT THE SAUDI ATTITUDE SEEMED POSITIVE TOWARDS SOME SUCH SEPARATE SETTLEMENT AND THAT KING FAISAL SAW IT AS A WAY OF GETTING THE PALESTINE QUESTION OUT OF THE WAY. THIS LEFT SYRIA AND IRAQ AS THE MAIN OBSTACLES AMONG ISRAEL'S IMMEDIATE NEIGHBOURS. AT THIS POINT, I QUESTIONED WHETHER KING HUSSEIN WOULD REALLY DARE TO GET OUT IN FRONT OF THE REST OF THE ARAB STATES TO THIS EXTENT AND ALSO WHETHER KING FAISAL WOULD ACCEPT A SETTLEMENT WHICH SEEMED FAVOURABLE TO ISRAEL. ROSTOW AGREED THAT BOTH THESE POINTS WERE OPEN TO QUESTION, BUT NONETHELESS REMAINED OPTIMISTIC.

5. ROSTOW CLAIMED TO HAVE LITTLE RELIABLE INFORMATION ABOUT WHAT WAS GOING ON IN THE UPPER REACHES OF THE U.A.R. LEADERSHIP. HE THOUGHT IT SIGNIFICANT THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAD BOUGHT U.S. DOLLARS 10 MILLION WORTH OF AMERICAN WHEAT FOR CASH ONLY TWO DAYS AGO AND WONDERED WHERE THE MONEY CAME FROM: I MENTIONED THE RECENT GIFTS FROM LIBYA AND KUWAIT.

6. ROSTOW REMARKED THAT THE SOVIET CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, WITH WHOM HE HAD LUNCHED THE OTHER DAY, HAD EXPRESSED VERY MODERATE VIEWS AND THAT IN GENERAL THE RUSSIANS SEEMED MILDER THAN THEY HAD BEEN IN PARIS ON THEIR WAY TO NEW YORK. THE AMERICAN IMPRESSION WAS THAT KOSYGIN DID NOT, HOWEVER, HAVE AUTHORITY TO YIELD VERY MUCH. ROSTOW'S OWN FEELING WAS THAT THE NEXT TWO WEEKS MIGHT BE THE BEST TIME IN WHICH TO ACHIEVE A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT AND THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE OPPORTUNITY SHOULD NOT BE LOST. THE RUSSIANS WERE REBUILDING THEIR POSITION FAST IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SPENDING A LOT OF MONEY DOING SO . NOW WAS THE TIME TO GET MOVING: AND THE KEY TO ANY SOLUTION LAY IN AMMAN.

7. AS FAR AS TACTICS AT THE UNITED NATIONS WERE CONCERNED, HE THOUGHT THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD MOBILIZE 40-50 VOTES FOR A SIMPLE WITHDRAWAL RESOLUTION. HE SAID HE HAD GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS FOR

/ TELEGRAMS

TELEGRAMS TO BE SENT TO UNITED STATES AMBASSADORS IN THE MORE MODERATE AFRICAN COUNTRIES ASKING THEM TO DO WHAT THEY COULD TO STIFFEN THE ATTITUDE OF THESE COUNTRIES IN THE UNITED NATIONS. HE STRESSED HOW IMPORTANT HE THOUGHT IT WAS THAT THE BRITISH AND THE AMERICANS SHOULD WORK OUT ANY DIFFERENCES IN ADVANCE AND NOT FALL APART OVER WHATEVER RESOLUTION WAS FINALLY SUBMITTED. THE DANISH RESOLUTION WAS THE BEST SO FAR: IT WOULD REPRESENT A TREMENDOUS PROPAGANDA DEFEAT FOR THE RUSSIANS. ROSTOW HAD HEARD THAT THE ITALIANS AND LATIN AMERICANS WERE ALSO COOKING UP SOMETHING.

8. FINALLY HE MENTIONED THAT RAYMOND HARE (LATELY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS - NOW RETIRED) WOULD BE GOING TO INDIA TO TALK TO MRS. GHANDI, BUT HE WAS NOT OVER SANGUINE ABOUT THE LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS. (NOR, I MIGHT ADD, AM I. HARE WAS PRETTY INEFFECTUAL AS ASSISTANT SECRETARY).

9. MUCH OF THIS, OF COURSE, REPRESENTS ROSTOW'S OWN THINKING AND I DOUBT IF HIS OPTIMISM ABOUT THE CHANCES OF A SETTLEMENT IS VERY WIDELY SHARED IN THE UNITED STATES ADMINISTRATION.

F.O. PASS PRIORITY AMMAN 40 TEL AVIV 58 JEDDA 32 DELHI 41 MOSCOW 151

SIR P. DEAN

SENT 0038/24 RCD 0040/24

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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CYPHER/CAT -A-
I M M E D I A T E PARIS
TELEGRAM NUMBER 659

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
23 JUNE 1967

CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 659 OF 23 JUNE AND RFI IMMEDIATE TO UKMIS NEW YORK (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE) WASHINGTON AND PRIORITY TO MOSCOW AND SAVING TO UKDEL NATO AND UKDEL OECD.

MIDDLE EAST SITUATION.

I CALLED ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AT THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO-DAY FOR A GENERAL TALK IN THE LIGHT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S DISCUSSIONS WITH GENERAL DE GAULLE, OF WHICH M. ALPHAND TOLD ME THAT HE HAD SO FAR ONLY SEEN A SUMMARY RECORD. HE SEEMED, HOWEVER, REASONABLY WELL INFORMED ABOUT WHAT HAD BEEN SAID.

2. I SAID THAT M. ALPHAND WOULD NO DOUBT HAVE SEEN THAT IN YOUR SPEECH IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, YOU HAD SET OUT FOUR PRINCIPLES WITH WHICH I SUPPOSED THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT DISAGREE: AND YOU HAD MADE THE SPECIFIC PROPOSAL FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN THE MIDDLE EAST. M. ALPHAND, WHO HAD READ THE TIMES REPORT OF YOUR SPEECH, SAID THAT IN YOUR FOUR PRINCIPLES YOU HAD GONE RATHER FURTHER THAN THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT, SINCE THE LATTER HAD NOT TAKEN ANY POSITION ABOUT THE PERMANENT CONTROL OF ARMS FOR THE MIDDLE EAST. HE SAW NO OBJECTION TO THE APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, BUT HE WONDERED WHETHER IT WOULD REALLY DO MUCH GOOD. THE ESSENTIAL PROBLEM WAS TO GET A NEGOTIATION GOING. THE ISRAELIS WERE PREPARED TO TALK TO THE ARABS, BUT THE ARABS WOULD NOT TALK TO THEM. ONE COULD ONLY HOPE THAT SOMETHING USEFUL MIGHT EMERGE FROM THE PRESENT DISCUSSIONS GOING ON IN PRIVATE AT NEW YORK.

3. I SAID THAT IN CONVERSATION WITH YOU, KOSYGIN HAD CONTINUED TO INSIST THAT THERE COULD BE NO NEGOTIATION BEFORE THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE ISRAELI TROOPS. M. ALPHAND SAID THAT THIS WAS OF COURSE NOT, REPEAT NOT, THE FRENCH POSITION. IN WHAT SOUNDED A SLIGHTLY DEFENSIVE REFERENCE TO THE GENERAL'S STATEMENT OF 21 JUNE, M. ALPHAND SAID THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT OF COURSE DID NOT ASCRIBE ALL THE

/BLAME

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PARIS TELEGRAM NO.659 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

BLAME TO ONE SIDE. THEY HAD BLAMED THE ARABS FOR THEIR ORIGINAL ACTION AGAINST ISRAEL AND THEY OF COURSE ALSO TOOK THE VIEW THAT ISRAEL WAS ENTITLED TO LIVE IN PEACE AND TO ENJOY REASONABLE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION. BUT THE GENERAL NATURALLY RESENTED MOST THE ISRAELIS' ACTION IN STARTING THE WAR. WHAT WAS NEW IN THE GENERAL'S STATEMENT WAS THE CLEAR LINK WHICH HE MADE BETWEEN THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM AND THAT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. I SAID THAT IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH YOU, KOSYGIN HAD DENIED THAT THERE WAS ANY SUCH LINK. HAD HE MADE IT IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GENERAL? M. ALPHAND SAID THAT HE HAD NOT AND THAT HE HAD ONLY MADE ONE BRIEF REFERENCE TO VIETNAM. THE LINK, THOUGH REAL, WAS PERHAPS MORE INDIRECT THAN DIRECT AND IT SPRANG AS MUCH AS ANYTHING FROM THE SEVERE PRESSURE WHICH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WERE UNDER FROM THE CHINESE ABOUT VIETNAM.

4. I ASKED WHETHER THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAD YET DECIDED WHAT LINE THEY WOULD TAKE ON THE SOVIET RESOLUTION. M. ALPHAND REPLIED THAT THEY HAD NOT YET CONSIDERED THIS AND HE DOUBTED WHETHER THEY WOULD TAKE ANY DECISION UNTIL A VOTE WAS IMMINENT, WHICH COULD HARDLY BE FOR ANOTHER WEEK. HE EXPECTED THAT THEY WOULD TAKE THE SAME LINE AS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THAT THEY WOULD ABSTAIN BOTH ON THE RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE AND ON THE INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPHS.

SEE MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.

FO PSE PASS IMMEDIATE TO UKMIS NEW YORK (FOR SECRETARY OF STATE) 58 AND WASHINGTON 196 AND PRIORITY TO MOSCOW 58.
SIR P REILLY

SENT 23/1652Z
RECD 23/1653Z

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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2476

Middle East Situation 23 June

(Summary of F.O. telegrams)

United Nations

On his return from visiting the President in Washington, the Foreign Secretary saw Mr. Kosygin on 22 June. He reported that, although they got down to brass tacks, Mr. Kosygin gave him no clear idea of specific Soviet objectives in the present situation. Otherwise the behind the scenes activity remains still at a preliminary stage as delegations await the outcome of the meeting between President Johnson and Mr. Kosygin.

2. King Hussein will be leaving Amman for the United Nations tomorrow.

Israel

3. General Dayan has told the Knesset that applications to cross over to the West Bank would not be refused to persons wishing to return home to their families.

Eastern Department

R 23 June, 1967

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Visit of the Foreign Secretary to the United States

19–24 June, 1967

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19–24 June, 1967

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Document No. 1

INTRODUCTION

The Foreign Secretary, accompanied by a number of his advisers, visited the Fifth Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations from Monday, 19 June, to Saturday, 24 June.

2. He travelled to New York by RAF Comet via Gander and returned (after a fault had developed in the Comet) by direct commercial flight.

3. The Special Session was convened on 17 June following the request (on 13 June) of the Soviet Union and after prolonged discussion of the Middle East situation in the Security Council. The belief that this was a Soviet propaganda exercise designed to regain credit in the Arab world after the Arab defeat was given substance when Mr. Kosygin and Gromyko announced that they would be leading the Soviet delegation to the Session. A considerable number of Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers from other countries then decided that they, too, should attend the Session.

4. During his stay in New York the Foreign Secretary saw many Ministers and Ambassadors, including Mr. Kosygin and Mr. Gromyko. On Thursday, 22 June, President Johnson invited him to lunch in Washington and made his aeroplane available for the flight there and back. Other guests on this occasion included Signor Moro and Signor Fanfani, the Italian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, and Mr. Krag, the Danish Prime Minister. Mr. Brown had a full hour's talk with the President before lunch.

Document No. 2

COMPOSITION OF THE PARTY

The Right Hon. George Brown, MP ...	Foreign Secretary
Sir Paul Gore-Booth, GCMG, KCVO	Permanent Under-Secretary of State
Sir Harold Beeley, KCMG, CBE ...	Ambassador, United Kingdom Delegation to the Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament
Sir Morrice James, KCMG, CVO, MBE	Deputy Under-Secretary of State, Commonwealth Office
Mr. P. T. Hayman, CMG, CVO, MBE	Assistant Under-Secretary of State
Mr. T. F. Brenchley, CMG	Assistant Under-Secretary of State
Mr. D. J. D. Maitland, CMG, OBE ...	Principal Private Secretary
Mr. W. R. Haydon	Head of News Department
Mr. D. G. Crawford	First Secretary
Mr. P. R. H. Wright	Private Secretary to Sir Paul Gore-Booth
Mr. W. L. Greig	Special Assistant to the Foreign Secretary
Mr. D. I. Morphet	Assistant Private Secretary

Document No. 3

PROGRAMME

Monday, 19 June

1900 Depart London Airport North by RAF charter Comet
1240 Arrive Kennedy Airport, New York (Stay at Carlyle Hotel)

Tuesday, 20 June

0900 Meeting with Lord Caradon (Carlyle Hotel)
1215 Meeting with U Thant, United Nations Secretary-General (United Nations Headquarters)
1315 Foreign Secretary's luncheon for Mr. Krag, Danish Prime Minister (Carlyle Hotel)
1500 Meeting with the Foreign Minister of Kuwait, Shaikh Sabah al Ahmed (Carlyle Hotel)
1900 Meeting with the Hon. Dean Rusk, the United States Secretary of State (Carlyle Hotel)

Wednesday, 21 June

1015 Courtesy call on Mr. Pazhwak, President of the General Assembly/ Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the United Nations (United Nations Headquarters)
1050 Address United Nations General Assembly
1315 Foreign Secretary's luncheon for Dr. Costa Mendez, Argentine Foreign Minister (Carlyle Hotel)
1500 Meeting with Mr. Habib Bourguiba, Jr., Tunisian Minister of Foreign Affairs (United Nations Headquarters)
1530 Meeting with Dr. Manuel Perez-Guerrero, Chairman of the United Nations Mission on Aden (United Nations Headquarters)
1630 Meeting with Mr. Adnan Pachachi, Iraq Foreign Minister (United Nations Headquarters)
1730 Meeting with Mr. Abba Eban, Israel Foreign Minister (United Nations Headquarters)
2030 Private dinner with Mr. and Mrs. Martin Segal

Thursday, 22 June

1100 Depart La Guardia Airport, New York, by Presidential aircraft
1200 Arrive Washington National Airport
1230 Meeting with President Johnson (White House)
1330 Luncheon with President Johnson (White House)
1545 Depart Washington National Airport by Presidential aircraft
1650 Arrive La Guardia Airport, New York
1745 Meeting with Mr. A. N. Kosygin, Soviet Prime Minister (Soviet Mission)
1930 Meeting with Mr. Maurer, Rumanian Prime Minister, and Mr. Manescu, Rumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs (Carlyle Hotel)

Friday, 23 June

0845 Meeting with Dr. Costa Mendez, Argentine Foreign Minister over breakfast (Carlyle Hotel)

1000 Meeting with Mr. S. S. Pirzada, Pakistan Minister for Foreign Affairs (Carlyle Hotel)

1100 Meeting with Dr. Fawzi, UAR Deputy Prime Minister (Waldorf Towers)

1215 Meeting with Governor Averell Harriman (United Nations Headquarters)

1315 Luncheon with Lord Caradon (4 East 66th Street)

1530 Meeting with Dr. Adam Malik, Indonesian Foreign Minister (United Nations Headquarters)

1555 Meeting with M. Tueni, Lebanese Ambassador to the Special Assembly of the United Nations (United Nations Headquarters)

1615 Meeting with Mr. Bishti, Libyan Minister for Foreign Affairs (United Nations Headquarters)

1700 Meeting with M. Balafrej, Moroccan Minister for Foreign Affairs (United Nations Headquarters)

1815 Meeting with Mr. Abba Eban, Israel Foreign Minister (United Nations Headquarters)

1800–2000 Reception given by Mr. Pazhwak, President of the General Assembly, and U Thant, United Nations Secretary-General (United Nations Headquarters)

2015 Dinner with M. Couve de Murville, French Foreign Minister (740 Park Avenue)

2245 Meeting with the Hon. Dean Rusk, United States Secretary of State (Waldorf Towers)

Saturday, 24 June

1015 Depart Kennedy Airport, New York, by flight No. QF 530 [RAF charter Comet unserviceable]

2015 Arrive London Airport

Document No. 4

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, IN THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S OFFICE AT THE UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS, NEW YORK, AT 12.15 p.m. ON TUESDAY, 20 JUNE, 1967

Present:

The Right Hon. George Brown, M P
Lord Caradon
Mr. D. J. D. Maitland

U Thant

Mr. Brown began by asking the Secretary-General what course he thought the debate would take.

2. *U Thant* said this was difficult to anticipate. His present view was that there would have to be some *quid pro quo*. In exchange for withdrawal the essential element would be acceptance of the right of innocent passage through the Straits of Tiran. It was not clear at this stage what would happen about Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip and the Syrian Heights which the Israelis occupy.

3. *Mr. Brown* then asked the Secretary-General what role he, Mr. Brown, ought to play. *U Thant* said that it would be most useful if Mr. Brown could talk to representatives of those countries who had a particular interest and influence in the situation. This included Yugoslavia and France.

4. *Mr. Brown* then asked U Thant for his views on the possibility of the Assembly agreeing to certain measures of immediate importance, *e.g.*, the strengthening of UNTSO, establishing a United Nations presence in the area and some fresh initiative over the refugees.

5. *U Thant* agreed that General Odd Bull's organisation had a useful role to play and that it should be strengthened. As regards a United Nations presence, he welcomed the support already given by the United Kingdom to the suggestion that there should be a representative of the Secretary-General sent to the area. As to a mediator it would of course be imperative (and very difficult) to find someone acceptable to both sides. U Thant was not in favour of setting up any new organisation to deal with the refugee problem. He thought that the present organisation of UNRWA was adequate and should be given all support.

Document No. 5

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND THE PRIME MINISTER OF DENMARK AT A LUNCHEON IN THE CARLYLE HOTEL, NEW YORK, AT 1.15 p.m. ON TUESDAY, 20 JUNE, 1967

Present:

The Right Hon. George Brown, M P
Lord Caradon
Sir Paul Gore-Booth
Mr. T. F. Brenchley
Mr. D. J. D. Maitland

Mr. Jens Otto Krag
Mr. H. R. Tabor
Mr. Fischer
Mr. S. G. Mellbin

During a lunch given by Mr. Brown for the Danish Prime Minister, there was a general conversation on the way that discussions about a compromise resolution were getting on. The Danes had been in touch with the Rumanians and were hopeful of being able to organise a fair body of support for a middle-of-the-road resolution. They knew that the Latin Americans were also working with the same

object in mind and were considering at what point the two groups might be got together. They thought it would be a mistake for the United Kingdom to offer to co-sponsor the compromise resolution: it was better that none of the permanent members of the Security Council should be involved to that extent.

2. There was also discussion about possible candidates for the job of United Nations Special Representative in the Middle East, assuming that the resolution eventually passed included a provision for the Secretary-General to appoint one. The Afro-Asians appeared to be ruled out. The Latin Americans might be able to produce an acceptable candidate; Bernardes and Galo-Plaza were mentioned. The Danes suggested that among the Europeans a Rumanian might be possible, in view of the sensible way in which the Rumanians had been steering clear of the Soviet *bloc* propaganda position. If so, Manescu would be the obvious choice. Mr. Brown commented that this was a very interesting idea, but there might be snags in it and he thought it would need a lot of thought.

Document No. 6

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF KUWAIT AT THE CARLYLE HOTEL, NEW YORK, AT 3 p.m. ON TUESDAY, 20 JUNE, 1967

Present:

The Right Hon. George Brown, M P
Mr. T. F. Brenchley
Mr. D. G. Crawford
Shaikh Sabah al Ahmed
Sayed Rashid al Rashid

Shaikh Sabah, after thanking Mr. Brown for receiving the new Kuwaiti Ambassador in London, stressed the importance which Kuwait attached to its long-standing and friendly relations with the United Kingdom. He asked that the United Kingdom should now demonstrate friendship and support for the Arabs now that they were in difficulties. Kuwait had shown her friendship by not cutting off her relations as other Arab States had done and the allegations made of American and British armed support for Israel had not been believed by the Kuwaiti Government. Shaikh Sabah hoped that these allegations could be put on one side, and Kuwait had advised other Arab countries that this should be done. Referring to the cutting off of oil supplies Shaikh Sabah asked Mr. Brown to understand the psychology of the Arab world. The emotional situation in Kuwait had made matters very difficult for his Government and they had believed that the temporary suspension of oil supplies would not hurt Britain too much and at the same time would allow Kuwait to demonstrate that it was doing its duty to the Arab world. Moreover, if Kuwait had not taken this action there would have been a grave risk that the oil installations would have been sabotaged and it was after representations from Kuwait that President Nasser had restrained the Arab people from damaging oil installations. He particularly asked that the United Kingdom would now call for the withdrawal of Israel forces from the occupied areas. If this were done its effect in the Arab world would be marked. It would allow a fresh start in relations between Britain and the Arabs.

2. *Mr. Brown* thanked Shaikh Sabah for his frankness and said that in his statement to the Assembly he would attempt to establish for Britain a position which any Arab politician of reason and not fanatically concerned with aggression against Israel would understand. It was a decision which he hoped that he as a Westerner and Shaikh Sabah as a Middle Easterner could sustain. After describing his long acquaintance with and admiration for Kuwait, Mr. Brown said he wanted to maintain a good relationship, but not at the price of being blackmailed. The cutting off of oil could only be regarded as a breach of commercial faith and if it happened again it would certainly oblige Britain to look elsewhere for its supplies. Given that there were other sources of oil, notably Iran who wished to increase production, and that there was natural gas available and nuclear power, it would not be possible for Britain to ignore these alternatives if there were no assurances of regular supplies from Kuwait.

3. As for the present situation, he personally had opposed the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 but 20 years later and after three wars there was nothing that anybody could do about reversing that position. Some day the Arabs would have to reconcile themselves to Israel and in the meantime Nasser should not be allowed to destroy Anglo-Kuwaiti relations. They were based on a sound business relationship which was of even greater advantage to Kuwait than to Britain. While politically we would do our best to make matters easier for the Kuwaitis, they would have to persuade other Arabs that they were living in the latter part of the 20th century.

4. *Shaikh Sabah* expressed his appreciation and said that he recognised the importance of the business relationship. Kuwait's motive in calling the meeting of Arab Foreign Ministers had been to urge them to take a more realistic attitude towards the present Middle East situation Kuwait was determined to play a role of reason, but to achieve this first and foremost the Israelis must withdraw.

5. *Mr. Brown* said that it was impossible to ask for withdrawal before certain practical steps had been taken. There had to be an effort to solve the refugee problem, to establish United Nations mediation, and to strengthen UNTSO. Then withdrawal might be considered, together with the Israel conditions for such withdrawal which would clearly include safeguards for the Straits of Tiran. Mr. Brown then asked at what stage would oil supplies be resumed.

6. Following an uncertain reply *Mr. Brown* said if oil supplies were not resumed then we would not talk business and Britain would have to look elsewhere for its supplies. Politics could not be divorced from business. If he could not obtain any undertakings about the oil then the political position might change. The vital point and the only one which could avoid difficulties was for the oil supplies to be resumed immediately. Kuwait had broken faith by cutting the supplies despite the reasons given by Shaikh Sabah and at least there should have been discussion between us before the decision to cut had been taken.

7. In reply *Shaikh Sabah* said that Kuwait was in need of the United Kingdom's friendship more than anything else and the stand which Mr. Brown took in the Assembly would allow him to persuade his Arab colleagues that this was the true British position. On oil he hoped to be able to give Mr. Brown the assurances he sought after the United Kingdom's statement had been made and before Mr. Brown left New York.

Document No. 7

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE AT THE CARLYLE HOTEL, NEW YORK, AT 7 p.m. ON TUESDAY, 20 JUNE, 1967

Present:

The Right Hon. George Brown, M P
Lord Caradon
Sir Paul Gore-Booth
Mr. D. J. D. Maitland

The Hon. Dean Rusk
The Hon. Llewellyn Thompson
Mr. Joseph Sisco
Mr. Robert E. Barbour

Mr. Brown began by asking Mr. Rusk what he thought our aims should be at the present stage.

2. *Mr. Rusk* said that our aim should be to get the discussion back as quickly as possible to the Security Council where negotiation could take place without breaking too many dishes on the way.

3. *Mr. Brown* said he had not been told in advance that Ambassador Goldberg was to introduce a resolution when he spoke in the Assembly earlier in the day. *Mr. Rusk* said the decision to do this had only been taken late the previous night. The purpose of the draft was to counter the Soviet draft resolution and to open the way for other delegations to work for a generally acceptable middle-of-the-road resolution.

4. Later *Mr. Sisco* said that he hoped that in his speech to the Assembly Mr. Brown would give general support to President Johnson's five principles. The United States Government would welcome a strong passage on withdrawal and thought that the most constructive proposal at this stage would be one recommending the introduction of a third party, in the form of a United Nations presence, into the area. Mr. Sisco was told that all these points would be covered in Mr. Brown's speech. Mr. Sisco went on to say that it was not the United States intention to press the proposal in their resolution for the registration of arms supplies.

5. *Mr. Thompson* said that it was still the American view that Mr. Kosygin had come to New York purely for propaganda purposes and that he would not be prepared to do business. It seemed likely that he would leave in two days. No definite plan had been made for him to meet President Johnson and up to the time of speaking the Russians had been playing " hard to get ".

Document No. 8

SPEECH BY THE FOREIGN SECRETARY THE RIGHT HON. GEORGE BROWN, MP, TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS ON 21 JUNE, 1967

Mr. President,

This emergency session of the General Assembly has met to discuss very grave problems. We have to discuss with great urgency the problems which have been caused by the war in the Middle East.

We are dealing with political problems. Let us not forget that politics involve and are about human beings. We are concerned with the fate of hundreds of thousands of ordinary men and women who have suffered from this war. This is more important than all the Resolutions in the world.

All countries must bear a measure of responsibility for the problems that now beset us. Attempts have been made in the past to reach a settlement in the Middle East. But for a long time we have given up these attempts. For the last 10 years there has been an uneasy calm broken at frequent intervals by frontier incidents and conflicts. We all hoped that the peace might be maintained by the United Nations Emergency Force. But we have been brought face to face with problems that we can no longer ignore. This is the background against which our discussions have to take place.

What is the reason for this emergency session of the Assembly? Her Majesty's Government had some doubts whether it was right to bring our problems before the Assembly while they were still being considered by the Security Council. But the plain fact was that we were prevented from making progress in the Security Council because of the threat of the veto. Therefore we must hope that some real practical results will emerge from this meeting of the Assembly. I suggest therefore that we need to concern ourselves with practical problems. There are gathered here the representatives of most countries of the world and the people of the world are waiting to see what we can do. We must not disappoint them. We must all remember what happened in the last years of the League of Nations. We must do everything we can to ensure that the General Assembly of the United Nations does not follow the same road as did the League.

And I must say in all frankness I think we have all been subjected here to an amazing amount of double talk.

I read very carefully the speech which Mr. Kosygin made on Monday. I was sorry that because of Parliamentary business in my own country I could not be here to listen to him.

He made a number of specific charges against the United Kingdom. I heard them repeated yesterday and I want to answer these one by one.

First he said—and I quote his words—" Israel has enjoyed support from certain imperialist circles . . . these powerful circles made statements and took practical action which might have been interpreted by Israel extremists as direct

encouragement to commit acts of aggression". In this context he went on to refer to the movement of British Naval and Air Forces to bring pressure to bear upon Arab States.

I notice that Mr. Kosygin did not say that there was direct participation by British Forces in the fighting. He knows that this cannot possibly be true. He can verify and no doubt has verified the facts from his own sources. There were, after all, pretty considerable Soviet Naval Forces in the Mediterranean at this time.

Those who put around these falsehoods must have known—must now know—that they were and are totally untrue. Nevertheless, throughout the fighting and since they were repeated over and over again by Cairo Radio and by other radio stations all over the Middle East.

I doubt if there is one person in this hall to-day who accepts any of these allegations. We for our part have said that we would welcome investigation by the United Nations and this offer still stands. We have taken an unprecedented step. We have placed the log books of our ships in the Library of the House of Commons and they are there now for consultation by anybody who wishes to consult them.

Her Majesty's Government, and I myself especially, deeply regret the damage which these false charges have done to our relations with our Arab friends. Now that they are seen to be without foundation I hope that we can re-establish once again our friendly relationship with these Arab States.

May I turn to other charges which Mr. Kosygin made? He implied that we had caused delays in the Security Council. He also suggested that by failing to give our assent to a decision prompted by the emergency we were promoting an aggressor. Once again nothing could be further from the truth. If Mr. Kosygin will read the records of the Security Council for the weeks before the fighting took place, he will be reminded that the United Kingdom urged the Council to take action to avoid a crisis. The whole aim of our policy was to try to prevent an issue, which we knew to be highly inflammable, from developing into war. If we could have got the support of the Soviet Union at that time, we might not now be faced with our present grave problems. Immediately after the outbreak of the fighting we were among the first to urge that the Council should call for an immediate cease-fire. It was not we who delayed that call until the second evening of the war.

As you see there was much in Mr. Kosygin's speech with which I profoundly disagree, but I have not been looking for differences. I want to find some common ground with him. We certainly share his view that, when questions of peace and war are involved, no State should be or can remain aloof. At the end of his speech Mr. Kosygin said and again I quote: "Much depends on the efforts of the Big Powers. It would be good if their delegations . . . found common language in order to reach decisions meeting the interests of peace in the Middle East and the interests of universal peace." This could be a very interesting and very challenging statement. I would like Mr. Kosygin to tell us exactly what he means by this statement. I found the statement a little hard to understand. Would he tell me, or better still would he tell the Assembly, what he has in mind? I will set out in what I have to say this morning what I think should be done. Will Mr. Kosygin tell me, or the Assembly, whether he is prepared to discuss these same proposals with us?

May I turn to the British position? Before the fighting broke out I said in the British Parliament that as a permanent member of the Security Council we had a duty to support efforts to keep the peace everywhere. I made it clear that Her Majesty's Government regarded the United Nations as primarily responsible for peace-keeping. I repeat here what I said there. We have had long-standing ties of friendship with all the Arab States of the Middle East, and also with Israel. If I may speak personally for a moment. I have for a long time felt a very deep concern for these countries. Our friendship with them has, I believe, been of great mutual value in the past. It is my desire to see it renewed and strengthened in the future: and I for one will work for that purpose.

The attitude of the British Government is clear. We want the area to be at peace. We recognise that peace demands the greatest measures of justice in its political arrangements. And on this foundation the progress of its people, especially of those whose need is greatest, must be based.

I would like, if I may, to set out certain principles which I believe should guide us in striving collectively for a lasting settlement.

Clearly such principles must derive from the United Nations Charter. Article 2 of the Charter provides that " All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or the use of force against the territorial integrity or the political independence of any State ". Here the words " territorial integrity " have a direct bearing on the question of withdrawal, on which much has been said in previous speeches. I see no two ways about this, and I state our position very clearly. In my view, from the words in the Charter, war should not lead to territorial aggrandisement.

Reports suggest that one particular point may be of special urgency. This concerns Jerusalem. I call upon the State of Israel not to take any steps in relation to Jerusalem which would conflict with this principle. I say very solemnly to the Government of Israel that, if they purport to annex the Old City or legislate for its annexation, they will be taking a step which will not only isolate them from world opinion, but will also lose them the sympathy that they have.

Having made clear my stand on this issue, I go on to recognise that in all this both the Arabs and Israel have matters to raise which they are entitled to feel must be heard and must be treated with respect. And we in the international community also have our legitimate interests which must similarly be respected.

First, there are the interests and welfare of the refugees. This very serious problem has been with us for a very long time. The problem has been made more difficult by what has happened in the last few weeks. We have fallen down so badly on this problem in the past that we cannot live with it any more. It now requires a great international effort to alleviate the problem. I shall have something more to say about this in a moment.

Secondly, any settlement must recognise the right of all States in the area to exist in true dignity and real freedom, and that must include the ability to earn their living in assured peace. I understand this to be the view of Mr. Kosygin and I hope my understanding was correct.

Thirdly, there must be respect for the right of free and innocent passage through international waterways for the ships of all nations. There is too the immediate practical problem of getting the Suez Canal cleared. Once it is done this great international waterway must be reopened as soon as possible. This is of vital importance to very many countries represented in this Assembly.

Fourthly—and now I come to a critical point—if the countries of the Middle East are to live together in peace and develop their resources, they must be freed from the pressures which have driven them to waste their resources in an arms race. Obviously, no Government can resist these pressures if its neighbours are not doing the same. The problem imposes responsibilities not only on the Government in the area but also on the Powers who are at present supplying arms. The latter—and of course it includes us—should reach an agreement as soon as possible. Already new countries are coming into the business of supplying arms to the Middle East. It is imperative that an agreement on arms limitation should be concluded as soon as possible.

I now come to the immediate practical things we can and must do. I shall say if I may a word about humanitarian action and then come to political action which the United Nations itself might take.

First, we must deal at once with the problem of displacement. The aftermath of war is always full of tragedy and we have all been distressed by the suffering caused to those in the areas where fighting has taken place. I do not think anybody expects a final settlement to be reached during this Assembly. Such a final settlement is going to take time. Meanwhile our most urgent thoughts should be given to the populations which have suffered and are still suffering from the upheaval of war. It is imperative if feelines are not to be further inflamed or a settlement made still more remote, that the Arab communities whose lands have been overrun should be allowed to stay where they are—or to return if they have fled and wish to come back. We cannot allow these people to suffer further and we cannot allow what has happened to them to result in a further escalation of the already intractable refugee problem. We must express this intention in any resolution we pass.

But this will not be enough. We must in the meantime lose no time at all in bringing relief to those who have been driven out of their homes and who have suffered directly from the fighting. This problem has been tackled energetically by many voluntary relief agencies which are doing magnificent work.

The British Government have sent a major contribution to the relief programme administered by UNRWA. By the end of this year, we shall have contributed 100 million dollars since 1950 to the UNRWA programme—14 per cent of the total of all governmental contributions. In particular, as a contribution to the present emergency, we are making a special grant to UNRWA of half a million dollars, in addition to our normal contribution.

We have also produced substantial relief in kind at very short notice, including badly needed blankets and medicines. We have told the Jordan Government that we will make a grant to them of half a million pounds to be spent on agreed rehabilitation and reconstruction work in Jordan. I am not saying all this in order to boast or to say that we are better than anyone else. I am simply saying these things because they are the practical things which can be done now. If any member of the United Nations has not done anything yet, they can start to-day.

But when we have done all we can to relieve suffering, it is still our main task in this Organisation to keep the peace. There cannot be any greater issue for the United Nations and this brings me to the main recommendation I want to make. I believe that the Secretary-General should nominate a representative, whose standing should be unchallenged, to go at once to the area. He should have a proper staff and full facilities. He should advise the Secretary-General on the whole conduct of relations arising from the cease-fire and the subsequent keeping of the peace on the frontiers. His task would be both to report to the Secretary-General and to play an active part in relations with all the parties in the area itself.

The first task of the Secretary-General's representative would be to make recommendations in consultation with the Chief of Staff about the work of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation. May I say here that the whole world community has every reason to feel and express the sincerest admiration and gratitude for what the present UNTSO team has done under the leadership of General Odd Bull? General Bull has in circumstances of the greatest danger and difficulty conducted his operations with outstanding courage and efficiency.

It seems clear, however, that General Bull could do with urgent reinforcement of both men and material. I suggest that the Secretary-General should be authorised to recruit and despatch at once any extra personnel whom General Bull may need. He will also need better communications and the Government of Israel should allow him without delay to reoccupy the Headquarters from which he was excluded during the fighting round Jerusalem.

This operation and its expansion should be conducted under the direction of the new representative to be appointed by the Secretary-General. But this operation only deals with the cease-fire and the arrangements which follow immediately from disengagement. There is the much bigger and more lasting problem of future peacekeeping in the area. It is clear that for this a new form of United Nations military presence will be necessary which will give reality to the preservation of peace in an area which may well be troubled for some time to come. One of the most urgent duties of the Secretary-General's representative should immediately advise the United Nations on the form which a future United Nations presence should take. Needless to say it should be set up in a form which sets out precisely the conditions under which it operates.

As I said earlier, the world looks to us now to do more than state principles and long-term objectives. My Government believe that the principles for a settlement which I have set out to-day will gain increasing acceptance and support. But that will not be enough. What everyone wishes to see, what everyone expects now, what is desperately required, is some immediate, positive, practical action. It is for that reason that I have made the proposals that I have for more effective United Nations action.

Whatever we achieve in statement of principles, it is by the action which follows our meeting here that we will be judged.

This is the purpose of the proposals that I have made for more effective United Nations action—action for dealing with distress, for preventing conflict, for laying the foundation of a just settlement we must move now to meet the desperate need.

Seldom has the United Nations faced such a crisis and such a challenge. Its whole future, on which we all depend, could turn on its ability to handle this situation. I speak as one who has for all my political life had faith in the League of Nations and subsequently in the United Nations. At this moment I confess to a desperate anxiety about the future.

As I speak now in this emergency session I feel that the future of the Organisation in which we have put our trust is in peril. And I am compelled by the strength of my conviction—a conviction which is shared, I believe, by countless people in different countries round the world—a conviction that the longings of the world depend very much on what we now decide.

Some of us remember that we have walked this road before. We have seen once before in our lives the collapse of an international organisation, the failure of an international ideal. What is more, as we meet there we cannot forget that even in the last few days news has come of new dangers on a scale which we can scarcely imagine and a new threat to human survival. These dangers and threats give new urgency to all we do here.

If we in the United Nations fail now, if we fail to meet this challenge, if we fail to act now, if we fail to take positive and practical action before we disperse, we shall have put in peril all those who depend on us.

I have tried to suggest the practical ways in which we might start to resolve the issues which face us in the Middle East. But if we fail to take the straightforward actions open to us, we must consider the consequences. I am not the only man in this Assembly with children and grand-children, daughters and grand-daughters. If we fail in an area as dangerous as this, the chances of the world, and our children and grand-children going up in a mushroom cloud must be enormous.

Document No. 9

NOTE ON THE LUNCHEON GIVEN BY THE FOREIGN SECRETARY FOR THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER AT THE CARLYLE HOTEL, NEW YORK, AT 1.15 p.m. ON WEDNESDAY, 21 JUNE, 1967

At this luncheon were discussed the items which might be included in a middle-of-the-road resolution.

[The Brazilian Foreign Minister was also invited to the luncheon but as he had only just arrived in New York from Rio de Janeiro and was feeling tired, he asked to be excused. The Brazilian and Chilean Ambassadors were present.]

Document No. 10

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND THE TUNISIAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT THE UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS, NEW YORK, AT 3 p.m. ON WEDNESDAY, 21 JUNE, 1967

Present:

The Right Hon. George Brown, M P
Sir Harold Beeley
Mr. T. F. Brenchley
Mr. D. J. D. Maitland
Mr. D. G. Crawford

Mr. Habib Bourguiba, Jr.

Mr. Bourguiba expressed his appreciation at the statement which Mr. Brown had just made in the General Assembly. He agreed with the purposes of the statement but said that Tunisia's position in the Arab world was now embarrassing since President Bourguiba's views on Israel had been fully confirmed by recent events. Because of this his Government were obliged to stand by the Arab countries in their humiliation.

2. *Mr. Brown* urged that President Bourguiba should now make a bid for leadership in the Arab world by taking a new realistic line towards Israel and making the point that the Arabs could not now continue their past policies. He wished President Bourguiba to know that he was wholly on the side of the Arabs but in return he must be helped by them. The United Kingdom could not be blackmailed by the cutting off of Arab oil supplies.

3. *Mr. Bourguiba* said that his President certainly intended to advocate a new Arab line at the forthcoming meetings of Arab leaders and on the question of oil supplies he had already counselled some Arab countries, including Libya and Saudi Arabia, not to ruin themselves by stopping their main source of revenue.

4. *Mr. Brown* considered that the one man who could now take the lead among the Arabs was Mr. Bourguiba. What was needed was an Arab of stature and of reason who was prepared to take his life in his hands in support of a new realistic policy towards Israel. If President Bourguiba did so decide to take up the flag of reason then the United Kingdom would do everything possible to help him.

5. *Mr. Bourguiba* said that his President was prepared to advocate the policies which Mr. Brown had in mind but at the right time. The President could not put the Tunisian people at risk and it should be borne in mind that Tunisia had a large neighbour in Algeria which was extreme in its policies against Israel. It was too much to ask the President to take a risk which was unrealistic. Mr. Bourguiba agreed however to convey Mr. Brown's sentiments to his President and also to tell him that once he did decide to take a new initiative in advocating a policy of " reason " the United Kingdom would give him full assistance.

Document No. 11

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION ON ADEN AT THE UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS, NEW YORK, AT 3.30 p.m. ON WEDNESDAY, 21 JUNE, 1967

Present:

The Right Hon. George Brown, M P
Lord Caradon
Mr. T. F. Brenchley
Mr. D. J. D. Maitland
Mr. D. G. Crawford

Dr. Manuel Perez-Guerrero

Referring to his statement on South Arabia in the House of Commons on the 19th of June, *Mr. Brown* said that he had been careful in it not to adopt any position which would prevent the United Nations Mission from taking further action. The British position remained malleable and he had been concerned not to pre-empt the United Nations Mission's freedom of action in achieving a Constitution and Government in South Arabia which would satisfy the terms of the United Nations resolutions. Similarly, he had lifted the ban on the National Liberation Front to give the Mission room for manoeuvre in making contact with that organisation. Mr. Brown stressed that he wanted the United Nations to proceed with its work as soon as possible and, if it came up with further proposals, they were by no means excluded from consideration by the terms of this statement.

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2. *Dr. Perez-Guerrero* said that he was encouraged by Mr. Brown's comments and he had been told previously by Lord Caradon of the new developments which had been announced in the statement. The Mission had hoped to have begun discussions with FLOSY, but the present Middle East crisis had prevented that. As for the NLF, the Mission had so far been unable to make contact with it but the

lifting of the ban might well be helpful in this respect. In answer to a question from Lord Caradon about the prospects for getting in touch soon with FLOSY, he said that the Mission was continuing its efforts towards this end. The Foreign Minister of Iraq continued to be helpful in this respect and the Yemenis were also being urged by the Mission to use their influence with FLOSY. There was a chance that when the present acute stage of the Middle East crisis was over, FLOSY would be willing to talk to the Mission. They were the main factor in the Mission's making further progress. After discussions with FLOSY, it might be possible to talk to the United Kingdom authorities again and thereafter to bring the various parties together. Perhaps this process might begin after the present Assembly was over. Dr. Perez-Guerrero doubted if the United Kingdom could help at present in facilitating contact between the United Nations Mission and FLOSY, but it might be helpful if Mr. Brown could discuss this specific point with the UAR Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador El Kony.

3. *Mr. Brown* reaffirmed that it was the United Kingdom intention to maintain a role for the United Nations Mission in South Arabia but he now wanted it to move quickly since less than seven months remained before independence for South Arabia. The independence date of the 9th of January was irrevocable. He had waited a long time for the United Nations Mission to resume its work but had finally been obliged to announce the developments given in his statement to the House of Commons. In answer to a question from Dr. Perez-Guerrero about why there had been no reference to a constitutional conference in the statement, he said that his purpose was to leave it open to the United Nations Mission itself to call such a meeting. If the Mission could get the various parties together for this purpose, the United Kingdom would be willing either to attend, or not to attend, or to wait in the " ante-room ", as the Mission wished. We were flexible on this point.

Document No. 12

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF IRAQ AT THE UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS, NEW YORK, AT 4.30 p.m. ON WEDNESDAY, 21 JUNE, 1967

Present:

The Right Hon. George Brown, M P
Lord Caradon
Sir Harold Beeley
Mr. T. F. Brenchley
Mr. D. G. Crawford
Mr. Adnan Pachachi

Mr. Pachachi said that Mr. Brown's statement had been helpful but the Arab case was for an unconditional withdrawal of the Israel troops from the areas they now occupied. Such a withdrawal was a matter of urgency since if it were postponed until certain practical arrangements now being advocated by some in the Assembly were put into effect a long time would elapse. The longer the Israeli troops stayed in their present positions the more difficult the situation would become. He asked Mr. Brown what were the precise practical steps he had in mind before the Israelis withdrew.

2. *Mr. Brown* replied that Israel withdrawal, which he advocated, was only achievable if it were accompanied by some or all of the practical measures he had described in his statement and which would need to be effected partly before the withdrawal of the Israel troops and partly after such withdrawal. For example, he deeply believed that something had now to be done about the Palestinian refugees who had been living in wretched conditions for 20 years. Progress might be made if the Arab countries would now declare how many refugees they were prepared to resettle in Arab lands. He accepted that the refugees had a right to choose on their future resettlement but the Arab countries needed now to

demonstrate that they were prepared to accept refugees on their territories by making practical arrangements and giving firm figures on the numbers they were prepared to take in.

3. Mr. Brown then said that the United Kingdom's major interest with Iraq was to have straight-forward commercial dealings with her and for there to be no further interference with the operations of the IPC. The United Kingdom could not accept that the supply of oil to her from Iraq, which was purely a commercial transaction, could be disrupted for political reasons. If oil supplies were not resumed in the very near future then the United Kingdom would not do business with Iraq whose oil she could afford to do without. He wished Mr. Pachachi to have no illusions on this point and he was not prepared to do anything more to help Iraq until oil supplies were resumed. Iraq need not announce it. All she had to do was to resume oil supplies without fuss and she only had a few more days to make up her mind.

4. *Mr. Pachachi* said that before the recent crisis Iraq had been on the verge of a new agreement with IPC which could be concluded after the present situation had been resolved but Iraq's obligations to the other Arab countries would not permit the restoration of oil before the Palestine issue was settled and Israel had withdrawn her troops.

Document No. 13

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND THE ISRAEL FOREIGN MINISTER AT THE UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS, NEW YORK, AT 5.30 p.m. ON WEDNESDAY, 21 JUNE, 1967

Present:

The Right Hon. George Brown, M P
Lord Caradon
Mr. T. F. Brenchley
Mr. D. J. D. Maitland

Mr. Abba Eban
Mrs. Golda Meir
Mr. E. Shimoni

Mr. Brown began by asking what the Israelis thought he should do to help. *Mr. Eban* said that at present the Arabs had an incentive to seek out the Israelis. The situation today was not similar to 1948.

2. Mr. Eban went on to say that there were certain things which should not be done now. For instance, there should be no withdrawal without peace and an overall settlement. *Mr. Brown* said that he did not agree. *Mr. Eban* said that the question was: in what way could Britain use her influence? It was important not to prejudge any negotiations by setting out too many principles in advance. Mr. Brown's remarks on Jerusalem in his speech at the Assembly that morning had taken him by surprise.

3. *Mr. Brown* said that he had deliberately put this passage in its proper perspective in the middle of his speech. He wished Mr. Eban to know that he had wanted to say that if the Israelis annexed Jerusalem they would lose the friends they had. But his advisers had pressed him not to. He now wished to tell Mr. Eban this face to face. Surely the right thing for Jerusalem was some form of internationalisation.

4. *Mrs. Meir* intervened to ask why there had been no internationalisation under Jordan. *Mr. Brown* said the reason probably was that the international community had not cared enough about Jerusalem, but he did care.

5. *Mrs. Meir* then said that she was amongst the hawks in Israel. The Arabs wanted to destroy Israel. They had been talking about a holy war. Were the Israelis to blame because they refused to be killed? The Israelis had waited

for two weeks hoping that a miracle might happen. They had not expected their friends to fight for Israel but nobody had said a thing to prevent the war. Ever since 1948 the young people of Israel, when they had reached military age, had had to go to war.

6. Mrs. Meir then said she did not understand the proposal in Mr. Brown's speech in the Assembly that a United Nations personality should go to the area. The UNTSO had been on both sides of the Syrian border for years but Syrian shelling of the kibbutzim had gone on uninterrupted. *Mr. Eban* said that UNTSO had merely recorded the shelling; they had not stopped it.

7. *Mr. Brown* said that a serious purpose lay behind his proposal for a United Nations personality. He drew a distinction between the immediate practical problems and the longer term issues. Withdrawal by the Israelis must be accompanied by other things, *e.g.*, rectification of the frontiers and guarantees about free passage through the Straits of Tiran and the Canal. Jerusalem was another of these immediate issues.

8. *Mrs. Meir* said that the other section in Mr. Brown's speech that she could not understand was on Jerusalem. Why did Britain take a stronger line on this than, for instance, the Italians? If Mr. Brown was talking about Israel losing friends, why had not King Hussein, who had behaved rashly in the week before the fighting, lost the friendship of Britain? *Mr. Brown* replied that the Israel attack on Samu' had begun the process which ended in King Hussein aligning himself with Nasser. *Mr. Eban* said that three months after Samu', King Hussein was telling the Israelis that his greatest wish was that Nasser would collapse.

9. *Mr. Brown* then reverted to the question he put at the beginning. What could he do to help? *Mrs. Meir* said Britain could do one thing. Britain could tell the Arabs: "You have started and lost three wars in 19 years. You have now got to accept the situation". *Mr. Brown* said that he had to say something to steady the situation. He thought that Israel must be the power-house of the Middle East. But she must develop the kind of relations with the hinterland which would enable her to play this role.

10. *Mr. Eban* said that Britain should use her influence to tell the Arabs that they had themselves to determine the basis for their own co-existence with Israel. Britain should not say anything now which would prejudge the negotiations. His two criticisms of Mr. Brown's speech related to Jerusalem and the proposal to increase the United Nations' authority. *Mrs. Meir* said the Israelis had no interest in any holy places in Jerusalem other than their own and were very ready to let Christian and Muslim holy places be looked after by Christian and Muslim religious leaders. *Mr. Brown* said that his own ideas for the city would give the Israelis full right of access to the Jewish holy places. *Mr. Eban* said that the Israel Government were only trying to do on the practical level those things which would unify the city without annexing it. He thought Mr. Brown's speech had made it more difficult for the Israel Government to resist extremist pressure. *Mr. Brown* pointed out that the Israelis had *de facto* control over the city and with it full access to the Wailing Wall. Why did they not leave the situation as it was for the time being? It would be politically a great mistake to turn Jerusalem into an Israel city.

11. At one point in the conversation *Mr. Eban* made an aside to the effect that he thought Nasser was now in the same position as Sukarno six months ago.

Document No. 14

MINUTE DATED 21 JUNE, 1967, BY THE PERMANENT UNDER-SECRETARY, SIR PAUL GORE-BOOTH

During the last day and a half I have had a number of talks with Ministers and officials from other countries. None of the conversations were a formal set-piece, but it may be useful if I record a few of the principal points very briefly.

India

Mr. Rusk told me that he had had a totally profitless conversation with the Indian Foreign Minister. Mr. Chagla had used all the familiar Indian cliches like " vacation of aggression " and had shown no disposition to depart from a fully pro-Nasser line. Mr. Chagla had inquired about the Suez Canal; Mr. Rusk had replied that the United States were " relaxed " about the Canal, the closure of which would hurt India more than it would hurt the United States. It seemed desirable for India to try to induce movement on this point.

I subsequently met Mr. Chagla who spoke in some degree, but not very strongly, in favour of the Soviet Resolution. I reminded him that there had been a degree of " diplomatic aggression " before the hostilities, and suggested that he studied the Foreign Secretary's speech very carefully as an indication of how genuine progress might be made.

Pakistan

Mr. Hilaly, Pakistani Ambassador in Washington, said that the Pakistanis had no alternative in the present situation but to support the Arab case; Pakistani public opinion was very strong on this. I said that I had heard that one from him in other contexts but Mr. Hilaly insisted that in this case there was a religious element which the Pakistani Government could not resist. However, he did not think Pakistan would vote for a " condemnation " of Israel though they would be likely to vote for withdrawal.

Iran

The Iranian Foreign Minister told me that he had travelled for some distance with the Foreign Ministers of Turkey and Pakistan and that he had tried to " beat some sense into the Pakistani Foreign Minister ". He was seeing a great many of the Arabs and trying the same treatment with them. He was not unhopeful of saner counsels growing in influence.

United States and the Secretary-General

Mr. Hilaly (see above) was most insistent that the Secretary-General felt deeply about the American attitude to him personally. He insisted that the question was not simply one of a difference of view about the merits of the Viet-Nam situation; it was that the White House entourage made a habit of speaking in very disparaging terms of U Thant who immediately heard about these things and strongly resented them. I said that I did not think that U Thant was that sort of man but Mr. Hilaly persisted and said that it did affect U Thant on other matters, *e.g.*, the UNEF.

Document No. 15

MINUTE DATED 21 JUNE, 1967, BY THE PERMANENT UNDER-SECRETARY, SIR PAUL GORE-BOOTH

Viet-Nam

During Mr. Rusk's call on the Secretary of State in the Carlyle Hotel on the evening of Tuesday, the 21st of June, I asked Mr. Rusk about the present position in regard to Viet-Nam. He said that basically the situation was unchanged in that

the Americans were still unable to get anybody to talk to from North Viet-Nam. As regards the military operations he said that, while this was in no way a commitment, he thought that the Americans had more or less completed bombing activity for the time being against those targets which were especially sensitive from the point of view of public opinion elsewhere.

Document No. 16

TEXT OF WASHINGTON TELEGRAMS Nos. 2127 AND 2128 OF 22 JUNE, 1967, TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE, REPORTING ON THE FOREIGN SECRETARY'S TALK WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON AT THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, AT 12.30 p.m. ON THURSDAY, 22 JUNE, 1967

The following is a record compiled from oral notes given to me by the Secretary of State of his hour-long talk with the President alone before lunch at the White House to-day. It is not the Secretary of State's own record and he may wish to correct details.

2. The general atmosphere of the meeting could not have been more friendly. The President was very kind and went out of his way to pay tribute to the British Government. He made it clear that he regarded us as his best Ally. The President himself looked rather tired and it was clear that almost all of his attention is still focussed on Viet-Nam.

3. On the Middle East, although the President had a general picture of the situation, he clearly had not concentrated on the full details. In general, he seemed to be prepared to follow the advice tendered to him by Dean Rusk and McGeorge Bundy and he seemed to have no very definite views of his own. On Jerusalem he indicated that he would in general follow the line suggested in the Foreign Secretary's speech to the General Assembly.

4. On Viet-Nam, there was little discussion and the President said nothing new. He showed signs of feeling very strongly and emotionally on the whole subject, as he had on the last occasion that the Secretary of State had seen him.

5. There was substantial discussion of the Soviet Government and Soviet policy. The President thought that there might be quite serious dissensions between the leading personalities and also between the Soviet Government and the Communist Party. The President had some information to show that the decision to call the Central Committee had only been taken after Kosygin had left for New York. The President was extremely doubtful whether the Soviet Government were in any position to deliver Hanoi in the context of Viet-Nam. The President and the Secretary of State agreed to keep in touch on whether, and if so in what form, a message should be sent to the Soviet Government on the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution.

6. On the French and de Gaulle, the President and the Secretary of State agreed that de Gaulle seemed to be losing his grip. His latest pronouncement on the Middle East and Viet-Nam was very confusing.

7. [Washington telegram No. 2128.] Most of the discussion was devoted to the question whether the President would meet Kosygin. The President said that he was awaiting a report from Rusk who was at that very time talking to Gromyko. It would be on the basis of this report that he would make up his mind. If Rusk reported that Kosygin appeared to have something to talk about and not only just wanted to have a talk, then probably a meeting would take place. But there was some doubt at the present time about the validity of Kosygin's credentials to speak for the Soviet Government. The President however would only make a move towards a meeting if Rusk reported that there were serious subjects for discussion and that a meeting would seem to be worth while.

Document No. 17

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND THE SOVIET PRIME MINISTER AT THE SOVIET MISSION, NEW YORK, AT 5.45 p.m. on THURSDAY, 22 JUNE, 1967

Present:

The Right Hon. George Brown, M P	Mr. A. N. Kosygin
Sir Paul Gore-Booth	Mr. A. A. Gromyko
Mr. P. T. Hayman	Mr. A. A. Soldatov
Mr. D. J. D. Maitland	Mr. V. M. Falin

Mr. Brown began by asking Mr. Kosygin whether there was anything he could do to help in the present situation.

2. *Mr. Kosygin* replied that it was his firm conviction that there must first of all be withdrawal. Then other things could follow. It was quite unrealistic to discuss other questions such as free navigation and rectification of the border. If the Assembly were to adopt a resolution calling on the Israelis to withdraw their troops beyond the Armistice lines, then the question could be referred to the Security Council which could adopt a similar resolution. If this were not possible the Security Council would have to call for sanctions against Israel. If no such resolution were passed the Arabs would take up arms again. This was the argument Mr. Kosygin had put to all the delegates he had met.

3. *Mr. Brown* said he thought this an unhelpful contribution to a situation as difficult for Britain as for the Soviet Union. His own purpose was to discuss practical means of moving towards a solution of this problem. He had made it plain both in the House of Commons and the General Assembly that Israel should not acquire territory by conquest. The Soviet Union however had taken a one-sided stand. How did Mr. Kosygin think progress could now be made?

4. *Mr. Kosygin* said the only practical way of tackling the problem was for the Israelis to withdraw. There would be a return to the positions before fighting began. The Suez Canal could then be reopened and oil would begin to flow. After that other questions could be taken up, for example the refugees. These issues would call for long negotiations lasting one year or even as long as three years. No one could say how long. Britain could not wait a year for the Suez Canal to be reopened, and for oil to flow. The Soviet Union was not concerned about these questions. The situation would return to normal when withdrawal had taken place. To talk about the Arabs and Israelis coming together to talk was utopian.

5. *Mr. Brown* said it would be a mistake for the Soviet Union to base their policy on the assumption that Britain could not change her sources of energy supply. *Mr. Kosygin* intervened to say that he was not trying to put pressure on Britain. He only wished to put pressure on Israel. The closing of the Suez Canal created difficulties for the Soviet Union which sent a lot of traffic through it. (This contradicted what he had said only two minutes earlier.) *Mr. Brown* said that this remark indicated that both he and Mr. Kosygin had an interest in ending the present situation.

6. Mr. Brown went on to say that in his Assembly speech he had set out the practical steps which could now be taken. These related to Jerusalem, the refugees, the Straits of Tiran, the United Nations presence in the Middle East and a United Nations representative. The question was: what would happen in return for the withdrawal of the Israeli troops? *Mr. Kosygin* asked what exactly Mr. Brown had in mind? *Mr. Brown* said that he had in mind guarantees not only for Israel but also for the other States in the area and perhaps some understanding about arms deliveries. *Mr. Kosygin* then suggested that Mr. Brown was putting pressure on him and that this was some kind of ultimatum. These proposals were in his view quite impractical and if Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States tried

to settle the problem with an approach of this kind there would be a prolonged war in the area. The Algerians had fought the French for seven years. The Arab world would fight on. He would do anything to prevent this situation arising.

7. *Mr. Brown* asked whether Mr. Kosygin had said the same thing when he met Mr. Rusk earlier in the day. *Mr. Kosygin* said that his conversation with Mr. Rusk when he paid a courtesy call had dealt only with the arrangements for his meeting with President Johnson.

8. At this point *Mr. Brown* suggested that the meeting go into restricted session.

Document No. 18

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND THE SOVIET PRIME MINISTER AT THE SOVIET MISSION, NEW YORK, AT 6.15 p.m. ON THURSDAY, 22 JUNE, 1967

Present:

The Right Hon. George Brown, M P	Mr. A. N. Kosygin
Sir Paul Gore-Booth	Mr. A. A. Gromyko (alternating with Mr. A. A. Soldatov)

Mr. Brown asked what Mr. Kosygin's objection was to the idea of a guarantee of the territorial integrity of the States of the area. This was essential. *Mr. Kosygin* agreed that it was an essential element but said that first we must decide what precedes what.

2. *Mr. Brown* said that his reaction to Mr. Kosygin's plan was to ask exactly that question. Mr. Kosygin's attitude was no help in bringing the two approaches closer. *Mr. Kosygin* asked whether Mr. Brown really thought that, *e.g.*, the refugee question could be decided in five days to which *Mr. Brown* replied that the United Nations must really do something. The difficulty was that there must be some kind of meeting with the Israelis and for this he must insist on some help from Mr. Kosygin.

3. *Mr. Kosygin* replied that the flaw in everything Mr. Brown had said was that it involved doing something which would be quite unacceptable to the Arabs. *Mr. Brown* said that there were two possible interpretations of this remark. If Mr. Kosygin was saying that he was simply embracing the Arab cause then he thought that Britain could do this as successfully as the Soviet Union. But if we were linking arms and looking for peace the case could be quite different. *Mr. Kosygin* commented that the Soviet Union had no need of further goodwill from the Arabs because they enjoyed so much sympathy from them already. There was plenty left over for us if we needed it. But we must remember the Arabs were no longer colonial peoples. *Mr. Brown* said that this was perfectly well known to us to which *Mr. Kosygin* replied that in that case what Mr. Brown was proposing was a deceptive move with ulterior objectives. *Mr. Brown* answered that he did not like this suggestion which was without foundation.

4. Mr. Brown said he must make it clear that he was not saying anything simply " for the record " as Mr. Kosygin appeared to suggest. He was upset that Mr. Kosygin should put such constructions on his statement.

5. *Mr. Kosygin* said that he certainly agreed that both parties were talking about what should be decided but he wished to make it quite clear that what Mr. Brown appeared to be suggesting would not be acceptable to the Arabs and was therefore not a basis for discussion. It was important to look at the order of events and the only conclusion that could be reached was that the troops should be withdrawn first, and other discussions such as that of boundaries, etc., could follow. He added that he was saying this without any idea of political influence. Proceeding on the basis of political weight would be both dishonest and dangerous, but the Soviet Government must proceed on the basis of what the Arabs think and on the premise that there must be no war.

6. Mr. Brown said that it might help if he were to send Mr. Kosygin or Mr. Gromyko a piece of paper in which he might set out a way in which practical things might be done. There was after all an identity of interest and there was no necessity for the Soviet and British points of view to be opposed to each other.

7. *Mr. Kosygin* said that before the recent conflict began the Soviet Government had exercised a restraining influence on the Arabs whereas the British had not restrained the Israelis. (Mr. Brown protested.) Mr. Kosygin repeated: " you did not restrain the Israelis ".

8. At this point *Mr. Gromyko* re-entered the room explaining that he had been seeing the Iraqis who were not satisfied but " optimistic . . .". *Mr. Brown* said that he would like to ask a dangerous question. Did Mr. Kosygin want to use the Middle East as a lever for policy in South-East Asia? *Mr. Kosygin* replied " no ", adding that such a policy was " not admissible ". He asked where Mr. Brown had got the idea. *Mr. Brown* replied that something said by Mr. Kosygin at their last meeting in the Kremlin had suggested this line of thought. *Mr. Kosygin* said that in that case Mr. Brown had misunderstood him.

9. Mr. Kosygin added, however, that there was a " link " between the two, but this did not mean that this link was part of Soviet policy or that the Soviet Government thought in any way in terms of a bargain. None the less there were tensions in different parts of the world some of which were promoted by forces interested in a clash between the different Powers, notably the fascists in Germany who were day-dreaming along these lines. The way to bring peace was to condemn aggression and to proceed along the three lines suggested in the Soviet resolution. Would Mr. Brown accept withdrawal by itself?

10. *Mr. Brown* said that he would not accept it alone. He was interested in a resolution which could be carried and have some practical affect. It should not turn out to be an impractical let-down. He wanted to discover and discuss the resolution which would carry, a resolution which should neither be the Soviet resolution nor a British resolution but to which both could agree. The starting point could be withdrawal, but the resolution must contain more than this.

11. *Mr. Kosygin* asked Mr. Brown whether he was afraid of the aggressor. *Mr. Brown* said that it was not his custom to be afraid to which *Mr. Kosygin* replied that he found it difficult to understand, in that case, why Mr. Brown should be trying to distort what he had previously said; people would simply not understand. When *Mr. Brown* asked what Mr. Kosygin thought he had distorted, *Mr. Kosygin* said that Mr. Brown was using withdrawal as a form of pressure. He said that if Mr. Brown chose to debate this subject with him in front of 100,000 people however, he would get an overwhelming majority. (*Mr. Brown* commented, incidentally, that he thought his own speech in the Soviet Union had gained considerable support.) *Mr. Brown* then suggested that he would try to work out something by himself which would indicate the kind of sequence of events which he was advocating. He would try if possible to devise a non-official piece of paper setting out his ideas and would send it round to Kosygin.

12. *Mr. Kosygin* in accepting this suggestion asked Mr. Brown to think very carefully about what he had suggested as the proper and responsible line to take. (On this point he said that while it had not yet been finally decided when he was leaving he would probably meet President Johnson and U Thant before he left.) *Mr. Brown* said that he would try to send something to Mr. Gromyko before Mr. Kosygin's departure.

Document No. 19

TEXT OF A LETTER SENT TO THE SOVIET PRIME MINISTER BY THE FOREIGN SECRETARY, DATED 22 JUNE, 1967

We agreed at our talk this afternoon that I should send you for your own eyes only a personal note about my views on the practical steps which should be taken now in relation to the Middle East problem. This was on the understanding that if you do not like my note you would tear it up.

SECRET

It seems to me that the steps which need to be taken at once are as follows:

(i) We must deal with the problem of displaced persons. In my view it is imperative that the Arab communities whose lands have been overrun should be allowed to stay where they are or to return if they have fled, and wish to come back.

(ii) We must lose no time in bringing relief to those who have been driven out of their homes and who have suffered directly from the fighting.

(iii) The Secretary-General should nominate a representative whose standing should be unchallenged, to go at once to the area. This representative should have a proper staff and full facilities. He should advise the Secretary-General on the whole conduct of relations arising from the cease fire and the subsequent keeping of the peace on the frontier. His task would be both to report to the Secretary-General and to play an active part in relations with all the parties in the area.

(iv) The Secretary-General's representative should make recommendations, in consultation with General Odd Bull, about the work of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation. The Secretary-General should be authorised to recruit and despatch at once any extra personnel that General Bull may need. The Government of Israel should recommend that General Bull, without delay, should re-occupy the headquarters from which he was excluded during the fighting around Jerusalem.

(v) The Secretary-General's representative should also advise the United Nations on the form which a future United Nations presence should take. It is clear that some new form of United Nations military presence will be necessary in order to preserve the peace in an area which may well be troubled for some time to come.

When we talked this evening, you were very insistent that we should take the big step. I feel, having thought about what you said, as I promised I would, that we would do better to proceed step by step. I should like to know how you feel.

Document No. 20

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND THE RUMANIAN PRIME MINISTER AND RUMANIAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT THE CARLYLE HOTEL, NEW YORK, AT 7.30 p.m. ON THURSDAY, 22 JUNE, 1967

Present:

The Right Hon. George Brown, M P
Sir Paul Gore-Booth
Mr. P. T. Hayman
Mr. D. J. D. Maitland
Mr. I. G. Maurer
Mr. C. Manescu
Mr. M. Malitza

I. The Middle East

After an exchange of compliments, *Mr. Brown* asked the Rumanian Prime Minister how he thought a solution to the Middle East problem could be reached. It was necessary to have a practical plan.

2. *Mr. Maurer* said that he did not have enough facts before him to enable him to suggest a solution. All kinds of answers were possible. He did not know what the Arabs themselves wanted. In his opinion the most important views in the Arab world were those held by the present leaders in the UAR and Syria. Other unknown elements were the ultimate objectives of the Soviet Union.

3. *Mr. Brown* said that it was by no means certain that the present leaders in the UAR and Syria would predominate in the Arab States. This was one of the uncertain elements. He agreed with the Rumanian Prime Minister about the objectives of the Soviet Union. He did not know what they really wanted in the Middle East. In the talk which he had just had with Mr. Kosygin he had stopped the Russian Prime Minister from making a propaganda speech, but he still did not know whether the Russians were in fact concerned about the Middle East itself or whether they were worrying about other things.

4. *Mr. Maurer* said that the Middle East problem was closely linked with the present situation in South-East Asia, and it would be a matter of real concern if the Middle East problems became part of a world confrontation.

5. *Mr. Brown* felt that it was essential that the Middle East crisis should so far as possible be kept as a local problem but he did not know whether the Soviet Union held the same views. He noted the Prime Minister's remarks about Viet-Nam, but he found an alarming similarity between Mr. Kosygin's views on the Viet-Nam war in which he took the line that everything would be settled if only the Americans stopped bombing Hanoi, and the Russian view on the Middle East where they took the view that everything would be settled if the Israelis would only withdraw their forces to the armistice lines. This was a dangerous parallel. Although he had a high personal regard for Mr. Kosygin he sometimes found that he could not get to first base with him.

6. *Mr. Maurer* said that he often felt the same about the Soviet Union, and this was a more serious matter for Rumania, which bordered upon the Soviet Union, than for Great Britain which was many hundreds of miles away.

H. East-West relations

7. *Mr. Brown* said that the main problem in this deal was still the future of Germany. How far was it possible to make progress on German reunification at present?

8. *Mr. Maurer* said that, speaking personally, he did not think that it was the right moment to raise the question of German reunification. On the other hand, after the experiences over so many years it would be quite wrong to prevent the issue of German reunification from being raised in due course. If the issue were stifled for too long, it would cause an explosion.

9. *Mr. Brown* said that he had grown up during the period when the Nazis attained power. He did not want to go along that road again. We must therefore give the present Government some encouragement, particularly over the question of German reunification. If this were not done, there would be a recrudescence of Nazism. He reminded Mr. Maurer of the pact signed by Molotov and Ribbentrop in 1939. The fact that this pact had been signed showed how dangerous it was to leave the German problem too much in Russian hands.

Copy on Foreign Policy E-West relations Pt 2.

10. *Mr. Maurer* said that he agreed with these views. Unless the Germans were given some hope of reunification they would revert to a kind of Nazi régime. The example of Rumania in resuming diplomatic relations with Bonn should be followed by other countries in Eastern Europe.

11. *Mr. Brown* warmly welcomed this development but he said that Rumania should not go out too far on her own. It was essential that she should find some friends. *Mr. Maurer* agreed with this. Although Rumania disagreed with Britain on many issues, he thought that Britain could be a good friend of Rumania. The Rumanians did not want to buy arms from Britain. They wanted to expand their trade relations.

12. *Mr. Brown* welcomed this and invited the Rumanian Prime Minister to send him a letter about the kind of economic co-operation that Rumania wanted from Britain. When he got the letter he would see that it was dealt with quickly and he would send a reply to Mr. Manescu. He had always felt that Rumania was a natural ally of Britain. If only some of the other countries of Eastern Europe were to follow the example of Rumania it would be possible to make a new and more hopeful foreign policy.

13. *Mr. Maurer* said that Herr Willy Brandt was to visit Bucharest at the beginning of August. They would discuss all these problems with him very frankly. He did not think that Herr Brandt regarded German reunification as possible at the present time.

14. *Mr. Brown* said that he thought it quite likely that Herr Brandt would raise the question of reunification at least for the record. He offered to explain to Herr Brandt that he should not push the question of reunification too far while he was in Bucharest.

Document No. 21

TEXT OF MESSAGE SENT TO HERR WILLY BRANDT, GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER, ON 23 JUNE, 1967, BY THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AFTER HIS MEETING WITH THE RUMANIAN PRIME MINISTER IN NEW YORK

I had a good talk to the Rumanian Prime Minister yesterday. He was pretty sensible on the Middle East and on East-West relations. He was obviously much looking forward to your visit to Bucharest in August.

2. I told him that I wished other countries in Eastern Europe would adopt the same forthcoming attitude on East-West relations as the Rumanians.

3. We talked a little about German reunification. Maurer said that you would no doubt take a realistic view on this when you were in Bucharest.

4. I must say that Maurer made a good impression on me. Manescu, who was also present, hardly spoke at all in front of the Prime Minister.

Document No. 22

TEXT OF UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM No. 1500 OF 23 JUNE, 1967, TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE REPORTING ON THE FOREIGN SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTER AT THE CARLYLE HOTEL, NEW YORK, AT 8.45 a.m. ON FRIDAY, 23 JUNE, 1967

Falkland Islands

Copy on Falkland Islands Nov '66

The Argentine Foreign Minister told the Foreign Secretary this morning that he felt there was now a real opportunity to make progress on the Falkland Islands. This was the only issue which clouded our otherwise excellent relations. The Argentine Government had closely studied the Working Document and were pleased that Her Majesty's Government now contemplated a transfer of sovereignty in certain circumstances. Costa Mendez stressed, however, that to make the transfer of sovereignty dependent on the wishes of the inhabitants would not be acceptable to Argentine public opinion.

2. The Foreign Secretary argued strongly that he could not defend any transfer of sovereignty before parliamentary and public opinion if it disregarded the wishes of the Islanders.

3. Costa Mendez then proposed, first, that the two Governments should issue a joint statement to the effect that they were continuing the talks provided for in the United Nations Resolution and that these were making good progress: and, secondly, that each Government should "inform its own public opinion" in a statement. For their part the Argentine Government would say that they were prepared to open up communications between Argentina and the Islands and to give all guarantees to the inhabitants. At the same time the British Government in their statement would set out the conditions under which they would be prepared to transfer sovereignty over the Islands. Costa Mendez had

no precise form of words in mind for this, but it would be to the effect that the transfer would take place if this accorded with the interests of the inhabitants, or in circumstances which took account of the interests of the inhabitants. Costa Mendez argued that the United Nations Assembly Resolution of December 1965 had referred to the interests not the wishes of the inhabitants. The Secretary of State pointed out that the resolution called for talks not a transfer of sovereignty.

4. Mr. Brown repeated that he could not commit himself to a transfer of sovereignty without regard to the wishes of the inhabitants. But he would think over what Costa Mendez had said and let him have any comments. It was agreed that this question would be pursued when Ambassador Ruda visited London in July.

5. Ruda later told Maitland that the Argentine Government accepted that it was up to them to create conditions in which the Falkland Islanders would wish to join the Argentine Republic. The problem was to find a form of words which would enable the Argentine Government to start the process of attracting the Islanders without losing face.

Document No. 23

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND THE PAKISTAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT THE CARLYLE HOTEL, NEW YORK, AT 10 a.m. ON FRIDAY, 23 JUNE, 1967

Present:

The Right Hon. George Brown, M P
Sir Morrice James
Mr. S. S. Pirzada

Mr. Pirzada said he thought there would be considerable support among delegations for a resolution calling simply for withdrawal by the Israelis from the Arab territories they had seized. *Mr. Brown* said this was not practical. An Israel withdrawal would have to grow out of other measures.

2. *Mr. Pirzada* replied that the Arab countries wanted an Israel withdrawal without conditions or strings. The other *desiderata* could be negotiated later. However, it might be possible to provide in the same resolution, which called for an Israel withdrawal, for freedom of passage in the Straits of Tiran and for the setting up of a new UNEF (which this time must be stationed on both sides of the UAR/ Israel frontier).

3. Mr. Pirzada said that the Pakistanis at a later stage might be able to play a useful part in moderating Arab demands, and encouraging them to take a more constructive view of the situation. Pakistan standing with the Arab countries was high, and her potential influence considerable. However, Pakistan public opinion had been deeply stirred by recent events in the Middle East. Hence Mr. Pirzada had had to declare in the Pakistan National Assembly that Pakistan would only remain a member of SEATO and CENTO if the Government considered that this served Pakistan's national interests. This "lawyer like phrase" had been a necessary concession to the Government extremist critics. However President Ayub's statements on the Middle East had helped to deflate popular feeling. The main issue now for the Pakistanis was the position in Jerusalem, where for religious reasons Pakistanis would never agree to the Muslim holy plates remaining permanently in Jewish hands. In his recent Assembly speech Mr. Pirzada had expressed his country's anger about Israel aggression; but he had not attacked Britain (or the United States). The Pakistan delegation were in close touch with the Arabs, and he wished to tell Mr. Brown that the position taken up by the United Kingdom Government in the current Assembly debate had been "highly appreciated" by them.

4. *Mr. Brown* said that he would like to see some more positive response from the Arab side to the line which we had taken, which was not without its difficulties so far as United Kingdom public opinion was concerned. Moreover the Arabs

should bear in mind that the Israelis had needs and feelings just as much as the Arabs had. Before the Israelis withdrew from the territories they occupied they would have to be given firm guarantees of various kinds and recognition must be accorded of Israel's right to exist. There would also have to be provision for the refugees (both the pre-5 June ones and the new ones who had left their homes because of the recent fighting). It would be best if (as Mr. Brown had himself suggested) a top-level United Nations representative were appointed to help settle all these matters, and the resolution should provide for this.

5. *Mr. Pirzada* repeated that he did not see the Arabs agreeing to this at present, but added that he for his part was not opposed to Mr. Brown's suggestions. He hoped that our two delegations could work closely together and believed that it would be mutually advantageous for them to do so. *Mr. Brown* said that we might be undertaking some lobbying in appropriate capitals next week, and added that we would welcome any ideas that Mr. Pirzada would like to let us have about where our efforts might usefully be made.

Document No. 24

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND THE UAR DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AT THE WALDORF TOWERS, NEW YORK, AT 11 a.m. ON FRIDAY, 23 JUNE, 1967

Present:

The Right Hon. George Brown, M P
Lord Caradon
Sir Harold Beeley
Mr. T. F. Brenchley
Mr. D. J. D. Maitland
Dr. M. Fawzi
Sayid Hassan Sabri al Kholi

Mr. Brown began by asking how Dr. Fawzi saw the situation.

2. *Dr. Fawzi* said that this was a moment to build things up not pull them down. It was important to work for withdrawal and the creation of an atmosphere of relative calm. It was up to each delegation to decide whether or not to vote for the condemnation of aggression. Such questions as recognition would have to wait until after the results of the recent aggression had been liquidated.

3. *Mr. Brown* said this approach was not wholly realistic. Israel was bound to say now that there must be an end to the period of belligerency and the Arabs must be realistic about this. *Dr. Fawzi* said that Israel's action had made this more, not less, difficult. *Sir Harold Beeley* said that Mr. Brown was drawing a distinction between non-belligerency and recognition. *Dr. Fawzi* asked what would replace belligerency if it disappeared. *Mr. Brown* suggested that it was unnecessary for anything to replace it.

4. *Dr. Fawzi* said that in his discussions with U Thant he had discussed the possibility of strengthening UNTSO. As regards a new UNEF the Arabs would let the Israelis carry this baby next time. As regards refugees, he thought that the Israelis should be asked what should be done with them. The Israelis had always taken the line that they would not take one refugee back nor give up an inch of their territory.

5. Dr. Fawzi went on to say that he thought it important to tidy up the mess of the last few days. Then perhaps the prospect for other things would improve. *Mr. Brown* said that the practical steps must be taken first. He had set these out in his speech. Later the bigger issues might fit into place.

6. Mr. Brown then said he wished to turn to Anglo-Egyptian relations. He had been glad when, before the fighting, it had been agreed to resume relations. Was the UAR position the same now as then? *Dr. Fawzi* said that next to the Americans the British were white. *Mr. Brown* said an important contribution to

the improvement of Anglo-Egyptian relations would be some action by the Egyptians over Aden and South Arabia. It was pointless for the Egyptians to encourage terrorism and to keep FLOSY apart. The British Government were firmly resolved to give South Arabia independence and to encourage the formation of a wider-based Government. He wanted the UAR Government to do two things. First, they could say that there was no longer any point in terrorism and that it should end. Secondly, they should persuade Asnag and Makkawi to come and talk with us. *Dr. Fawzi* said that the UAR Government had indeed encouraged the FLOSY leaders to talk with the United Nations Mission but in the event they refused. He hoped that they would come forward soon to talk to the British.

7. Dr. Fawzi went on to say that it was up to the British to shed more light on their position. The British said they were going to make South Arabia independent and that there would not be a base. But some Arabs said it would not be real independence and in the military field we were trying to leave behind a set-up which constituted a base. *Mr. Brown* said that one would have to stand the facts on their heads to support this line of argument. Asnag and Makkawi were not stooges of the British and the Federal Government would become quite a different thing if they joined it. Dr. Fawzi was mistaken on the base. We were trying to do exactly the opposite to what he said.

8. *Dr. Fawzi* welcomed this statement and asked what Mr. Brown suggested he should do. *Mr. Brown* said that the date for independence had been set and time was running out. We wanted to stop terrorism and to prepare the way for a new Constitution. Every time we had tried to arrange a meeting with Asnag and his colleagues they had withdrawn at the last moment. He wanted the UAR Government to help to arrange a meeting. It was the FLOSY leaders who would lose by not talking to us.

9. *Dr. Fawzi* said that the UAR Government could perhaps take this in two stages. Someone might try to bring influence to bear on the FLOSY leaders. This might not necessarily be an Egyptian. Secondly, as regards terrorism it was politically impossible for the UAR to call publicly for an end to it. To the UAR this was not terrorism but a " national struggle ". *Mr. Brown* said he did not mind how the Egyptians got the message across so long as they did.

10. *Dr. Fawzi* then said he ought to explain his reference to the military set-up we were creating in South Arabia. He understood that we were appointing Arab officers of our own choice to command various forces. *Mr. Brown* said we were being forced into taking decisions now with those who were prepared to co-operate with us. *Mr. Brenchley* pointed out that in order that the British forces could withdraw we had to leave behind Arab officers in command. *Mr. Brown* said that we would only leave a small military training mission for a limited period. This would enable us to withdraw and leave the Arab forces under acceptable leaders. *Dr. Fawzi* said that Egypt had bitter experience of British military missions. None the less he was anxious to help. *Mr. Brown* said that he hoped we had seen the last of terrorism and he asked Dr. Fawzi to make this clear to President Nasser.

11. *Dr. Fawzi* said that the UAR wanted good relations with Britain. The day would come when this wish could be put into practice. The UAR needed help in the technological field. They had not begun to get at the wealth of the area. It was misleading to think of this wealth only in terms of oil. The UAR wanted help over technology, business administration, &c. *Mr. Brown* said that the UAR could make a start in improving relations by opening the Canal. *Dr. Fawzi* said that if the Israelis evacuated the East Bank the Canal would reopen. The UAR could not afford to forgo the £100 million a year which the Canal brought them in foreign exchange.

12. *Mr. Brown* asked whether the UAR Government still wanted to restore relations. *Dr. Fawzi* said they did but things had happened meanwhile. More important than resuming diplomatic relations was re-establishing relations in the economic, commercial, technological and cultural fields. Could we not appoint a higher level representative to our residual Embassy staff to pursue this?

13. *Mr. Brown* asked how progress could be made. There was a problem with public opinion. *Dr. Fawzi* replied that for the UAR as an African State Rhodesia also posed a problem. *Mr. Brown* said that he understood the Rhodesian

aspect of the question had been resolved at a meeting of the African countries who had broken relations on this issue. *Dr. Fawzi* agreed that this was so but said that the UAR needed something to point to as a reason for resuming relations and some progress on Rhodesia would be helpful.

14. Dr. Fawzi then said he wished to express his appreciation of Mr. Brown's fair and far-seeing stand on Jerusalem in his speech to the Assembly. *Mr. Brown* said that he hoped that in return the UAR could be reasonable and moderate and support a resolution calling for practical steps. He was returning to London and would have to defend his stand in the House of Commons. He would be helped if more delegations expressed moderate attitudes in the Assembly. *Dr. Fawzi* concluded the conversation by saying that he hoped our delegations would keep in touch.

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15. At a subsequent meeting *Sayid Hassan Sabri al Kholi* told Sir Harold Beeley that Dr. Fawzi was not familiar with all the details of the South Arabian question, and had therefore omitted some important information from his remarks to Mr. Brown. This was that there had been a meeting in Cairo, on the evening of the 2nd of June, in the house of Field-Marshal Amer, at which the FLOSY leaders were present. Amer had said that he could not give them orders, but it was his strong advice that they should go to New York and enter into discussions with Lord Caradon, with a view to arranging their participation in the South Arabian Government. A telegram had been sent to Ambassador Kony informing him of this meeting, but there had been no further developments because the proposal was overtaken by the Israel crisis.

Document No. 25

NOTE OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND GOVERNOR AVERELL HARRIMAN AT THE UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS, NEW YORK, AT 12.15 p.m. ON FRIDAY, 23 JUNE, 1967

The meeting lasted half an hour and Mr. Brown gave Governor Harriman a general account of the bilateral talks he had had up to that point and in particular his meeting the previous evening with Mr. Kosygin.

Document No. 26

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND THE INDONESIAN FOREIGN MINISTER AT UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS, NEW YORK, AT 3.30 p.m. ON FRIDAY, 23 JUNE, 1967

Present:

The Right Hon. George Brown, M P
Sir Paul Gore-Booth
Mr. D. J. D. Maitland
Mr. D. G. Crawford

Dr. Adam Malik
Mr. Anwar Sani

Mr. Brown said he had been much impressed by the efforts of the Indonesian Government to restore their economy. The British Government had been happy to give a loan and he only wished it could have been larger. *Dr. Malik* expressed his satisfaction at the present state of our relations.

2. *Mr. Brown* then asked what Dr. Malik thought would be the outcome of the debate in the Assembly. *Dr. Malik* said that no other country would accept the Soviet resolution. *Mr. Brown* said that he was concerned that the Assembly should

concentrate on the practical steps. If withdrawal were raised the Arabs would be faced with a choice between recognising Israel or at least dropping their belligerency. *Dr. Malik* said that his views were similar to Mr. Brown's. It would be no solution to return to the *status quo ante*. Any recommendation for withdrawal must be matched by a call to the Arabs to recognise the existence of Israel and to establish the principle of innocent passage through the waterways. He thought the whole city of Jerusalem should be internationalised, but when he had put this to the Arabs they turned it down. Dr. Malik did not expect much to come out of the Assembly.

3. *Mr. Brown* said it would be a grievous blow to the United Nations if the Assembly failed to produce a result. We would run the risk of what happened to the League of Nations over Ethiopia. He hoped at least that the Assembly would tackle the immediate problems. This would give a breathing space after which the bigger issues might be dealt with. *Dr. Malik* said this was very much his own view.

4. *Mr. Brown* concluded the discussion by saying how much he had admired the way that Dr. Malik, General Suharto and the Sultan had been managing Indonesia's affairs.

Document No. 27

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND THE LEBANESE AMBASSADOR TO THE SPECIAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS AT THE UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS, NEW YORK, AT 3.55 p.m. ON FRIDAY, 23 JUNE, 1967

Present:

The Right Hon. George Brown, M P
Mr. T. F. Brenchley
Mr. D. J. D. Maitland
Mr. P. R. H. Wright

M. Ghassan Tueni

Mr. Brown began by asking what M. Tueni thought should be done in the present situation.

2. *M. Tueni* thought that first priority should be given to getting a sensible dialogue going between the Arabs and the West. In this dialogue certain points could be looked at, *e.g.*, Jerusalem. He thought that all the Arabs could be rallied on the position Mr. Brown had taken on Jerusalem in his Assembly speech. The despatch of a fact-finding mission to the Middle East might enable conversations between the West and the Arabs to be started. He thought Mr. Kosygin was not anxious for a solution to be reached. His attitude was rigid. M. Tueni added that he felt some " moral reparation " was due to the Arabs. In answer to Mr. Brown's question he said this might take the form of a preliminary resolution calling for an Israel withdrawal to the armistice lines.

3. *Mr. Brown* thought this approach unrealistic. The Israelis could not be asked to withdraw without getting something in return. He himself put Jerusalem in a separate category. If the Israelis annexed it they would create a new situation. Mr. Brown thought that any resolution passed by the Assembly should deal with such questions as the refugees (old and new) and the waterways, and should spell out what the Israelis would get in return for withdrawal. It was also important to get the United Nations into the act at some point and to establish them in force on the borders.

4. *M. Tueni* repeated that the important thing was to get a dialogue going between the Arabs and the West. He thought that this could only start with some emotional appeal which would show the Arabs that they were not being treated as a vanquished nation. It was an important moral point for the Arabs that the United Nations should refuse to accept Israel's territorial gains.

5. *Mr. Brenchley* intervened to say that it would be a serious matter for the United Nations if there were no effective result from this Assembly.

6. *Mr. Brown* concluded the conversation by saying that he was irritated at the oil being stopped, diplomatic relations being broken off and so on.

Document No. 28

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND THE LIBYAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AT THE UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS, NEW YORK, AT 4.15 p.m. ON FRIDAY, 23 JUNE, 1967

Present:

The Right Hon. George Brown, M P
Lord Caradon
Mr. T. F. Brenchley
Mr. D. J. D. Maitland
Mr. D. G. Crawford
Mr. Ahmed Bishti
Mr. Al Bouri

Mr. Bishti expressed his appreciation for the positive arguments used by Mr. Brown in his statement to the Assembly, particularly concerning Jerusalem and the refugees. He also welcomed the stand that Lord Caradon had taken at the United Nations, in support of Jordan. He hoped that the Arabs could depend on the United Kingdom to exert influence in their favour, particularly with the Americans.

2. *Mr. Brown* said that he wished King Idris to know that he had a deep sympathy and understanding of the Arab point of view and recognised that the Arabs did not have influential friends around the world as had the Zionists. The United Kingdom would work for a resolution at the Assembly, embodying those practical steps to improve the Middle East situation which could be dealt with immediately—viz., a settlement of the refugee problem. Other major issues, such as the Israel withdrawal, would take time. The Israelis would first require the Arabs to recognise them or to drop the state of belligerency and clearly the Arabs were not prepared for such concessions now. Jerusalem however was in a separate category and it would be wrong for the Israelis to annex the old city, since this would create a new problem.

3. *Mr. Bishti* replied that on Palestine all Arab countries had one point of view. They wished the Assembly to adopt a resolution, requiring Israel withdrawal, and such withdrawal was becoming more urgent, particularly in the light of the situation on the west bank. The United Kingdom had a special relationship with Jordan and should therefore recognise that Israel withdrawal there was indeed urgent.

4. Turning to bilateral relations *Mr. Brown* asked whether the Libyan Government wished to push hard on the question of the withdrawal of the British bases or to play the issue long. If the former, then British forces could leave quickly, since we did not wish to stay in any coutnry where we were not wanted. *Mr. Bishti* said that this was a question which could be dealt with through the normal diplomatic channel and that the Libyan request had been made in response to a demand from the Arab countries that the bases should be removed. He did not dissent when *Mr. Brown* inferred from this answer that the matter was not one for immediate decision.

5. *Mr. Bishti* expressed his concern that the main result of the present crisis would be to leave the Russians in a stronger position in the Middle East. They were trouble-makers and should not gain from the crisis at the expense of the West. *Mr. Brown* doubted whether this need be the case. The stories of renewed Soviet arm shipments to Arab countries were much exaggerated and the Russians would now probably take a little time to decide where their future best lay in the Middle East.

Document No. 29

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND THE MOROCCAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AT THE UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS, NEW YORK, AT 5 p.m. ON FRIDAY, 23 JUNE, 1967

Present:

The Right Hon. George Brown, M P
Lord Caradon
Mr. T. F. Brenchley
Mr. D. J. D. Maitland
Mr. D. G. Crawford

M. Balafrej
M. Benhima

M. Balafrej welcomed Mr. Brown's statement in the Assembly and commented that its references to the holy places had created a profound impression. If the Israel occupation were condoned it would mean that the rule of force had taken over again instead of respect for international law which the United Nations embodies. Morocco shared the view of all Arab countries, that Arabs should not be dispossessed in Palestine and because of her normal good relations with the United States and the United Kingdom, the present situation was painful. He hoped to see the United Kingdom play a conciliatory role.

2. *Mr. Brown* considered that it would be best to concentrate on the practical measures which could now be taken to relieve the present situation. The question of an Israel withdrawal was tied up with what the Arabs might give in return, possibly recognition of Israel or non-belligerence. This was not, however, the time to ask an Arab State to give either, and thus it was unrealistic to hope that these major matters could be dealt with at the present time. It was not necessary to accept the Israel occupation of Arab land following the recent war as a *fait accompli*. It would need to be re-arranged at the appropriate moment but not now, when the Arabs were hurt and humiliated.

3. Replying to a comment from M. Balafrej that this was the American view, Mr. Brown said that he went further than the Americans, particularly on Jerusalem. Moreover he believed that important problems such as the refugees could now be tackled. Mr. Brown suggested that Morocco should now be considering the future of the Arab world, particularly since nobody could tell whether Arab leadership would stay in Cairo.

4. *M. Balafrej* thought that leadership in the Arab world should be with those countries who were strong and developed and who regarded the real problem of the Arab countries as their fight to conquer underdevelopment. Nevertheless, the King could not afford to refuse to show solidarity with other Arab countries over Palestine. He agreed that there was a need to wait for Arab passions to subside but at the same time, for this to occur, some gesture towards the Arabs was required.

5. *Mr. Brown* paid tribute to the courage and wisdom which the King had shown during the crisis despite the many difficulties he had faced in Morocco. The whole situation might have changed if he had not so acted. *M. Balafrej* pointed out that Morocco had been obliged to take steps to protect 100,000 Jewish citizens.

6. M. Balafrej said that he was glad to see we were not abandoning King Hussein of Jordan who now had to deal with a most difficult internal situation. While he thought that King Hussein had not shown sufficient wisdom, *Mr. Brown* confirmed that the United Kingdom would not desert the Hashemite family. We would not, however, make things worse for King Hussein by being over friendly to him.

Document No. 30

RECORD OF A MEETING BETWEEN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND THE ISRAEL FOREIGN MINISTER AT THE UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS, NEW YORK, AT 6.15 p.m. ON 23 JUNE, 1967

Present:

The Right Hon. George Brown, M P
Lord Caradon
Mr. T. F. Brenchley
Mr. D. J. D. Maitland

Mr. Abba Eban
Mr. G. Rafael

Mr. Eban began by saying that he had been instructed to inform Mr. Brown officially that the Israel Government had been disconcerted by his speech to the Assembly, particularly when they compared it with that of other Western representatives, *e.g.*, the Canadian. His Government had been disconcerted not only by what the speech contained but by what it omitted. The speech indicated a lack of understanding of the situation Israel had been in since May. In general the speech contrasted with the spirit which had animated the relations between the two Governments in recent weeks. As regards Jerusalem it was the Israel Government's intention to give guarantees in respect of the holy places. What the Israel authorities had done now was to make Jerusalem once again a united city. All gun positions had been destroyed. He thought Mr. Brown was mistaken in seeing disaster in what was happening in Jerusalem. The Israel Government wanted to satisfy the religious interests of the world community.

2. Mr. Eban then said that the present thinking in Tel Aviv as regards negotiations with the Arabs was that they would seek from the Egyptians three things. First, a peace treaty on the basis of the international frontiers; secondly, demilitarisation of Sinai; and, thirdly, free passage through the waterways. His Government had not made up their minds about Gaza; whether or not Israel wanted to incorporate the Gaza Strip, which Egypt did not claim as Egyptian territory, was a function of the refugee problem. Mr. Eban emphasised that what he had just said as regards Israel's negotiating position reflected the way Tel Aviv was thinking and not firm decisions.

3. *Mr. Brown* said he would answer point by point. As to the omissions from his speech, he had been urged by his advisers to restrict it to 30 minutes and he asked Mr. Eban to read what he had said in the Assembly together with the longer statement he had made in the House of Commons. As regards the contents of his speech, the only new item was his advice to the Israel Government not to annex Jerusalem. He had chosen his words carefully. He had not called on the Israelis to withdraw and he now found he was being viciously attacked in the Israel Press.

4. Mr. Brown said that in his talks with representatives of almost all the Arab countries he had stressed one point in particular. He had told them they could not ask the Israelis to withdraw unless they, the Arabs, were prepared to do something in exchange. If the Arabs raised the question of withdrawal the Israelis would at once raise the question of the price that the Arabs would have to pay for it. He had told the Arabs they would have to drop their claim to be in a state of belligerency if withdrawal was raised. Some of the Arabs saw the situation as he did.

5. Mr. Brown went on to say that he hoped the Assembly would in the end pass a resolution dealing with the practical issues, leaving the big issues such as withdrawal on one side. In this situation he urged the Israel Government not to create a new problem over Jerusalem. *Mr. Eban* said that there had never been any idea of issuing some pompous statement annexing Jerusalem. All the Israel Government had in mind was enabling legislation to help the municipal authorities.

6. *Mr. Brown* then said that he would be returning to London the following day and would make a statement two days later in the House of Commons. Mr. Eban should know that there was no chance of his conniving at the defeat of

Israel at the Assembly or asking Israel to give something up in return for nothing. *Mr. Eban* said that if Mr. Brown made this clear in the House there would be no further problem with public opinion in Israel. *Mr. Brown* was doubtful whether the moment had yet come for him to state his position in public. He had explained his views to all the Arabs he had met, but he might lose his power to influence them if he stated them in public. Mr. Brown added that none of the Arabs had contradicted what he said.

7. *Lord Caradon* said that the danger in the Assembly was that the Soviet Union might drop their demand for the condemnation of Israel, leaving in isolation their demand for withdrawal. This might command a large measure of support. The best way to avert this would be to introduce something new, *e.g.*, a resolution containing a call for withdrawal and certain other elements.

8. Finally *Mr. Eban* raised the question of Nasser's position. He was now in a Sukarno-type situation and the Israelis hoped he would eventually go. *Mr. Brown* said he was not yet certain whether it would be a good or bad thing if Nasser went.

Document No. 31

TEXT OF UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM No. 1501 OF 23 JUNE, 1967, TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE, REPORTING ON THE FOREIGN SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE AT 10.45 p.m. ON FRIDAY, 23 JUNE, 1967, AT THE WALDORF TOWERS, NEW YORK

Meeting between President Johnson and Mr. Kosygin

Mr. Rusk asked the Secretary of State to call this evening on his return from Glassboro. He said that the President and Mr. Kosygin had met for two hours alone, and he knew little of what had passed. On the Middle East, it seemed from Rusk's account that Kosygin had been as rigid as he was yesterday with the Foreign Secretary. At the last moment, Kosygin had unexpectedly asked for a further meeting. This has been arranged for Sunday.

2. Rusk had not had a full account from the President himself and was therefore not in a position to assess the conversation. He had the impression however that non-proliferation was the only promising subject.

Document No. 32

MINUTE DATED 23 JUNE, 1967, BY THE PERMANENT UNDER-SECRETARY, SIR PAUL GORE-BOOTH

I have been trying to put a little nerve into the CENTO members on the subject of the eventual resolution.

2. The Iranian Foreign Minister says he certainly feels that there should at least be something which confirms the existence, &c., of Israel. So does the Turk (Eralp) with whom I discussed this and who is so recommending to his Foreign Minister: he added however that it would not be expedient to put freedom of navigation into the General Assembly Resolution.

3. Both said they were trying to persuade the Pakistanis to take a less extreme line. The Turk said he hoped Turkey and Ethiopia could work together: I suggested he should contact the Latins.

PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister

23/6

Has anyone thought to forward up Quickly the U.S. hiring about Krugin's meeting in Ga.

Have they

Is there known to

is on the Shields.

If so when?

23/6

Cypher/Cat. A

FLASH TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 690 25 June 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 690 of 25 June Repeated for information to UKMission New York, Amman and Washington.

UKMission New York telegram No. 2506: West Bank and Refugees.

I would urge strongly that we follow the same line as the Americans as described in Washington telegram No. 2137.

2. Action in United Nations is only likely to stiffen Israeli attitudes. The same goes for suggestions to send in high powered United Nations observers or presences. To suggest that our Consuls in Jerusalem should carry out this function would be the worst of all since it would introduce into humanitarian problem of refugees and the political problem of possible developments on the West Bank (my telegram No. 683) what the Israelis would interpret as a move to try and enshrine what is to them one of the repugnant features of the previous special status of Jerusalem. It might well precipitate the showdown over Consuls which for the time being seems to have been postponed.

3. I have no doubt that things are going from bad to worse with regard to the exodus from the West Bank. I see from a leader in 'The Times' of 23 June that Jordanian Government have announced officially that anyone collaborating with the occupying Israelis will be treated as a traitor. I do not know what basis there is for this statement but if true it could explain the renewed flow of refugees, perhaps Amman can comment. But John Kimche told me last night, in a very depressed mood, that he had no doubt that the Israel Government had no policy, that Eshkol was now in complete control of any development on the West Bank and was taking no notice of advice from people like Herzog, Moshe Dayan or army officers who would be all in favour for working for developments along the lines of winning the Palestinians over (my telegram No. 683). He said that there was a lot of 'old Zionist' thinking prevalent in the upper reaches of Mapai which had not progressed beyond an attitude towards the Arabs which had been prevalent during the mandate and in 1948 and 1949 and that junior local commanders for the lack of clear directives were behaving in a way which would only encourage Palestinians to leave. There was also increasing fear among West Bankers that they had better not be too forthcoming with Israel as the powers would not let them do a deal. Kimche is not, of course, a reliable source, but I do believe that it is probably true that those who were hawks on the question of war are doves on the question of the West Bank while those who were doves about war are now probably hawks about what to do with the Arab population there.

/4.

CONFIDENTIAL

Cy [redacted] /Cat.A

FLASH TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 691 25 June 1967

What is happening about this?

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 691 of 25 June.
Repeated for information to UKMis.New York, Amman and Washington.

X is this prejudicial as implying recognition of a new Jordan East of the river

My immediately preceding telegram.

Following are suggested points:-

(i) There is no doubt that Israel's victory in the recent war against what appeared to be an overwhelming Arab threat received a tremendous amount of sympathy and understanding among the vast majority of the British public:

(ii) Unfortunately, reports of a large scale exodus from the West Bank and description of the flight of refugees in Jordan are now having quite the contrary effect:

(iii) Although we are sure that it was not Israeli policy to encourage the inhabitants of the West Bank to leave and we believe that there was a period when the initial exodus seemed to have died away, reports from unprejudiced and reliable observers in Transjordan can only confirm that the exodus has started again:

X

(iv) There is now bound to be pressure in the United Nations and this is going to be very prejudicial to Israel's interests, not only from a humanitarian point of view but from the political point of view of the attitude of many delegations to the conflicting Soviet and American stands:

(v) Quite apart from the humanitarian aspect, our information was that there were the beginnings of favourable developments on the West Bank which could have led to cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians which could have been the first chapter in the general peace, which we are convinced the Israelis have always wanted. But unless these favourable developments are encouraged by Israeli actions they are all too likely to wither and leave Israel in just as bad a case as before with regard to peace:

(vi) What is required now to forestall United Nations action which may be prejudicial or unacceptable to Israel is

(a) action by Israel to stop people leaving the West Bank even if they want to go - unless, of course, they can produce incontrovertible evidence that they are bona fide residents of the East Bank,

(b) a clear announcement by the Israel Government that now that they have got conditions back to normal on the West Bank they would welcome back all bona fide inhabitants of the West Bank who have fled, and

/(c) the announcement

(c) the announcement of the intention to introduce a programme for the rehabilitation and resettlement, as a first step, of all refugees previously resident on the West Bank:

(vii) Failing action on the above lines, it is going to be very difficult for Her Majesty's Government to stand aside from any general move in the United Nations to censure Israel for her failure to cope with the problem of the West Bankers and to call on her to take steps, the scope of which is unforeseeable.

Foreign Office pass UKMis.New York 143, Washington 158 and Amman 175.

Mr. Hadow

Sent 1825Z/25 June 1967

Recd. 2030Z/25 June 1967

[Repeated as requested]

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4. Unfortunately our supposed attitude about Jerusalem has gravely prejudiced our standing here and the possibility of our advice being given much weight (my 2nd immediately following telegram) nevertheless, I am sure we should make a further try to get the Israelis, in their own interests, to behave more sensibly. I would therefore suggest that in addition to anything the Secretary of State may have said to Mr. Eban a high level message should be sent from the Prime Minister to Mr. Eshkol on the lines of my immediately following telegram.

5. Foreign Office pass UKMission New York 142, Amman 174, Washington 157.

Mr. Hadow

Sent 1824Z/25 June 1967
Recd 1955Z/25 June 1967

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CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat A

PRIORITY JEDDA TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 462 25 June, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 462 of 25 June. Repeated for information to: U.K.Mission New York (for Secretary of State), Amman, Beirut, Kuwait, Bahrain, Khartoum, Tel Aviv, Washington and Saving to: Tripoli, Tunis, Algiers, Rabat

My telegram No. 459 not to all: United Nations and the Middle East.

King Faisal received me on the afternoon of 24 June. He was very friendly and there was no sign of any bitterness. Dr. Rashad Pharaon was also present.

2. Not surprisingly Faisal's remarks to me in the course of the audience showed clearly that although he feels as strongly as ever about Israel his attitude towards President Nasser has not changed and he remains deeply mistrustful of the man he considers to be an arch-intriguer and his inveterate enemy.

3. I began by presenting to His Majesty the album of photographs commemorating his recent State Visit to Britain and he was obviously very pleased. He said how much he had enjoyed his visit and asked that his renewed thanks should be conveyed to Her Majesty, The Queen.

4. The conversation then turned to the Arab/Israel war and its aftermath. Faisal said that the withdrawal of the Jews to their original positions and international condemnation of their aggression were two immediate requirements. Thereafter some sort of settlement might be negotiated, but there could not be direct talks between the Arabs and the Jews. In reply to my question he said that he had been glad to hear what you, Sir, had said in your speech to the General Assembly on 21 June. You had spoken with reason and logic and he had found your statement, though not of course 100% acceptable, quite satisfactory.

5. Faisal then reminded me that he had told me in London at the end of May that Nasser had embarked on a gigantic bluff. Unfortunately for Nasser - and particularly for the rest of the Arab world - the Jews had called his bluff and he had been decisively beaten. The King said that if he had been in Israel's place he would have done exactly the same and struck first rather than risk being attacked and overwhelmed. If Nasser had not tried to be too clever and waste time by seeking to bargain with the Americans from what he believed to be his new position of strength, he could have launched a decisive attack on the Israelis. What Nasser should have done, had he seriously wanted to lead the Arabs in a victorious assault on Israel, was to have made far more serious military preparations including the addition of the tough fighters of Algeria together with their Air Force. Only then would he have been in a strong enough position to attack Israel successfully. As it was, the Egyptians had been incredibly inept and the Israelis had caught them napping. The other Arabs, and particularly King Hussain, were paying the price of Nasser's bogus leadership.

/6.

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6. Faisal stressed that none of his remarks meant that he himself was any less determined that the so-called State of Israel must one day be liquidated. In the next breath he said that of course Nasser would turn his hand against his fellow Arabs directly the Palestine question was off his agenda. In other words, once the dust of the immediate crisis had settled and the long drawn out process of finding a solution had begun, Nasser would resume his subversive actions against established Arab régimes like Saudi Arabia.

7. I asked the King what he thought of the prospects for an Arab summit meeting and he said that it was too early to say, since the present forum for discussion was New York and all the Arab Foreign Ministers were there. It depended on what happened at the United Nations. When I suggested Nasser ought to go to New York Faisal entirely agreed.

8. We then talked about South Arabia and Yemen and my immediately following telegrams contain Faisal's views.

9. I thanked the King for the precautions taken by the Saudi authorities to ensure that British subjects and their property had not been molested during the critical days of the war. He replied that this was the obvious duty of the Government and that he would never tolerate that private citizens should take the law into their own hands. If Saudi Arabia disliked something Britain did it was for the Saudi Government and not for individuals to express their displeasure. He mentioned the Eastern Province as the only place where disturbances had taken place but the authorities had suppressed them. (My United States colleague tells me that the Saudi police and army were in fact quite useless during the attacks on the United States Consulate General at Dhahran and on the bungalows of the United States Military Training Mission at the Dhahran Airbase and that only the belated arrival of several hundred National Guardsmen from Riyadh put an end to a potentially very ugly situation. All has been quiet now for some time throughout the country.)

Foreign Office pass Priority U.K.Mission New York (for Secretary of State) 33, Routine Amman 45, Beirut 120, Khartoum 10, Tel Aviv 8, Washington 79 and Saving to Tripoli 2, Tunis 2, Algiers 1, Rabat 1.

Mr. Man

Sent 1050Z 25 June
Recd. 1412Z 25 June

[Repeated as requested]

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Cypher/Cat A

JEDDA TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 463 25 June 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to F.O. telegram No. 463 of 25 June
Repeated for information to:
Amman, Beirut, Kuwait, Bahrain, H.C. Aden, (Personal)
U.K. Mission New York (For Secretary fo State), Washington.

My telegram No. 462 not to Aden, paragraph 8: South Arabia.

I asked Faisal what he thought of our policy for the future of the South Arabian Federation as announced in the House of Commons on 19 June. He said that he had not had time to study the details and I outlined a summary for him stressing the additional military help we intended to provide to the new Independent State, particularly as regards defence.

2. Faisal commented that in the light of the recent outbreak of violence by the South Arabian army we should think twice before giving independence as early as January. He had expressed his doubts to us in London on the reliability of the South Arabian army and although he deplored the loss of life which these incidents had caused he hoped that we would benefit from this lesson and not be over-hasty in leaving South Arabia.

3. He asked me to inform you that in his view we should now more than ever be flexible and leave ourselves a way out to postpone our departure rather than bind ourselves to a date line and a programme for independence which circumstances might well oblige us later to alter yet again.

4. He also commented that there were dangerous implications not only for South Arabia but for other countries as well (and he clearly implied his own) when the armed forces of a State attempted to take the law into their own hands.

F.O. pass Amman 46, Beirut 121, H.C. Aden Personal 60, U.K. Mission New York 34, Washington 80.

Mr. Man Sent 1100Z 25 June
Recd 1501Z 25 June

[Repeated as requested]

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JEDDA TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 464 25 June, 1967

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Addressed to F.O. telegram No. 464 of 25 June.

Repeated for information to: Amman Beirut Kuwait
Bahrain Aden (Personal
UKMis New York (for Secretary of State)
Washington.

My telegram No. 462 paragraph 8: Yemen.

In reply to my question whether Nasser might now wish to withdraw entirely from Yemen, Faisal said that the time to have done so - and thereby to have shown that he was genuinely committed to the destruction of Israel - was when the war broke out. This had not happened and only a token U.A.R. force had been withdrawn.

2. The King did not consider that Nasser wished to give up his foothold in Yemen. Nasser would hang on not only because his prestige could not afford to suffer another defeat after Sinai, but because of the prize of South Arabia which Nasser hoped would one day fall to him.

3. Faisal was very doubtful that any compromise could ever be reached with Nasser on the Yemen problem.

Foreign Office pass Amman No. 470, Beirut No. 122, Aden (Personal) No. 61, UKMis New York No. 35, Washington No. 81.

Mr. Man

Sent 1100Z 25 June
Recd 1449Z 25 June

[Repeated as requested].

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EN CLAIR

IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1515 25 JUNE

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1515 OF 25 JUNE

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW.

MR. KOSYGIN'S PRESS CONFERENCE AT U.N. HEADQUARTERS.

THE FOLLOWING ARE EXTRACTS FROM MR. KOSYGIN'S PRESS CONFERENCE THIS EVENING:-

AFTER OPENING REMARKS ON STANDARD LINES CALLING FOR THE CONDEMNATION OF ISRAEL AND THE NEED FOR WITHDRAWAL, MR. KOSYGIN SAID ''IN THE LAST FEW DAYS HERE IN NEW YORK, WE HAVE BEEN ENDEAVOURING TO UNDERSTAND CLOSER THE VIEWS OF THE ARAB STATES. IN ORDER TO START THE CONSIDERATION OF POSSIBLE PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS OF THE PROBLEMS OF THE MIDDLE EAST, IT IS NECESSARY AS A FIRST STEP TO ACHIEVE THE WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES BEHIND THE ARMISTICE LINES. THAT IS THE MOST IMPORTANT, IT IS INDEED THE FOCAL QUESTION TODAY. ALL THE OTHER SOLUTIONS THAT ARE PUT FORWARD BY CERTAIN GROUPS, OR BY CERTAIN COUNTRIES, WHICH AIM AT CONSIDERING THE WHOLE PACKAGE OF QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE MIDDLE EAST, COULD NOT LEAD SO SWIFTLY TO A SOLUTION OF THE PRIME PROBLEM, WHICH IS TO PREVENT A RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES. THEREFORE THE ONLY REALISTIC METHOD IS TO ACHIEVE THE WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES AND THEN HAVE THE SECURITY COUNCIL CONSIDER ALL THE OTHER QUESTIONS WHICH ARISE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.''

MR. KOSYGIN THEN WENT ON TO READ OUT THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT ON HIS TALKS WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON: ''TWO MEETINGS WERE HELD BETWEEN THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR AND PRESIDENT JOHNSON IN GLASS BORO, NEW JERSEY, NOT FAR FROM NEW YORK. AT THE SECOND PART OF THE FIRST MEETING WHICH TOOK PLACE ON THE AFTERNOON OF JUNE 23, THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS TOUCHED UPON SEVERAL INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS.

/...IN CONNECTION

IN CONNECTION WITH THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THE TWO SIDES SET FORTH THEIR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS. IT WAS STATED ON THE SOVIET SIDE THAT THE MAIN THING NOW IS TO ACHIEVE THE PROMPT WITHDRAWAL BEHIND THE ARMISTICE LINES OF THE FORCES OF ISRAEL WHICH HAVE PERPETRATED AGGRESSION AGAINST THE ARAB STATES. THIS QUESTION IS OF SIGNAL IMPORTANCE FOR THE RESTORATION OF PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND IT IS IN THE CENTRE OF ATTENTION OF THE EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. IT MUST BE POSITIVELY RESOLVED WITHOUT DELAY.

THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE VIETNAM PROBLEM ONCE AGAIN REVEALED THE PROFOUND DIFFERENCES IN THE POSITIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES. IT WAS EMPHASISED ON THE SOVIET SIDE THAT THE SETTLEMENT OF THE VIETNAM PROBLEM IS POSSIBLE ONLY ON CONDITION OF AN END TO THE BOMBING OF THE TERRITORY OF THE D.R.V. AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN FORCES FROM SOUTH VIETNAM.

BOTH SIDES REAFFIRMED THAT THEY BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT TO ACHIEVE UNDERSTANDING ON THE CONCLUSION OF AN INTERNATIONAL TREATY ON THE NON-DISSEMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

IN THE COURSE OF THE TALKS A GENERAL REVIEW WAS MADE OF THE STATE OF BILATERAL SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS. THE MEETINGS OFFERED THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE U.S. AN OPPORTUNITY TO COMPARE THEIR POSITIONS ON THE QUESTIONS DISCUSSED WHICH, BOTH SIDES BELIEVE, IS USEFUL. WE WERE ALSO ABLE TO HAVE TALKS WITH SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, U THANT, WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY MR. PAZHWAK, WHOM I WOULD LIKE TO THANK FOR THE ATTENTION AND COURTESY WHICH THEY DISPLAYED TOWARDS OUR DELEGATION''.

MR. KOSYGIN THEN ANSWERED QUESTIONS. ASKED ABOUT THE CONTROL OF ARMS SHIPMENTS TO THE MIDDLE EAST HE SAID: ''THIS IS A QUESTION WHICH SHOULD BE RESOLVED AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES BEHIND THE ARMISTICE LINES. THE FIRST STEP SHOULD BE THE WITHDRAWAL OF

/FORCES

FORCES BEHIND THE ARMISTICE LINES AND THEN THERE COULD BE A CONSIDERATION OF ALL THE QUESTIONS THAT ARISE IN THIS CONNECTION, QUESTIONS THE SOLUTION OF WHICH COULD HELP BRING ABOUT THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACE IN THE AREA.'' ON GUARANTEES OF EXISTENCE AND THE RIGHT OF FREE PASSAGE MR. KOSYGIN SAID: ''THESE TOO ARE QUESTIONS WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS''.

ASKED WHAT WERE THE CHANCES OF IMPLEMENTING THE PRINCIPLES SET OUT IN MR. KOSYGIN'S SPEECH TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, HE REPLIED: ''THESE PRINCIPLES ARE QUITE REALISTIC AND IF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY COULD ADOPT A DECISION ALONG THOSE LINES IT COULD THEN ENTRUST THE SECURITY COUNCIL WITH IMPLEMENTING THAT DECISION. IF THAT DECISION WERE NOT COMPLIED WITH BY ANYONE THEN THE APPROPRIATE SANCTIONS COULD BE APPLIED.''

ASKED ABOUT REPORTS OF SOVIET ARMS SHIPMENTS TO THE MIDDLE EAST MR. KOSYGIN SAID: ''THIS IS A QUESTION BETWEEN THE ARAB STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION AS OF TODAY WHAT IS ESSENTIAL IS TO RESOLVE THE FIRST AND MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE, AND THAT IS TO BRING ABOUT THE WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES BEHIND THE ARMISTICE LINES. WHEN THAT IS DONE, THEN ALL THE OTHER QUESTIONS THAT MAY ARISE CAN BE CONSIDERED AND RESOLVED.''

ASKED IF FOUR POWER TALKS MIGHT FOLLOW THE BILATERAL TALKS IN GLASSBORO, MR. KOSYGIN SAID : ''WE DID NOT CONSIDER OR DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITY OF CONVENING A BIG FOUR MEETING''.

ASKED ABOUT HIS TRAVEL PLANS HE SAID: ''I AM RETURNING HOME AND I MAY BE VISITING SOME OTHER COUNTRIES ON MY WAY BACK.''

ASKED WHETHER HE FAVOURED DIRECT TALKS BETWEEN ISRAELIS AND ARABS MR. KOSYGIN SAID : ''THAT IS A QUESTION WHICH THE ARAB STATES SHOULD DECIDE UPON AND REPLY.''

ON THE QUESTION OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, MR. KOSYGIN SAID:

''WE BELIEVE THERE HAS BEEN A SIGNIFICANT MOVE FORWARD IN

MISSION NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 1515 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

-4-

THANK RESPECTFULLY AS I NOTED IN MY STATEMENT, WE ARE CONTINUING OUR EFFORTS AIMED AT FINDING A SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM. WE BELIEVE THAT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY I WANT TO SAY THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS INTERESTED IN ACHIEVING A SITUATION WHERE THERE SHOULD BE NO DISSEMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND WE BELIEVE THAT THE UNITED STATES IS SEEKING THE SAME GOALS, AS ARE THE MAJORITY OF NATIONS IN THE WORLD. [REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

FG PASS MOSCOW AND 2094

LORD CARADON

SENT AT 0438Z/26 JUNE 1967

RECD AT 0438Z/26 JUNE 1967

BY

THE

BELIEVE

ARAB STATES

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CYPHER CAT A
IMMEDIATE FROM UKMISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO 1516 25 JUNE, 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 1516 OF 25 JUNE,
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, TEL AVIV AND OTTAWA.

MY TELEGRAM NO 1311
MIDDLE EAST

A MEETING WAS HELD THIS EVENING AT GOLDBERGS APARTMENT AT WHICH THE CANADIAN, ITALIAN, DUTCH, JAPANESE, BRAZILIAN, CHILEAN, ARGENTINIAN, VENEZUELAN REPRESENTATIVES AND OURSELVES WERE PRESENT.

2. THERE WAS A WIDE RANGING DISCUSSION BOTH ON SUBSTANCE AND ON TACTICS WHICH I SHALL REPORT MORE FULLY TOMORROW. THE UPSHOT OF THE MEETING WAS THAT THE DANISH REPRESENTATIVE AGREED TO MAKE HIMSELF RESPONSIBLE FOR STARTING THE PROCESS TOMORROW MORNING OF DRAFTING A RESOLUTION IN INFORMAL CONSULTATION WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF DIFFERENT GROUPS, IN PARTICULAR SOME LATIN AMERICANS, EUROPEANS AND THE FRENCH AFRICANS, WHO HAD EXPRESSED INTEREST IN CONSULTING ON A MIDDLE POSITION. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT ON THE NEED TO MOVE SWIFTLY IF A ''NON-ALIGNED'' MOVE TO MUSTER SUPPORT FOR A RESOLUTION DEALING ONLY WITH WITHDRAWAL WAS TO BE HEADED OFF.

3. THE MAIN ISSUE OF SUBSTANCE ON WHICH DISCUSSION WAS CONCENTRATED WAS THE PROBLEM OF WHAT SORT OF LINK SHOULD BE WRITTEN INTO A RESOLUTION BETWEEN WITHDRAWAL AND GUIDELINES ON OTHER ISSUES. OPINION VARIED BETWEEN THOSE WHO THOUGHT THAT ANY LINK COULD BE NO MORE THAN IMPLICIT AND THOSE WHO THOUGHT THAT WITHDRAWAL WOULD HAVE TO BE SET MORE CLEARLY IN THE

/CONTEXT

CONTEXT OF THE ISSUES WHICH HAD LED TO THE RECENT HOSTILITIES. BUT IT WAS ACCEPTED THAT THE BEST WAY OF CLARIFYING OPINION ON THIS POINT WAS TO TRY TO GET DOWN THE TEXT OF A RESOLUTION TO PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR MORE EXACT DISCUSSION.
FOREIGN OFFICE PLEASE PASS MOSCOW NO 210, PARIS NO 208, TEL AVIV NO 228.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT 0450Z/26 JUNE 1967
RECD AT 0450Z/26 JUNE 1967

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS].

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CYPHER CAT A
IMMEDIATE FROM UKMISSION NEWYORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO 1517 DATED 25 JUNE, 1967
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ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 1517 OF 25 JUNE,
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, TEL
AVIV AND OTTAWA

MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM: JOHNSON/KOSYGIN MEETING.

AT THE END OF THE MEETING MR RUSK CAME IN AND GAVE THOSE PRESENT THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT OF THE DISCUSSION ON THE MIDDLE EAST BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND KOSYGIN AT GLASSBORO.

2. KOSYGIN HAD BEEN VERY TOUGH ON THE PRIORITY OF THE ISSUE OF WITHDRAWAL WHICH HE SAID WAS A PREREQUISITE. ON OTHER ISSUES, SUCH AS THE NEED TO ACCEPT THE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL AND THE QUESTION OF BELLIGERENCE, KOSYGIN HAD BEEN FLEXIBLE. GROMYKO HAD REMINDED RUSK THAT JAPAN AND THE SOVIET UNION HAD RENOUNCED BELLIGERENCE BEFORE THERE WAS A PEACE TREATY. ON INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS THE RUSSIANS SEEMED TO SEE NO PROBLEM OVER THE STRAITS OF TIRAN BUT PASSED OVER SUEZ, POSSIBLY BECAUSE THEY ''COULD NOT DELIVER THE EGYPTIANS''. THEY SHOWED SOME INTEREST IN THE QUESTION OF ARMS LIMITATION, BUT AGAIN INSISTED THAT WITHDRAWAL MUST COME FIRST. THEY DID NOT MENTION CONDEMNATION OF ISRAEL OR THE QUESTION OF COMPENSATION FOR THE ARABS BOTH OF WHICH KOSYGIN HAD CALLED FOR IN HIS SPEECH.

3. RUSK THOUGHT THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS HARD FOR UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL AND FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO BE AUTHORISED TO IMPLEMENT AN ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION CALLING FOR IT. (YOU WILL HAVE NOTICED KOSYGIN'S REFERENCE IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE THIS EVENING TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL IMPOSING SANCTIONS IF WITHDRAWAL WERE NOT CARRIED OUT.) RUSK HAD TOLD GROMYKO TO BE CAREFUL THAT

/THE RUSSIANS

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THE RUSSIANS WERE NOT MORE ARAB THAN THE ARABS SINCE THE UNITED STATES HAD FOUND MORE FLEXIBILITY ON THE PART OF SOME ARABS.

4. SPEAKING TO ME LATER GOLDBERG WAS LESS HOPEFUL AND WAS INDEED VERY DEPRESSED PARTLY BY RUSK'S REPORT AND PARTLY BY SEEING KOSYGIN'S PERFORMANCE ON TV AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE TONIGHT (GOLDBERG WAS NOT AT GLASSBORO). HE SAID IT HAD DEFINITELY NOT BEEN A GOOD MEETING. THE FIRST MEETING HAD BEEN MERELY EXPLORATORY BUT THIS TIME THOUGH THE EXCHANGES HAD BEEN POLITE THERE WAS NOTHING HE HAD HEARD BUT REPETITION OF THE COMMUNIST HARD LINE. THERE HAD BEEN SOME MOVEMENT ON NON-PROLIFERATION BUT HIS IMPRESSION WAS THAT OTHERWISE THERE HAD BEEN NO GIVE AND IN PARTICULAR NO BENDING ON THE MIDDLE EAST. ON VIET NAM THERE WAS NO ADVANCE AT ALL.

5. GOLDBERG TOLD ME THAT HE WAS PARTICULARLY DISCOURAGED ON THE MIDDLE EAST. HE HAD PREPARED A STATEMENT FOR THE PRESIDENT SETTING OUT POINTS FROM KOSYGIN'S ASSEMBLY SPEECH WHICH MIGHT GIVE AN INDICATION OF SOME AREAS OF POSSIBLE AGREEMENT BUT KOSYGIN HAD SHOWN NO READINESS TO EXPLORE THESE POINTS JOINTLY.

6. GOLDBERG ALSO TOLD ME THAT KOSYGIN'S NEXT STOP WAS EXPECTED TO BE IN CUBA.

FOREIGN OFFICE PLEASE PASS MOSCOW NO 211, PARIS NO 209
TEL AVIV NO. 229.

LORD CARADON

RCVD 0510Z 26 JUNE 1967
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[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION.]

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Minister of Power
FS/67/48

Mr. Frank Law's contact with King Hassan

M/East (Pour 4)

— Thank you for your minute of 5 June about Mr. Frank Law's conversation with King Hassan.

I am always ready to take advantage of unofficial contacts with other governments even when official contacts through our Ambassadors are friendly, as they are with Morocco. It is good of you to tell me about this opportunity.

At present, however, I doubt whether we need make use of this channel. King Hassan has had no difficulty in keeping in touch with us through the normal channels during recent weeks, and we have had the usual contacts, through diplomatic sources.

If, however, an occasion should arise where Mr. Law's close friendship with King Hassan could be of value we shall certainly get in touch with him.

(GEORGE BROWN)

CONFIDENTIAL R / 26 June, 1967.

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CYPHER/CAT A

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PRIORITY COLOMBO TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

Telno 353 26 June 1967

RESTRICTED
AS IDE

Addressed to Commonwealth Office telegram No.353 of 26 June.
Repeated for information Saving to Moscow and U.K. Mission New York.

Soviet rôle in Middle East.

Author of article in my immediately preceding telegram is member of Ceylon Communist Party, official of Lanka Soviet Friendship Society and journalist with a long record as spokesman of Soviet "line". An employee of the New China News Agency in Ceylon until (after the Sino-Soviet dispute) he joined "Novosti", he recently visited Soviet Union.

2. Article amounts to Soviet inspired insistence that Arabs suffered militarily irredeemable defeat and their leaders sought cease-fire without Soviet pressure.

C.O. please pass Saving to Moscow and U.K. Mission New York.

Mr. Dutton

Sent 1011Z 26 June
Recd. 1020Z 26 June

[Repeated as requested]

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VVVVV

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Prime Minister

With the compliments of

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

27/6

26 June, 1967.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

T1924, T193

CONFIDENTIAL

June 26, 1967

The Prime Minister has made certain amendments to the draft replies enclosed in your letter to me of June 21 with the messages he received from President Ayub and Mrs. Gandhi about the Middle East Crisis.

I enclose copies of the amended drafts as approved by the Prime Minister for dispatch.

A Wilson

O.G. Forster, Esq., MVO,
Commonwealth Office.

8 file

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CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1526

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
26 JUNE 1967

CONFIDENTIAL.
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 1526 OF 26 JUNE
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON AND OTTAWA.
M I P T : MIDDLE EAST.
FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF U.S. PROPOSALS:-
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
HAVING HEARD THE STATEMENTS OF THE PARTIES,
CONCERNED AT THE RECURRING CRISES IN THE MIDDLE EAST, INCLUDING
REPEATED OUTBREAKS OF MILITARY HOSTILITIES,
TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE OBLIGATIONS OF ALL MEMBERS UNDER THE
CHARTER, AND SPECIFICALLY ARTICLE 2 THEREOF,
RECALLING THAT A FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSE OF THE CHARTER IS TO
DEVELOP FRIENDLY RELATIONS AMONG NATIONS BASED ON RESPECT FOR
THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL RIGHTS AND SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES,
RECALLING FURTHER THE PREAMBLE OF THE CHARTER THAT PEOPLE SHOULD
PRACTICE TOLERANCE AND LIVE TOGETHER IN PEACE,
DESIROUS OF CONTRIBUTING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE AND SECURITY
IN THAT AREA,
1. RECOMMENDS THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AS A MATTER OF URGENCY,
REQUEST THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO SEEK AND OBTAIN THE SERVICES
OF AN EMINENT WORLD STATESMAN TO PROCEED TO THE AREA AS AN
EMISSARY OF THE UNITED NATIONS, TO CONSULT WITH THE PARTIES
CONCERNED, WITH A VIEW TO ESTABLISHING PEACE AND SECURITY IN
THE MIDDLE EAST BASED ON THE FOLLOWING GUIDELINES:

../..(A) THAT

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(A) THAT ARMED FORCES BE DISENGAGED AND WITHDRAWN AND THE STATE OF WAR AND BELLIGERENCY BE TERMINATED, ON THE BASIS OF ARRANGEMENTS TO RESPECT INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES AND TO PROTECT VITAL SECURITY INTERESTS OF ALL STATES IN THE AREA:

(B) THAT THE RIGHT OF EVERY MEMBER IN THE AREA TO MAINTAIN AN INDEPENDENT NATIONAL STATE OF ITS OWN AND TO LIVE IN PEACE BE RESPECTED:

(C) THAT IN THE WORDS OF THE CHARTER, BOTH THE QUOTE THREAT AND USE OF FORCE UNQUOTE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STATE OR IN ANY MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS BE RENOUNCED:

(D) THAT THE RIGHTS OF FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND OF INNOCENT PASSAGE BE RESPECTED:

(E) THAT A JUST AND PERMANENT SETTLEMENT OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEMS BE CONCLUDED:

(F) THAT THE DEVELOPMENTS OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMIES AND IMPROVEMENT OF THE LIVING STANDARDS OF THE PEOPLE SHOULD TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER A WASTEFUL ARMS RACE IN THE AREA:

(G) THAT APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS TO ASSIST IN ACHIEVING THESE RESULTS BE ESTABLISHED.

2. REQUESTS THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO KEEP THE SITUATION UNDER CAREFUL REVIEW.

LORD CARADON

SENT 0136Z 27 JUNE
RECD 0325Z 27 JUNE

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CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1527

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
26 JUNE 1967

CONFIDENTIAL.
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 1527 OF 26 JUNE
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON AND OTTAWA.
MY SECOND IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM.
MIDDLE EAST.
FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF CANADIAN PROPOSALS:
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
NOTING THAT THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A CEASE-FIRE IN THE MIDDLE EAST,
IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 233, 234, 235 AND
236 OF 6, 7, 9 AND 12 JUNE 1967, HAS LEFT UNRESOLVED THE QUESTIONS
OF WITHDRAWAL, AS WELL AS THE ISSUES WHICH GAVE RISE TO THE
CONFLICT,
NOTING THAT ALL MEMBERS ARE OBLIGATED UNDER ARTICLE 2 OF THE
CHARTER TO QUOTE SETTLE THEIR INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES BY PEACEFUL
MEANS IN SUCH A MANNER THAT INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY,
AND JUSTICE, ARE NOT ENDANGERED UNQUOTE,
1. AFFIRMS THE PRINCIPLE THAT FORCES SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN AS
SOON AS POSSIBLE, AS PART OF THE PROCESS OF THE PEACEFUL
SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES, TO WHICH ALL PARTIES ARE
OBLIGATED UNDER ARTICLE 2 OF THE CHARTER, INCLUDING THE OBLIGATION
QUOTE TO REFRAIN IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FROM THE THREAT
OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL
INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STATE UNQUOTE,

/2. RECOMMENDS

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2. RECOMMENDS THE APPOINTMENT BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE (OR MR. X), TO MAINTAIN FULL CONTACTS WITH ALL GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED, IN ORDER TO ASSIST IN ESTABLISHING A BASIS OF NEGOTIATIONS AS REQUIRED UNDER THE CHARTER, AND, WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF UNTSO, TO SUPERVISE THE COMPLIANCE BY THE PARTIES WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS ALREADY ADOPTED AS ENUMERATED IN PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE,

3. REQUESTS THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO FOLLOW UP THE IMPLEMENTATIONS OF THIS RESOLUTION.

LORD CARADON.

SENT AT 0255Z/27 JUNE 1967.

RECD AT 0256Z/27 JUNE 1967.

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CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1529

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
26 JUNE 1967

CONFIDENTIAL.
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 1529 OF 26 JUNE 1967
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW PARIS TEL AVIV
AND COPENHAGEN.
MY TELNO 1516: MIDDLE EAST.

SINCE WE HAVE BACKED THE PROPOSAL FOR DRAFTING A THIRD RESOLUTION, WE ARE NOW UNDER SOME OBLIGATION TO GIVE THE DANES IDEAS ON WHAT A THIRD RESOLUTION SHOULD CONTAIN. THEY ARE AWARE OF OUR THOUGHTS IN GENERAL TERMS FROM THE MEETING LAST NIGHT IN GOLDBERG'S APARTMENT (AND ALSO FROM A CONVERSATION WHICH I HAD WITH THE DANISH REPRESENTATIVE TODAY). THEY WOULD LIKE, HOWEVER, TO HAVE SOMETHING MORE SPECIFIC IN WRITING AND UNLESS YOU SEE OBJECTION I MIGHT GIVE THEM, ENTIRELY INFORMALLY AND WITHOUT COMMITMENT, A PAPER ON THE LINES OF MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.

2. THE WEAKNESS OF THIS PAPER IS THAT IS LEAVES OVER THE EXACT DRAFTING OF THE CRUCIAL PARAGRAPH ON WITHDRAWAL (OTHERWISE IT FOLLOWS CLOSELY THE POINTS MADE IN YOUR ASSEMBLY SPEECH OF JUNE21). AS I MADE CLEAR IN MY TELEGRAMS NUMBERS 1328 AND 1510 WE SHALL NOT BE ALLOWED TO DUCK THIS ISSUE AND ANY RESOLUTION CAPABLE OF COMMANDING A RESPECTABLE MAJORITY WILL HAVE TO DEAL UNEQUIVOCALLY WITH IT. WHETHER OR NOT WE SUGGEST LANGUAGE TO THE DANES WE ARE ALMOST CERTAINLY WITHIN THE NEXT WEEK OR SO GOING TO HAVE TO VOTE ON SOME RESOLUTION DEALING WITH THE ISSUE.

3. THE ISSUE OF WITHDRAWAL HAS TWO ASPECTS. THE FIRST IS THE EXTENT

../.. TO WHICH

CONFIDENTIAL

TO WHICH WITHDRAWAL SHOULD BE CONDITIONAL ON SOME ATTEMPT TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS WHICH BROUGHT ABOUT HOSTILITIES. THE GROUP THAT DISCUSSED THIS SUBJECT YESTERDAY (SEE MY TEL UNDER REFERENCE) SEEMED REALISTIC ON THIS AND WE MUST DO ALL WE CAN TO ENSURE THAT THE DRAFT RESOLUTION WHICH EMERGES WILL CONTAIN WORDING WHICH ESTABLISHES A LINK BETWEEN WITHDRAWAL AND THE OTHER ISSUES. THE OTHER ASPECT IS THE QUESTION OF WHERE WITHDRAWAL IS TO BE TO. THE RUSSIANS CALL UNEQUIVOCALLY FOR WITHDRAWAL TO THE QUOTE ARMISTICE LINES UNQUOTE. UNLESS WE ARE CLEAR WHAT, IF ANY, RESERVATIONS WE MIGHT HAVE IN MIND ON THIS IT IS DIFFICULT TO JUDGE WHAT WORDING ON THIS ASPECT MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE TO US.

4. THE IMMEDIATE EFFECT OF OUR HAVING NO LANGUAGE OF OUR OWN IS THAT ANY DOCUMENT SUCH AS THE ONE CONTAINED IN MY I.F.T. IS BOUND TO HAVE SOMETHING OF A PRO-ISRAEL FLAVOUR. I RECOGNISE, HOWEVER, THE DIFFICULTY WITH WHICH YOU ARE FACED IN THE HOUSE AND WITH PUBLIC OPINION IN ENGLAND ON THE ISSUE OF WITHDRAWAL, AND THAT IT MAY BE EASIER FOR US TO APPEAR RELUCTANTLY TO ACQUIESCE IN OTHER PEOPLES' LANGUAGE THAN TO PROPOSE LANGUAGE ON WITHDRAWAL OF OUR OWN. CERTAINLY FOR US TO PUT TO THE DANES IN A DOCUMENT THE EXISTENCE OF WHICH MAY BECOME KNOWN LANGUAGE LESS CATEGORICAL THAN QUOTE CALLS UPON ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW HER FORCES FROM THE TERRITORY OF THE UAR, JORDAN AND SYRIA UNQUOTE WOULD BE MORE DANGEROUS THAN NOT TO PROPOSE SPECIFIC LANGUAGE AT ALL.

5. I SHOULD, THEREFORE, BE GRATEFUL TO KNOW BY 9.30 A.M. NEW YORK TIME TOMORROW

(A) WHETHER THERE IS ANY REASONABLY CATEGORICAL LANGUAGE CALLING FOR THE ISRAEL WITHDRAWAL WHICH I COULD INCORPORATE IN THE TEXT IN M.I.F.T.

../..(B) ON THE

(B) ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THERE IS NOT, WHETHER YOU AGREE TO MY GIVING THE DANES A PAPER ON THE LINES OF M.I.F.T. OR
(C) GIVEN THE APPARENT PRO-ISRAEL FLAVOUR OF THE DOCUMENT AS IT NOW STANDS YOU WOULD PREFER ME TO SAY THAT WE WOULD WISH TO SEE SOME TEXT PROPOSED BY OTHERS BEFORE OURSELVES COMMENTING. AS BETWEEN (B) AND (C) ABOVE MY OWN PREFERENCE IS FOR (B).

F O PASS MOSCOW 215, PARIS 214, TEL AVIV 235 AND COPENHAGEN 103.

LORD CARADON.

SENT ØØ48Z 27 JUNE
RECD Ø11ØZ 27 JUNE

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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EN CLAIR

IMMEDIATE U.K. MISSION NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1531 :

UNCLASSIFIED

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

26 JUNE 1967

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO 1531 OF 26 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW PARIS TEL AVIV AMMAN AND SAVING TO JEDDA OTTAWA OSLO.

MY TELNO 1523: EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION.

WHEN THE ASSEMBLY RECONVENED THIS AFTERNOON, THE PRESIDENT INVITED KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN TO ADDRESS THE DELEGATES.

2. THE KING SAID THAT THE U.N. WAS FACING A SERIOUS CHALLENGE. IF ITS MORAL AUTHORITY WAS TO BE PRESERVED, THE ORGANISATION MUST TAKE ACTION, AS IT HAD DONE OVER SUEZ IN 1956. HE SPOKE ON BEHALF OF THE ARAB NATION, AND HIS PURPOSE WAS TO STATE CLEARLY THE ARAB CASE. HE WAS ASTONISHED AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S FAILURE TO CONDEMN ISRAELI AGGRESSION IMMEDIATELY. IF THE ARABS HAD ATTACKED FIRST, WHAT A HUE AND CRY THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN. THERE WAS A DOUBLE STANDARD ON THE PART OF SOME POWERS IN CONSIDERING THE ISRAELI AND ARAB CASES AS WITNESS THE FACTS. ON 5 JUNE, THE ISRAELIS HAD CROSSED NOT BORDERS BUT THE TRUCE LINES OF 1948 OVER WHICH THE REFUGEES, NOW TOTALLING 1,300,000, HAD FLED. VICTORY HAD GONE TO THOSE WITH THE UNIQUE MILITARY ADVANTAGE, THAT OF SURPRISE. IT WAS AN IRONIC AND DANGEROUS PRECEDENT TO REWARD THE AGGRESSOR WITH THE FRUITS OF HIS AGGRESSION. THE PRETEXT HAD BEEN THE RIGHT OF MARITIME TRANSIT. BUT THE STRAITS OF TIRAN WERE NOT OPENED TO ISRAEL UNTIL 1956, AND NO VITAL ISRAELI INTEREST HAD SUFFERED BEFORE THEN. NO ISRAELI VESSEL HAD BEEN THROUGH THE STRAITS IN THE LAST 2 AND A HALF YEARS. SO MARITIME PASSAGE COULD HARDLY BE A QUOTE VITAL INTEREST UNQUOTE JUSTIFYING AGGRESSION AND THE DEATH OF THOUSANDS. THE FACT WAS THAT ISRAEL HAD LIVED IN ARROGANT DEFIANCE OF THE U.N. CHARTER FOR 19 YEARS. THIS LATEST ATTACK HAD BEEN PREMEDITATED, LIKE THE BLITZKRIEG ON POLAND.

/JORDAN

JORDAN COULD NOT COPE ADEQUATELY AGAINST QUOTE UNDREAMT-OF FIRE-POWER ON AIR AND LAND. UNQUOTE SHE HAD COMPLIED IMMEDIATELY WITH THE U.N. CALL FOR A CEASE-FIRE, BUT THE ISRAELIS FOUGHT ON UNTIL THEY ATTAINED THEIR PREMEDITATED OBJECTIVES. THE ISRAEL ARMY, AS VICIOUS AS ANY BARBARIAN INVADER, HAD USED NAPALM AND FRAGMENTATION BOMBS: ILL-TREATED PRISONERS OF WAR, LOOTED, EXPELLED CIVILIANS FROM THEIR HOMES AND CREATED TERROR AND CONFUSION. UNLESS THE U.N. ACTED SPEEDILY, THE PLIGHT OF THE REFUGEES WOULD BE WORSE THAN EVER BEFORE.

3. THERE MUST NOW BE CLEAR U.N. RECOGNITION THAT THE TERRITORY OF THREE ARAB STATES HAD BEEN VIOLATED WITH PREMEDITATION BY A MEMBER STATE. ITS TROOPS REMAINED ON THEIR SOIL, WHICH WAS AN INTOLERABLE SITUATION. SO THE U.N. MUST SWIFTLY CONDEMN ISRAEL AND CALL FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF HER FORCES TO THE PRE-5 JUNE ARMISTICE LINES. A TRAGEDY HAD BEFALLEN JORDAN WITH THE LARGEST PART OF HER BEST LAND, INCLUDING JERUSALEM, BETHLEHEM, HEBRON AND JERICO, IN ENEMY HANDS, AND 150,000 NEW REFUGEES. THE ASSEMBLY MUST SEE TO IT THAT ALL THIS TERRITORY WAS SWIFTLY RETURNED TO JORDAN. IF ALL THE TRACES OF THE 5 JUNE AGGRESSION WERE NOT ERASED, JORDAN WOULD SURVIVE AND RISE AGAIN WITH THE WHOLE ARAB NATION. THE ARABS HAD NOT LEARNT TO USE MODERN WEAPONS WELL ENOUGH, BUT THEY WOULD, IF NEED BE: 5 JUNE WOULD THEN BE JUST AN EPISODE IN A PROTRACTED WAR. JORDAN HAD OBEYED THE CEASE-FIRE CALL PROMPTLY AND CONFIDENTLY. BUT IF THE U.N. DID NOT LIVE UP TO THE PROMISE OF ITS CEASE-FIRE CALL: IF IT ALLOWED THE AGGRESSOR TO KEEP QUOTE EVEN ONE SQUARE FOOT OF HIS SPOILS UNQUOTE, THE U.N. WOULD NEVER BE ABLE TO ORDER A CEASE-FIRE AGAIN ANYWHERE, AND BE OBEYED.

4. THE PRESIDENT (PAZHWAK, AFGHANISTAN) THEN SPOKE ON THE HUMANITARIAN ISSUES CREATED BY THE 5 JUNE WAR. HE HAD CONFIRMED FROM THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR UNRWA AT BEIRUT THAT MORE THAN 100,000 NEWLY DISPLACED PERSONS I JORDAN WERE IN URGENT NEED OF THE NECESSITIES OF LIFE, PARTICULARLY TENTAGE, FOOD AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES. HE APPEALED TO ALL MEMBERS TO CONSIDER SUPPLEMENTARY CONTRIBUTIONS FOR RELIEF.

/5.

5. SALAM (YEMEN) DILATED ON THE PERFIDIOUS IMPERIALIST PLOT BEHIND THE ISRAELI AGGRESSION. THE SOVIET DRAFT WAS THE MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE TO HIS DELEGATION.

6. HAMBRO (NORWAY) SAID THAT IT WAS NEITHER CONSTRUCTIVE NOR USEFUL AT THE PRESENT TIME TO INDULGE IN RECRIMINATION OR CONDEMNATION. THE UNDERLYING PROBLEMS WERE UNLIKELY TO BE SOLVED DURING THIS SESSION: IT WOULD BE A LONG AND ARDUOUS TASK. THE RECOGNITION OF SOVEREIGN EQUALITY, AND ASSURANCES NOT TO RESORT TO THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE WERE THE TWO ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES FOR A SETTLEMENT IN THE NEAR EAST. THESE PRINCIPLES ALSO MEANT THAT NO TERRITORY COULD BE CLAIMED AS THE FRUIT OF CONQUEST. THE IMMEDIATE TASKS WERE THEREFORE THE WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS AND THE FIXING OF LASTING BOUNDARIES.

7. THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT HOPED THAT THE GREAT POWERS WOULD REFRAIN FROM SUPPORTING STATES IN THE REGION WITH ARMS. NORWAY WAS IN FAVOUR OF A UNITED NATIONS PRESENCE, QUOTE EITHER AN ENLARGEMENT OF THE UNTSO, OR SOME OTHER KIND OF ORGANISATION UNQUOTE AS A PRACTICAL STEP LEADING TO A LASTING SETTLEMENT. NORWAY WOULD BE WILLING TO CONTRIBUTE TO ANY SUCH OPERATION. INNOCENT PASSAGE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS WAS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE.

8. EBAN (ISRAEL) EXERCISED HIS RIGHT OF REPLY. HE STATED THAT FROM 14 MAY TO 5 JUNE THE U.A.R. HAD ORGANISED A WAR TO DESTROY ISRAEL. THE ISRAELI/EGYPTIAN BORDER HAD BEEN REASONABLY STABLE FOR TEN YEARS. A MILITARY BUILD-UP DURING THESE WEEKS IN EGYPT WAS INDISPUTABLE: ISRAEL POSSESSED THE OPERATIONAL ORDERS ISSUED TO EGYPTIAN PILOTS DURING THIS PERIOD SPECIFYING MILITARY TARGETS IN ISRAEL, INCLUDING PLANS TO TAKE EILATH. NASSER HAD HEAVILY RELIED ON SOVIET SUPPORT. EVEN NOW A RENEWAL OF THE ARMS BUILD-UP WAS IN PROGRESS.

9. EBAN ASKED WHAT THE REACTION OF OTHER MEMBER STATES WOULD BE IF THEIR NEIGHBOURING STATES HAD (A) SURROUNDED THEM WITH INFANTRY: (B) ANNOUNCED THEIR INTENTION TO ANNIHILATE THEM: (C) BLOCKADED

/THEIR

THEIR PORTS: (D) ANNOUNCED THAT THE SPECIFIC INTENTION OF THE BLOCK-ADE WAS TO PRECIPITATE WAR: AND IF, IN ADDITION TO ALL THIS, THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD FAILED TO TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO GUARANTEE PROTECTION? AN ATTEMPT TO ENCIRCLE AND STRANGULATE HAD FAILED: THE IMPORTANT THING WAS NOT THAT IT HAD FAILED BUT THAT IT HAD OCCURRED.

10. JORDAN HAD BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR OPENING HOSTILITIES ALONG THE ISRAELI/JORDAN FRONTIER, IN SPITE OF A MESSAGE SENT THROUGH GENERAL BULL THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT ATTACK UNLESS ATTACKED BY JORDAN. THE HEAVY AND UNIQUE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SPREADING THE CONFLICT WAS THEREFORE JORDAN'S ALONE. THE SUBSEQUENT TRADEGY LAY IN THE ERROR OF THIS DECISION.

11. ON THE WEST BANK NORMAL LIFE WAS RETURNING, AND THE ESSENTIAL SERVICES WERE AGAIN AVAILABLE. THOSE WHO HAD LEFT THE WEST BANK HAD DONE SO MAINLY FOR FINANCIAL REASONS. EBAN ASSURED THE ASSEMBLY THAT FAMILIES WHO WISHED TO MIGRATE FROM THE EAST TO THE WEST BANK WOULD BE ALLOWED TO DO SO.

12. A RESOLUTION INSISTING MERELY ON WITHDRAWAL WAS A PRESCRIPTION FOR RENEWED HOSTILITES. THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WAS NOT AS PESSIMISTIC AS THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT ABOUT THE POSSIBILITIES OF REACHING A SOLUTION. THEY FELT THAT AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A DIALOGUE NOW EXISTED, AND WERE SURE THAT THE ASSEMBLY WOULD NOT WISH TO REDUCE ANY CHANCE OF PROGRESS IN THIS DIRECTION. THERE WERE THREE POSSIBILITIES FOR THE FUTURE, PEACE, WAR, OR A PERPETUATION OF SOMETHING IN BETWEEN. ONLY PEACE HAD NOT YET BEEN TRIED. A TWENTY-YEAR ARMISTICE WAS AN ABSURD ANACHRONISM. ISRAEL'S OBJECTIVE WAS SECURITY AND PEACE THROUGH MUTUAL AGREEMENT.

13 BAROODY (SAUDI ARABIA) SPOKE AT LENGTH OF EXERCISE IN HIS RIGHT OF REPLY.

14. THE ASSEMBLY ADJOURNED UNTIL 10.30 TOMORROW MORNING.

/F O PASS

UKMISSION NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 1531 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

F O PASS MOSCOW 217 PARIS 216 TEL AVIV 237 AMMAN 116 AND SAVING TO JEDDA 68 OSLO 2

LORD CARADON

SENT AT Ø247Z/27 JUNE 1967.
RECD AT Ø248Z/27 JUNE 1967.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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EN CLAIR

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO UKMIS NEW YORK

TELNO 3364 27 JUNE 1967 (EASTERN)

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NUMBER 3364 OF 27 JUNE
AND TO AMMAN TEL AVIV BEIRUT BAHRAIN RABAT ALGIERS TUNIS TRIPOLI
BENGHAZI CAIRO KHARTOUM JEDDA AND H.C. ADEN.
MIDDLE EAST.

FOLLOWING ARE EXTRACTS FROM INTERVIEW GIVEN BY FOREIGN SECRETARY TO TELEVISION PROGRAMME QUOTE THIS WEEK UNQUOTE ON 27 JUNE.

QUESTION: MR BROWN YOU HAVE BEEN AT THE CENTRE OF YET ANOTHER STORM THIS TIME OVER ADEN AND YOUR SPEECH AT THE UNITED NATIONS. LET'S START WITH THE U.N. ARE YOU REALLY PRO- ARAB?

ANSWER: NO, MOST CERTAINLY NOT. ON THE OTHER HAND I THINK THEY HAVE A CASE THAT IS NOT OFTEN HEARD ENOUGH: NOT OFTEN LISTENED TO ENOUGH, AND I TRY TO TAKE CARE TO SEE THAT IT IS. I ALSO UNDERSTAND WHAT A LOT OF PEOPLE - OTHER PEOPLE - DON'T SEEM TO UNDERSTAND, THAT BRITAIN HAS TEMENDOUS INTERESTS IN THAT PART OF THE WORLD, AND THEY HAVE TO TAKEN CARE OF TOO. BUT IF WHEN YOU ASK ME AM I PRO-ARAB - MEANING AS AGAINST ISRAEL - THE ANSWER IS MOST CERTAINLY NOT.

QUESTION: BUT WHAT IS UPPERMOST IN YOUR MIND AT THE MOMENT? IS IT TO RE-BUILD THE BRIDGES WITH THE ARAB NATIONS?

ANSWER: I HAVE TO TAKE THAT VERY MUCH INTO ACCOUNT. BUT I WOULDN'T SAY THAT'S UPPERMOST IN MY MIND. WHAT IS UPPERMOST IN MY MIND IS TO GET THIS TIME A LASTING SETTLEMENT - MAY I REPEAT THE WORD, LASTING SETTLEMENT - BY WHICH EACH OF THE COUNTRIES IN THAT AREA CAN LIVE WITHOUT FEAR - AS I PUT IT IN NEW YORK, WITH TRUE DIGNITY, EARN THEIR LIVING IN PEACE. THIS IS UPPERMOST IN MY MIND, BUT OF COURSE I MUST TAKE THE OTHER INTO ACCOUNT.

QUESTION: WITH SUCH AN EMOTIVE PROBLEM AS THIS IS IT POSSIBLE TO SAY ANYTHING, HOWEVER TECHNICALLY NEUTRAL IT MIGHT BE, WHICH DOESN'T OFFEND ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER?

ANSWER: I DOUBT THAT - I THINK, THIS IS WHAT I TRIED TO SAY IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS YESTERDAY - I DOUBT WHETHER

/ANY

ANY FOREIGN SECRETARY COULD SAY ANYTHING ON THIS SUBJECT - UNLESS HE WERE AN ABSOLUTE NEUTER - THAT WOULDN'T, IN FACT, DISTURB SOMEBODY, AN I THINK ONE OF THE PROBLEMS BEING WITH THIS JOB - AND I AM NOT A MAN WITHOUT FEELINGS MYSELF - IS THAT YOU HAVE TO ACCEPT THAT YOU ARE ALMOST CERTAIN TO DISTURB SOMEBODY.

QUESTION: THE PRIME MINISTER OF ISRAEL, MR. ESHKOL, IS ON THE RECORD AS SAYING THAT ISRAEL DOES NOT WANT TERRITORIAL AGGRANDIZMENT. BY ORDERING ISRAEL TO PULL BACK, WHICH IS THE INTERPRETATION OF YOUR SPEECH, ARE YOU NOT ENCOURAGING THOSE PEOPLE IN ISRAEL, LIKE GENERAL DAYAN, WHO WISH TO HANG ONTO SOME OF THOSE GAINS?

ANSWER: I DIDN'T EITHER ORDER ISRAEL TO PULL BACK, OR EVEN SAY THAT SHE SHOULD. WHAT I SAID WAS THAT SHE SHOULDN'T PILE ANOTHER PROBLEM ORON THE ONES WE ALREADY HAD: AND I ASKED HER TO BE CAREFUL ABOUT THE OLD CITY OF JERUSALEM. I DIDN'T MENTION WITHDRAWAL. NOW IN MY OWN VIEW, AND I SAID THIS TO EVERYBODY I SAW IN NEW YORK, ALL THE ARAB DELEGATES I SAW, ALL THE AFRICAN DELEGATES I SAW, ALL THE ASIAN DELEGATES I SAW, MR KOSYGIN, MR JOHNSON, I SAID THAT WITHDRAWAL WILL REQUIRE SOME BALANCING THINGS THAT ISRAEL WILL NEED TO KNOW , THIS TIME, THAT SHE CAN LIVE. LIKE OTHER COUNTRIES, JORDAN, WILL NEED TO KNOW THAT SHE CAN LIVE. NOW I MADE THIS ALL QUITE CLEAR, ALL I SAID IN MY SPEECH WHICH PEOPLE FASTENED ON, DON'T PILE ANOTHER PROBLEM ON AN ALREADY COMPLICATED SITUATION. AND I THINK THEY HAVE BEEN VERY WISE NOT TO DO IT.

QUESTION:
NOW YOU SAY THAT ISRAEL MUST LIVE, BUT DO YOU MEAN BY THAT A RIGHT OF ACCESS THROUGH THE STRAITS OF TIRAN, OR, AND AS WELL, RIGHT OF ACCESS THROUGH THE SUEZ CANAL?

ANSWER:
I MEAN THAT INTERNATIONAL WATER-WAYS MUST BE OPEN TO US ALL.

../NOW I WOULDN'T

NOW I WOULDN'T FUSS. I KNOW WHAT YOU WANT TO DO BUT I WOULDN'T DO IT. I WOULDN'T FASTEN EITHER THE STRAITS OF TIRAN, OR THE SUEZ CANAL ONTO ISRAEL. YOU WON'T HELP ISRAEL IF YOU DO. YOU WON'T HELP THE ARABS IF YOU DO. YOU WON'T HELP US IF YOU DO. BUT I THINK YOU CAN FASTEN BOTH ON THE RIGHTS OF MARITIME NATIONS TO HAVE GUARANTEED ACCESS THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATER-WAYS. NOW I THINK WE CAN DO THIS, AND ONE OF THE THINGS I SAID IN NEW YORK WAS THAT WE, IN OUR RESOLUTION THAT WE WORK OUT, WE OUGHT TO HAVE THAT KIND OF GUARANTEE. BUT THEN WE HAVE TO WORK OUT SOME OTHER THINGS, BECAUSE WE HAVE THAT KIND OF GUARANTEE SO FAR AS THE SUEZ CANAL IS CONCERNED ALREADY,BUT THEN IT GETS MESSED UP.

QUESTION:

BUT IT'S NEVER BEEN OPERATED.....

ANSWER:

BY THE COMPLICATIONS. WELL IT GET'S MESSED UP B Y INTERNAL COMPLI-CATIONS. SO, THEREFORE, WE HAVE NOW TO THINK ABOUT THE OTHER PROBLEMS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN COUNTRIES. HOW YOU ARRANGE THEM. HOW THEY ARE SUPERVISED. i THINK THIS IS WHAT WE OUGHT TO ADDRESS OUR ATTENTION TO AT THE MOMENT.

QUESTION:

YOU DON'T THINK THAT YOU SHOULD GO INTO THIS QUESTION OF GUARANTEES, AFTER ALL THIS IS WHERE THE PRESENT CRISIS BEGAN. BRITAIN SAID - AT THE TIME THE STRAITS OF TIRAN WERE CLOSED BY EGYPT, THAT THE RIGHTS OF INTERNATIONAL NAVIGATION SHOULD BE ENSURED. WE WERE NOT ABLE TO DO IT. THE ISRAELIS HAD TO DO THAT. NOW WHAT CAN WE DO NOW?

ANSWER:

BECAUSE WE STARTED AT THE WRONG POINT. LET'S NOW - IF I MAY SUGGEST- START AT A DIFFERENT POINT. LET'S DEAL WITH THE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS. THE REFUGEES. THE RIGHTS OF NATIONS. THEN LET'S LOOK AT THE AUTHORITIES WHO COULD ENSURE THAT THE WATER-WAYS STAY OPEN, IF WE DO IT THAT WAY ROUND WE MAY DO A JOLLY SIGHT BETTER THAN WE DID LAST TIME.

./QUESTION: YOU WANT

QUESTION:
YOU WANT TO HAVE THIS SOLUTION THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS, DON'T YOU?
ANSWER:
OH, VERY MUCH - YES.
QUESTION:
NOW DO YOU REALLY THINK THAT ISRAEL CAN EXPECT TO GET JUSTICE FROM THE UNITED NATIONS?
ANSWER:
YES. IT'S THE ONLY PLACE WHERE ANYBODY CAN, IN THE END, GET JUSTICE FROM. ISRAEL - ALRIGHT, WON THIS PARTICULAR WAR. ISRAEL COULDN'T BE SURE - ALWAYS, OF WINNING ANY SUBSEQUENT WAR. HER ONLY GUARANTEE IS IN A SITUATION IN WHICH THERE ISN'T GOING TO BE A SUBSEQUENT WAR.
QUESTION:
BUT I CAN'T REMEMBER WHETHER IT WAS YOU OR THE PRIME MINISTER IN THE DEBATE BEFORE THE WAR BEGAN WHO SAID THAT THE UNITED NATIONS WAS EVER READY TO CONDEMN ISRAEL FOR AGRESSION INTO THE ARAB COUNTRIES BUT THEY NEVER CONDEMNED THE ARAB COUNTRIES.
ANSWER:
I NEVER SAID THAT - I DON'T KNOW WHO DID SAY IT, BUT I CERTAINLY NEVER DID. BUT I'M SURE- MR. FFITCH - I'M SURE AS I CAN BE THAT ISRAEL'S HOPE, AND IT'S THE HOPE OF JORDAN - IT'S THE HOPE OF MANY OTHER COUNTRIES IN THAT AREA OF THE WORLD, IS THAT THE UNITED NATIONS CAN, IN FACT, ENSURE SOME POLICING ARRANG-MENTS. SOME SUPERVISIORY ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WILL WORK: AND THIS NOT ONLY APPLIES TO THE WATER-WAYS, IT APPLIES TO THE BOUNDARIES - APPLIES TO A LOT OF OTHER THINGS INDEED. AN I THINK THAT THIS IS WHAT WE OUGHT TO WORK FOR. THIS IS WHY I ASKED WHEN I WAS THERE, THAT WE - THE SECRETARY GENERAL, SHOULD PUT A REPRESENTATIVE INTO THE AREA. THIS IS WHY I SAID WE SHOULD STRENGTHEN THE TRUCE SUPERVISORY ORGANISATION. THIS IS WHY I SAID WE SHOULD DISCUSS A KIND OF NEW UNITED NATIONS FORCE THAT COULD GO IN. SOME DAY, SOME DAY ISRAEL, AND HER ARAB NEIGHBOURS WILL LEARN TO LIVE TOGETHER - QUITE NATURALLY. UNTIL THAT HAPPENS, THEN OTHER

../ARRANGEMENTS HAVE

ARRANGEMENTS HAVE TO BE MADE.
QUESTION:
BUT WOULD YOU AGREE THAT THAT UNITED NATIONS FORCE WOULD HAVE TO BE ONE THAT SIMPLY COULD NOT BE ORDERED OUT BY PRESIDENT NASSER AGAIN, WHEN IT WAS CONVENIENT FOR HIM.
ANSWER:
MOST CERTAINLY, AND MAY I MATCH THAT BY SAYING THE NEXT TIME THE ISRAELIS MUSN'T REFUSE TO HAVE IT ON THEIR SOIL, AS THEY DID FOR A VERY LONG TIME, AND ONE OF THEIR BIGGEST MISTAKES - AND I'M NOT NOW TALKING WITH HINDSIGHT, BECAUSE I SAID IT TO THEM A LONG TIME AGO - WAS TO REFUSE TO HAVE IT ON THEIR SIDE OF THE BORDER TOO.
QUESTION:
THE CRITISISM DIRECTED AGINST THE GOVERNMENT, BOTH WITHIN YOUR OWN PARTY, AND FROM THE OPPOSITION, IS THAT YOUR POLICY SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE CRISIS HAS HELPED NOBODY, BUT HAS DAMAGED BRITAIN.
ANSWER:
IF YOU ARE IN A SITUATION, LETS FACE IT, WHERE YOU CAN'T TAKE A STAND ON BEHALF OF ONE OR THE OTHER PARTIES, IT IS, AS I SAID YESTERDAY, IN THE HOUSE, DIFFICULT TO HOLD - IT DOESN'T MEAN IT'S DONE US DAMAGE.
QUESTION:
WELL, IT'S CUT OFF OUR OIL, HASN'T IT?
ANSWER:
NO NO, NO NO - LOOK THE OIL IS FLOWING, THIS IS NOT SOMETHING WE TALK ABOUT TOO PLAINLY - I WOULDN'T WORRY IF I WERE YOU, TOO MUCH ABOUT THAT: BUT IF YOU ARE GOING TO HOLD A INDEPENDENT POSITION, OF COURSE YOU ARE VULNERABLE TO CRITICISM AND TO ATTACK, BUT MR. FFITCH, THE BUSINESS OF A MINISTER AT THIS MOMENT IS TO SEE THAT OUR INTERESTS ARE UP - HELD, HOWEVER DIFFICULT IT MAY BE: THAT WE ARE DOING.
QUESTION:
SO THERE HAS BEEN NOTHING IN THIS MIDDLE EAST CRISIS WHICH HAS AFFECTED YOUR VIEW OF THE ROLE THAT BRITAIN SHOULD PLAY IN THE

../WORLD?

WORLD?
ANSWER:
I HAS RATHER STRENGTHENED IT AS A MATTER OF FACT - I DON'T BELIEVE IT'S A ROLE YOU OUGHT TO PLAY WITH SHIPS AND GUNS AND BATTALIONS. IT'S A ROLE YOU OUGHT TO PLAY WITH COMMERCIAL INTERESTS, FINANCIAL INTERESTS, AND A GENUINE POLITICAL CONCERN FOR OTHER PEOPLE, AND ABOVE ALL, OF COURSE, FOR THE UNDERDOG - FOR THE UNDER DEVELOPED OF THE WORLD. I THINK WHAT THIS HAS SHOWN UP, IS THAT YOU CAN PLAY THAT ROLE, YOU WILL BE ATTACKED BY THOSE WHO THINK THEY'RE A LITTLE BIT BETTER OFF THAN THE OTHERS, BUT YOU WILL BE VERY MUCH WELCOMED BY THOSE WHO NEED YOUR SUPPORT.
QUESTION:
FOREIGN SECRETARY, WE DO HAVE SHIPS AND GUNS AND PLANES IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND IF YOU ARE GOING TO FORCE THROUGH THE TIRAN STRAITS, YOU WOULD HAVE HAD TO USE THEM. PEOPLE WANT TO KNOW WHY ARE WE MAINTAINING THESE FORCES AT GREAT EXPENSE, NOT JUST AT ADEN, BUT AT THE PERSIAN GULF, IF THEY ARE NOT IN FACT, ABLE TO GUARANTEE US OIL SUPPLIES.
ANSWER:
YOU CAN'T GUARANTEE YOURSELVES OIL SUPPLIES BY GUNS, SHIPS AND AIRPLANES, ON THE OTHER HAND YOU CAN MAINTAIN ALLIANCES AND ARRANGEMENTS, THIS WAY FOR A TIME. WE ARE NOT MAINTAINING ALL THAT MUCH - OUR SHIPS THAT WERE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, WERE IN FACT, EN PASSAGE: THEY WERE MOVING: WE DIDN'T HAVE A SIXTH FLEET THERE: WE ARE UNWINDING OUR COMMITMENTS, BUT IT TAKES TIME TO DO IT, AND WE ARE DOING IT IN A VERY SENSIBLE WAY. IN THE 1964/6 DEFENSE REVIEW WE UNWOUND A LOT OF COMMITMENTS OF THIS KIND, WE ARE NOW LOOKING AT WHAT WE CAN UNWIND IN THE FUTURE.

SOSFA SENT 0317Z/28 JUNE 1967

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FFFFF

SECRET

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2180 27 JUNE 1967.
SECRET.
ADDRESSED FOREIGN OFFICE (IMMEDIATE) TEL NO 2180 OF 27/6 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK AMMAN TEL AVIV MOSCOW AND UKDEL NATO.
MIDDLE EAST.
MR. EUGENE ROSTOW ASKED ME TO CALL THIS AFTERNOON TO TALK ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST.
2. IN HIS OPENING REMARKS ABOUT THE SITUATION IN GENERAL HE SHOWED DISTINCTLY LESS OPTIMISM THAN WHEN I LAST SAW HIM (MY TELEGRAM NO. 2145). HE EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT SOVIET INTENTIONS. HE SAW THE RUSSIANS AS LAUNCHING A MAJOR LONG-RANGE ATTACK ON THE WESTERN SECURITY POSITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, USING THE PRESENT SITUATION TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR GRIP ON THE RADICAL REGIMES AND TO UNDERMINE THE POSITION OF THE MODERATE LEADERS. HE WAS PARTICULARLY WORRIED ABOUT LIBYA (SEE MIFT - NOT TO ALL).
3. ROSTOW WENT ON TO TELL ME ABOUT THE LINE WHICH PRESIDENT JOHNSON INTENDS TO TAKE WITH KING HUSSEIN WHEN THEY MEET HERE TOMORROW. HE MENTIONED THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE TOLD THE AMERICANS IN STRICT SECRECY OF THE POSITION THEY INTEND TO TAKE OVER FRONTIERS. THIS WAS IN ROSTOW'S VIEW, EXTREMELY MODERATE. ON THE EGYPTIAN FRONT THEY WOULD INSIST ON THE RETENTION OF THE GAZA STRIP AND DEMILITARIS-ATION OF THE SINAI PENINSULA (THEY DID NOT MENTION ANY SPECIFIC PLANS FOR SHARM EL SHEIKH THOUGH THERE MUST BE SOME). ON THE SYRIAN FRONT THEY WOULD ONLY ASK FOR DEMILITARISATION OF THE FRONTIER HILLS

../..ON JERUSALEM

SECRET

ON JERUSALEM THEIR POSITION WAS NOT YET FROZEN. THEY HAD SO FAR TAKEN THE LINE THAT THE CITY SHOULD BE UNIFIED AND THAT ACCESS TO HOLY PLACES SHOULD BE GUARANTEED. ROSTOW THOUGHT THEY MIGHT ACCEPT SOME FORM OF ''FUNCTIONAL INTERNATIONALISATION''. ON THE WEST BANK THEIR POSITION WAS LIKEWISE STILL FLUID. IT WAS FOR THEM A VITAL INTEREST THAT THE WEST BANK SHOULD BE UNDER FRIENDLY, OR AT LEAST NON-AGGRESS-IVE, CONTROL. SINCE THE LATEST HOSTILITIES AND ABOVE ALL SINCE HUSSEIN'S SPEECH IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY (OF WHICH ROSTOW SPOKE VERY CRITICALLY) THEY WERE AT A LOSS TO KNOW ''WHO HUSSEIN WAS'' AND WHAT HIS INTENTIONS WERE. IT WAS THEREFORE ESSENTIAL FOR HUSSEIN, IN HIS OWN INTERESTS, TO REASSURE THE ISRAELIS. THE AMERICANS WOULD TRY HARD TO PERSUADE HIM OF THIS WHILE HE IS HERE. THEY WOULD SUGGEST TO HIM THAT HE SHOULD ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL OVER THE WEST BANK AND OTHER PROBLEMS EITHER DIRECTLY OR THROUGH AN INTERMEDIARY. THEY WOULD POINT OUT THAT TIME IS NOT ON THE JORDANIAN SIDE: THAT A CHANCE DOES NOW EXIST FOR HUSSEIN TO RECOVER THE WEST BANK (OR DID EXIST BEFORE HIS SPEECH IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY), BUT THAT HE COULD ONLY DO THIS BY SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS BASED ON THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION: IF JORDAN DID NOT TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY SHE WOULD FIND THE WEST BANK GONE FOREVER. PRESIDENT JOHNSON WOULD REAFFIRM AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR JORDAN AND WOULD OFFER U.S. ASSISTANCE IN DEALING WITH THE REFUGEE PROBLEM. HE WOULD REMIND HUSSEIN THAT ONE OF THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION WAS THAT JORDAN HAD MADE THE MISTAKE OF STARTING THE SHOOTING ON HER FRONTIER WITH ISRAEL. HE WOULD ALSO RECALL THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS NEVER FULLY RECOGNIZED JORDANIAN SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE WEST BANK.

4. ROSTOW WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE SAW CONSIDERABLE ATTRACTIONS IN THE IDEA THAT JORDAN AND ISRAEL SHOULD BE IN SOME WAY COMBINED. SUCH A SOLUTION WOULD SOLVE THE REFUGEE PROBLEM AND WOULD MAKE JERUSALEM INFINITELY EASIER TO DEAL WITH. WITH ISRAELI MONEY AND OUTSIDE HELP

../.. THE WHOLE

S E C R E T

WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO. 2180 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

THE WHOLE AREA (INCLUDING TRANS-JORDAN) COULD BE DEVELOPED ECONOMICALLY AT A MUCH FASTER RATE. IF HE ACCEPTED SUCH A SOLUTION, KING HUSSEIN COULD BE LEFT WITH POLITICAL AUTHORITY OVER THE WEST BANK.

5. THE AMERICANS WOULD PUT THESE IDEAS VERY FIRMLY TO HUSSEIN WHEN HE IS HERE, STRESSING THE POINT THAT IF HE DOES NOT TAKE ANY INITIATIVE THE ISRAELIS WILL ESTABLISH DE FACTO CONTROL OVER THE WEST BANK. THE QUESTION IN ROSTOW'S MIND WAS WHETHER HUSSEIN'S GRIP ON REALITY IS STRONG ENOUGH FOR HIM TO BE PERSUADED TO IMPLEMENT THESE SUGGESTIONS. BRITISH INFLUENCE ON HIM WOULD BE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT IN THIS CONTEXT. ROSTOW PRESUMED WE WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH HIM IN THE NEAR FUTURE. HE EXPRESSED THE STRONG HOPE THAT WE WOULD REINFORCE THE AMERICAN SUGGESTIONS DESCRIBED ABOVE. WERE THERE ANY ENGLISHMEN WHO KNEW HUSSEIN WELL ENOUGH TO SPEAK TO HIM ABOUT THIS? IN ROSTOW'S VIEW, WITH THE EGYPTIAN SITUATION ''LOCKED UP'', THE ONLY CHANCE OF A POLITICAL BREAKTHROUGH WAS NOW ON THE JORDANIAN FRONT.

6. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY COMMENTS YOU MAY HAVE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON THE ABOVE AND ON THE GENERAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK FOR JORDAN.

F O PASS AMMAN 45 TEL AVIV 63 MOSCOW 156 AND UKDEL NATO 200

SIR P DEAN

SENT 0058Z 28 JUNE
RECD 0100Z 28 JUNE

[NOT REPEATED TO MOSCOW PENDING DEPARTMENTAL DECISION. REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO REMAINDER OF POSTS]

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S E C R E T

Subject

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL MESSAGE SERIAL No T 192/67

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO RAWALPINDI

TELNO 764 27 JUNE 1967 (S)

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO RAWALPINDI TELEGRAM NO.764 OF 27 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO NEW DELHI.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO.624.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER IN REPLY TO MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT AYUB, CONTAINED IN YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE:

QUOTE
THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST. YOU WILL KNOW THAT WE SHARE WITH YOU A SENSE OF GRAVE ANXIETY OVER THE EVENTS OF THE LAST FEW WEEKS AND A HOPE THAT OUT OF THE PRESENT TRAGEDY SOME FAIR AND PERMANENT SETTLEMENT CAN BE ACHIEVED.

THROUGHOUT THE CRISIS WE HAVE WORKED UNCEASINGLY FOR PEACE AND HAVE URGED RESTRAINT ON ALL THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED. IT WAS CLEAR TO US FROM THE START THAT, WHATEVER JUDGEMENTS MIGHT BE MADE ON ALL THE SHORT AND LONG TERM FACTORS IN THE SITUATION THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE U.N. FORCE AND THE CLOSURE OF THE STRAITS OF TIRAN WERE LIKELY TO PROVOKE A WAR. OUR VIEW OF THE GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION SO CREATED REGRETTABLY PROVED IN THE EVENT TO BE WELL FOUNDED. WHEN THE FIGHTING BROKE OUT WE MAINTAINED A STRICT NEUTRALITY AND EXERTED ALL OUR EFFORTS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND ELSEWHERE TO ACHIEVE A CEASE-FIRE. IN SPITE OF THIS OUR MOTIVES WERE MISREPRESENTED AND WE HAVE BEEN FALSELY AND SCANDALOUSLY ACCUSED OF BEING IN SOME WAY INVOLVED IN SUPPORTING ISRAEL. I AM SURE YOU WILL SHARE OUR CONTEMPT FOR THESE MALICIOUS LIES AND THAT YOU WILL USE YOUR GREAT INFLUENCE IN COUNTERING THEM AND IN URGING ON THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED THE NEED TO RECOGNISE THE TRUE FACTS OF THE CASE.

/AS FOR THE FUTURE

AS FOR THE FUTURE IT IS NOT YET CLEAR HOW THE SEARCH FOR A SETTLEMENT, IN THE U.N. AND ELSEWHERE, WILL PROCEED. WHAT IS CLEAR IS THAT A TRUE AND PERMANENT SETTLEMENT WILL ONLY COME ABOUT BY NEGOTIATION, AND IT IS OBVIOUS THAT MANY WEEKS OF CONSULTATION LIE AHEAD. WE FOR OUR PART WILL DO ALL WE CAN TO CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE OF CALM AND OBJECTIVITY IN WHICH CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS FOR PEACE CAN BE PUT FORWARD. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WHATEVER SETTLEMENT EMERGES FROM THE PRESENT CRISIS MUST BE BASED ON AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT BY THE ARABS AND THE ISRAELIS THAT THEY HAVE TO CO-EXIST: AND THAT SUCH CO-EXISTENCE INVOLVES A BALANCE OF OBLIGATIONS TOWARDS ONE ANOTHER AS WELL AS OF RIGHTS. WE REMAIN AS WE HAVE ALWAYS BEEN, OPPOSED TO THE USE OF FORCE TO SOLVE DISPUTES. AND WE RECOGNISE THAT ANY ACCEPTABLE SETTLEMENT MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF THE COUNTRIES IN THE AREA: AND, IN PARTICULAR, MUST MAKE SATISFACTORY PROVISION FOR DEALING WITH THE REFUGEE PROBLEM.

I KNOW THAT YOU WILL DO EVERYTHING, AS WE WILL, TO URGE RESTRAINT AND TO WORK FOR PEACE. I CONFIDENTLY HOPE THAT YOUR OWN PRESTIGE AND INFLUENCE WITH THE ARAB COUNTRIES WILL BE USED TO ENCOURAGE THEM TO REDUCE TENSION AND TO BRING ABOUT AN EQUITABLE AND LASTING SETTLEMENT.

UNQUOTE.

2. PLEASE DELIVER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE SHALL BE SENDING A COPY TO PAKISTAN HIGH COMMISSION.

CROSEC SENT 1955Z 27 JUNE

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CONFIDENTIAL

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B.F. 4/7/67.

CONFIDENTIAL

June 27, 1967

The Prime Minister has seen Tel Aviv Telegrams No. 690 and 691, of June 25, suggesting that he might send a message to the Israel Prime Minister containing the points summarized in Tel Aviv Telegram No. 691.

He has asked what is happening about this; and, in connection with the word "Transjordan" in point (iii) in that telegram, he has asked whether this would be prejudicial as implying recognition of a new Jordan east of the river.

Michael Palliser

D. Day, Esq.,
Foreign Office.

Subject

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER'S

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO NEW DELHI

PERSONAL MESSAGE

TELNO 1428 27 JUNE 1967 (S)

CONFIDENTIAL

SERIAL No T 193/67

ADDRESSED DELHI TELNO 1428 OF 27 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION RAWALPINDI.

MY TELNO 1302.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER TO MRS. GANDHI IN REPLY TO HER MESSAGE CONTAINED IN MY TEL UNDER REFERENCE:-

QUOTE THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER ABOUT THE RECENT EVENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. MY COLLEAGUES AND I SHARE THE CONCERN YOU EXPRESS AND ARE ACUTELY CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED TO ACHIEVE PEACE AND STABILITY IN THIS CRUCIAL AREA.

THROUGHOUT THE CRISIS OUR EFFORTS HAVE BEEN DIRECTED SOLELY TOWARDS THIS END, AND WE HAVE USED ALL OUR INFLUENCE BOTH IN PRIVATE AND IN PUBLIC TO URGE RESTRAINT ON EVERYONE CONCERNED. OUR INITIAL ASSESSMENT, OF WHICH YOU WERE AWARE FROM THE DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIONS WE MADE IN INDIA AS ELSEWHERE, WAS THAT WHATEVER JUDGEMENTS MIGHT BE MADE ON ALL THE MANY SHORT AND LONG TERM FACTORS IN THE SITUATION, THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE U.N. FORCE AND THE CLOSURE OF THE GULF OF AQABA WOULD, IF NOTHING WAS DONE, INEVITABLY GIVE RISE TO WAR. OUR VIEW OF THE GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION CREATED REGRETTABLY PROVED WELLFOUNDED, THOUGH OUR EFFORTS TO AVERT THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES WERE MISREPRESENTED.

SINCE THE FIGHTING STARTED WE HAVE GIVEN OUR FULL SUPPORT TO THE EFFORTS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN BRINGING THE WAR TO AN END. AND WE SHALL CONTINUE TO GIVE WHATEVER ASSISTANCE WE CAN TO THE WORK OF THE U.N. IN ALLEVIATING THE SUFFERING CAUSED BY THE WAR - AND WE HAVE ALREADY ARRANGED FOR THE PROVISION OF EMERGENCY SUPPLIES TO JORDAN - AND IN MAINTAINING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CEASE-FIRE. NOR WILL WE HESITATE TO CONDEMN IN STRONG TERMS ANY BREACH OF THE CEASE-FIRE BY ANY OF THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED.

WE IN BRITAIN HAVE BEEN SHOCKED AND DISAPPOINTED TO LEARN THAT, DESPITE OUR STRINGENT CARE IN MAINTAINING COMPLETE NEUTRALITY THROUGHOUT THE CONFLICT, LIES AND DISTORTIONS ALLEGING AN INVOLVEMENT ON OUR PART HAVE BEEN PUT ABOUT AND HAVE GAINED SOME CURRENCY. SUCH FABRICATIONS CAN SERVE ONLY TO IMPEDE THE CAUSE OF PEACE, AND I HOPE THAT YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT WILL HELP TO COUNTER THESE MALICIOUS SLANDERS AND TO URGE ON ALL THE MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES THE NEED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE TRUE FACTS OF THE CASE.

I WOULD PARTICULARLY VALUE YOUR ADVICE AND HELP ABOUT THE SUEZ CANAL. AS YOU KNOW, MOVEMENT THROUGH THE SUEZ CANAL WAS FORBIDDEN ON 6 JUNE. THE U.A.R. AUTHORITIES ARE REPORTED TO HAVE STATED BOTH THAT THE CANAL IS BLOCKED BY SHIPS SUNK BY ISRAELI ACTION AND THAT MOVEMENT THROUGH THE CANAL WILL NOT BE PERMITTED SO LONG AS ISRAELI FORCES REMAIN ON THE EAST BANK. IN ANY CASE, WE HAVE NO INFORMATION THAT ANY ACTION IS BEING TAKEN TO RE-OPEN IT TO NAVIGATION. THIS IS I THINK AN UNACCEPTABLE SITUATION. WE, LIKE YOU, RELY HEAVILY OH THE CANAL. A HOLD UP, PARTICULARLY A PROTRACTED ONE, CAN ONLY DAMAGE INTERNATIONAL TRADE. IT MUST HAVE A PARTICULARLY SERIOUS EFFECT ON YOUR SUPPLIES OF WHEAT, AND AS THE MAJOR USER OF THE CANAL WE TOO ARE DAMAGED BY ITS CLOSURE. OUR INFORMATION IS INCOMPLETE, AND WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANYTHING YOU CAN TELL US. WE WOULD LIKE TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH YOU AND OTHER COUNTRIES CONCERNED WITH THIS PROBLEM, AND I HOPE THAT YOU WILL USE YOUR INFLUENCE TO TRY TO GET THE NORMAL WORKING OF THE CANAL RESTORED.

AS I SEE IT, A DURABLE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST WILL ONLY COME ABOUT IF BOTH THE ARABS AND THE ISRAELIS ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THEY MUST CO-EXIST WITH ONE ANOTHER: AND THAT CO-EXISTENCE IMPLIES A BALANCE OF MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS AS WELL AS RIGHTS. A SETTLEMENT, IF IT IS TO BRING LASTING PEACE AND A REAL BASIS FOR THE PROSPERITY OF ALL THE PEOPLES IN THE AREA, MUST BE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF THE U.N. CHARTER, AND IN PARTICULAR ON REJECTION OF THE USE OF FORCE TO SOLVE DISPUTES, AND ON RECOGNITION OF THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF STATES. NO LASTING MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT CAN BE IMPOSED BY FORCE AND THERE WILL NEED TO BE SATISFACTORY GUARANTEES OF THE SECURITY OF THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED, AND FAIR TREATMENT FOR ALL THE REFUGEES. THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A SETTLEMENT WILL I FEAR BE A LONG AND DIFFICULT PROCESS. BUT THE PAST FEW WEEKS HAVE SHOWN THAT IT WILL ONLY BE POSSIBLE BY PATIENT PURSUIT AND NEGOTIATION. WE OURSELVES WILL STRIVE, AS I AM SURE YOU WILL, TO BRING ABOUT AN ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH SUCH NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE POSSIBLE. UNQUOTE

2. PLEASE DELIVER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE SHALL BE SENDING A COPY TO INDIA HOUSE.

CROSEC SENT 1947Z 27 JUNE
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Israel Pt 6

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Seen by Prime Minister

THIS WEEK - TUESDAY

No. 35 - GEORGE BROWN

DIRECTOR TERRY YARWOOD

PRODUCER JEREMY TAYLOR

TRANSMISSION: Tuesday, 27th June, 1967.

POST PRODUCTION SCRIPT

GEORGE FFITCH: Mr. Brown you have been at the centre of yet another storm this time over Aden and your speech at the United Nations. Let's start with the U.N. Are you really pro-Arab?

GEORGE BROWN: No, most certainly not. On the other hand I think they have a case that is not often heard enough; not often listened to enough, and I try to take care to see that it is. I also understand what alot of people - other people - don't seem to understand, that Britain has tremendous interests in that part of the world, and they have to be taken care of too. But if when you ask me am I an Arab - meaning as against Israel - the answer is most certainly not.

FFITCH: But what is uppermost in your mind at the moment? Is it to re-build the bridges with the Arab Nations?

BROWN: I have to take that very much into account. But I wouldn't say that's uppermost in my mind. What is uppermost in my mind is to get this time a lasting settlement - may I repeat the word, lasting settlement - by which each of the countries in that area can live without fear - as I put it in New York, with true dignity, earn their living in peace. This is uppermost in my mind, but of course I must take the other into account.

FFITCH: With such an immotive problem as this is it possible to say anything, however technically neutral it might be, which doesn't offend one side or the other?

BROWN: I doubt that - I think, this is what I tried to say in the House of Commons yesterday - I doubt whether any Foreign Secretary could say anything on this subject - unless he were an absolute neuter - that wouldn't, in fact, disturb somebody, and I think one of the problems being with this job - and I am not a man without feelings myself - is that you have to accept that you are almost certain to disturb somebody.

FFITCH: Isn't this a case then for saying nothing?

BROWN: No. There is never a case for saying nothing if you want to be the Foreign Secretary of this country.

ALASTAIR BURNET: Now Mr. Brown, the Prime Minister of Israel, Mr. Eshkol, is on the record as saying that Israel does not want territorialaggrandizment. By ordering Israel to pull back, which is the interpretation of your speech, are you not encouraging those people in Israel, like GeneralDayan, who wish to hang onto some of those gains?

BROWN: Alastair, I didn't - either order Israel to pull back, or even say that she should. What I said was that she shouldn't pile another problem or the ones we already had; and I asked her to be careful about the old city of Jerusalem. I didn't mention withdrawal. Now in my own view, and I said this to everybody I saw in New York, all the

Arab delegates I saw, all the African delegates I saw, all the Asian delegates I saw, Mr. Kosygin, Mr. Johnson, I said that withdrawal will require some balancing things that Israel will need to know, this time, that she can live. Like other countries, Jordan, will need to know that she can live. Now I made this all quite clear, all I said in my speech which people fastened on, don't pile another problem on an already complicated situation. And I think they have been very wise not to do it.

BURNET: Now you say that Israel must live, but do you mean by that a right of access through the Straits of Tiran, or, and as well, right of access through the Suez Canal?

BROWN: I mean that wa - international water-ways must be open to us all. TOGETHER Now I wouldn't fuss - I - no, I'm sorry, I know what you want to do but I wouldn't do it. I wouldn't fasten either the Straits of Tiran, or the Suez Canal onto Israel. You won't help Israel if you do. You won't help the Arabs if you do. You won't help us if you do. But I think you can fasten both on the rights of maritime nations to have guaranteed access through international water-ways. Now I think we can do this, and one of the things I said in New York was that we, in our resolution that we work out, we ought to have that kind of guarantee. But then we have to work out some other things, because we have that kind of guarantee so far as the Suez Canal is concerned already, but then it gets messed up.

BURNET: But it's never been operated.....

TOGETHER

BROWN: By the complications. Well it get's messed up by internal complications. So, therefore, we have now to think about the other problems in the Middle East. The relationships between countries. How you arrange them. How they are supervised. I think this is what we ought to address our attention to at the moment.

BURNET: You don't think that you should go into this question of guarantees, after all this is where the present crisis began. Britain said - at the time the Straits of Tiran were closed by Egypt, that the rights of international navigation should be ensured. We were not able to do it. The Israelis had to do that. Now what can we do now?

BROWN: Because we started at the wrong point. Let's now - if I may suggest - start at a different point. Let's deal with the practical problems. The reffugees. The rights of nations. Then let's look at the authorities who could ensure that the water-ways stay open, if we do it that way round we may do a jolly sight better than we did last time.

FFITCH: Mr. Brown what did you think you achieved at the United Nations?

BROWN: Oh, I think I made it clear, to the Arabs certainly,

that we were taking a genuinely objective look at it. I think I made it clear to the Israelis what I thought would be the mistakes they could make: and I think we got Britain's position back, and in the front, and - you know, one of the great things was that when I'd finished speaking - the number of people said to me, not only privately, but who went to the rostrum and drew attention to what I had said; and I suppose, therefore, the big thing was that I had re-established that Britain had a role to play - and good advice to give, and should be listened to.

FFITCH: You want to have this solution through the United Nations, don't you?

BROWN: Oh, very much - yes.

FFITCH: Now do you really think that Israel can expect to get justice from the United Nations?

BROWN: Yes. It's the only place where anybody can, in the end, get justice from. Israel - alright, won this particular war. Israel couldn't be sure - always, of winning any subsequent war. Her only guarantee is in a situation in which there isn't going to be a subsequent war.

FFITCH: Typical But I can't remember whether it was you or the Prime Minister in the debate before the war began who said that - er - the United Nations was ever ready to condemn Israel for aggression into the Arab countries but they never condemned the Arab countries?

BROWN: I never said that - I don't know who did say it, but I certainly never did. But I'm sure - Mr. Ffitch - I'm sure as I can be that Israel's hope, and it's the hope of Jordan - it's the hope of many other countries in that area of the world, is that the United Nations can, in fact, ensure some policing arrangements, some supervisiory arrangements which will work; and this not only applies to the water-ways, itapplies to the boundaries -applies to alot of other things indeed. And I think that this is what we ought to work for. This is why I asked when I was there, that we - the Secretary General, should put a representative into the area. This is why I said we should strengthen the truce supervise - supervisory organisation. This is why I said we should discuss a kind of new United Nations force that c-could go in. Some day, some day Israel, and her Arab neighbours will learn to live together - quite naturally. Until that happens, then other arrangements have to be made.

BURNET: But would you agree that that United Nations force would have to be one that simply could not be ordered out by President Nasser again, when it was convenient for him.

BROWN: Most certainly, and may I match that by saying the next time the Israelis musn't refuse to have it on their soil, as they did for a very long time, and one of their biggest mistakes - and I'm not now talking with hindsight, because I said it to them a long time ago - was to refuse to have it

on their side of the border too.

BURNET: Can I go on now. You mentioned Britain's interest in the Middle East and you said the Foreign Secretary couldn't be neuter on any issue there. Now is is not a fact that because of the sterling balances, and because of oil, Britain has been very powerless in this crisis, and that Britain's standing, there and elsewhere in the world, has been damaged at the Government's handling of this crisis?

BROWN: I would have thought that the opposite was the truth. I wouldn't have thought - any thought - any - anybody thought we were powerless. I wouldn't have thought anybody would have thought we were'nt intervening. I gather the attack on me was because I was trying to play too powerful a hand; trying to intervene too much. Of course, the sterling balances, of course the oil, is of interest of us - of ours - of course the passage through the seas, through the water-ways is an interest of ours; but why did Britain ever become a powerful nation, ever. It was because we had commercial, maritime, raw material interests. There's nothing to be ashamed of about that. It's something to proclaim and something to stand very firmly for.

George Ffitch * from

But the critisism directed against the government, both withih your own party, and the*opposition, is that your policy, since the beginning of the crisis has helped nobody, but has damaged Britain.

George Brown

If you are in a situation, lets face it, where you can't take a stand on behalf of one or the other parties, it is, as I said yesterday, in the House, difficult to hold - it doesn't mean it's done us damage.

George Ffitch

Well, it's cut off our oil, hasn't it?

George Brown

No no, no no - look the oil is flowing, this is not something we talk about too plainly - I wouldn't worry if I were you, too much about that; but if you are going to hold an independant position, of course you are vulnerable to criticism and to attack, but Mr. Ffitch, the business of a minister at this moment is to see that our interests are up-held, however difficult it may be that; we are doing. The business of somebody in opposition or somebody who only has to scribble a column in a newspaper, is the damage to the govern-ment - we are not comparing like with like.

George Ffitch

But, President de Gaulle seems to have up-held French interests.

George Brown

Has he ?

George Ffitch

You don't think he has?

George Brown

Has he, I am just asking you.?

George Ffitch

Well, he certainly doesn't seem to have had any damage with the relations with the Arab states.

George Brown

But, would you just tell me where he gets his oil from - just tell me what deposits of foreign currency he has got?

George Ffitch

But this is the point that Alastair....

George Brown

No no, will you please tell me - you are comparing de Gaulle with me, will you please tell me.?

George Ffitch

But Foreign Secretary, I was not aware of the fact that there were very large balances of francs held in the Middle East, or that this would affect the standing of the franc on the International Market.

George Brown — There aren't very large bal...Middle East balances held in Paris are there?

Alastair Burnet — No

George Brown — and where does de Gaulle's oil come from?

Alastair Burnet — de Gaulle was much more of a free agent in this crisis - de Gaulle is better equiped in fact - he's got more money, he's got better balance of payments to buy oil from North America.

George Brown — What are you trying to prove.?

Alastair Burnet — I'm merely - I'm saying in this particular crisis France, agreed, starting with certain advantages, appears to have played, not only a more important role in the world, after all Mr. Kosygin did call in to see President de Gaulle, on his way to New York, but that secondly, President de Gaulle, has managed apparently, to retain good relations with the Arab countries, and also, though it appears that he was actually arming Israel, according to some reports, he has got away with that as well. Now, surely there is a lesson for somebody here?

George Brown — No no, there is no lesson for us there - let's just take your three points, I'm not sure if I remember them - help me through will you? He hasn't played a larger role in the world than we have, that is quite certainly not so, we played a much larger role at New York. Secondly, he saw Mr. Kosygin - it didn't seem to me an awful lot came out of that - did it to you?

Alastair Burnet — I think they were in agreement, were they not? about future policy in the Middle East. Do not the French and Russians adopt the same position.

George Brown — I have no such impression at all, and I don't want to go into this, because, you know, it will be held against me later on. I don't think there is any evidence that General de Gaulle will have got very far with Mr. Kosygin at all. And your third point is oil - well look at the scources of his oil - they happen to be different from ours, and he has the Sahara and some other places.

George Ffitch — Are you saying Mr Brown, that Britain behaved honourably in this crisis, and France didn't?

George Brown — Well, I'm not discussing France, because that would be a terrible thing to do, I'm certainly saying we behaved very honourably - we behaved we looked after our own interests, and why shouldn't we - we behaved very honourably

between the Arabs, and the Israelis, we have reasons for being very friendly with each of them, and I don't think there is any basis on which we can be attacked, unless you want to say, we ought to have been more pro. one or the other. I think we behaved honourably, and I believe we looked after our own interests. at the same time.

George Ffitch — So there has been nothing in this Middle East crisis which has affected your view of the role that Britain should play in the world?

George Brown — It has rather strengthened it as a matter of fact - I don't believe it's a role you ought to play with ships and guns and battalions. It's a role you ought to play with commercial interests, financial interests, and a genuine political concern for other people, and above all, of course, for the underdog - for the under developed of the world. I think what this has shown up, is that you can play that role, you will be attacked for playing it, you will be attacked by those who think they're a little bit better off than the others, but you will be very much welcomed by those who need your support.

Alastair Burnet — Foreign Secretary, we do have ships and guns and planes in the Middle East, and if you are going to force through the Tiran Straits, you would have had to use them. People want to know why are we maintaining these forces at great expense, not just at Aden, but at the Persian Gulf, if they are not in fact, able to guarantee us oil supplies.

George Brown — You can't guarantee yourselves oil supplies by guns, ships and airplanes, on the other hand you can maintain alliances and arrangements, this way for a time. We are not maintaining all that much - our ships that were in the Mediterranean, were in fact, (en passage); they were moving; we didn't have a Sixth Fleet there; we are unwinding our commitments in the sense, but it takes time to do it, and we are doing it in a very sensible way. In the 1964/6 defense review we unwound a lot of commitments of this kind, we are now looking at what we can unwind in the future.

Alastair Burnet — Can I take you up on that, because this is another speech of yours, this one in the H. of C. about Aden itself. Now, it has been said that you were putting up a smoke screen for a British withdrawal from Aden, but that this smoke screen was badly laid. Did you really mean that Britain is getting out quickly from Aden, or did you really mean that Britain must keep her military commitments there for some time to come?

George Brown — I don't know who said it was badly laid, and I'm getting rather used now, to all the commentators say that anything I do is not as good as you know....somebody else would do it.

Alastair Burnet — You speech* certainly surprised your own friends on the back benches.
* was

George Brown — The speech was very clear. I stand by the speech - I said we are giving - that is not a good word to use; we accept that independence will come to South Arabia on or about *... 9th and that we have no intention of staying on the ground after that - that between here and now we shall be pulling troops out, bring other people out. After January the 9th, or whatever the date is, I won't argue whether it is the 7th or the 11th, it's around that time - after that, we will give the new independent state a gurantee that if anybody aggresses upon it from outside, they will have to deal with us, and so we will keep some ships and some airplanes off shore - off shore for 6 months afterwards - now this I was told, well look six months simply says to somebody, six months and one week, you can come in, so I then said alright, we will give an additonal guarantee that after the 6 months, we are off the ground in January - the sea born force has gone away in June, after the 6 months, I'll keep some airplanes with a great capability available for as long as the government decides, as short as, as long as the government decides, so that anybody minded to aggress from outside would know that they would have to take this into account. Now, I think that is a reasonable guarantee, to give an independent state, it's not open ended., as my predecessors would have done it - they'd give them their defence treaty, it doesn't get our troops involved in conflict on the ground inside the new state, but it does give the new state a reasonable guarantee against external aggression. I can't see why this is thought to be wrong.
* January

George Ffitch — Would you expect to see peace in that part of the world after we finally go, or do you expect them to be at each others throats?

George Brown — In South Arabia.

George Ffitch — Yes

George Brown — Very hard to say, isn't it, I would think we could leave them with a stable government, I think we could leave them with a secure government, and I think we could leave them probably with some guarantee against aggression, but you know, I wouldn't go much beyond that.

George Ffitch — Mr. Brown, two major speeches of yours on Aden and the U.N., you've had to say again, as it were, rather than re-interpret; why do you think that you are misunderstood - is there a knocking campaign against you?

George Brown — May I answer you very frankly - I think there is, I think there is. I don't think there was anything in either speech which needed either re-interpreting or re-stating - I've refused to re-interpret either, I've re-stated them. I think there is at the moment well, is knocking campaign the right words? I think there is at the moment, pretty clearly an attack on me, and people look for something in everything I say, some short phrase, some sentence, and this is lifted out of what I say.

George Ffitch — Who is behind this/ attack? - who is behind these attacks?

George Brown — No idea at all - I have no idea at all - but given me, I suppose it's you know...I'm, anybody of course, given the government - you go for, I suppose, the most vulnerable, or colourful, or whatever the word is, personality. And in any of our speeches, If I looked at any of your scripts I could lift a sentence out, couldn't I, and blazen it abroad - I think this is what they are doing to me at the moment.

Alastair Burnet — It's not just the newspapers though, is it Mr. Brown; I think there are certain members of your own party who have expressed disatisfaction with what you have done.

George Brown — Well, it is mostly the newspapers as far as the public are concerned - as far as my own party is concerned, I have never been one, never been one, for hesitating to state a view. and to carry it through, and if you do that, you are bound of course to antagonise, to upset, to disturb, groups who disagree with you. Now, I've done this on very many fronts, and therefore, by definition, I've disturbed very many groups. Now, these overlap - it is arguable, as I saw written in one paper this morning, it is arguable that somebody wants to be at the top of his party, or wants to be front minister, should never do this alright what do you end up with, what do you end up with? A fellow who wouldn't do that, what kind of a minister. I could put one recent name to it at least - I leave it to you.

Alastair — In My view, this is a risk you must take, a risk you must ride - I don't mind that, what I do mind, what I do care deeply about, is the personalised writing - it's my style, it's my

and I won't mind, you can always answer them back - always be told I'm wrong - can always
* I'm be proved * wrong, but just to be told, you know, he hasn't got the right manner, he doesn't dress in the right way, doesn't choose his words as carefully as he should, that I think is silly.

Alastair Burnet You've always said you like being Foreign Secretary - do you still like that?

George Brown Very much indeed - I liked the other job, and I wouldn't hide from you, there are times when I hanker after the other job, when I think there are things still to be done there, which I would like to do - but I like this job very much, and I like the.....

George Ffitch I was going to say, by the other job, you didn't mean the Prime Ministership, did you?

George Brown No, I did not, DEA - I meant the Department of Economic Affairs.

***

George Brown No, I think,* when the day comes to finish the Foreign Office - I would find it very hard to
* you know go anywhere else at all, except possibly back into the Trade Unions.

George Ffitch Mr. Brown, thank you very much indeed.

***George Ffitch But do you still feel that some day, you would like to go back to the Foreign Office - umm, the Home Department?

Y BAG

FOREIGN OFFICE AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO CERTAIN MISSIONS

GUIDANCE NO. 163 28 JUNE 1967 (IP6)

UNCLASSIFIED

Guidance Nos. 132 and 137 (not to all)

Middle East: Allegations of British military involvements

King Hussein was interviewed in New York by Pauline Frederick on NBC's "Today Show" on 27 June. The following is transcript of passage dealing with alleged Western military intervention.

Begins.

Frederick: "Your Majesty, do you have any evidence that the United States and/or the United Kingdom were involved, either directly or indirectly, in this war?"

King Hussein: "No, we have no evidence whatsoever, and I've heard a great deal of comments on suspicions that we had a telephone conversation that was unfortunately not complete that was broadcast by the Israelis that was supposed to have taken place between me and President Nasser at a certain point.

"There were some indications, we had some radar sightings of aircraft that were appearing from the sea. We faced a tremendous and overwhelming enemy air force that covered all the skies of Jordan. Suddenly the West Bank and everything got moved.

"There were some wrong identifications of aircraft, and we did not know that this was possible radar (?). Our radar was destroyed soon. Many of the things that we had seen were explained later. For example, these aircraft that we had sighted on radar apparently were Israeli aircraft returning from their attacks on the United Arab Republic, which they carried out at low level, and on the way back they were climbing. And that's when we spotted them.

"We have said that we have no physical or definite proof that there was any intervention by Britain or America. And what we really wanted to know was the truth of exactly what happened, because that is so important for us to know it, so that we can move ahead in the future".

ENDS.

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J.I.P.G.D.

vvvvv

EN CLAIR

IMMEDIATE U.K. MISSION NEW YORK

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 1550

28 JUNE 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1550 OF 28 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO NAIROBI, KAMPALA, ACCRA, LAGOS, BATHURST, MASERU, GABERONES, FREETOWN, MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, PARIS, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, AND SAVING TO NEW DELHI AND BELGRADE.

MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM: EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION: MIDDLE EAST.

FOLLOWING IS A DRAFT RESOLUTION INTRODUCED TODAY BY THE QUOTE NON-ALIGNED UNQUOTE AFGHANISTAN, BURUNDI, CEYLON, CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE) CYPRUS, GUINEA, INDIA, INDONESIA, MALI, PAKISTAN, SOMALIA, TANZANIA, YUGOSLAVIA, ZAMBIA.

BEGINS

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

HAVING DISCUSSED THE GRAVE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST,

NOTING THAT THE ARMED FORCES OF ISRAEL OCCUPY AREAS INCLUDING TERRITORIES BELONGING TO JORDAN, SYRIA AND THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC,

1. CALLS UPON ISRAEL IMMEDIATELY TO WITHDRAW ALL ITS FORCES BEHIND THE ARMISTICE LINES ESTABLISHED BY THE GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARAB COUNTRIES:

2. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH THE PRESENT RESOLUTION, AND, WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE U.N. TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANISATION IN PALESTINE ESTABLISHED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL, TO SECURE STRICT OBSERVANCE BY ALL PARTIES OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARAB COUNTRIES:

3. CALLS UPON ALL STATES TO RENDER EVERY ASSISTANCE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION:

4. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT URGENTLY TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON ISRAEL'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION:

/5. REQUESTS

5. REQUESTS FURTHER THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL'S ARMED FORCES BEHIND THE ARMISTICE LINES HAS BEEN COMPLETED, TO GIVE CONSIDERATION TO QUESTIONS PERTAINING TO THE SITUATION IN THE AREA.
ENDS
F.O. PASS IMMEDIATE NAIROBI 17, KAMPALA 3, ACCRA 1, LAGOS 10, BATHURST 1, MASERU 5, GABERONES 7, FREETOWN 15, MOSCOW 228, PARIS 227, TEL AVIV 248, AMMAN 119, AND SAVING TO NEW DELHI 40 AND BELGRADE 2.

LORD CARADON M SENT AT 290135Z
RECD AT 290135Z

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 1551 28 JUNE 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1551 OF 28 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO TEL AVIV, AMMAN, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS AND HOLY SEE.

JERUSALEM.

SINCE THE RECEIPT HERE OF AGENCY REPORTS ANNOUNCING THE INCORPORATION OF THE OLD CITY INTO THE MUNICIPALITY OF JERUSALEM, ARAB DELEGATIONS HAVE BEEN URGENTLY CONSIDERING THE TABLING OF A RESOLUTION ON THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM. THE JORDANIANS ARE IN FAVOUR OF A CONDEMNATION OF THE ISRAELI ACTION, BUT THE EGYPTIANS, UNDER FAWZI'S DIRECTION, ARE TRYING TO KEEP THE TEXT MODERATE TO MUSTER MAXIMUM VOTING SUPPORT. THIS EVENING THE ONLY PROPOSED OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH OF A FIRST ARAB DRAFT CALLED ON THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL NOT TO TAKE ANY ACTION TO CHANGE THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM. BUT THE ARABS ARE HAVING ANOTHER MEETING TONIGHT AND THE PALESTINIAN ELEMENT IN THE VARIOUS ARAB DELEGATIONS MAY INSIST ON TIGHTENING THE TEXT UP.

2. AT ALL EVENTS A DRAFT RESOLUTION OF SOME KIND ON JERUSALEM MAY BE TABLED TOMORROW. THE AMERICANS HERE HAVE TOLD US THAT IF A MODERATE TEXT EMERGES THEY MAY WELL SUPPORT IT, IN VIEW OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S STRONG STATEMENT DEPLORING THE ISRAELIS' QUOTE HASTY ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION UNQUOTE ISSUED THIS AFTERNOON. I IMAGINE YOU WOULD WISH US ALSO TO SUPPORT ANY REASONABLY MODERATE DRAFT.

F.O. PASS TEL AVIV 249, AMMAN 120, MOSCOW 229, PARIS 228 AND HOLY SEE 2.

LORD CARADON

SENT 290038Z
RECD 290040Z

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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EN CLAIR

IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1554 28 JUNE 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 1554 OF 28 JUNE
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW PARIS
TEL AVIV COPENHAGEN NAIROBI LAGOS KAMPALA BATHURST ACCRA MASERU
GABERONES FREETOWN.
M.I.P.T. (NOT TO ALL).
FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION WHICH MAY BE PUT DOWN WITH
EUROPEAN/LATIN AMERICAN SPONSORSHIP TOMORROW.
BEGINS.
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
GRAVELY CONCERNED AT THE RECURRING CRISIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST,
INCLUDING OUTBREAKS OF MILITARY HOSTILITIES,
TAKING NOTE OF THE CEASE-FIRE ESTABLISHED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL
IN ITS RESOLUTIONS 233, 234, 235 AND 236 OF 6, 7, 9 AND 12 JUNE,
1967,
RECALLING AND EMPHASISING THE OBLIGATIONS OF ALL MEMBERS UNDER
THE CHARTER, IN PARTICULAR ARTICLES 2 AND 33 THEREOF, AND BEARING
IN MIND THE PRINCIPLES EXPRESSED IN THE DECLARATION CONTAINED IN
RES. 2131 (XX),
1. CALLS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL FORCES AND TERMINATION OF ANY
STATE OF BELLIGERENCE OR CLAIM THERETO WITHOUT DELAY.
2. ACCORDINGLY, CALLS FOR URGENT DISENGAGEMENT OF ALL FORCES UNDER
APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS.
3. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO APPOINT A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO PROCEED TO THE AREA AND TO ESTABLISH AND
MAINTAIN CONTACTS WITH ALL THE STATES CONCERNED WITH A VIEW TO
ASSISTING THEM IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION
AND IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE AMONG THE
STATES CONCERNED.
4. REQUESTS THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO REPORT PROMPTLY THROUGH

/THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND REQUESTS THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO KEEP THE SITUATION UNDER CAREFUL REVIEW.
5. CALLS ON ALL MEMBER STATES TO CO-OPERATE WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN GIVING EFFECT TO THIS RESOLUTION.
ENDS

F O PASS IMMEDIATE TO MOSCOW 232, PARIS 231, TEL AVIV 252, COPENHAGEN 111, NAIROBI 18, LAGOS 11, KAMPALA 4, BATHURST 2, ACCRA 2, MASERU 6, GABERONES 8 AND FREETOWN 16.

LORD CARADON.

SENT AT 290150Z
RECD AT 290151Z

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CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

TELNO 7209 28 JUNE 1967 (E)

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED WASHINGTON TELNO 7209 OF 28 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION UKMIS NEW YORK AMMAN TEL AVIV JERUSALEM MOSCOW UKDEL NATO

YOUR TELNO 2180 : MIDDLE EAST.

WE HOPE TO LET YOU HAVE SHORTLY FOR DISCUSSION WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT A PAPER ON THE POSSIBLE OUTCOME FOR JORDAN OF THE PRESENT SITUATION. MEANWHILE, WE ARE DISTURBED BY THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE ISRAELIS APPEAR TO HAVE SUCCEEDED IN SELLING TO ROSTOW THEIR THESIS THAT A SEPARATE PEACE BETWEEN HUSSEIN AND ISRAEL IS A PRACTICABLE PROPOSITION AND THAT HUSSEIN SHOULD BE PRESSED TO ACCEPT IT BY THE THREAT THAT JORDAN WILL LOSE THE WEST BANK IF SHE DOES NOT FALL IN WITH THIS PROPOSAL.

2. THERE ARE OF COURSE AND HAVE BEEN FOR TWENTY YEARS ATTRACTIONS IN QUOTE THE IDEA THAT JORDAN AND ISRAEL SHOULD BE IN SOME WAY COMBINED UNQUOTE, AND THE ISRAELIS HAVE BEEN CONSTANT ADVOCATES OF IT. IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES HOWEVER IT SEEMS TO US TO BE OUT OF TOUCH WITH ARAB REALITIES AND THE REALITIES OF NEW YORK. OUR VIEW, ON WHICH WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THE COMMENTS OF HER MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR AMMAN, IS THAT SUCH A COURSE WOULD MEAN THE END OF HUSSEIN AND OF ANY ARRANGEMENTS HE HAD AGREED TO, AND WOULD NOT THEREFORE DO THE ISRAELIS ANY GOOD.

3. THE PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS OF THE STUDY WHICH WE ARE CONDUCTING ON THE FUTURE OF JORDAN ARE THAT:

(A)

(A) EVEN WITHIN THE IMMEDIATE ARAB/ISRAEL CONTEXT THE SEPARATION OF THE WEST BANK FROM JORDAN, DESPITE THE MOST GENEROUS TERMS IMAGINABLE FOR ARAB AUTONOMY IN A QUOTE BUFFER STATE UNQUOTE WOULD NOT PROVIDE A STABLE SETTLEMENT.
(B) THE WEIGHT OF BRITISH INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS HEAVILY AGAINST OUR TAKING ANY PART WHATSOEVER IN THE PROMOTION OF SUCH A SOLUTION.

4. FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF OUR INTERESTS, OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A STABLE ARAB/JEWISH RELATIONSHIP, AND OF THE STABILITY OF THE WHOLE AREA, IT SEEMS PRIMA FACIE DESIRABLE THAT ANY SETTLEMENT SHOULD PROVIDE FOR A RECONSTITUTED JORDAN. MOREOVER WHATEVER TERRITORIAL ADJUSTMENTS HAVE TO BE ACCEPTED TO MEET ISRAEL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS, IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO RECONCILE IN ARAB EYES OUR CLAIM TO HAVE AN IMPARTIAL INTEREST IN THE RIGHT OF ALL STATES TO EXIST WITH CONNIVANCE AT THE PARTITION OF JORDAN.

5. THE ABOVE IS FOR YOUR INFORMATION AT THIS STAGE. IF ROSTOW REVERTS TO THE QUESTION OF WHAT WE SHOULD SAY TO HUSSEIN YOU SHOULD SAY THAT WE HAVE CONSIDERABLE DOUBTS ABOUT WHETHER HIS IDEAS ARE PRACTICABLE BUT HAVE NOT YET CLEARED OUR MINDS ON OUR OWN VIEWS.

6. SINCE HUSSEIN INTENDS TO STOP IN LONDON ON HIS RETURN JOURNEY WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY INFORMATION YOU CAN GET ABOUT WHAT PASSES BETWEEN HIM AND THE PRESIDENT AND OTHERS.

SOSFA SENT 2114Z 28 JUNE 1967

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P.S.
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P.S.
P.U.S.
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(22)

FLASH

Mr. Moore

NO. 10 DOWNING STREET
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~~D.I.O. CABINET OFFICE~~
D.I.S. M.O.D.
~~D.C.C. M.O.D.~~

CYPHER/CAT A

FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 1557 29 JUNE 1967.

✓ This is being looked at today. Camden will probably see for.

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 1557 OF 29 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO TEL AVIV AMMAN BEIRUT HOLY SEE AND JERUSALEM.

MYTEL 1551:

JERUSALEM.

WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE TEXT OF THE PROPOSED ARAB DRAFT RESOLUTION, WHICH MAYBE TABLED SOMETIME TO-DAY, IS NOW AS FOLLOWS:-

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

DEEPLY CONCERNED AT THE SITUATION PREVAILING IN JERUSALEM AS A RESULT OF THE MEASURES BEING TAKEN BY ISRAEL TO CHANGE THE STATUS OF THE CITY:

1. DECLARES THAT SUCH MEASURES ARE INVALID:

2. CALLS UPON ISRAEL TO DESIST FORTHWITH FROM TAKING ANY ACTION WHICH WOULD ALTER THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM, AND TO RESCIND ALL MEASURES TAKEN IN THIS REGARD:

3. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE SITUATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RESOLUTION NOT LATER THAN ONE WEEK FROM THE ADOPTION THEREOF.

FO PASS PRIORITY TEL AVIV 253, AMMAN 121 ROUTINE BEIRUT 67,
HOLY SEE 3 AND JERUSALEM 11

LORD CARADON

SENT 29/1447Z TG

SENT WASHINGTON AT 1448Z/29 LRD

CCN WA AMMAN 121

Rec'd 1449Z/29

No Palliser ✓
(Personal)

SECRET - GUARD

COPY NO: 13

CYPHER/CAT.A.
IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2209

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
DATED 29TH JUNE 1967

SECRET AND GUARD
ADDRESSED IMMEDIATE TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 2209 OF 29 JUNE 67 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO UKMIS NEW YORK PRIORITY TO AMMAN, TEL AVIV, MOSCOW SAVING TO JERUSALEM
YOUR TEL. 7209: MIDDLE EAST
GENE ROSTOW THIS MORNING GAVE ME AN ACCOUNT OF THE AMERICAN TALKS WITH KING HUSSEIN. HE STRESSED THE EXTREME DELICACY OF THE INFORM-ATION AND ASKED THAT IT BE GIVEN THE MINIMUM DISTRIBUTION.
2. ROSTOW BEGAN BY SAYING THAT THE AMERICANS ''HAD NOT BEEN AT ALL DISCOURAGED'' BY THEIR EXCHANGES WITH THE KING. THEY HAD SPOKEN TO HIM VERY FRANKLY ABOUT HOW THEY SAW THE PRESENT POSITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND HAD TOLD HIM THAT THE UNITED STATES COULD NOT IMPOSE A SETTLEMENT. NOR COULD THEY ''DELIVER THE ISRAELIS'' SEMI COLON INDEED AMERICAN ABILITY TO INFLUENCE ISRAEL WAS PROBABLY LESS NOW THAN AT ANY TIME IN RECENT YEARS. A PEACEFUL SOLUTION MUST BE FOUND, AS THE WORLD COULD NOT STAND ANOTHER ROUND OF FIGHTING IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THEY HAD SUGGESTED TO KING HUSSEIN THE POSSIBILITY OF TALKS WITH THE ISRAELIS THROUGH AN INTERMEDIARY, PERHAPS FOLLOWING AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. HE WAS TOLD THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO FACE UP TO THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE JORDANIAN ATTACK ON ISRAEL SEMI COLON THIS LED HIM TO ASK WHAT THE AMERICANS KNEW OF THE PRESENT ISRAELI ATTITUDE TOWARDS HIM. HE WAS GIVEN THE REPLY THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE VERY PUZZLED AS TO ''WHO HE WAS '' AND WHERE HE STOOD.
3. THE KING APPARENTLY AGREED WITH THE AMERICAN THESIS THAT THE ARABS HAD REACHED ''A FORK IN THE ROAD'' AND COULD EITHER CHOOSE THE PATH TOWARDS PEACE OR A FRESH BOUT OF REARMAMENT. THE KING SAID THAT HE HIMSELF FAVOURED THE PEACEFUL OPTION, BUT IN ORDER TO PURSUE

/IT

IT HE NEEDED THE SUPPORT OF OTHER ARAB STATES. HE FOLT HIMSELF TO BE IN A STRONG MORAL POSITITON VIS-A-VIS THE OTHER ARAB STATES, IN THAT JORDAN HAD FOUGHT HARD AND PAID HEAVILY FOR THE PART SHE HAD PLAYED IN RECENT EVENTS. HE WAS GOING TO CAIRO AND BAGHDAD AND WOULD PRESS FOR AN ARAB SUMMIT MEETING SEMI COLON ACCORDING TO ROSTOW, ALL THE INDICATIONS WERE THAT HE WISHED TO USE THE OCCASION TO CONFRONT NASSER AND HE HAD EVEN CLAIMED TO THE AMERICANS THAT HE COULD GET THE SUPPORT OF ALL ARAB STATES FOR PURSUING A PEACEFUL PATH. THE KING HAD ALSO MADE IT CLEAR THAT, IF SUCH SUPPORT WAS NOT FORTHCOMING, HE DID NOT EXCLUDE GOING IT ALONE.

4. AT THIS POINT ROSTOW MENTIONED (BUT ASKED THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE RECORDED) AN ACCOUNT GIVEN BY KING HUSSEIN OF A CONVERSATION HE HAD HAD WITH ATASSI IN NEW YORK, IN THE COURSE OF WHICH ATASSI HAD APPARENTLY FREELY ADMITTED HOW WRONG THE SYRIANS AND OTHER ARABS HAD BEEN IN THE PAST AND HAD AGREED ON THE NEED TO PURSUE NEW AND DIFFERENT POLICIES.

5. ROSTOW SAID THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAD REMAINED SILENT DURING THE EARLIER PART OF THE TALKS WITH THE KING, BUT THAT AFTER LUNCH HE HAD TAKEN HIM ASIDE AND SPOKEN TO HIM FOR ABOUT TWENTY MINUTES IN THE SAME VEIN AS THE EARLIER EXCHANGES.

6. I ASKED HOW KING HUSSEIN HAD REACTED TO THE ISRAELI ANNOUNCEMENTS YESTERDAY ABOUT JERUSALEM. ROSTOW SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN CONCERNED, BUT NOT VIOLENTLY UPSET. THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN CAREFUL TO GET THEIR STATEMENTS OUT BEFORE THE TALKS WITH KING HUSSEIN BEGAN (MY TEL. 2203). THE KING SEEMED PREPARED TO AGREE ON THE NEED FOR ADJUSTMENTS ALONG THE FRONTIER BUT HAD NOT SPOKEN AT ALL SPECIFICALLY ABOUT WHAT KIND OF SETTLEMENT FOR THE WEST BANK HE MIGHT BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT.

7. ROSTOW WENT ON TO MENTION THE PROBLEMS FACING THE KING IN TRYING TO REGROUP HIS ARMY. THE RUSSIANS HAD OF COURSE OFFERED HIM ARMS. THE JORDANIAN CHIEF OF STAFF HAD TOLD THE AMERICANS THAT THE MOST URGENT NEED WAS FOR JEEPS, RIFLES AND SIMILAR EQUIPMENT. SOME EQUIPMENT FROM EARLIER ORDERS IS APPARENTLY IN THE PIPELINE FOR JORDAN, BUT THE AMERICANS HAVE TOLD THE JORDANIANS THAT FRESH REQUESTS FOR ARMS WERE VERY DIFFICULT AND WOULD REQUIRE FURTHER CONSIDERATION.

/8.

8. ROSTOW SAID THAT THE AMERICANS WERE WORKING ON THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF AID FOR JORDAN. IF ONLY SOME SETTLEMENT BETWEEN JORDAN AND ISRAEL COULD BE REACHED WHICH WOULD AT THE SAME TIME RESOLVE THE REFUGEE QUESTION, HE THOUGHT THE POTENTIAL GAIN SO GREAT THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE PREPARED TO PAY A HIGH PRICE TO ACHIEVE IT. THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR HAD CONFIRMED ONLY YESTERDAY THAT IT WAS STILL HIS GOVERNMENT'S POLICY TO DO A DEAL WITH KING HUSSEIN IF THIS WERE POSSIBLE.

9. IN CONCLUSION ROSTOW ALLUDED TO THE TREMENDOUS SOVIET ARMS RESTOCKING PROGRAMME FOR THE U.A.R. AND OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES AND SAID THAT MORE AND MORE HE WAS COMING TO LOOK ON RECENT EVENTS NOT AS AN ARAB/ISRAELI WAR, BUT AS A MAJOR SOVIET ATTEMPT TO NEUTRALIZE EUROPE AND DISMANTLE N.A.T.O. WHATEVER THEY MIGHT ULTIMATELY SETTLE FOR, THE RUSSIANS WERE CLEARLY KEEPING THEIR OTHER OPTIONS NOT ONLY OPEN BUT OPERATIVE.

FO PASS (PRIORITY ALL) AMMAN 48 TEL AVIV 66 MOSCOW 156 AND SAVING JERUSALEM 5

SIR. P. DEAN SENT AT 0137Z 30 JUNE 1967

RECD AT 0137Z 30 JUNE 1967

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

PRISEC (F.O.) ADVANCE COPIES SENT

* Few days ago the Americans were saying this was not the case.

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A
PRIORITY WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2215
CONFIDENTIAL.

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
29 JUNE 1967.

ADDRESSED FOREIGN OFFICE TEL NO 2215 OF 29/6 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK UKDEL NATO MOSCOW PARIS AND BONN.

JOHNSON/KOSYGIN AND RUSK/GROMYKO TALKS.

MR. RUSK TOLD ME THIS EVENING THAT, WITH CERTAIN EXCEPTIONS, KOSYGIN'S PRESS CONFERENCE (UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 1515 TO YOU) HAD BEEN A PRETTY ACCURATE REFLECTION OF THE SOVIET LINE AT GLASSBORO. THE TONE AT GLASSBORO HAD BEEN DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE. THE TALKS HAD BEEN BUSINESSLIKE AND WITHOUT INVECTIVE, POLEMICS OR THREATS. AT GLASSBORO IT HAD BEEN HARD WORK AND THE RUSSIANS HAD BEEN WILLING TO DISCUSS ALL SUBJECTS IN GREAT DETAIL FOR A TOTAL OF SOME NINE HOURS ALTOGETHER.

2. ON SPECIFIC ISSUES, PLEASE SEE MIFT FOR MIDDLE EAST.

3. VIETNAM. IN CONTRAST WITH HIS PRESS CONFERENCE, KOSYGIN IN HIS TALKS WITH THE PRESIDENT HAD NOT SPOKEN OF WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN FORCES AS WELL AS STOPPING THE BOMBING. HE HAD STILL FAILED TO GIVE ANY INDICATION OF WHAT WOULD ENSUE IF THE BOMBING DID STOP. IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION WHETHER WHATEVER THEIR INFLUENCE IN HANOI, THE RUSSIANS REALLY WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE WAR BROUGHT TO AN END, MR. RUSK SAID HE RATHER THOUGHT SO. (INCIDENTALLY, MR. RUSK ALSO SAID THAT MAURER HAD TAKEN A HARD LINE ON VIETNAM, BUT WHEN ANSWERED IN KIND HAD SMILED BROADLY AND REMARKED THAT ''HE WAS SITTING IN THE FACE OF A DECISION'').

4. ABMS. MR. RUSK CONFIRMED THAT IT HAD PROVED IMPOSSIBLE TO GET KOSYGIN TO NAME A DATE FOR SERIOUS TALKS ON ABMS. MCNAMARA HAD MADE THE POINT THAT OFFENSIVE MISSILE SYSTEMS WERE CHEAPER THAN DEFENSIVE ONES AND KOSYGIN HAD COMMENTED THAT THIS WAS A ''VERY COMMERCIAL'' APPROACH. RUSK SAID THAT THE AMERICANS INTENDED TO CONTINUE TO PRESS THE RUSSIANS ON THIS AND THOUGHT THAT THEY MIGHT HAVE A MORE POSITIVE RESPONSE WITHIN THE NEXT TWO WEEKS.

as he did to us!

5. CHINA. WHEN I ENQUIRED WHETHER THE SUBJECT OF CHINA HAD ARISEN, MR. RUSK SAID ONLY INDIRECTLY IN THE CONTEXT OF SECURITY ASSURANCES (SEE MY TELEGRAM N9.2213 NOT TO ALL).

/6.

CONFIDENTIAL

6. CUBA. RUSK CONFIRMED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD HIT KOSYGIN VERY HARD ON THE LATEST INFILTRATION INTO VENEZUELA. CASTRO AND THE RUSSIANS WERE ALREADY QUARRELLING ABOUT THIS AND TO JUDGE FROM PRESS REPORTS THERE COULD HAVE BEEN SOME COOL TALK BETWEEN KOSYGIN AND CASTRO ABOUT IT.

7. BILATERAL QUESTIONS. GROMYKO HAS TOLD RUSK THAT THE RUSSIANS EXPECT TO RATIFY THE CONSULAR AGREEMENT BEFORE LONG.

FO PASS ROUTINE UKDEL NATO 208 MOSCOW 161 PARIS 194 AND BONN 195

SIR P DEAN

SENT 0339Z 30 JUNE 1967.

RECD 0339Z 30 JUNE 1967.

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION. REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A
PRIORITY WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2216
CONFIDENTIAL.

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
29 JUNE 1967.

ADDRESSED FOREIGN OFFICE TEL NO 2216 29/6 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK UKDEL NATO MOSCOW PARIS BONN AMMAN TEL AVIV M I P T (NOT TO ALL) : MIDDLE EAST.

MR. RUSK TOLD ME THIS EVENING THAT, APART FROM THE TIMING OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, THE TALKS WITH THE RUSSIANS HAD REVEALED THAT BOTH SIDES SAW THE ELEMENTS OF A SETTLEMENT IN VERY MUCH THE SAME WAY. THIS APPLIED TO THE RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL AS A STATE : THE TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR (ON WHICH GROMYKO HAD VOLUNTEERED THE PARALLEL OF THE TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF WAR BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND JAPAN DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF A PEACE TREATY) : AND RUSK IS LOOKING INTO THE POSSIBLE UTILITY OF THIS: THE DESIRE TO KEEP OPEN THE STRAITS OF TIRAN (COUPLED ON THE SOVIET SIDE WITH NO OBJECTION TO REOPENING THE SUEZ CANAL, BUT NO APPARENT INTENTION OF DOING ANYTHING ABOUT IT): AND REFUGEES (ON WHICH THE SOVIET UNION WOULD CREATE NO OBSTACLES ALTHOUGH THEY WOULD NOT MAKE ANY CONTRIBUTION). ON WITHDRAWAL THE RUSSIANS HAD REMAINED VERY TOUGH AND WERE INDEED BEING MORE ARAB THAN THE ARABS.

2. AT THIS POINT I SHOWED MR. RUSK A COPY OF MOSCOW TELEGRAM NO.1123 TO YOU AND HE SAID THAT SIR G. HARRISON'S VIEWS WERE SUPPORTED BY HIS IMPRESSIONS OF HIS TALKS WITH THE RUSSIANS. HE THOUGHT HIS COMMENTS WERE SHREWD.

3. THE RUSSIANS HAD NOT PRIVATELY PRESSED FOR THE CONDEMNATION OF ISRAEL NOR FOR REPARATIONS. ON ARMS LIMITATION, THE AMERICANS HAD GOT NOWHERE WITH THE RUSSIANS, BUT HE HAD BEEN STRUCK BY KOSYGIN'S EMPHASIS AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE ON SOVIET DEVELOPMENT AID TO AFRICA, THE ARAB WORLD AND ASIA. KOSYGIN HAD SAID THAT THIS WAS A VERY COMPLICATED QUESTION AND THAT PAST DISARMAMENT DISCUSSIONS HAD SHOWN HOW DIFFICULT IT WAS TO AGREE ON FORCE LEVELS. HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE COULD NOT DISCUSS THIS QUESTION JUST AFTER A MAJOR ARAB DEFEAT.

4. I ENQUIRED ABOUT MR. RUSK'S VIEWS ON SOVIET INTENTIONS. HE

/THOUGHT

CONFIDENTIAL

THOUGHT KOSYGIN'S REFERENCE TO FURTHER ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS NOT TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY. THE CLOSEST THAT KOSYGIN HAD COME TO UTTERING THREATS IN HIS TALKS WITH THE PRESIDENT HAD BEEN TO SAY THAT IF THERE WERE NOT IMMEDIATE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL THERE WOULD BE A RESUMPTION OF THE FIGHTING, PERHAPS INVOLVING OTHERS BESIDES ISRAEL AND THE ARABS. WHEN THE PRESIDENT HAD REACTED SHARPLY HE HAD AT ONCE BACKED DOWN ON THIS.

5. RUSK WENT ON TO SAY THAT THERE WERE THREE MAJOR ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE MIDDLE EAST:-

(A) THE ARAB ISRAEL CONFLICT.

(B) THE CONTEST BETWEEN THE ''PROGRESSIVE'' AND THE MODERATE ARABS:

(C) SOVIET EFFORT TO PENETRATE THE MIDDLE EAST AT THE EXPENSE OF THE WEST.

SOME FEATURES OF THE SITUATION ONLY FELL INTO PLACE IF ALL THREE CONSIDERATIONS WERE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. FOR INSTANCE THE LINE ADVOCATED RECENTLY BY SENATOR CHURCH (ON 26 JUNE IN THE SENATE, WHEN HE ADVOCATED THAT THE U.S. SHOULD REFRAIN FROM ALL ARMS SUPPLIES) WAS NO GOOD WHEN SOME ARABS NEEDED ARMS IN ORDER TO FEND OFF NASSER. FURTHERE MORE THE RUSSIANS WOULD CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS AT PENETRATION, ALTHOUGH THEY HAD SEVERAL POINTS OF DIFFICULTY TO WORRY ABOUT. IT LOOKED AS THOUGH SOMETHING COULD HAPPEN AT ANY MINUTE TO THE SYRIAN REGIME, AND THE SITUATION IN CAIRO WAS VERY ''SPOOKY''. FAWZI HAD SEEMED TO HAVE NO CLEAR DIRECTIVE IN HIS TALKS WITH RUSK AND NOBODY APPEARED TO BE ABLE TO GET TO NASSER HIMSELF.

5. THE FACT THAT THE ARABS WERE FORCED TO SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE AGAINST ISRAEL CONCEALED BUT DID NOT ELIMINATE THEIR CONCERN AS BETWEEN THE PROGRESSIVES AND THE MODERATES AND AT SOVIET PENETRATION.

/THE

WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO. 2216 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

THE MODERATES REMAINED NO LESS ALIVE TO BOTH AND THERE WAS A VERY DANGEROUS PERIOD AHEAD.

FO PASS ROUTINE MOSCOW 162 PARIS 195 BONN 196 AMMAN 5Ø AND TEL AVIV 68.

SIR P DEAN

SENT AT Ø411Z 3Ø JUNE 1967.
RECD AT Ø411Z 3Ø JUNE 1967.

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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Foreign Office and Whitehall Distribution

ISRAEL
6 July, 1967
Section 1

THE SECOND ARAB-ISRAEL WAR, 1967. THE PRELIMINARIES

Mr. Hadow to Mr. Brown. (*Received 6 July*)

SUMMARY

1. This is an impressionistic despatch which tries to get through the mass of paper of a fortnight which only shows how wrong I was. (Paragraphs 1–2.)

2. The trouble with Syria which occupied us for the previous year and probably led up to what happened. (Paragraph 3.)

3. The events up to the 23rd of May which should normally have led the Israelis to hit the Egyptians then. (Paragraphs 4–5.)

4. The international preoccupation with the question of the Straits of Tiran, what was going on inside Israel and how we again stopped the Israelis going. (Paragraphs 6–8.)

5. The vital importance to either side of the first strike. (Paragraph 9.)

6. Again internal politics and the growth of the problem. (Paragraphs 10 and 12.)

7. Why the Jordanian behaviour really counted. (Paragraph 11.) [*sic*]

8. The moment of truth. (Paragraphs 13–15.)

9. A rather feeble apologia and some hindsight. (Paragraph 16.)

P.S. I realise that this despatch contains what may be considered to be criticisms of " intelligence appreciations ". I would like to stress that I am in no way pointing at any British organisation. I am talking about them, the Israelis and very largely this Embassy and myself.

(No. 18. Confidential) *Tel Aviv,*
29 June, 1967.

Sir,

On the 4th of June I reported with some confidence that the Israel Government, for a variety of reasons, appeared to have accepted that for the foreseeable future there was no alternative to maintaining a passive posture (albeit with the maximum state of military readiness possible) in the face of Nasser's seizure of the initiative against them. Next day they embarked on one of the most ruthlessly efficient military campaigns in modern history, in the course of which they shattered the numerically superior forces of a coalition of Arab States, which had, as in 1948–49, combined against them. At the end of just over five days they had occupied the whole of Sinai: their troops were paddling in the Suez Canal: they had opened the Straits of Tiran to Israel shipping: they were in occupation of enough of Syria to ensure that their settlements in Northern Galilee were no longer under the 19-year-old threat of Syrian guns on the heights above: they had occupied the entire West Bank of Jordan: and, most

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miraculous of all, had won the unsought-for prize of Old Jerusalem, thus realising the 2,000-year-old Jewish dream of the recovery of Zion, the City of David.

2. In the course of this despatch I have the honour, with the advantage of hindsight and with some humility in view of my lack of foresight, to give some picture of what led up to these shattering happenings. For over two weeks before the 5th of June, I had been reporting daily, sometimes even hourly, the course of events here. It is not therefore my intention to try and recapitulate all that happened—there are already so many trees to be counted that one is liable to lose sight of the wood itself. All I can do is to read once more through the mass of telegrams, minutes and reports, then close them, forget them and, after a pause, set down in a highly impressionistic way what is left in my mind of the general trends which led to these cataclysmic (from a Middle Eastern point of view) events.

3. For the last year we seemed to have been occupied mainly with the threat to Middle East peace posed by the Israel/Syria situation. There were countless incidents attributable to the new Syrian doctrine of waging a continual proxy war against Israel. The Government of Mr. Eshkol, because of their fear of the Soviet Union, were extremely chary of yielding to popular demand to teach the Syrians a good lesson once and for all. This Government attitude gave rise to the totally irrelevant aberration of the Samua raid (which nevertheless may have had its lasting and traumatic effect on the subsequent peculiar behaviour of King Hussein). Even the total incompetence of the Syrian Air Force as illustrated on the 7th of April and the failure of any Soviet reaction did little to remove general Government fears about the Soviet/Syrian threat. Indeed, if one is to try to pinpoint any single event which started off the whole train ending with the cease-fire of the 10th of June, it is perhaps Mr. Eshkol's speech of the 13th of May. I am sure this was intended as a deterrent measure, lest customary terrorist activities over the Independence Day celebrations might once again renew unwelcome pressures on Mr. Eskhol to allow a fairly large punitive operation. It succeeded in its short-term object, but it resulted in the activation of the Syrian/Egyptian Defence Pact, the Syrian accusation of large Israel troop concentrations on her borders (supported for mysterious reasons *vis-à-vis* the Egyptians by Soviet sources) and the decision of the Egyptians to move considerable forces into Sinai with the maximum propaganda.

4. There follows what I would call the period of "Overtaken Intelligence Appreciations". The Israelis agreed with us that Nasser's new posture posed no real threat and was done for propaganda purposes only. They were even anxious lest King Hussein's constant needling of Nasser on the subject of UNEF and the Straits of Tiran might push him into actions he would otherwise not take. But events were rolling with their own momentum. Appreciations were only made to be overtaken by events. Would or could the Secretary-General of the United Nations allow UNEF forces to be pushed out? He had. As he explained privately to us later, he was motivated by fears for the safety of his forces at the hands of the Egyptians. But all that was heard from him in public at the time was a complaint of one incident involving the buzzing of a United Nations plane by the Israelis. Then there were doubts whether UNEF were actually being forced to evacuate Sharm el Sheikh, followed by speculation whether Nasser would actually occupy the point himself. The next questions were whether, having occupied it, he would announce the closure of the Straits of Tiran to Israel shipping and then whether, having announced the closure, he was really going to do anything about it. In all these cases preliminary assessments were unduly optimistic. By this time the Israelis had begun to realise that they and indeed most of the world had been caught flat-footed either, as Israel's Western friends seemed to think, as the result of an unforeseen chain of events, or, as the Israel intelligence began to suspect, as the result of a carefully-thought-out plan. It had always been one of the beliefs of your Department, Sir, and in this Embassy that the closure of the Straits of Tiran was likely to be an immediate *casus belli* and now the Israelis were suddenly faced with the actual situation. What would they do about it?

5. However optimistic had been the various intelligence appreciations of what was really going on, the Israelis and indeed other responsible Governments took precautionary steps. As early as the 18th of May there was a limited call-up in Israel of certain specialised and technical

categories as the result of Egyptian moves into Sinai. The withdrawal of UNEF led to a much more extensive mobilisation on the night of the 20th of May. As it became apparent that the occupation of Sharm el Sheikh might well lead to hostilities, the United States Government and Her Majesty's Government issued warnings to casual visitors to the Middle East to leave. By the afternoon of the 23rd of May it was clear that quiet but nevertheless much increased mobilisation measures were being put into force and from all the indications I had from various sources, both then and subsequently, an attack on Egypt was planned to take place at first light on the 24th of May. Meanwhile, however, heavy American pressure to leave it to the United States and to other Powers to secure the opening of the Straits had had its effect on the Government and it was decided not to fight but to send Mr. Eban to the United States to probe these possibilities further. My own instructions arrived after the Government decision had been taken, but there is no doubt that the news of the Prime Minister's intended Margate speech served a useful purpose in convincing the Israel Government that the United States was not alone in realising the gravity of the situation and in being prepared to do something about it.

6. We had got over one hump and another situation (in a series) had been created which made it politically difficult for the Israelis to take any action on their own. Although the possibility of some successful Syrian terrorist action still hung over us, the problem had become concentrated on the Straits of Tiran, to which all eyes were turned. There followed a considerable period when our main preoccupation was lest the Israelis might seek the desired showdown with Egypt by means of some small incident involving the passage of an Israel ship through the Straits, an Egyptian response and a massive Israel counter-response. The Israel Army and their highly efficient intelligence services were, however, thinking about other matters. They observed the reinforcements and consolidation of the Egyptian tanks and aircraft in Sinai. They realised that in the event of a fight with Egypt it was inevitable that they would have to fight on a second front with Syria. They saw the "reasonable" Arabs like King Faisal and King Hussein becoming ensnared in the triumphant progress of the Nasserite bandwagon. They knew that the 23rd of May was about the last date on which they could have caught the Egyptians more or less unprepared and they saw the basic Israel advantages of surprise and the ability to mobilise and deploy rapidly becoming whittled away with each day that passed. They began to see that another situation was imperceptibly arising, which again the Foreign Office and this Embassy had always considered a possible *casus belli*: the effective united large-scale build up of Arab armies designed to attack Israel. Morale among the public began to decline. The economic consequences of maintaining a large scale mobilisation were beginning to be discussed. The diplomatic interlude merely served to increase the feelings in the army of frustration and disillusionment with the political leadership. They still had no doubts about their abilities to take on all comers, but they felt that political delays were liable to increase military difficulties, casualties and the safety in war of the civil population. It is from this period that the demand began to be expressed for greater leadership and more decisiveness in the Government, which was to end in the appointment of General Dayan as Minister of Defence. Meanwhile we in this Embassy were busy watching the situation in the Straits of Tiran like a terrier at a rat hole.

7. The next hump was already visible. Would Mr. Eban bring back enough to satisfy the Israel Government that her interests in the Straits of Tiran could be preserved by other friendly Powers and that Israel did not have to take unilateral action? In view of the feelings of the 200,000 or so voters in the army, the gloomier intelligence appreciations of the situation in the Arab world and the Government's own awareness of its growing unpopularity for inaction, it looked as if the decision was bound to be a fairly close-run thing. On the assumption that Israel military action would have to take a surprise and pre-emptive form; becoming increasingly apprehensive that our appreciation that Nasser did not want a war and therefore would not move first himself might be becoming invalid; and knowing that once hostilities had started the air battle would close down possibilities for civil transport, I decided on the evacuation of dependents of this Embassy.

8. The crucial Cabinet meeting to hear Mr. Eban's case was on the 28th of May.

My American colleague and I were using every argument we could to try and ensure the decision went the right way. In the event it did. In an interview I had with Mr. Allon, the Minister of Labour, immediately after the Cabinet decision, he seemed satisfied that the right course had been taken. But he gave me strong indications again that it was not really the question of the Straits of Tiran which was worrying the Israelis. It was the overall picture. Nasser was moving his armour in a way which suggested Eilat might be his target. He also stressed the importance of the air battle.

9. Since this latter must have played such a vital role in the final Israel decision to strike, perhaps I may be excused if I make some of the salient points which both we and the Israelis have all along had in mind. Israel has one of the most efficient air forces in the world, but it only has four main aerodromes off which to operate and these are in fairly close proximity to each other owing to the geographical formation of this tiny country. Israel also has a highly concentrated urban nexus placed square in the narrowest part of her territory—at one point only 9 miles wide. The Arabs, and in particular the Egyptians, had numerically superior forces and the Egyptians had numerous and widely scattered air bases with most of their bombers (a commodity Israel does not possess) situated in air fields well to the south and near to the Sudanese border. The Israelis could possibly hope to match by superior skill the united Arab Air Forces in the air, but they would take severe losses and there was bound to be some penetration of the urban nexus by Egyptian bombers with resulting civilian hardship. It was therefore obvious that in the event of any type of hostilities with Egypt which went beyond a border clash, the Israelis would have to strike first at the Egyptian airfields in order to stop, completely if possible, the capability of the Egyptians to put their superior and more damaging air force into the air. The converse is equally true, that Israel simply could not afford to allow a first Egyptian strike against her limited airfields. We now know that Nasser was talking of forcing the Israelis into a war but insisting that they must strike first, as though the avoidance of " aggression " as Rule One in the United Nations Wisden were some sort of talisman which would bring ultimate salvation or victory. The fact that Nasser's approach made utter military nonsense in terms of modern warfare cannot really have been foreseen by the Israelis who must have assumed that the Egyptians, with their Russian advisers, must have had at least some rudimentary commonsense. Over a year ago I advised your department that my appreciation was that in the event of hostilities with Egypt the Israel Air Force would have to take action at D minus 5 minutes. In my conversation with Mr. Allon he fairly well confirmed this theory. As one journalist later put it to me, it was like the Western film where the more intelligent hero could not even afford to watch the gun hand of the fast-drawing villain, but watched his eyes for the flicker in them that would indicate that his gun hand was about to move.

10. Externally there followed the period of the steps to organise an International Maritime Declaration or, possibly even, Force. I myself had been rather surprised to gather from Mr. Eban that he thought this period might run into weeks. His estimation was certainly out of tune with what the Israel public felt and certainly what the army felt. The very decision to go for a diplomatic solution had heightened the sense of frustration and put the Israel intelligence services in a state of near despair as they hourly plotted the ascending graph of the Arab potential. Internally this meant that the Government finally had to give way to pressure to include General Dayan in the Cabinet, not only as a sop to the army but as a sop to public opinion as a whole. It really made little difference to overall Government policy, but just as Nasser had to seek his talismans in concepts of the United Nations Charter, so too did the Israel public and army have to have its one-eyed (and far from yellow) idol. It is perhaps typical of Israel political life that this event could not come about without the most agonising contortions among the parties and the political machine as a whole.

11. King Hussein's sudden rush to Cairo, his embrace of Nasser and the certainty that Jordan would now in some way become involved in the fight, caused no major public flutter. Once again the feeling was that this was something that had to happen, it was largely political and it did not really matter very much though it was thought rather surprising that the King had had to go to quite such lengths to demonstrate that he too was a loyal member of the United Arab Command. This was not, however,

the feeling in the Israel intelligence services or in the heart of General Narkiss (Commander of the Central Front) who was expected to hold his long frontier against Jordan attacks with about two brigades. He was given some solace by the strengthening of his command with a little more armour and one extra weak brigade formation. Generally speaking, however, the hope still was that King Hussein, if he had to fight at all, would fight a sort of politico-military war and would do nothing really foolish. Looking back, it now seems rather surprising to me that in the welter of good advice and pressure to which the Israelis were subject, as far as I know, at no time did anyone think of speaking severely to King Hussein about the lunacy of his actions or warn him against attacking Israel seriously. It was left to the Israelis to make a last-minute appeal to him, but by that time His Majesty was telling foreign Ambassadors that all he wanted was " to be left alone with the Israelis ".

12. The major problem facing the Israel Government at this time, quite apart from the bitter pill of General Dayan, was how to maintain the necessary military readiness for what was obviously going to be a long haul, without damaging the economy of the country too badly. Committees were set up and sensible arrangements made to meet the situation. Politically the Government realised that they had again tied their hands, possibly even more firmly than before. Even General Dayan, quite honestly, in conversation with his brother-in-law and other generals who were chafing at inaction, was expounding the doctrine that it would not pay Israel at all to infuriate the Tall Texan by acting on her own when he was dealing with Israel's interests. On Saturday the 3rd of June large numbers of troops were released and the beaches were as crowded as Blackpool in the holiday season. But on the Saturday night the Israel Military Intelligence was at it again. This time they were worried about reports of Iraqi reinforcements on their way to Jordan and Syria, the possibility of Jordanian troops being placed under Egyptian command and arrangements to fly two battalions of Egyptian commandos to Jordan. They had woken up to the fact that they were now probably facing a third *casus belli* which we had always feared—a Nasserite-controlled Jordan. Like the other preceding events things had come about in a very un-clearcut way. The presumption had always been that the gallant little King might lose his throne and that a Government totally hostile to the West (and even more so to Israel) would be in command of the West Bank. It was suddenly appreciated that militarily this was what, in fact, had happened although the previous political outward trappings were still there. There was a further Cabinet on the Saturday night which was inconclusive. Fear of the Tall Texan still won the day. It was for the intelligence services to try and demolish this last obstacle.

13. On Sunday the Cabinet met again and General Yariv, the Director of Military Intelligence, who has told me since that by this time he was the most unpopular man in Israel with the politicians, gave the performance of his life. He explained the great gravity of the new Jordanian threat which would be even worse after the Iraqi brigades arrived. He expounded the dangers of the overall Arab threat drawing extensively on intelligence he had about Egyptian thinking and planning, together with even more significant moves in the shape of tank concentrations. These looked as if Nasser might well be contemplating pre-empting Western efforts to get the Straits of Tiran opened by taking the port of Eilat and therefore rendering the whole question nugatory. He exposed that the diplomatic effort was getting nowhere. I understand Mr. Eban had some embarrassing moments in explaining quite how long the timetable was likely to be—apparently he was less than precise about this in the Cabinet of the 28th of May. Finally Yariv gave an analysis of every piece of information available to him indicating American thinking at all levels. He succeeded in persuading the Cabinet that President Johnson might well not be nearly as angry, if the Israelis took action, as the Israel Cabinet itself thought.

14. The inclusion of Messrs. Beigin, Dayan and Saphir in the Cabinet at this stage was really an irrelevance. Dayan could certainly have been relied on to have supported the military appreciation of the gravity of the threat and the military need to take some sort of action. Basically, however, he did not have to work very hard to convince his colleagues. The overriding military arguments were reinforced by an acceptance that the political disadvantages were perhaps not as grave as they had been thought to be. I assume also that the decision once taken, it was decided to

implement it immediately, thereby regaining to a large extent the element of surprise and illustrating once again, if it needs to be done, the advantage of the short interior lines of communication of this country and the efficiency of the call up procedures which had now had almost three weeks' running-in period. The soldiers on leave were almost invisibly whisked back to their units in the course of Sunday afternoon.

15. When the air raid sirens went at 8 o'clock on Monday morning there was nobody in Tel Aviv who did not think they were merely a practice. They went again about 40 minutes later with no all clear in between, but this was because those responsible had not yet perfected how to differentiate between an alert and an all clear! Certainly nobody knew that the war had started and even the preliminary communiqués indicated little more than a somewhat outsize-scale armoured clash to the south of Gaza. My first reactions, when I knew the war had started, were to feel that quite apart from the brilliance of the military campaign, which I was sure would follow, an even greater feat had probably been in a deception plan unparalleled in history which had probably gone on for days.

16. Perhaps this is still the case and it would certainly be interesting to think so and to try and analyse the scope of this plan. But I do not believe it really. Things were much more simple than that. My American colleague and myself and the other diplomats in Israel are unfortunately not party to Israel Cabinet proceedings, but I am certain, along with my other colleagues, that as late as Saturday night there was no decision to go to war. What passed on Sunday we were not aware of until later. And what passed on Sunday was the convincing of the Israel Cabinet that Israel was faced with a situation incorporating no less than three elements each of which in previous days would have been considered a *casus belli* on its own. This was coupled with an appreciation that neither the Russians nor the Americans would move militarily and that the latter, who were much more of a deterrent to Israel action than the Russians, were unlikely, for a variety of reasons, to react too strongly. All that was left to be seen was the answer to the questions the army had been asking ever since they had become restricted by world diplomatic activities—"How long have we got? Can we at least have 48 hours?" It was to meet this question that the real deception plan was entered upon. Maybe here one can see the hand of Moshe Dayan. At any rate it succeeded, helped by the ineptness of Israel's adversaries in their response and Israel got more than twice its 48 hours. This is really a subject for inclusion in a further despatch on the actual military operations which I have the honour to be preparing parallel with this present effort.

17. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives in Amman, Ankara, Bahrain, Beirut, Bonn, Jedda, Khartoum, Kuwait, Moscow, Nicosia, Paris, Rabat, Tehran, Tripoli, Tunis and Washington; to the United Kingdom Representative at the United Nations in New York; to Her Majesty's Consul-General, Jerusalem; to the Commander, British Forces, Near East; and to the British Interests Section in Algiers.

I have, &c.

R. M. HADOW.

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ER 2/16

Foreign Office and Whitehall Distribution

ISRAEL
6 July, 1967
Section 2

THE SECOND ARAB-ISRAEL WAR, 1967: THE BATTLE

Mr. Hadow to Mr. Brown. (*Received 6 July*)

SUMMARY

1. Who started the war? Almost certainly Israel. Her reasons. (Paragraphs 1–2.)

2. Outbreak of hostilities. The air battle. (Paragraph 3.)

3. Advance into the Gaza Strip and Sinai. (Paragraph 4.)

4. Campaign against Jordan. (Paragraphs 5–7.)

5. The real deception plan and how Israel won time at the United Nations to complete the destruction of Nasser's forces. (Paragraph 8.)

6. The campaign against Syria. (Paragraph 9.)

7. Naval engagements. (Paragraph 10.)

8. Almost unbelievable discrepancy between fighting abilities of Israelis and Arabs. (Paragraph 11.)

9. The end of hostilities. Reactions in Israel. (Paragraph 12.)

10. The Israelis made war. The Arabs thought it was a game according to rules which suited them. (Paragraphs 13–14.)

11. Was this only the first round? (Paragraph 15.)

(No. 19. Confidential) *Tel Aviv,*
Sir, *29 June, 1967.*

In my despatch No. 18 of to-day's date I have described Israel's reactions to events starting with President Nasser's moves in Sinai and the Straits of Tiran which led to general hostilities between Israel and her Arab neighbours early on the 5th of June. I have the honour in this despatch to trace the course of the war as seen from Tel Aviv, in so far as this is possible on the still incomplete information available. In due course, when the fog of war has dispersed, and the Israel military authorities have revealed much more of the picture than they have so far been willing to show, I hope, with the help of my Service Attachés, to provide a detailed military analysis of the campaign.

2. We shall probably never know (and this is perhaps no longer an important question) which side started the fighting. I believed at the time and it is still my view that the Israelis got in the first blow, although there may be substance in their claims, which they say have since been confirmed from captured documents, that the Egyptians were on the point of launching a tank attack to cut off Eilat and an air strike against Israel's airfields. I have said in my parallel despatch that I am pretty certain that the decision to attack was taken on the 4th of June and was influenced by political as well as military factors. By then any hopes Israel may have had that action by the United States and Britain could defeat Nasser's blockade of the Straits of Tiran had disappeared. The closure of the Straits was in any case no longer the central problem for the Israelis who saw that the whole military balance in the area was daily swinging against them, threatening no less than the continued survival of their country. This danger was forceably brought home to them by the news of King Hussein's hurried visit to

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Cairo on the 30th of May to sign a joint Defence Pact with Egypt, and by reports of the movement of Iraqi troops and aircraft into Jordan. Either of these developments would, a few months ago, have been in itself a near *casus belli*. Israel, if she were to keep sufficient forces in the south to defeat the powerful Egyptian Army in Sinai, which by then was estimated to be at a strength equivalent to seven divisions with upwards of 1,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, could not deploy more than a thin defensive screen along the Jordan border. A determined armoured thrust by the Jordanian Army, especially if reinforced by Iraqi brigades, could drive through to the sea at Israel's narrowest point in a matter of hours, cutting the country in two. This, coupled with their fear of a pre-emptive UAR air strike against Israel's airfields and cities, must have seemed to the Israel Government an unacceptable risk. There could only be one answer—to strike first before the odds became too great.

3. The first official intimation of the commencement of hostilities was telephoned to my Defence Attaché by the Israel Military Liaison Officer at 8.35 a.m. local time on the 5th of June. The message simply said that fighting had broken out in Southern Israel early that morning between Egyptian air and armoured forces advancing towards Israel, and Israel forces which had "advanced to stop them". I subsequently learned that the opening shots had been fired at about 7 a.m. At 7.45 a.m. the Israel Air Force made its first strikes against Egyptian airfields in Sinai, the Cairo/Canal complex and the Nile Valley. This operation was carried out with surgical precision. Within the first three hours every major airfield in Egypt capable of launching bombing raids against Israel had been put out of use, and the Egyptian Air Force had ceased to exist as an effective instrument of war. No Egyptian aircraft succeeded in penetrating Israel's air space, and no Egyptian bombs fell on Israel territory. Later in the day, airfields in Syria, Iraq and Jordan, from which sporadic attacks had been carried out against civilian targets in the narrow waist of Israel north of Tel Aviv, received the same treatment. There were no Arab air strikes on major IAF airfields, but one transport plane was destroyed by a Jordanian Hunter attack on Kfar Sirkin, and Syrian aircraft three times attacked a disused airfield at Megiddo which had been disguised for decoy purposes to resemble the main Israel air base at Ramat David. By shortly after noon on the 5th of June the Israel Air Force had undisputed mastery of the air. Their score card by that time showed the destruction of 400 Arab aircraft (including 300 Egyptian) for the loss of only 19 of their own. Strikes by Israel aircraft on Arab airfields were made on subsequent days to keep them out of operation, but the greater part of the IAF could now be used in support of ground operations.

4. On the ground, Israel forces attacked at the eastern end of the Gaza Strip breaking through to the coast at El Arish. Egyptian forces in the Gaza area were cut off and subsequently subdued. The Israelis fanned out from El Arish westwards along the coast and southwards towards Abu Ageila. Meanwhile two other Israel armoured columns broke into Sinai at Ketsiot and Quntileh.

5. Attacks commenced almost simultaneously from across the Jordan border, despite a last minute attempt by the Israel Government through General Odd Bull, the head of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organisation, to persuade King Hussein to agree to a mutual arrangement of non-belligerency. The Israelis had no plans to attack Jordan, and their dispositions on the Jordan front were purely defensive and manned entirely by reservists. From the middle of the morning of the 5th of June, Jordanian artillery shelled agricultural settlements inside the Israel border, and their long-range guns bombarded the main centres of urban population in the coastal strip causing damage in or near Tel Aviv, Peta Tikva, Nathanya and Lod. In Jerusalem, indiscriminate fire was opened on the New City, and Jordanian troops seized Government House, the headquarters of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organisation, in an apparent attempt to enfilade into the Israel sector. These Jordanian attacks made little military sense, but they inflicted serious civilian damage and casualties, and could not have been better calculated to enrage the Israelis and force them to do battle.

6. At first only holding operations were possible in the Tulkarm and Kalkilya sectors with the weak Israel forces immediately available on that front. But

one Israel brigade from Northern Command (Syrian Front) launched an attack in the afternoon from the north towards Jenin which was successful by nightfall. Its main job was to capture the high ground from which Jordan artillery could shell the main IAF airfield at Ramat David. At dawn on the 6th of June Israel forces took Latrun and fanned out from Jenin. The air force and ground forces silenced Jordanian artillery positions in the Tulkarm and Kalkilya areas which had kept up a steady bombardment for 24 hours. The thrust through Latrun took the high ground on the way to Jerusalem and Ramallah was occupied by the afternoon. After reinforcements, including tanks and paratroops, had been brought up from the Negev, Jerusalem was surrounded by an Israel pincer movement along the heights, though Jordanian forces still held out in the Old City and continued to shell and mortar the Israel sector and such parts of Jordan Jerusalem as had fallen into Israel's hands.

7. By all accounts, individual soldiers and units of the Jordan Legion fought stubbornly and skilfully, but Jordanian generalship and the administrative handling of their forces was barely one whit more competent than that of the Egyptians. Without air cover, the Jordanian armour, some of which failed to reach the scene of action for lack of fuel, was at the mercy of the Israel Air Force. King Hussein had had his wish and found himself " alone with the Israelis ". What he found was not to his taste and he embarked on a series of desperate appeals to the British and American Governments, through their Ambassadors in Amman, for help to bring the fighting to a speedy end. On your instructions, I twice made representations (as did my United States colleague) to the Israel Foreign Ministry for a cease-fire, but by then it was too late. Events were moving too fast. Having been provoked into a fight which they did not want, and had done their best to avoid, the Israelis were in no mood to listen to King Hussein's pleas that they should give him a chance to opt out. In any case, far from scaling down the fighting, the Jordanian troops on the ground were attacking even more strongly than before near Nablus and in the Old City. The Israelis were doubtful whether King Hussein was still in a position to control his own forces, or any longer in touch with the military situation (a point of view which seemed later to be confirmed by reports from Her Majesty's Ambassador in Amman on the 7th of June that, unless the Israelis ceased their attacks, the Jordanians would counter-attack with everything remaining to them, including " the use of aircraft "). The Israelis suggested that King Hussein should demonstrate his desire to end the fighting by dismissing his Egyptian Commander, but this he was either unable or unwilling to do. Jordanian resistance continued at Nablus and in the Old City of Jerusalem during the early part of the 7th of June, but was subdued later in the day. When the cease-fire took effect Israel forces were in occupation of the whole of the West Bank, and the surviving Jordanian forces had withdrawn eastwards across the Jordan River.

8. Meanwhile, in Sinai, the question was no longer whether the Israelis would win but whether they would be given enough time to complete the destruction of Nasser's armour, which was now streaming back in confusion on all routes westwards to the Suez Canal. On the 7th of June Egyptian tank forces were decimated by ground and air attacks in the areas of Bir Gafgafa and the Mitla Pass, and by the end of the day their escape routes to the Canal had been blocked by Israel forces which had got behind them. On the same day an Israel force landed from the sea, supported by paratroops who were landed on a nearby airfield, occupied Sharm-es-Sheikh without opposition, after its Egyptian garrison had withdrawn to avoid being cut off by the main Israel advance to the north. At the time the Israel military authorities disclosed very little information about these operations, neither to the public nor the Press, nor, despite the strongest urging of my American colleague and myself, to our Service Attachés. There were sufficient local pointers to show that the battle was going Israel's way. The complete absence of activity by the Egyptian Air Force, for example, was in itself an indication of the extraordinary success achieved by Israel strikes against enemy airfields. But, helped by false or greatly inflated Arab propaganda claims, the true extent of Israel's successes was concealed from the outside world, enabling extra time to be bought at the United Nations. It was not until some 36 hours after the Security Council met to consider a cease-fire that the Russians and the Indians, acting on behalf of the Arabs,

realised the danger to their friends and dropped their opposition to a simple cease-fire resolution. Even then the Egyptians continued to delay their acceptance of the cease-fire giving the Israel forces still further time in which to complete the tasks they had set themselves. When firing eventually ceased on the 8th of June, all that was left of the Egyptian forces was the smoking wreckage of their aircraft, armour and other impedimenta, and a pathetic rabble of disorganised troops, who had cast off their boots to hasten their flight, and were now painfully making their way back through the Israel lines to the doubtful sanctuary of the west bank of the Canal.

9. For all their martial bombast the Syrians had a healthy respect for Israel's military capabilities, especially in the air, and were much less eager than King Hussein to sacrifice themselves on the altar of Nasser's ambitions. The war was almost a day old before the Syrian Army entered the lists. Apart from two infantry attacks, supported by tanks, on the 8th of June, which were easily driven off, activity soon confined itself to the traditional Syrian sport of shelling Israel settlements within range of the guns which overlooked the Hula Valley and all the border southwards to the Sea of Galilee. The Syrian bombardment was heavy and sustained. Much damage was caused to Israel kibbutzim, though civilian casualties were fortunately light owing to the use of well-constructed shelters. Here the women, children and infants lived for five days without ever coming up. Continual attacks by the Israel Air Force reduced the shelling but had little effect on the Syrian gun positions which were deeply dug in and expertly camouflaged. They could not be attacked on the ground until sufficient Israel forces could be assembled to make this possible. By the evening of the 8th of June, the Israelis had brought up heavy reinforcements, released by the cessation of hostilities in Jordan and Sinai, and were ready to move in. But, inexplicably as it then seemed, the attack was held off. I have since learned on good authority that, despite strong pressure from the army, Israel Ministers, including General Dayan, did their utmost to avoid an advance into Syria, believing that, as Damascus was the nerve centre of Russian influence in the Middle East, the consequences of prodding in that region could have been disastrous. I believe too that the Americans, at the request of Mr. Eshkol, passed messages on the 8th of June to the USSR to the effect that Israel had no intention of attacking if the Syrians would agree to an early cease-fire, and later told the Soviets that it was not the intention of Israel to attack Damascus. But the Syrians, believing perhaps that the Israel overtures were a sign of weakness, delayed their acceptance of the Security Council's call for a cease-fire, while continuing their damaging bombardment of Israel settlements. The Israel Government could no longer hold out against army and pressure from the northern kibbutzim. On the 9th of June Israel forces attacked simultaneously at a number of points in the north between Banias and Gadot, and in the south near Tel Katzir. After some heavy fighting against determined Syrian opposition, the Israel attacks were successful and the enemy's strong defensive positions astride the Roshpinna–Kuneitra road were enveloped by advances on the north and south. On the southern sector of the front the Syrian's will to fight was broken by continual air attacks and Israel troops were airlifted on to the high ground by helicopter. From then on their advance to the eventual cease-fire line proceeded rapidly at all points. By the 10th of June when a cease-fire took effect they had secured the whole of the Syrian escarpment forward of a line between Banias through Kuneitra and Darbashiya to El Hamma. Despite Syrian claims to the contrary, there is no evidence that they advanced further towards Damascus, though with the collapse of Syrian resistance it would have required little extra effort for them to have taken the capital within a matter of hours.

10. To round off this catalogue of unrelieved Arab defeats, it remains only to mention that the Egyptian Navy made little attempt to exploit its clear superiority over the puny naval forces of Israel. Its intervention in the war was limited to some ineffective shelling of positions in the Gaza area captured by Israel forces—an action which indirectly contributed to the tragic attack made in error by Israel torpedo boats and planes of the Israel Air Force on an American survey ship which foolishly, and without notifying her presence, strayed too close to the Sinai coast. The Israel authorities have put out contradictory statements of attacks by their vessels at Alexandria and Port Said on the night of the 5th–6th of June, and claim to have

damaged Egyptian submarines operating off Haifa. But nothing is known with certainty about these engagements, other than that the Egyptians hold prisoner six Israeli naval " frogmen ".

11. The battle areas which my Service Attachés have so far visited show relatively little evidence of hard fighting, and they believe that the Israel military authorities may in some cases have exaggerated the strength of the enemy resistance. If so, this would be in line with the Israelis' policy of concealing the full extent of their successes in order to win time at the United Nations. It does not however detract from the superb performance of their forces which fully measures up to our own earlier military assessments of their morale, fighting ability and technical competence. These were not élite professional troops lavishly equipped with the most modern equipment, but for the most part civilian reservists, with comparatively limited training behind them, who were carried into battle in civilian transport, and were supplied and supported by essentially civilian services. By comparison, the professional Arab armies showed a total lack of appreciation of the essential elements of modern warfare, and an almost equal inability to use the sophisticated weapons and equipment provided by their Russian quartermasters. Their leadership on almost all fronts was inept to a degree which hardly seems possible after 10 years of preparation and training for a war which was to bring about Israel's annihilation.

12. The end of the fighting on the 10th of June left Israel slightly numbed at the magnitude of her victory. There was no general expression of exultation and few outward signs of public jubilation such as marked VE Day in London. Success was accepted calmly, though with a realisation that Israel was now a power in her own right. Demobilised soldiers or those coming home on leave returned as unobtrusively as they had gone, to be welcomed back by their families in private reunions. The immediate mood was one of sadness for the dead. It should be noted that of the killed some 25 per cent were officers and another 15 per cent regular non-commissioned officers, thus illustrating the truth of the story that in the Israel Army the order to " Advance " is replaced by " Follow me ". There was some quiet pride in the military valour of Jewish husbands, sons and brothers, coupled with relief that the civilian population had been spared the suffering and loss which they had expected, and were ready to take, from the Egyptian bombing and naval bombardment of their cities.

13. For those of us who were here throughout the period there was something very inspiring and yet rather terrifying about the orderly and almost imperceptible mobilisation of this citizen army; its rather dispassionate and clinical action in war; and the return of a large portion of it to civilian business-as-usual without fuss or heroics. Another impression is of the ability of the army leaders for brilliant improvisation—even in Sinai much of the advance, often through areas thought impassable, was played off the cuff, and the whole campaign against Jordan was an improvisation from start to finish. If ever the importance of complete command of the air was illustrated this was a case. We should also not forget the tremendous advantage Israel enjoyed from interior lines of communication. Perhaps a remarkable illustration of this can be seen in the experience of one of the drivers of this Embassy who was in the transport section attached to a parachute unit. On Monday morning he was at Nitzana on the edge of Sinai, his truck loaded with barbed wire and camouflage netting. Some time in the afternoon, his unit, whose role was to attack Abu Ageila from the rear, was told that Abu Ageila was falling without their help. They about faced and by dawn on Tuesday morning were taking Latrun. In the afternoon he was in Ramallah and on Wednesday watched the mopping-up operations on the outskirts of the Old City. By Thursday he was in Galilee and spent Friday waiting above the Bridge of the Daughters of Jacob. On Saturday he was half way to Kuneitra. On Monday he was back on leave and " Would you believe it ", he said, " I never unloaded my truck all through this time ".

14. Against this, with the exception of the Syrians who seem to have shown a certain amount of military realism throughout, the Jordanians and the Egyptians seemed to be living in a military Never-Never Land. There was some element in their thinking that war was only a projection of cross-frontier fighting under the Armistice Agreements. Nasser wanted war but only on terms which made military nonsense. To King Hussein it was some

sort of gallant and romantic game. The Ambassadors who were in disfavour on the 4th of June and whom he had told to leave him alone with the Israelis were being appealed to two days later to get the Israelis to stop the fighting. His most successful *coup* in the war was probably the promulgation of the "Big Lie". At one stroke British and American relations with numerous Arab countries were broken, Consulates and reading rooms were attacked and the flow of oil was stopped. Yet hardly was the war over when he was right back in form, suggesting that his shattered forces should be re-equipped by the West so that he could resist Soviet blandishments. For one side the whole thing was some kind of game controlled (unless they were winning) by rules laid down almost 20 years ago together with some they had thought up since. To the Israelis it was a cold-blooded and unwanted surgical intervention. One can only be put in mind of the story of the Spanish Ambassador, who, after a particularly rough audience with Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth I, haltingly proposed that Her Majesty might care for a game of chess. "Sirrah", she replied, "tell your master that the only game I play is the Bloody Game of War".

15. Once upon a time, wars stopped with the surrender of one party or another. Nowadays they stop because of cease fires and armistices imposed from outside. There is no peace treaty; the losers have not really lost and the winners have not really gained. Certainly, the problems for the winners seem more difficult than those for the losers. Already we hear that the Russians have supplied Nasser with 200 MiGs; that there is an airlift of arms and technicians to Cairo; that there have been military alerts and blackouts in Egypt and that, for mysterious reasons, Cairo Airport was suddenly sealed off to all traffic for nine hours. The Israelis are watching this situation with some apprehension although it does not get much publicity in the Israel Press. The appreciation must be that the Russians are only making a series of rather spectacular gestures to maintain the present Egyptian régime in power and that these gestures do not betoken any possibility of some quick *coup* by the Egyptians to try and win back some face in the Arab world. I only hope on behalf of the staff of this Embassy that this appreciation is right.

16. I am sending copies of this despatch to the recipients of my despatch No. 18.

I have, &c.

R. M. HADOW.

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EN CLAIR

PRIORITY TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 717 29 June 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.717 of 29 June.
Repeated for information to Jerusalem.

My telegram No.715 of 29 June.

Jerusalem.

The text of the three laws is as follows

(a) Law for the amendment to the Law and Administration Ordinance.

1. Law and Administration Ordinance 1948, after Section 11A insert 11B the laws, courts and administration of the State shall apply in any area of the State of Israel which the Government may designate by administrative order.

2. This law shall come into force on the day it is passed by the Knesset.

(b) Law for the amendment of the Municipalities Ordinance.

1. After Section 8 of the Municipalities Ordinance insert - (8A) the Minister of the Interior is empowered, at his discretion and without holding the investigation provided for in Section 8, to extend the limits of a given city by including any area which has been designated under Section (116) of the Law and Administration Ordinance 1948.

(b) In extending the limits of a city as aforesaid, the Minister is authorised to appoint by order, from among the inhabitants of the area, additional members of the Municipal Council 7 any member of the Council thus appointed shall serve for the remainder of the Council's term of office, but the Minister is authorised to appoint by order another in his place.

2. This law shall come into force on the day on which it is passed by the Knesset.

(c) Protection of Holy Places Law, 5727-1967. Protection of Holy Places.

1. The Holy Places shall be protected from desecration and any other violation and from anything likely to violate the freedom of access of the members of the different religions to the places sacred to them or their feelings with regard to those places.

Offences.

2. (a) Who ever desecrates or otherwise violates a Holy Place shall be liable to imprisonment for a term of seven years.

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Shaving of the Laws.

3. This law shall add to, and not derogate from any other law.

Implementations and regulations.

4. The Minister of Religious Affairs is charged with the implementation of this law, and he may, after consultations of the religions concerned and with the consent of the Minister of Justice, make regulations as to any matter relating to such implementation.

Commencement.

5. This law shall come into force on the date of its adoption by the Knesset.

Mr. Hadow

Sent 2030Z 29 June
Recd. 2330Z 29 June

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En Clair

PRIORITY JERUSALEM TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 256 29 June 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 256 of 29 June
Repeated for information to Tel Aviv, Amman, Washington and U.K.Mission New York

My telegram No. 252.

Under an ordinance published yesterday the area of Jerusalem under Israeli law and administration has been extended to include the Old City and an area comprising in the north Calandia Airport, in the east Mount Scopus, the Mount of Olives and the villages of Abudis and in the south a point just north of Rachels Tomb 500 metres north of Bethlehem.

2. Travel restrictions and curfew within this area are abolished from today. The West Bank remains under military control and access to it is subject to permit.

3. In the unified city area Israeli currency will be the only legal tender and all Jordanian currency is being called in. On the West Bank Jordanian currency will continue to be used, the cash reserves of commercial banks there are being taken over by the occupation authorities and future exchange and banking arrangements are not yet clear.

4. A single Municipal Council for Jerusalem is to be set up including representatives of the Old City but the structure of this is still under consideration.

Foreign Office pass Washington and U.K.Mission New York as my telegrams 34 and 38 respectively.

Mr. Lewen Sent 1400Z 29 June 1967
Recd 1940Z 29 June 1967
[Repeated as requested]

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EN CLAIR

IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 2203 29 JUNE 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 2203 OF 29 JUNE

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO AMMAN, TEL AVIV AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

TEL AVIV TELEGRAM 711: JERUSALEM.

THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT WAS ISSUED FROM THE OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY YESTERDAY MORNING: QUOTE THE PRESIDENT SAID ON JUNE 19 THAT IN OUR VIEW QUOTE THERE MUST BE ADEQUATE RECOGNITION OF THE SPECIAL INTEREST OF THREE GREAT RELIGIONS IN THE HOLY PLACES OF JERUSALEM. UNQUOTE ON THIS PRINCIPLE HE ASSUMES THAT BEFORE ANY UNILATERAL ACTION IS TAKEN ON THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM THERE WILL BE APPROPRIATE CONSULTATION WITH RELIGIOUS LEADERS AND OTHERS WHO ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED. JERUSALEM IS HOLY TO CHRISTIANS, TO JEWS AND TO MOSLEMS. IT IS ONE OF THE GREAT CONTINUING TRAGEDIES OF HISTORY THAT A CITY WHICH IS SO MUCH THE CENTRE OF MAN'S HIGHEST VALUES HAS ALSO BEEN, OVER AND OVER, A CENTRE OF CONFLICT. REPEATEDLY THE PASSIONATE BELIEFS OF ONE ELEMENT HAVE LED TO EXCLUSION OR UNFAIRNESS FOR OTHERS. IT HAS BEEN SO, UNFORTUNATELY, IN THE LAST TWENTY YEARS. MEN OF ALL RELIGIONS WILL AGREE THAT WE MUST NOW DO BETTER. THE WORLD MUST FIND AN ANSWER THAT IS FAIR AND RECOGNIZED TO BE FAIR. THAT COULD NOT BE ACHIEVED BY HASTY UNILATERAL ACTION, AND THE PRESIDENT IS CONFIDENT THAT THE WISDOM AND GOOD JUDGMENT OF THOSE NOW IN CONTROL OF JERUSALEM WILL PREVENT ANY SUCH ACTION. UNQUOTE

2. THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY A SECOND STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT LATER IN THE DAY:

QUOTE THE HASTY ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION TAKEN TODAY CANNOT BE REGARDED AS DETERMINING THE FUTURE OF THE HOLY PLACES OR THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM IN RELATION TO THEM. THE UNITED STATES HAS NEVER RECOGNIZED SUCH UNILATERAL ACTION BY ANY STATE IN

/THE

THE AREA AS GOVERNING THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF JERUSALEM. THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES WILL BE GOVERNED BY THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT OF 19 JUNE AND THE WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT THIS MORNING. THE VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES HAVE BEEN MADE CLEAR REPEATEDLY TO REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED. UNQUOTE

3. A WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN SUBSEQUENTLY CONFIRMED THAT THIS TOO REPRESENTED THE PRESIDENT'S VIEWS.

F.O. PASS PRIORITY AMMAN 47 TELAVIV 65

SIR P. DEAN

SENT AT 1830/29
RECD AT 1832/29

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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CYPHER/CAT A
FLASH UKMIS NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO 1557 29 JUNE 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 1557 OF 29 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO TEL AVIV AMMAN BEIRUT HOLY SEE AND JERUSALEM.

MYTEL 1551:
JERUSALEM.

WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE TEXT OF THE PROPOSED ARAB DRAFT RESOLUTION, WHICH MAYBE TABLED SOMETIME TO-DAY, IS NOW AS FOLLOWS:-

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

DEEPLY CONCERNED AT THE SITUATION PREVAILING IN JERUSALEM AS A RESULT OF THE MEASURES BEING TAKEN BY ISRAEL TO CHANGE THE STATUS OF THE CITY:

1. DECLARES THAT SUCH MEASURES ARE INVALID:

2. CALLS UPON ISRAEL TO DESIST FORTHWITH FROM TAKING ANY ACTION WHICH WOULD ALTER THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM, AND TO RESCIND ALL MEASURES TAKEN IN THIS REGARD:

3. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE SITUATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RESOLUTION NOT LATER THAN ONE WEEK FROM THE ADOPTION THEREOF.

FO PASS PRIORITY TEL AVIV 253, AMMAN 121 ROUTINE BEIRUT 67, HOLY SEE 3 AND JERUSALEM 11
LORD CARADON
SENT 29/1447
RECD 29/1449

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CYPHER/CAT A

FLASH FOREIGN OFFICE TO UKMIS NEW YORK

TELNO 3427 30 JUNE 1967 (E)

CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 3427 OF 30 JUNE REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON PARIS MOSCOW TEL AVIV COPENHAGEN.
YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 1571: EMERGENCY SESSION MIDDLE EAST.
I REGARD IT AS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE THAT A LATIN AMERICAN RESOLUTION SHOULD BE TABLED TODAY SO THAT THE YUGOSLAV RESOLUTION WILL NOT (NOT) COME TO THE VOTE IN ISOLATION. I AM SURE YOU WILL DO ALL YOU CAN TO INFLUENCE THE SPONSORS IN THIS SENSE. I HOPE THAT AFTER ALL IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO INCLUDE A REFERENCE TO THE APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL IN ADDITION TO A GOOD GENERAL REFERENCE TO A UNITED NATIONS PRESENCE IN THE AREA. BUT THE MAIN OBJECT OF THE RESOLUTION WOULD BE TO GET AS MANY GOVERNMENTS AS POSSIBLE TO VOTE FOR IT AND THUS SECURE THE BLOCKING OF THE YUGOSLAV RESOLUTION.
2. WE HAVE ALSO CONSIDERED WHETHER THE UNITED KINGDOM SHOULD CO-SPONSOR A MORE COMPREHENSIVE RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD INCLUDE PROVISIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT AID AND HELP FOR REFUGEES. THIS WOULD HAVE TO FIT IN WITH THE SWEDISH DRAFT. ALTERNATIVELY A PARAGRAPH COVERING THESE POINTS MIGHT BE INCLUDED IN THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT RESOLUTION. THIS COULD HAVE THE GREAT MERIT OF ADDRESSING ITSELF TO SOME OF THE PROBLEMS WHICH REALLY MATTER NOW. GRATEFUL FOR YOUR VIEWS ON WHETHER THIS WOULD BE TACTICALLY WISE.
3. IF A REASONABLE LATIN AMERICAN RESOLUTION WERE TABLED TODAY (AND WE SHOULD OF COURSE WISH TO SEE THE TEXT FIRST) WE SHOULD BE INCLINED TO VOTE IN FAVOUR OF IT. IF, DESPITE ALL YOUR EFFORTS, THE LATIN AMERICANS CANNOT BE PERSUADED TO TABLE A RESOLUTION, WE WOULD BE INCLINED TO VOTE IN FAVOUR OF A RESOLUTION SPONSORED BY WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ON THE LINES OF YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 1554, BUT YOU SHOULD ASK FOR CONFIRMATORY INSTRUCTIONS BY TELEPHONE /FIRST.

FIRST. OUR ATTITUDE TO THE YUGOSLAV RESOLUTION WOULD SOMEWHAT DEPEND ON WHETHER A LATIN AMERICAN RESOLUTION IS TABLED TODAY. IT WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE MUCH EASIER FOR US TO VOTE AGAINST THE YUGOSLAV RESOLUTION IF WE WERE IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS TO VOTE IN FAVOUR OF A REASONABLE LATIN AMERICAN RESOLUTION. IN TALKING TO OTHER DELEGATIONS YOU SHOULD SAY THAT OUR ATTITUDE TO THE YUGOSLAV RESOLUTION WOULD BE MUCH INFLUENCED BY THE SUBSTANCE OF ANY ALTERNATIVE RESOLUTION (SEE PARAS 1 AND 2 ABOVE).

4. YOU SHOULD OF COURSE REFER FOR INSTRUCTIONS IF THE WORST HAPPENS AND NO LATIN AMERICAN RESOLUTION IS TABLED BUT A VOTE IS REQUIRED ON THE YUGOSLAV RESOLUTION TODAY.

SOSFA SENT 1310Z 30 JUNE 1967

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IMMEDIATE AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 789 30 June, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.789 of 30 June, Repeated for information to Washington, UKMIS New York, UKDel NATO, Tel Aviv, Moscow, Jerusalem and Paris.

My immediately preceding telegram.

If the Americans have already spoken to King Hussein on the lines of Washington telegram No.2180 and this is their final position with regard to Jordan it seems to us very likely that he will throw himself into the Nasser/Soviet camp.

2. There are in fact very few options open to him. When he left here he did not appear to have accepted, any more than other Arabs, that a solution of the Palestine problem acceptable to them cannot be achieved by force of arms. Moreover, he will return to Jordan to find a Government which is doing nothing, and growing disaffection in the army. My despatch No.13 which should reach you by 3 July contains a fuller assessment of this. King Hussein will, I think, be inclined to conclude that to restore his position he needs a massive injection of new military equipment (as after Samu) and also (in present circumstances) a diplomatic victory such as the return of part at least of the West Bank. He may well judge that alignment with Nasser and the Russians offers him the best prospects of attaining these objectives.

3. The alternative is to tighten his belt and go it alone. To have any chance of success this will need drastic action to dismiss or punish members of the High Command of the army and others who showed cowardice or incompetence in battle. And it will be necessary to infuse new life and vigour into the Government. Unless as a result of action within or without the United Nations early progress is made on the re-occupation of parts of the West Bank the King may, for the time being, have to fall back on a small group of East Bank trusties, which would not necessarily augur well for economic and social reconstruction and would lose him Palestinian support.

4. King Hussein is likely to want to know what are the prospects of continuing British military and civil aid. We have been taking a very non-committal line locally, and it is difficult to recommend that we should be more forthcoming in view of the fact,

(a) That the prospect of Jordan's providing a useful stabilising influence in the area now seems remote; and

(b) That our belief that the existence of a stable and comparatively prosperous Jordan would reduce the risk of an Arab/Israeli war has been shown to be false.

/5. I am

5. I am assuming that the Russians are willing to go a considerable way towards rearming and equipping the Arabs. As seen from here they can hardly do less, and there is little hope for real stability or a lasting settlement so long as this supposition is correct. Moreover, if United States policy towards Jordan is roughly as outlined by Mr. Rostow to Sir P.Dean there would seem to be little that Her Majesty's Gowernment can do to retrieve the situation.

6. In all the circumstances, I suggest that the line to take with King Hussein in London might be as follows:-

(a) He must recognize the fact that the Arabs have been decisively beaten in combat by the Israelis and that there are no grounds for supposing that any future engagement would produce a different result.

(b) There is therefore no future in pursuing the will o' the wisp of a grand Arab alliance supported by Russian arms.

(c) The best chance for the survival of Jordan as a non-revolutionary state is to set her house in order with all speed and to work, through the United Nations at first, for the negotiated return of the lost territories (or part of them);

(d) In this context the Jordanian armed forces should be streamlined, the dead wood cut out and a smaller force formed and highly trained in internal security and frontier control rôles.

(e) Stringent measures for the protection and development of the economy should be taken without delay.

7. This would be very unpalatable advice. It would sweaten a very bitter pill if it were possible to add that Her Majesty's Government would continue to give support to United Nations action to restore occupied territories, to give humanitarian assistance and, perhaps, some help in reshaping and strengthening the economy. I take it that our relationship with Jordan will in future be based upon our common belief in the evolutionary (as opposed to the revolutionary) way of life and the thought that an evolutionary Jordan may be helpful to us in our relations with those Arab States where we still have political commitments, and our wish to contain Russian influence in this area. We should be prepared to pay something for this, although we should not, I submit, now, for the reasons given in paragraph 4 above, [gp undec ? underrate] the Hashemite Régime. Nor should we allow our policies to diverge too widely from those of the Americans and from other Europeans. After all, it is the Western position here, rather than an exclusively British one, with which we are now concerned.

/Foreign Office

Foreign Office please pass Immediate to Washington 14, UKMIS New York 90 and UKDel NATO M98 and routine to Tel Aviv 154, Moscow M99, Jerusalem 72 and Paris 17.

Mr. Adams

Sent 0840Z/30 June
Recd 1125Z/30 June

[Repetition to Moscow and Tel Aviv referred for Departmental Decision, repeated as requested to other posts].

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Week Ending

(1699/90/67G)

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
30th June, 1967.

RESTRICTED

Dear Brooks,

Hot line on Middle East

We have been told by a member of the White House Staff that the press were given a fuller briefing on the hot line exchanges than has yet appeared in print but, of the versions which have been published, that of June 16 in "Life" was the best. I enclose a copy of the relevant extract.

RECEIVED
3 JUL 1967
J. I. C. (A)

359/2.

Yours ever,

Peter

(P. A. G. WESTLAKE)

Please send copy with my compliments to:-

F. B. Richards, Esq., CMG, DSC,
Cabinet Office,
London, S.W.1.

Mr Butler
Mr Pallister (No.10)

Asec
Asec 2.
TBL JIC Reg.
7/7

Extract from "Life" of June 16th, 1967

THE PRESIDENCY by Hugh Sidey

.....

Over the hot line - the Middle East

.....

In his first message, Kosygin spoke of the terribly dangerous situation which had arisen in the Middle East and the necessity that Russia and the U.S. not get involved. Johnson's reply was cautious, echoing Kosygin's position that the two major powers should stay beyond the battle. The two men were feeling each other out.

A second flurry of exchanges came when the U.A.R. made its wild charges that the U.S. and British planes had helped Israel. Over the hot line, Johnson and Kosygin gave assurances that neither was getting involved in the shooting. Hours later, as the course of the war became clear, Russia proposed a cease fire and Johnson answered its proposals with our own.

On Wednesday morning came the tense moment when Johnson learned that the U.S. ship LIBERTY had been hit. Not knowing yet what really had happened, the President ordered U.S. planes to scramble to look for survivors and rushed a message to Kosygin explaining that the planes were not going to battle. While that was clattering out to Moscow, Israel admitted that it was responsible. Johnson, who was in the Situation Room, added this new information. Kosygin acknowledged it immediately.

There were more than a dozen messages in this first, historic hot-line exchange. The President now keeps them all - his own messages, Kosygin's messages in the original Russian with the translations on an opposite page - at his desk in a green notebook.

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[redacted]ner/Cat A

PRIORITY NEW DELHI TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

Telno. 1372 30 June, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Commonwealth Office telegram No. 1372 of 30 June. Repeated for information Saving to: Washington, U.K.Mission New York, Rawalpindi

Your telegram No. 1428: Arab/Israel.

Prime Minister's message to Mrs. Gandhi.

I immediately asked for an appointment to deliver the Prime Minister's reply to Mrs. Gandhi personally but could get no response until the evening of 29 June when I received a message that she was too busy to see me herself that day and was leaving New Delhi on 30 June. Would I please deliver it to the Head of her private Secretariat.

2. Although I am afraid that this is a further instance of Mrs. Gandhi's emotional lack of sympathy with British policies and, possibly, of a consequential dislike of being exposed to personal representations thereon, there is, given this attitude of hers, something to be said for communication with her senior officials who will at least read documents, listen to arguments and may be in a better position to get her to pay attention than would result from a direct confrontation.

3. Mr. Haksar apologized for Mrs. Gandhi's inability to receive me before she left New Delhi the following morning. The Prime Minister's letter would be drawn to her attention immediately. He himself read the latter apparently with some care, but volunteered little comment on it beyond saying that it was an interesting and frank letter and that Mrs. Gandhi would study it closely.

4. In more general conversation, Mr. Haksar revealed that he is by no means enamoured of the Arab Governments, though he was careful not to comment in any way on the wisdom of Indian policies. He said that G.O.I. were exceedingly concerned about the closure of the Canal: that a settlement would eventually have to take account of the needs of both Israel and the Arabs: that nevertheless he felt the first stage must be some action by Israel to save the Arab face and put them in a mood to negotiate. He did not believe that it was practical politics to suppose that the Arabs would consider recognition of Israel, undertakings about the waterways etc., until Israel had agreed to withdraw, though he thought it just possible that some sort of continuing process might be worked out, provided the first stage was Israeli withdrawal.

5. I put to him that possibly an Israeli withdrawal might be equated with a terminating of the state of belligerency on all sides as a first stage. He cautiously agreed that it was an interesting proposition to separate the termination of belligerency from the actual recognition of Israel and that he would like to reflect on this. He thought that in the last analysis both Nasser and Hussain might prove negotiable, but he was very doubtful about the Syrians, "who seem to be absolutely fanatical".

6. Finally he said that he was mildly encouraged that there was apparently some slight flexibility in the position of all the interested outside Powers conferring together in New York.

Sent 1120Z 30 June
Recd. 1309Z 30 June

Mr. Freeman
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C.O. S.A.D. F.O. Eastern Dept.
NEW & UN Dept. N.E.A.D.

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RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND THE ISRAEL AMBASSADOR HELD AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE ON FRIDAY, 30 JUNE, 1967.

Present

The Rt. Hon. George Brown, MP — Mr. Aharon Remez

Mr. B.J.D. Maitland — Mr. Yeshayahu Anug

Mr. Remez handed the Secretary of State a message from Mr. Eban about the non-aligned resolution tabled at the special session of the U.N. General Assembly on the Middle East (see copy attached). Mr. Remez tried by numerous means to get the Secretary of State to say what was our attitud to this resolution. Mr. Brown made it clear that he had not yet decided what instructions to send to Lord Caradon about this resolution. He suggested that Mr. Remez should be able to deduce from his speech to the General Assembly and his statement in the House of Commons that he hoped a resolution would be passed which would make easier rather than more difficult a general settlement in the Middle East. He asked Mr. Remez to tell Mr. Eban in reply that he had taken note of what Mr. Eban said in his message.

2. Mr. Remez then tried to discover what the Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister would be saying to King Hussein on Monday. Mr. Brown said that we would try to see in what areas we could co-operate with him and we would hope to find an answer to the question which we understood was being posed in Israel: who exactly is King Hussein today? Mr. Brown offered to give Mr. Remez some account of our talks with King Hussein on Monday evening if this were possible.

3. Mr. Brown then spoke to Mr. Remez about the new refugees crossing the Jordan on the lines of the instructions sent that morning to Mr. Hadow. Mr. Remez said that the Israel Government were using every means short of force to stop these people crossing. They were required not only to say why they wished to leave but also to produce a letter from the mukhtar

/of their

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of their village confirming that these reasons were valid. Many of these new refugees were crossing into Arab territory in order to continue to receive remittances from relatives elsewhere.

4. Mr. Remez went on to speak confidently about the degree of co-operation the Israelis were getting from various Arab authorities. In occupied territory the police forces and municipal authorities had been reinstated and he hoped that schools would open next week. The Jordanian dinar was being maintained except in Jerusalem, where the Israelis had had to introduce their own currency to prevent a black market. Price levels, particularly for foodstuffs, were also being maintained in occupied areas. Even in the refugee camps things were returning to normal, but there had been a somewhat more difficult problem in the Gaza Strip than elsewhere.

5. Mr. Remez then said that the Israelis had captured Jordanian operations orders dated 25 or 26 May which called for the massacre of all inhabitants in areas to be occupied by Jordanian forces. The Israelis intended to publish these orders in a "white book". Mr. Anug intervened to say that this document would show King Hussein in a new light, but Mr. Remez said it was not clear whether King Hussein knew about these orders. Mr. Remez added that these compared unfavourably with Egyptian orders which had also been captured. These provided only for the destruction of airfields and military installations. Mr. Brown said he hoped the Israel Government would choose carefully the moment for publishing this material; they would do well to calculate what its effect would be in the U.N. and elsewhere. In answer to Mr. Brown's question the Ambassador said that there was no objection to the question of these orders being raised with King Hussein on Monday.

6. Turning to Jerusalem Mr. Remez said that members of the Arab municipality were being invited to join the new combined municipality. They were being offered 5 seats out of 16, which was a higher proportion than the Arab population formed in the combined city. He hoped that by next week Jerusalem would be a free and open city.

/7.

7. Mr. Brown then raised the question of the re-equipment of the Arab forces by the Russians. Mr. Reiez said that his Government were inclined to think that the Russians were only supplying enough material to restore the self-confidence of the Arab armed forces and not enough to provoke a fresh outbreak of fighting. He mentioned at this point that the Israelis had received a reliable, but so far unconfirmed, report that 25 or 26 surface-to-surface missiles of a type not hitherto identified in Egypt had been moved from Cairo to the Egyptian-held Canal zone. Finally, Mr. Reiez said that the Israel authorities believed there were 6 or 7 ships sunk in the Suez Canal but that it would not be a long job to re-open the Canal once a decision to do so were taken.

A.M. Palliser, Esq.,
10 Downing Street.

With the compliments of

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1

30 June, 1967.

[Copy of message from Mr Rusk to S. of State, delivered am 30 June to Resident-Clerk]

CONFIDENTIAL

GTE I KNOW THAT YOUR PEOPLE, LIKE OURS, HAVE BEEN WORKING VERY HARD IN NEW YORK TO OBTAIN A SATISFACTORY OUTCOME AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. THERE HAS BEEN THE USUAL AMOUNT OF PASSIONATE ORATORY AND CONFUSED THINKING. BUT AS WE SEE IT, THINGS ARE NOW COMING DOWN TO THE MOMENT OF DECISION. THE YUGOSLAVS HAVE ASKED FOR A VOTE BY TOMORROW NIGHT ON THE NON-ALIGNED RESOLUTION CALLING FOR IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI TROOPS BEHIND THE OLD ARMISTICE LINES. THE ISRAELIS WOULD NOT ACCEPT THE NON-ALIGNED RESOLUTION, AND WE THINK ITS PASSAGE WOULD LEAD ONLY TO FRUSTRATION AND ANOTHER DEMONSTRATION OF UN INEFFECTUALITY. MEANWHILE, A SCANDINAVIAN-LATIN AMERICAN GROUP IS PREPARING TO FLOAT AN ALTERNATIVE DRAFT RESOLUTION WHICH, WHILE ALSO CALLING FOR WITHDRAWAL, LOOKS TOWARD IT AS ONE ELEMENT OF A PACKAGE INCLUDING THE DISENGAGEMENT OF FORCES AND A UN EFFORT TO WORK OUT A DURABLE PEACE SETTLEMENT. WE THINK SUCH A RESOLUTION MAY BE THE ONLY REAL ALTERNATIVE TO AN INDEFINITELY CONTINUED STATE OF BELLIGERENCY IN THE AREA.

GTE FOR THIS REASON I HOPE VERY MUCH THAT GARADON WILL BE INSTRUCTED TO VOTE AGAINST THE NON-ALIGNED DRAFT AND TO SUPPORT THE EUROPEAN-LATIN AMERICAN VERSION. IF, AS WE HOPE, THE LATTER IS ADOPTED, WE SHALL HAVE A BASIS FROM WHICH TO MOVE TOWARD FAIR AND REALISTIC SOLUTIONS OF THE OLD PROBLEMS WHICH HAVE BEDEVILED THE PARTIES THERE.

GTE ONE OF THESE PROBLEMS - JERUSALEM - HAS BEEN MUCH ON OUR MINDS IN THE LAST FEW DAYS. YOU WILL NOTE HOW STRONGLY WE REACTED TO THE ISRAELI SUSPENSION OF ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OVER THE OLD CITY. THE ISRAELIS TOOK THIS ACTION AFTER WE HAD SEVERAL TIMES WEIGHED IN WITH THEM AGAINST HASTY UNILATERAL STEPS THERE. THIS UNFORTUNATE EPISODE, WE THINK, MAKES IT ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT THAT THE ASSEMBLY SET UP MACHINERY NOW TO DEAL CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH THIS AND OTHER MIDDLE EASTERN PROBLEMS.

GTE I KNOW WE CAN COUNT ON YOUR COOPERATION IN TRYING TO STEER THE ASSEMBLY IN THIS DIRECTION. AT BEST WE HAVE NO GUARANTEE THAT WHATEVER THE ASSEMBLY SAYS THE PARTIES WILL COOPERATE. BUT IF THE ASSEMBLY TAKES ACTION WHICH AT THE OUTSET ANTAGONIZES PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT EFFORTS, WE MAY BE IN FOR A VERY BAD TIME. RUSK

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EN CLAIR

FLASH U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 1578 30 JUNE 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1578 OF 30 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, TEL AVIV, AMMAN AND COPENHAGEN.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 1550: MIDDLE EAST.

FOLLOWING IS REVISED QUOTE NON-ALIGNED UNQUOTE DRAFT RESOLUTION INCORPORATING AMENDMENTS TABLED BY YUGOSLAVIA AT THE END OF THE GENERAL DEBATE THIS MORNING. MALAYSIA HAS NOW JOINED THE LIST OF CO-SPONSORS.

BEGINS

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

HAVING DISCUSSED THE GRAVE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST,

NOTING THAT THE ARMED FORCES OF ISRAEL OCCUPY AREAS INCLUDING TERRITORIES BELONGING TO JORDAN, SYRIA AND THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC,

1. CALLS UPON ISRAEL IMMEDIATELY TO WITHDRAW ALL ITS FORCES TO THE POSITIONS THEY HELD PRIOR TO 5 JUNE 1967:

2. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH THE PRESENT RESOLUTION AND TO SECURE, WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANISATION ESTABLISHED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL, STRICT OBSERVANCE BY ALL PARTIES OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARAB COUNTRIES:

3. FURTHER REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO DESIGNATE, AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME, A PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE WHO WILL BE IN CONTACT WITH THE PARTIES CONCERNED IN DEALING WITH THE PROBLEMS OF THE AREA:

4. CALLS UPON ALL STATES TO RENDER EVERY ASSISTANCE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION:

5. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT URGENTLY TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON ISRAEL'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION:

/6. REQUESTS

6. REQUESTS THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL, IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE ISRAEL ARMED FORCES HAS BEEN COMPLETED, CONSIDER URGENTLY ALL ASPECTS OF THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SEEK PEACEFUL WAYS AND MEANS FOR THE SOLUTION OF ALL PROBLEMS -- LEGAL, POLITICAL AND HUMANITARIAN, THROUGH APPROPRIATE CHANNELS, GUIDED BY THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, IN PARTICULAR THOSE CONTAINED IN ARTICLES 2 AND 33.

ENDS

F.O. PASS IMMEDIATE MOSCOW 237, PARIS 238, TEL AVIV 261, AMMAN 127, AND ROUTINE COPENHAGEN 113.

LORD CARADON

SENT 30/1944Z
RECD 30/1950Z

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

E.K.

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EN CLAIR

F L A S H UKMIS NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1582 30 JUNE 1967

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ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 1582 OF 30 JUNE
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW PARIS TEL AVIV
AMMAN AND COPENHAGEN.
MY TELNO 1578: MIDDLE EAST.
FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A RESOLUTION NOW TABLED BY TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO, PANAMA, PARAGUAY, COSTA RICA, ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CHILE, GUATEMALA, BOLIVIA, HONDURAS, MEXICO, GUYANA, EL SALVADOR, JAMAICA, NICARAGUA, ECUADOR, COLOMBIA, VENEZUELA :-
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
CONSIDERING THAT THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE IS AN UNAVOIDABLE OBLIGATION OF ALL MEMBER STATES AND CONSEQUENTLY THAT THEY SHOULD ABSTAIN FROM THE USE OF FORCE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SPHERE:
CONSIDERING ALSO THAT THE CEASE-FIRE ORDER ISSUED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND ACCEPTED BY THE STATE OF ISRAEL AND BY THE STATES OF JORDAN, SYRIA AND THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC IS A FIRST STEP TO REACH A JUST PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH SHOULD BE CONFIRMED BY OTHER MEANS THAT THE ORGANISATION MIGHT ADOPT AND THE PARTIES ENFORCE:
1. CALLS URGENTLY UPON
(A) ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW ALL ITS FORCES FROM ALL THE TERRITORIES OF JORDAN, SYRIA AND THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC WHICH IT HAS OCCUPIED AS A RESULT OF THE RECENT CONFLICT:
(B) THE PARTIES IN CONFLICT TO PUT AN END TO THE STATE OF BELLIGERENCY TO ENDEAVOUR TO ESTABLISH A CO-EXISTENCE BASED ON GOOD NEIGHBOURLINESS AND TO RESORT IN EVERY CASE TO THE PROCEDURES FOR PACIFIC SETTLEMENT AS SPECIFIED IN THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

2. REITERATES THE CONVICTION THAT NO STABLE INTERNATIONAL ORDER CAN BE BASED ON THE THREAT OR THE USE OF FORCE, AND DECLARES THAT THE VALIDITY OF OCCUPATION OR ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY SUCH MEANS SHOULD NOT BE RECOGNISED.

3. REQUESTS THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO CONTINUE WITH A SENSE OF URGENCY THE CONSIDERATION OF THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

/COOPERATING

COOPERATING DIRECTLY WITH THE PARTIES AND RELYING ON THE PRESENCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS,

(A) IN ORDER TO CARRY OUT THE PROVISIONS OF OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 1(A) ABOVE;

(B) TO GUARANTEE THE FREEDOM OF TRANSIT THROUGH THE INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS OF THE REGION;

(C) TO OBTAIN AN ADEQUATE AND COMPLETE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF REFUGEES; AND

(D) TO GUARANTEE THE INVIOLABILITY OF THE TERRITORY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES OF THE REGION, INCLUDING TO THIS EFFECT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DE-MILITARIZED ZONES.

4. REAFFIRMS, AS IN PREVIOUS RECOMMENDATIONS, THE DESIRABILITY OF ESTABLISHING AN INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR THE CITY OF JERUSALEM, WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS 22ND SESSION.

F O PASS MOSCOW 240, PARIS 241, TEL AVIV 263, AMMAN 129 AND COPENHAGEN 114.

LORD CARADON

SENT 2204Z/30 JUNE 1967
RECD 2205Z/30 JUNE 1967

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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ERW

EN CLAIR
IMMEDIATE U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1585 30 JUNE 1967

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO 1585 OF 30 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW PARIS TEL AVIV AMMAN COPENHAGEN.
MY TELNO 1582: MIDDLE EAST.
TEXT OF LATIN AMERICAN RESOLUTION IN MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE WAS AS READ BY THE TRINIDAD REPRESENTATIVE. THE FOLLOWING SUBSTANTIVE TEXT, WHICH HAS VERBAL DIFFERENCES, HAS NOW BEEN CIRCULATED AS ASSEMBLY DOCUMENT A/L523:-
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
CONSIDERING THAT ALL MEMBER STATES HAVE AN INESCAPABLE OBLIGATION TO PRESERVE PEACE AND, CONSEQUENTLY, TO AVOID THE USE OF FORCE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SPHERE,
CONSIDERING FURTHER THAT THE CEASE-FIRE ORDERED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND ACCEPTED BY THE STATE OF ISRAEL AND THE STATES OF JORDAN, SYRIA AND THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC IS A FIRST STEP TOWARDS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A JUST PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, A STEP WHICH MUST BE REINFORCED BY OTHER MEASURES TO BE ADOPTED BY THE ORGANIZATION AND COMPLIED WITH BY THE PARTIES.

1. URGENTLY REQUESTS:
(A) ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW ALL ITS FORCES FROM ALL THE TERRITORIES OF JORDAN, SYRIA AND THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC OCCUPIED AS A RESULT OF THE RECENT CONFLICT:
(B) THE PARTIES IN CONFLICT TO END THE STATE OF BELLIGERENCY, TO ENDEAVOUR TO ESTABLISH CONDITIONS OF COEXISTENCE BASED ON GOOD NEIGHBOURLINESS AND TO HAVE RECOURSE IN ALL CASES TO THE PROCEDURES FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT INDICATED IN THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:

2. REAFFIRMS ITS CONVICTION THAT NO STABLE INTERNATIONAL ORDER CAN BE BASED ON THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE, AND DECLARES THAT THE VALIDITY OF THE OCCUPATION OR ACQUISITION OF TERRITORIES BROUGHT ABOUT BY SUCH MEANS SHOULD NOT BE RECOGNIZED:

/3....

3. REQUESTS THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO CONTINUE EXAMINING THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST WITH A SENSE OF URGENCY, WORKING DIRECTLY WITH THE PARTIES AND RELYING ON THE PRESENCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO:
(A) CARRY OUT THE PROVISIONS OF OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 1(A) ABOVE:
(B) GUARANTEE FREEDOM OF TRANSIT ON THE INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS IN THE REGION:
(C) ACHIEVE AN APPROPRIATE AND FULL SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF THE REFUGEES AND GUARANTEE THE TERRITORIAL INVIOLABILITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES OF THE REGION, THROUGH MEASURES INCLUDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DEMILITARIZED ZONES:

4. REAFFIRMS, AS IN EARLIER RECOMMENDATIONS, THE DESIRABILITY OF ESTABLISHING AN INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR THE CITY OF JERUSALEM, TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS TWENTY-SECOND SESSION

F O PASS MOSCOW 243 PARIS 244 TEL AVIV 266 AMMAN 130 COPENHAGEN 115.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT 2342Z 30 JUNE 1967.
RECD AT 0215Z 1 JULY 1967.

REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister.

Here are the telegrams
you discussed on
the phone with
the Foreign Sec.

T.W

1/7

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE U.K. MISSION NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1593

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
30 JUNE 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 1593 OF 30 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON PARIS MOSCOW TEL AVIV COPENHAGEN.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 3427: MIDDLE EAST: EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION.

TWO IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS TOOK PLACE TODAY. FIRST WE HEARD THAT THE YUGOSLAVS AND THE OTHER SO-CALLED NON-ALIGNED DELEGATIONS WERE WORKING ON SUBSTANTIAL AMENDMENTS TO THEIR DRAFT RESOLUTION. WHEN WE SAW THE AMENDMENTS (THE TEXT OF THE REVISED DRAFT IS IN MY TELNO 1578) WE REALISED THAT THE CHANGES WERE INDEED SUBSTANTIAL. THE PROVISION (PARAGRAPH 3) FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO MAKE CONTACT WITH THE PARTIES AND THE REFERENCE (PARAGRAPH 6) TO ARTICLE 2 OF THE CHARTER WHICH INTER ALIA REFERS TO QUOTE THE PRINCIPLE OF THE SOVEREIGN EQUALITY OF ALL ITS MEMBERS UNQUOTE MAKES THE DRAFT A GOOD DEAL MORE ATTRACTIVE. SEYDOUX (FRANCE) TOLD US THAT HE WOULD VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THIS NEW DRAFT AND WE KNOW THAT HE HAS BEEN LOBBYING FRENCH AFRICANS AND OTHERS TO DO LIKEWISE.

2. THE SECOND IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT OF THE DAY WAS THE TABLING THIS AFTERNOON OF THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT RESOLUTION (SEE MY TELNO 1585). THE LATIN AMERICAN GROUP WORKED THROUGH THE DAY FROM EARLY THIS MORNING BUT WE FEARED AT ONE TIME THAT THE APPEARANCE OF THE REVISED YUGOSLAV DRAFT MIGHT LEAD THEM TO HOLD BACK. SO WE WERE RELIEVED WHEN THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT WAS EVENTUALLY TABLED, SPONSORED BY 18 LATIN AMERICANS - AND WE GATHER THAT SOME OF THE LATIN AMERICANS WHO WERE NOT PREPARED TO SPONSOR (SUCH AS URUGUAY) DECLINED TO DO SO BECAUSE IT WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY PRO-ISRAELI. WE DO NOT OF COURSE AGREE WITH EVERYTHING IN THE LATIN AMERICAN RESOLUTION AND WE SHALL HAVE TO RESTATE OUR POSITION EXPLAINING OUR VOTE BUT I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT WE SHOULD VOTE IN FAVOUR OF IT.

3. WHEN THEREFORE THE PRESIDENT ANNOUNCED THAT THE VOTING WOULD /NOT

NOT TAKE PLACE TILL MONDAY IT SEEMED THAT WE NOW HAD A CLEAR FIELD WITH TWO HORSES (THE YUGOSLAV AND THE LATIN AMERICAN) LEFT IN THE RUNNING, IT MAY STAY LIKE THAT BUT AS THINGS LOOK AT PRESENT NEITHER RESOLUTION CAN BE SURE TO ESCAPE A BLOCKING THIRD SO THERE MAY WELL BE FURTHER CONSULTATIONS AND VARIATIONS BETWEEN NOW AND MONDAY.

4. WE MUST, HOWEVER, MAKE OUR ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON VOTING ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE TWO RESOLUTIONS (YUGOSLAV AND LATIN AMERICAN) REMAIN UNCHANGED - WITH PROBABLY THE YUGOSLAV RESOLUTION BEING TAKEN FIRST.

5. THE YUGOSLAV RESOLUTION WILL CERTAINLY ATTRACT A SUBSTANTIAL VOTE - POSSIBLY 60 OR EVEN MORE - BUT THERE IS A LIKELIHOOD OF A BLOCKING THIRD IF THE LATIN AMERICANS OR NEARLY ALL OF THEM VOTE NO. (RUDA (ARGENTINE) THINKS MOST WILL VOTE NO). WE STILL HAVE TO DO A ROUND UP OF PROBABLE NO VOTES. THE AMERICANS WILL WORK HARD TO GET THE MAXIMUM AND WE GATHER THAT THE DANES AND CANADIANS AND ITALIANS AND NORWEGIANS WILL STICK TO THEIR INTENTION TO VOTE NO, WITH SEVERAL OTHER WESTERN EUROPEAN AND OTHERS FOLLOWING THEIR EXAMPLE.
6. A LOT WILL DEPEND ON OUR DECISION. IF WE DECIDE TO VOTE NO SEVERAL WAVERERS WILL BE INFLUENCED TO DO LIKEWISE, WHEREAS IF WE DECIDED TO ABSTAIN THIS MIGHT MAKE ALL THE DIFFERENCE IN LOSING A BLOCKING THIRD.

7. IF THE YUGOSLAV DRAFT GETS A TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY I THINK THAT THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT MUST BE REGARDED AS A WRITE OFF. WE STOPPED TO CONSIDER WHETHER, IF THE YUGOSLAV RESOLUTION IS PASSED, WE MIGHT ATTEMPT TO PASS THE LATIN AMERICAN TEXT TOO (ON GROUNDS THAT THEY ARE NOT BASICALLY CONTRADICTORY) BUT I DO NOT THINK THAT THIS IS A PRACTICAL POSSIBILITY.

8. IF THE YUGOSLAV DRAFT FAILS TO GET A TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY WHAT CHANCE IS THERE THAT THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT WILL PASS WITH A TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY? VERY LITTLE I AM AFRAID. THE COMMUNISTS AND THE ARABS AND THOSE WHO SYMPATHISE WITH THEM WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY

/ BE ABLE

BE ABLE TO MUSTER A BLOCKING THIRD.

9. WE HAVE HAD SOME PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATION WITH THE AMERICANS ABOUT CONTINGENCY PLANNING IN THE EVENT OF NEITHER OF THE RESOLUTIONS RECEIVING THE NECESSARY TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY. THE AMERICANS SUGGESTED THAT WE MIGHT THEN PUT FORWARD A SIMPLE RESOLUTION REQUESTING THE ASSEMBLY TO RECOMMEND TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL THAT HE SHOULD SEND A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE AREA. BUT THIS PROPOSAL MIGHT ALSO FAIL, AND GOLDBERG IS NOW INCLINED TO AGREE WITH ME THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO LEAVE FUTURE ACTION TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

10. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WE HAVE ONCE AGAIN REVIEWED THE QUESTION WHETHER WE SHOULD VOTE AGAINST OR ABSTAIN ON THE YUGOSLAV REVISED RESOLUTION. IF WE ABSTAIN WE SHALL VERY MUCH OFFEND THE AMERICANS AND OTHERS WHO HAVE WORKED CLOSELY WITH US IN RECENT WEEKS AND IF THE BLOCKING THIRD IS NOT OBTAINED WE SHALL BE ACCUSED OF HAVING SOLD THE PASS. MOREOVER, WE HAVE THROUGHOUT MAINTAINED THAT IT IS UNREALISTIC AND UNSOUND TO CALL ON THE ISRAELIS TO WITHDRAW TO THEIR 4 JUNE POSITIONS WITHOUT ANY ASSURANCE THAT THEY WILL THEN GET SATISFACTION FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS TO THEIR FUTURE SECURITY. THE YUGOSLAV DRAFT DOES NOT PROVIDE THE ESSENTIAL LINK BETWEEN WITHDRAWAL AND OTHER ACTION.

11. BUT THERE ARE ARGUMENTS THE OTHER WAY. THE YUGOSLAV REVISED DRAFT HAS MADE AN EFFORT TO COME SOME WAY TO MEET THE VIEWS OF THOSE WHO WANT A BALANCED RESOLUTION. IT CAN ALSO BE CONTENDED THAT IF WE ARE TO GET A BETTER ATMOSPHERE FOR DEALING WITH FUTURE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEMS AND ANY EARLY PROSPECT OF COOPERATION WITH THE RUSSIANS AND THE FRENCH, IT WILL BE A MISTAKE TO INFLICT A DEFEAT ON THE ARABS HERE IN THE UNITED NATIONS IN ADDITION TO THE DEFEAT THEY HAVE SUFFERED IN THE CONFLICT. CERTAINLY A NEGATIVE VOTE ON THE YUGOSLAV RESOLUTION WILL BE BITTERLY HELD AGAINST US HERE BY THE ARABS FOR LONG TO COME AND WILL NO DOUBT DO US LASTING DAMAGE ELSEWHERE.

/ 12.

12. IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO MAKE A RECOMMENDATION ON THIS. MY OWN VIEW ON BALANCE IS THAT WE SHOULD STICK TO THE LINE WE HAVE TAKEN THROUGHOUT AND VOTE AGAINST THE YUGOSLAV RESOLUTION AND THEN VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE LATIN AMERICAN RESOLUTION.

13. I SHALL BE VERY GRATEFUL IF YOU CAN GIVE ME YOUR DECISION ON THIS QUICKLY SINCE WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO TELL OUR FRIENDS SOON WHAT WE PROPOSE TO DO ON THE VOTE. GOLDBERG STRONGLY PRESSED ME ON THIS TODAY AND SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON WOULD REGARD THIS AS SUFFICIENTLY IMPORTANT TO SEND A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

14. WHEN YOU HAVE TAKEN YOUR DECISION YOU MAY THINK THAT THERE IS STILL TIME TO DO SOME LOBBYING PARTICULARLY IN SOME AFRICAN CAPITALS.

F O PASS PARIS 247, MOSCOW 245, TEL AVIV 269 AND COPENHAGEN 117.

LORD CARADON

SENT Ø125Z/Ø1 JULY 19 67
RECD Ø126Z/Ø1 JULY 1967

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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ERW

Private Secretary,
10, Downing Street.

With the compliments of

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1

30. 6. 1964

No. 10

Record of Conversation

TFB 30/6

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND SIR BARNETT JANNER, M.P., HELD AT THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON FRIDAY, 30 JUNE, 1967, AT 1 P.M.

Present:

The Rt. Hon. George Brown, M.P.

Sir Barnett Janner, M.P.

Mr. T. F. Brenchley

Sir B. Janner said that he had tried to put down a Private Notice question about the Yugoslav Resolution which was now before the Special Assembly of the United Nations. As this had been disallowed, he had sought this ~~concession~~ conversation with Mr. Brown. He now understood that the matter might be a little less urgent than he had supposed.

2. Mr. Brown said that we could not be quite sure of the timing. Apart from the Russian and American Resolutions which were not likely to come to the vote, the Yugoslav Resolution was the only one at present on the table. It might therefore come to a vote that day. But on the whole this seemed unlikely. The deadline for tabling resolutions had been fixed for 3 p.m. on Monday and a great deal of work, in which we were involved, was in progress on the preparation of a more constructive resolution than that tabled by

/the Yugoslavs.

the Yugoslavs. The chances were that no vote on the Yugoslav Resolution would be taken before this alternative resolution had been tabled, probably on Monday.

3. Sir B. Janner said that he had been disturbed by rumours which had reached him that Lord Caradon might have been instructed to abstain on the Yugoslav Resolution. To him, it seemed impossible that we could do anything but vote against it.

4. Mr. Brown said that no instructions on voting had yet been given to Lord Caradon. He was of course in constant touch with New York, but he preferred not to decide on the voting until the whole picture was clear. A good deal depended on what resolution either than the Yugoslav Resolution might be coming to the vote.

5. Sir B. Janner pointed out that the Americans would be voting against the Yugoslav Resolution. This was a matter on which he regarded it as impossible for us to get out of line with the U.S. Government.

6. Mr. Brown said that for his part he had no sure information on American voting intentions. His understanding was that they, like ourselves, were waiting to see what the alternatives were before taking a final decision on voting. Sir B. Janner admitted that this might be the case but said that he had nevertheless no doubt how the American vote would be cast.

/7.

7. Mr. Brown said that he had taken full note of Sir B. Janner's views. Similar views had been strongly expressed to him by the Israel Embassy and by others. But there were additional points which he, as Foreign Secretary responsible for British interests in the area, had to take into account. He was quite sure what his own attitude would be if he were in Sir B. Janner's position. But he was not; he was Foreign Secretary and had to consider all the implications. However, Sir B. Janner could assure his contacts that Mr. Brown had noted carefully what had been said to him.

8. Sir B. Janner asked whether he could see Mr. Brown again before the matter came to a head. Mr. Brown replied that, on the assumption that this would be on Monday, he would certainly hope to be able to have a further discussion with Sir B. Janner on that day.

CONFIDENTIAL June 30, 1967

When the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary met this morning they briefly discussed the situation in the U.N. General Assembly arising out of the Middle East debate.

The Foreign Secretary explained the position as regards the "non-aligned" draft and the other draft being prepared by a more moderate group. He explained that the latter draft was not wholly satisfactory from our point of view. But we should be in a difficult position if we were confronted with the need to vote on the "non-aligned" (Yugoslav~~ia~~) draft. A vote against this would be very ill-received by the Arabs; we should probably have to abstain. The Prime Minister suggested that this might be very difficult if, as appeared from Mr. Rusk's message to the Foreign Secretary, the Americans intended to vote against it and that the Government might face considerable difficulties if we took a less firm line in this matter than the U.S. Government. The Foreign Secretary pointed out that vital British interests were more at stake in the Arab world than those of the U.S. and that he had hoped we should be able to abstain on this resolution. But he recognised the difficulties to which the Prime Minister was referring and that we might in fact have to vote the same way as the United States.

The Prime Minister urged strongly that Lord Caradon should be instructed to press for the inclusion in any appropriate resolution of a call for an imaginative developed plan by the U.N. and its special agencies for the Middle East as a whole, including adequate financial provision for the refugees. He thought that the United States Government would be willing to offer a substantial contribution to such a plan and that a gesture of this kind should have considerable appeal for the Arabs. The Foreign Secretary said that the latter were at the moment so concerned with politics that he doubted whether such a proposal could conveniently be fitted into the current framework of discussion of the resolutions. But he agreed that Lord Caradon could perhaps try to have such a concept included.

The Foreign Secretary also explained the position about the Arab draft resolution on Jerusalem and the instructions sent to Lord Caradon about this.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Reid (Cabinet Office).

Michael Palliser

D.J.D. Maitland, Esq., C.M.G., O.B.E.,
Foreign Office.

PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister

This is likely to
have to be raised when
the Assembly meets
tomorrow or Monday.

It is important
that how we
respond on Armagh
prisoners doesn't
damage it!

MW
4/7

CONFIDENTIAL (c.c. Sir Burke Trend)

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

Middle East - United Nations General Assembly

The Prime Minister discussed with the Foreign Secretary on the telephone at 12.50 p.m. to-day the instructions to be sent to Lord Caradon in response to the latter's telegram from U.K. Mission, New York, No. 1593 of June 30.

The Foreign Secretary explained the difficult position we were in resulting from the fact that the "non-aligned" (Yugoslav) Resolution had now been amended so as to make it considerably less objectionable but still unsatisfactory from our point of view; but that if we voted against it and helped ensure that it thereby failed to get a two-thirds majority in the Assembly, while at the same time not succeeding in getting either a vote or a two-thirds majority for the Latin American Resolution, our relations with the Arabs would be deplorable and our economic and financial interests, as well as our general interests in the Arab world, might suffer very seriously. Equally, however, if we abstained on the non-aligned draft and thereby (as was quite possible) produced a situation in which it might receive a two-thirds majority, we should infuriate the Americans and possibly create a difficult situation for ourselves subsequently in the Security Council. If it looked as if we were going to vote this way, the Prime Minister could probably expect to receive a message from the President.

After discussion it was agreed that Lord Caradon should be told to make it clear that he expected instructions to vote against the non-aligned draft and to vote for the Latin American draft; but that it was essential in the view of H.M.G. that the Latin American draft should be brought to the vote. The Foreign Secretary said that this would be a very difficult hand to play, since we could not be sure of reaching a firm decision about the Latin American draft. But if we lobbied hard over the week-end in the capitals concerned and if Lord Caradon lobbied at the United Nations on the basis described above, we might be able to achieve a vote on both resolutions; and conceivably (though he doubted it) a two-thirds majority for the Latin American draft.

The Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary also agreed that if, despite the efforts described above, we were unsuccessful in getting both resolutions brought to the vote we might well be forced at the last minute to abstain on the non-aligned draft rather than vote against it.

The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, after considering the possible economic and financial consequences of an unfavourable British vote on the non-aligned Resolution, agreed that it was unnecessary at this stage to consult the Chancellor of the Exchequer about the proposed instructions to Lord Caradon.

July 1, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A

F L A S H U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1621 3 JULY 1967

CONFIDENTIAL.

YOUR TELNO 3504: MIDDLE EAST.

PARAGRAPH 2 CONTAINS TEXT OF MY STATEMENT IN EXPLANATION OF VOTE BEFORE THE VOTE. NEITHER THIS, NOR THE TEXTS IN M I F T SHOULD BE RELEASED UNTIL THEY HAVE BEEN MADE, SINCE LAST MINUTE AMENDMENTS MAY BE NECESSARY TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF CHANGES OF CIRCUMSTANCE. ANY LAST MINUTE INSERTIONS OR AMENDMENTS WILL BE TELEPHONED ON DELIVERY. WE ASSUME THAT YOU WILL ARRANGE REPETITION TO OTHER POSTS.

2. BEGINS.

QUOTE TODAY AFTER OUR LONG DELIBERATIONS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND IN THIS ASSEMBLY WE COME TO TAKE ACTION. WE ON OUR PART HAVE MADE OUR PURPOSES CLEAR. THEY ARE PURPOSES WHICH WE BELIEVE COMMAND OVERWHELMING SUPPORT IN THIS ASSEMBLY.

WE SHALL VOTE FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL FORCES FROM THE ARAB TERRITORY THEY HAVE OCCUPIED. WE WISH TO TAKE ACTION HERE AT THE UNITED NATIONS THAT WILL END ANY CLAIMS TO BELLIGERENCY, AND WE WANT TO ACHIEVE WITHDRAWAL WITHOUT DELAY.

WE WISH, MOREOVER, TO LAY THE FOUNDATIONS OF A STABLE AND DURABLE PEACE. WE WISH TO BRING URGENT RELIEF TO THOSE WHO HAVE SUFFERED IN THE CONFLICT, AND WE WISH TO BRING THEM JUSTICE TOO. WE WISH TO BRING SECURITY TO EVERYONE CONCERNED. WE WISH TO RESPECT THE RIGHT TO ALL THE STATES CONCERNED TO LIVE IN TRUE DIGNITY AND REAL FREEDOM AND ASSURED PEACE. WE WISH NOT ONLY TO MAKE DECLARATIONS BUT TO TAKE.

/IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE STEPS TO PUT THESE PURPOSES INTO PRACTICAL EFFECT.
WE HAVE DECLARED THESE PURPOSES, AND WE ARE DETERMINED TO PURSUE THEM.

HOW CAN THEY BEST BE ACHIEVED?

WE HAVE BEFORE US TWO RESOLUTIONS WHICH COMMAND SUBSTANTIAL SPONSORSHIP. NEITHER IS FULLY SATISFACTORY, IN OUR OPINION, TO ACHIEVE ALL THE PURPOSES WE HAVE STATED.

I TAKE FIRST THE RESOLUTION PROPOSED BY YUGOSLAVIA AND OTHER DELEGATIONS. IN ITS ORIGINAL FORM IT WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO US LARGELY BECAUSE IT DID NOT TAKE ACCOUNT OF ALL THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION AND THUS WOULD NOT CONTRIBUTE TO THE AIM IT SET. IT WAS INADEQUATE TO ACHIEVE ITS OBJECTIVE. INDEED IT MIGHT WELL PREVENT THE VERY PURPOSE IT DECLARED.

WE RECOGNISE HOWEVER THAT AN EFFORT HAS BEEN MADE TO MAKE SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENTS. IN PARTICULAR THE COUNTRIES WHICH HAD SPONSORED THE RESOLUTION HAVE DECLARED THEMSELVES IN FAVOUR OF THE APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO MAKE CONTACT WITH THE PARTIES CONCERNED. WE HAVE STRONGLY ADVOCATED SUCH A PROPOSAL. WITHOUT SUCH A PRESENCE IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW PRACTICAL PROGRESS CAN BE MADE. IT IS A PROPOSAL WHICH HAS OUR WHOLEHEARTED SUPPORT.

WE ARE ALSO SPECIALLY GLAD THAT THIS RESOLUTION INCLUDES REFERENCE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER AND IN PARTICULAR THOSE CONTAINED IN ARTICLES 2 AND 33. THIS SEEMS TO US A MOST VALUABLE ADDITION.

BUT THE RESOLUTION HAS CERTAIN IMPORTANT DEFECTS TO WHICH I WILL RETURN IN A MOMENT.

I TURN TO THE RESOLUTION PRESENTED TO US ON FRIDAY LAST BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO ON BEHALF OF EIGHTEEN STATES. OUR MAIN CRITICISM OF THAT RESOLUTION IS THAT IT DOES NOT INCLUDE SPECIFIC PROVISION FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. THIS SEEMS TO US A SERIOUS OMISSION, THOUGH IT DOES NOT OF COURSE PRECLUDE THE SECURITY COUNCIL FROM REACHING A

/CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION ON THAT OR ON ANY OTHER ACTION REQUIRED.

WE HAVE SOME RESERVATIONS ON OTHER SECTIONS OF THIS RESOLUTION. FOR INSTANCE, WHILE WE ARE IN FAVOUR OF FULL FREEDOM OF ACCESS TO THE HOLY SITES, WE DOUBT IF IT WILL BE WISE TO ATTEMPT TO STATE ANY IMMEDIATE CONCLUSION ON THE PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH AN INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR THE CITY OF JERUSALEM.

NEVERTHELESS IN SPITE OF THESE RESERVATIONS WE BELIEVE THAT THIS

RESOLUTION CONTAINS VERY VALUABLE AND SUBSTANTIAL PROVISIONS. IT PROVIDES FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORY. IT PROVIDES FOR THE END OF BELLIGERENCY. IT PROVIDES FOR FREEDOM OF TRANSIT THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS. IT STATES ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES, AND WE WARMLY WELCOME THE REFERENCE TO THE NEED FOR A FULL SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF THE REFUGEES. THROUGHOUT IT HAS BEEN ONE OF OUR MAIN PURPOSES TO ASSIST IN ANY WAY WE CAN THE INTERNATIONAL EFFORT TO DEAL WITH THE WIDESPREAD AND ACUTE SUFFERING WHICH THE CONFLICT HAS CAUSED.

NOW THEN WE HAVE TO DECIDE WHICH OF THESE RESOLUTIONS WE SHALL SUPPORT. IN REACHING THIS DECISION WE APPLY THE TEST OF EFFECTIVE-NESS. WE APPLY THE TEST OF WHICH RESOLUTION CAN MAKE PROGRESS TO BRINGING ABOUT THE PURPOSES OF WITHDRAWAL AND SECURITY AND A DURABLE PEACE. IT IS ON THAT TEST THAT WE DECIDE THAT THE SECOND RESOLUTION NOT ONLY CONFORMS WITH THE PURPOSES WHICH WE HAVE SET BUT ALSO OFFERS THE BEST PROSPECT OF ACHIEVING THEM.

WE BELIEVE THAT THE FIRST RESOLUTION PROPOSED BY YUGOSLAVIA AND OTHERS WOULD NOT ACHIEVE THOSE PURPOSES BECAUSE OF SOME OF THE PROVISIONS WHICH IT CONTAINS AND BECAUSE SOME OTHER IMPORTANT PROVISIONS ARE OMITTED. ON THE OTHER HAND WE FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT THE RESOLUTION PROPOSED BY TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO AND OTHERS CAN CONTRIBUTE TO A SETTLEMENT. MY DELEGATION WILL THEREFORE VOTE AGAINST THE FIRST RESOLUTION AND IN FAVOUR OF THE SECOND RESOLUTION.

WE NOW REACH THE CRITICAL STAGE IN OUR DELIBERATIONS. WHAT WE DO NOW OR WHAT WE FAIL TO DO WILL HAVE IMMEDIATE AND FAR-REACHING EFFECTS NOT ONLY TO THE MILLIONS OF PEOPLE DIRECTLY CONCERNED BUT ALSO TO THE FUTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION ITSELF. IT IS

/OUR

OUR CONVICTION THAT THE RESOLUTION WE OPPOSE WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF POSTPONING AND INDEED POSSIBLY FRUSTRATING THE OBJECTIVES WHICH COMMAND SUCH A WIDE MEASURE OF AGREEMENT. ON THE OTHER HAND THE RESOLUTION WE SUPPORT WILL OPEN THE WAY TO A REALISTIC ADVANCE. FOR THAT REASON WE EARNESTLY TRUST THAT THE SECOND RESOLUTION WILL TODAY RECEIVE AN OVERWHELMING MAJORITY. UNQUOTE.

LORD CARADON

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RCD 1556Z 7.

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CYPHER/CAT A
F L A S H UKMIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1622

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
3 JULY 1967

CONFIDENTIAL.
MIDDLE EAST.
FOLLOWING ARE TEXTS OF THE EXPLANATION OF VOTE I SHALL MAKE, AFTER THE VOTE, ON INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPHS OF THE QUOTE NON-ALIGNED UNQUOTE DRAFT AND ON THE LATIN-AMERICAN DRAFT IF THERE IS PARAGRAPH VOTING ON THE LATTER. WE WILL INFORM YOU BY TELEPHONE OF ANY AMENDMENTS MADE AND WHETHER ONE OR BOTH OF THESE EXPLANATIONS IS USED.
2. EXPLANATION OF VOTE ON PARAGRAPH VOTING ON THE QUOTE NON-ALIGNED DRAFT UNQUOTE.

THOUGH MY DELEGATION VOTED AGAINST THE FIRST RESOLUTION PROPOSED BY YUGOSLAVIA AND OTHERS, THAT RESOLUTION, AS I SAID IN SPEAKING BEFORE THE VOTE, CONTAINED MUCH OF VALUE, PARTICULARLY AFTER IMPORTANT AMENDMENTS HAD BEEN INCORPORATED IN IT. I SHOULD NOW LIKE TO EXPLAIN THE ATTITUDE OF MY GOVERNMENT ON THE INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPHS OF THIS RESOLUTION.

2. ON OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 1, WE VOTED IN FAVOUR OF THIS PARAGRAPH BUT WE MUST EMPHASISE THAT IN OUR VIEW WITHDRAWAL MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY ACTION ON OTHER ISSUES. WE CAN ACCEPT THE WORD QUOTE IMMEDIATELY UNQUOTE BECAUSE IN OUR VIEW ALL ACTION SHOULD BE IMMEDIATE. BUT THE WORD QUOTE IMMEDIATE UNQUOTE MUST NOT BE INTERPRETED AS MEANING IN ADVANCE OF OTHER ACTION.

3. ON OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 2, WE VOTED IN FAVOUR, MAKING IT CLEAR THAT WE STRONGLY SUPPORT HELP BEING GIVEN TO THE UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANISATION. WE ARE ALSO IN FAVOUR OF STRICT OBSERVANCE BY ALL PARTIES OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS.

4. ON PARAGRAPH 3, WE SUPPORTED THIS PARAGRAPH FOR REASONS ALREADY GIVEN IN MY SPEECH BEFORE THE VOTE. MY GOVERNMENT HAS STRONGLY ADVOCATED THE APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO MAKE CONTACT WITH THE PARTIES CONCERNED.

/AS MY

CONFIDENTIAL

AS MY SECRETARY OF STATE SAID ON 21 JUNE WHEN ADDRESSING THE ASSEMBLY, IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW PRACTICAL PROGRESS CAN BE MADE WITHOUT SUCH A PRESENCE ON THE SPOT.

5. ON PARAGRAPH 4, WE ABSTAINED SINCE WE VOTED AGAINST THE RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE:

6. ON PARAGRAPH 5, WE ABSTAINED SINCE COMPLIANCE BY ISRAEL ALONE IS SPECIFIED. THIS IS CONTRARY TO OUR FIRMLY HELD VIEWS ON THE RESOLUTIONS AS A WHOLE, WHICH MUST BE BALANCED TO HAVE ANY HOPE OF BEING EFFECTIVE. THIS PARAGRAPH MIGHT ALSO SERIOUSLY AFFECT SUBSEQUENT ACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

7. ON PARAGRAPH 6, WE VOTED AGAINST SINCE THERE IS A REFERENCE TO ACTION BEING TAKEN BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL QUOTE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE ISRAELI ARMED FORCES HAS BEEN COMPLETED UNQUOTE. THIS IS QUITE CONTRARY TO OUR WHOLE POSITION ON THE TWO RESOLUTIONS.

3. EXPLANATION OF VOTE IF THERE IS PARAGRAPH VOTING ON THE LATIN-AMERICA DRAFT.

MY DELEGATION VOTED IN FAVOUR OF THE LATIN AMERICAN RESOLUTION FOR REASONS WHICH I EXPLAINED BEFORE THE VOTE. WE SUPPORTED ALL PARAGRAPHS EXCEPT FOR OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 4. ON THIS PARAGRAPH WE ABSTAINED. IF THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF JERUSALEM APPEARS ONE DAY TO BE BROADLY ACCEPTABLE TO ALL CONCERNED MY GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT OPPOSE IT. BUT THAT IS IN ANY EVENT FOR THE LONGER TERM. OUR ABSTENTION DOES NOT HOWEVER IN ANY WAY DEROGATE FROM OUR DECLARED POSITION VIS A VIS ANY UNILATERAL MEASURES PURPORTING TO ANNEX JERUSALEM, WHICH MY SECRETARY OF STATE PUT VERY CLEARLY TO THE ASSEMBLY IN HIS SPEECH ON 21 JUNE. WE WOULD DEPLORE ANY STEP WHICH IS PREJUDICIAL TO THE STATUS OF THE CITY.

LORD CARADON

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EN CLAIR

F L A S H UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1624 3 JULY

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1624 OF 3 JULY

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, AMMAN, TEL AVIV, PARIS AND MOSCOW.

MIDDLE EAST :

EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION OF THE ASSEMBLY.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF THIRD REVISION OF THE ''NON-ALIGNED'' RESOLUTION AS ANNOUNCED AND CIRCULATED IN THE ASSEMBLY THIS MORNING.

QUOTE.

IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF THE ARMED FORCES OF ISRAEL FROM TERRITORIES BELONGING TO JORDAN, SYRIA AND THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC.

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

HAVING DISCUSSED THE GRAVE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST,

NOTING THAT THE ARMED FORCES OF ISRAEL OCCUPY AREAS INCLUDING TERRITORIES BELONGING TO JORDAN, SYRIA AND THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC,

1. CALLS UPON ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW IMMEDIATELY ALL ITS FORCES TO THE POSITIONS THEY HELD PRIOR TO 5 JUNE 1967:

2. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH THE PRESENT RESOLUTION AND TO SECURE, WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANISATION ESTABLISHED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL, STRICT OBSERVANCE BY ALL PARTIES OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARAB COUNTRIES:

/3. REQUESTS

3. REQUESTS FURTHER THE SECRETAY GENERAL TO DESIGNATE A PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE WHO WILL ASSIST HIM IN SECURING COMPLIANCE WITH THE PRESENT RESOLUTION AND BE IN CONTACT WITH THE PARTIES CONCERNED.

4. CALLS UPON ALL STATES TO RENDER EVERY ASSISTANCE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:

5. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT URGENTLY TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION:

6. REQUESTS THATTHE SECURITY COUNCIL CONSIDER ALL ASPECTS OF THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SEEK PEACEFUL WAYS AND MEANS FOR THE SOLUTION OF ALL PROBLEMS - LEGAL, POLITICAL AND HUMANITARIAN - THROUGH APPROPRIATE CHANNELS, GUIDED BY THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, IN PARTICULAR THOSE CONTAINED IN ARTICLES 2 AND 33.

FO PASS IMMEDIATE TO AMMAN NO. 140, TEL AVIV NO. 282, PARIS NO. 258 AND MOSCOW NO. 253.
LORD CARADON

SENT 1812Z/3
RCD 1821Z/3

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED].

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EASTERN DEPARTMENT

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With the compliments of

SIR PAUL GORE-BOOTH

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

Eastern Department

Talk with Iranian Ambassador

The Iranian Ambassador, Mr. Aram, lunched with me today. We had a tour d'horizon.

Middle East Situation

2. Mr. Aram was very worried about the present U.N. position as it affected both Iran and ourselves. He took a pessimistic view of Arab reactions to our proposed negative vote on the so-called "Non-aligned" resolution and thought that Iran could hardly even abstain. I explained our motives and expressed the hope that they would manage to do this.

3. As regards next steps, the Ambassador said he had been thinking in terms of a possibly valuable part being played by the non-Arab Muslim countries who were not too far away, - particularly Turkey, Afghanistan and Iran. (He thought Ethiopia might help but would have the disadvantage of not being predominantly Muslim.) If the Great Powers (possibly excluding France) could get into some kind of conversation at the Permanent Representative level at the United Nations, the Permanent Representatives of the powers mentioned above might join with them in bringing discussion slowly along towards a more permanent settlement. He realised that the Soviet Government would be difficult but they would have sooner or later to become engaged in a settlement.

4. Mr. Aram expressed considerable anxiety about Soviet expansion in the Middle East and was clearly much worried/

worried by Mr. Podgorny's visit to Syria and Iraq.

Iran-British Relations

5. Continuing this argument Mr. Aram said that he would like soon to have a general discussion of the strengthening of the relations between our two countries since we were both extremely important to each other in present circumstances. He did not have any concrete proposals but thought that we could think of ways in which to contribute to the strengthening of Iran which would be helpful with the Shah. I said that if, in the meantime, I could offer a word of advice, it would be that the Iranians should not fall for the fashionable habit of quarrelling with the Americans. The Americans have a big country and therefore when they made mistakes they made big ones. But it would be an appalling thing for Western Europe if the Americans withdrew from there and I thought it would be equally appalling if they lost interest in the Middle East and also in Iran. Mr. Aram said this was an extremely important point and he hoped Sir Denis Wright would use it with the Shah.

6. I asked the Ambassador how he was finding life in London and he was clearly finding it very rewarding. I mentioned that it was extremely important for him to keep in active touch with all sections of opinion, at the same time commiserating with him in his exercise of having to balance the various strains against each other in order to arrive at what could be called

"British/

"British public opinion".

Other Items

7. Mr. Arem asked for information on talks with Mr. Kosygin in New York and on our talks with King Hussein. I gave him a general idea of the former and said that the Department would be in touch with him about the latter. The Ambassador was most insistent that if only King Hussein could be persuaded to come out and say frankly that the Arabs had suffered a disaster because of disastrous leadership, he could set a whole train of events going which would have the most healthy possible effect. But he recognised that this was very difficult and that any such action would endanger his life.

(P.H. Gore-Booth)
3 July, 1967.

Copied to: Private Secretary
Mr. Thomson
Sir D. Allen
Mr. Garvey
Mr. Brenchley
Sir D. Wright (Tehran)
Sir R. Beaumont
Mr. Palliser
Sir S. Garner

EN CLAIR
IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1631

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
3 JULY 1967

UNCLASSIFIED
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 1631 OF 3 JULY
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW PARIS TEL AVIV
AND SAVING TO OTTAWA AMMAN DUBLIN BRUSSELS RAWALPINDI LIMA
AND SOFIA.
M.I.P.T. : MIDDLE EAST : EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION.
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY RECONVENED AT 3.30 P.M.
GOLDBERG (USA) SPOKE IN EXPLANATION OF VOTE. HE SAID THAT
THE FOLLOWING ESSENTIAL STEPS HAD TO BE TAKEN TO ACHIEVE PEACE
IN THE MIDDLE EAST:-
(A) DIS-ENGAGEMENT AND WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES TO THEIR OWN
TERRITORIES AND AN END TO THE STATE OF WAR AND BELLIGERENCY:
(B) RESPECT FOR THE RIGHT OF EVERY MEMBER STATE TO LIVE IN PEACE:
(C) RESPECT FOR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ALL STATES:
(D) PROTECTION FOR ALL STATES VITAL SECURITY INTERESTS:
(E) AN END TO THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE:
(F) FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN ALL INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS:
(G) A JUST SETTLEMENT OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM:
(H) AN END TO THE WASTEFUL ARMS RACE WITH PRECEDENCE BEING GIVEN
TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL ECONOMIES:
(I) SAFEGUARDING OF THE HOLY PLACES, AND INTERNATIONAL ACCESS TO
JERUSALEM GUARANTEED:
(J) INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS TO HELP ACHIEVE THE ABOVE MEASURES
TO BE CARRIED OUT BY THE UNITED NATIONS OR SOME OTHER THIRD
PARTY.
IN THE VIEW OF THE U.S. DELEGATION THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT WOULD
HELP TO ACHIEVE THESE ESSENTIAL STEPS TOWARDS PEACE BUT THE
YUGOSLAV NON-ALIGNED DRAFT BECAUSE IT ONLY DEALT WITH ONE PART
OF THE PROBLEM WOULD BE INADEQUATE. THE YUGOSLAV DRAFT IN
PARTICULAR OMITTED ANY MENTION OF THE ELEMENTAL RIGHT TO
EXISTENCE. IT DID NOT CALL FOR THE ENDING OF BELLIGERENCY. IT WAS

/ CLEAR

CLEAR AND DEFINITE IN PARAGRAPH 1, (WHICH CALLED FOR WITHDRAWAL) BUT IT WAS VAGUE IN PARAGRAPH 6, IN SPITE OF THE MANY REVISIONS WHICH HAD BEEN MADE TO ELIMINATE PREVIOUS OBJECTIONS. HIS DELEGATION WOULD VOTE FOR THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT, IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THEY WOULD HAVE WISHED IT TO HAVE GONE A LITTLE FURTHER ESPECIALLY WITH REGARD TO ARMS LIMITATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HIS DELEGATION WOULD VOTE AGAINST THE YUGOSLAV DRAFT AND THEY WOULD STRONGLY SUPPORT THE 21 POWER HUMANITARIAN RESOLUTION SPONSORED BY SWEDEN.

2. CREMIN (IRELAND) SAID THAT WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS ALONE WOULD NOT SOLVE THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEMS AND SO HIS DELEGATION WOULD VOTE AGAINST THE YUGOSLAV RESOLUTION AND IN FAVOUR OF THE LATIN AMERICAN RESOLUTION.

3. IGNATIEFF (CANADA) SAID THAT HIS DELEGATION WOULD VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE LATIN AMERICAN TEXT BUT WOULD VOTE AGAINST SOVIET, ALBANIAN AND NON-ALIGNED TEXTS BECAUSE IN THEM WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES WAS NOT RELATED TO THE BASIC ISSUES INVOLVED. HIS DELEGATION WOULD ALSO VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THE 21 POWER SWEDISH RESOLUTION WHICH DEALT WITH THE HUMANITARIAN PROBLEM AND THE PAKISTANI RESOLUTION DEALING WITH JERUSALEM.

4. GROMYKO (SOVIET UNION) SPOKE ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY OF THE NEED FOR WITHDRAWAL, TOTAL AND IMMEDIATE, TO POSITIONS HELD BEFORE 5 JUNE. ISRAEL WAS THE AGGRESSOR BEYOND ANY DOUBT, AND HAD COMMITTED FRESH ACTS OF AGGRESSION IN SINAI ON 1 AND 2 JULY. IF MILITARISM HAD NOT YET STULTIFIED EVERYBODY IN TEL AVIV, THE ISRAELIS SHOULD REALISE BY NOW THAT THEY WERE CUTTING AWAY THE BRANCH ON WHICH THEY SAT. THEY MUST CHANGE THEIR POLICIES. EVERYTHING SEIZED SHOULD BE RETURNED TO THE LAWFUL OWNERS: NOTHING SHOULD BE RETAINED AS A BARGAINING COUNTER. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD VOTE FOR THE QUOTE NON-ALIGNED UNQUOTE DRAFT RESOLUTION.

5. SCHUURMANS (BELGIUM) SAID THE RESOLUTIONS BEFORE THE ASSEMBLY HAD TO BE EXAMINED ON THE BASIS OF HOW THEY CONFORMED WITH THE CHARTER. HIS DELEGATION COULD NOT SUPPORT THE NON-ALIGNED DRAFT. THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT OFFERED THE ASSEMBLY THE BEST CHANCE OF

/ ACHIEVING

ACHIEVING A BALANCED SETTLEMENT, AND HIS DELEGATION WOULD SUPPORT IT.

6. DAVID (CZECHOSLOVAKIA) SAID HIS DELEGATION DID NOT AGREE TO THE OBJECTIONS MADE AGAINST THE SOVIET DRAFT, WHICH WAS PREFERABLE TO ALL OTHERS. AS TO THE U.S. DRAFT RESOLUTION, IF THE ASSEMBLY VOTED FOR THAT, IT WOULD BE ENDORSING THE LAW OF THE JUNGLE. HIS DELEGATION WOULD ALSO VOTE AGANST THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT, AS IT LINKED WITHDRAWAL WITH A NUMBER OF CONDITIONS. HOW COULD THE ISRAELI DECISION TO ANNEX THE OLD CITY OF JERUSALEM BE INTERPRETED AS OTHER THAN PROOF OF FURTHER AGGRESSION? HIS DELEGATION SUPPORTED THE NON-ALIGNED DRAFT. THEY WANTED IT TO HAVE PRIORITY BEFORE THE OTHER DRAFTS CAME TO THE VOTE. CZECHOSLOVAKIA ALSO SUPPORTED THE TWENTY-ONE POWER RESOLUTION TABLED BY SWEDEN, SINCE SHE WAS ALREADY GIVING ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES MADE HOMELESS BY ISRAEL.

7. RAKOTOMALALA (MADAGASCAR) SAID HIS COUNTRY FAVOURED FREE NEGOTIATIONS, RESPECT FOR THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ALL, AND PEACE. THE PROBLEM SHOULD BE SOLVED BY THE CREATION OF DEMILITARISED ZONES BETWEEN THE TERRITORIES OF THE COMBATANTS. THE REFUGEE PROBLEM MUST ALSO CLAIM A HIGH PLACE ON THE LIST OF URGENT QUESTIONS. NEGOTIATIONS WERE ESSENTIAL AND NO SOLUTION COULD BE IMPOSED FROM THE OUTSIDE. MADAGASCAR COULD NOT ASSOCIATE HERSELF WITH ANY DRAFT NOT IN ACCORD WITH THESE POLICIES.

8. SEYDOUX (FRANCE) SAID THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT'S POSITION HAD BEEN MADE CLEAR TO THE ASSEMBLY BY M. COUVE DE MURVILLE ON 22 JUNE. HE WOULD THEREFORE NOT GO INTO THAT AGAIN. BUT HE WOULD COMMENT ON THE DRAFT RESOLUTIONS BEFORE THE ASSEMBLY IN THE LIGHT OF FRENCH POLICY AS THEN DEFINED. THE RESOLUTION TABLED BY YUGOSLAVIA AND OTHER COUNTRIES LIMITED ITSELF TO ESSENTIALS VIZ: (A) WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES: AND (B) SOLUTION OF OTHER OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS. FRANCE COULD NOT COUNTENANCE FAITS ACCOMPLIS. MILITARY OCCUPATION COULD NOT CREATE LEGAL SITUATIONS: TROOPS MUST WITHDRAW TO POSITIONS HELD ON 5 JUNE, WHICH WERE THE QUOTE TRUE FRONTIERS UNQUOTE. FRANCE CONSIDERED THAT OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE QUOTE

/ NON-ALIGNED

NON-ALIGNED UNQUOTE DRAFT WAS NOT REALISTIC, SINCE IT CALLED FOR WITHDRAWAL IMMEDIATELY. IF THIS WORDING COULD HAVE BEEN AMENDED, HE WOULD HAVE PREFERED SUCH A TEXT. BUT FRANCE STILL AGREED ON ITS SUBSTANCE, AS SHE WANTED A LASTING SOLUTION OF OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE REFUGEES, AND OF FREE NAVIGATION. THERE WAS ALSO NEED FOR AN UNDERSTANDING ON GOOD-NEIGHBOURLINESS. FRANCE BELIEVED THAT DISCUSSIONS ON THESE MATTERS WITHIN THE U.N., I.E. IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL OR QUOTE WITHIN ITS FRAMEWORK UNQUOTE, SHOULD BEGIN IMMEDIATELY. ANY UNDERSTANDINGS WHICH EMERGED SHOULD BE ENDORSED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. HIS DELEGATION NOTED THE IMPROVEMENTS TO OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 6 TABLED THIS MORNING. THE DRAFT COULD STILL BE IMPROVED, BUT ITS MERIT WAS THAT IT DEALT WITH THE ESSENTIALS OF THE PROBLEM FACING THE ASSEMBLY. HIS DELEGATION WOULD THEREFORE VOTE FOR THE QUOTE NON-ALIGNED UNQUOTE DRAFT WHILE ABSTAINING ON THE CUBAN AND ALBANIAN AMENDMENTS TO IT.

9. KHATRI (NEPAL) SAID THAT HIS DELEGATION'S POSITION HAD BEEN MADE CLEAR ON 26 JUNE. NEPAL STOOD FOR END OF OCCUPATION OF ARAB TERRITORIES, IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL, AND A CESSATION OF BELLIGERENCY ON BOTH SIDES. HE WOULD HAVE VOTED FOR THE ORIGINAL TEXT OF THE QUOTE NON-ALIGNED UNQUOTE RESOLUTION, BUT ITS THREE REVISIONS CALLED ON ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW IMMEDIATELY TO POSITIONS HELD BEFORE 5 JUNE. THE DIFFICULTY WAS THAT NEITHER PARTY HAD INFORMED THE U.N. OF THEIR EXACT POSITIONS BEFORE FIGHTING BROKE OUT. SO NEPAL COULD NOT SUPPORT THE IDEA OF WITHDRAWING TO UNSPECIFIED LOCATIONS. FURTHERMORE THE QUESTION OF JERUSALEM COULD NOT BE SEPARATED FROM WIDER QUESTIONS NEEDING SETTLEMENT. NEPAL WOULD HAVE TO ABSTAIN ON BOTH THE QUOTE NON-ALIGNED UNQUOTE AND LATIN AMERICAN DRAFTS.

10. PIRZADA (PAKISTAN) SAID THAT THE MOMENT OF DECISION HAD BEEN REACHED ON THE TWO MAIN DRAFT RESOLUTIONS BEFORE THE ASSEMBLY, I.E. THE NON-ALIGNED AND LATIN AMERICAN DRAFTS. THE LATTER DID NOT METE OUT EVEN-HANDED JUSTICE BETWEEN THE PARTIES. OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS 1(A) AND 3(C) MIGHT EVEN BE CONSTRUED TO JUSTIFY THE TERRITORIAL EXPANSION OF ISRAEL AFTER ITS SUCCESSFUL RECOURSE TO FORCE. THE OBJECTIVE OF THE AFRO-ASIAN DRAFT WAS LESS COMPLICATED.

/ THE AGGRESSOR

THE AGGRESSOR WOULD HAVE TO DISGORGE HIS GAINS BEFORE PROGRESS COULD BE MADE ON OTHER PROBLEMS. THIS MEANT THAT WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI TROOPS MUST BE GIVEN ABSOLUTE PRIORITY. THE AFRO-ASIAN DRAFT CONTAINED SUFFICIENT SAFEGUARDS AGAINST RENEWED TENSIONS IN THE AREA, PROVIDED WITHDRAWAL CAME FIRST. NO RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES NEED BE FEARED IF, WHEN ISRAELI TROOPS WITHDRAW, THEY WERE REPLACED BY U.N. FORCES.

11. TARABANOV (BULGARIA) SPOKE ALONG FAMILIAR LINES AND STATED THAT HE WOULD VOTE FOR THE U.S.S.R. RESOLUTION, THE NON-ALIGNED RESOLUTION AND AGAINST THE LATIN AMERICAN RESOLUTION AND THE U.S.A. RESOLUTION IF THE LATTER WERE PUT TO A VOTE.

12. GARCIA SAYAN (PERU) SAID THAT HIS DELEGATION WERE NOT AMONG THE CO-SPONSORS OF THE LATIN AMERICAN RESOLUTION BECAUSE IT OMITTED CERTAIN REQUIREMENTS WHICH THEY FELT WERE NECESSARY. NEVERTHELESS HIS DELEGATION WOULD VOTE FOR THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT AND COULD NOT SUPPORT OTHER DRAFTS.

13. VILLAMIL (HONDURAS) SPOKE IN FAVOUR OF THE LATIN AMERICAN RESOLUTION WHICH HE SAID HIS DELEGATION WOULD VOTE FOR.

14. CSATORDAY (HUNGARY) SAID THAT HIS DELEGATION WOULD VOTE FOR THE NON-ALIGNED DRAFT BUT WOULD HAVE PREFERRED THE U.S.S.R. DRAFT AS THIS WAS THE CLEAREST. THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO HIS DELEGATION AND OF COURSE THE U.S.A. DRAFT WAS COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE.

15. CHEIK OMAR (GUINEA) SPOKE IN FAVOUR OF THE NON-ALIGNED DRAFT WHICH HE STATED HIS DELEGATION WOULD VOTE FOR.

16. WALDHEIM (AUSTRIA) THEN PROPOSED AN IMMEDIATE ADJOURNMENT UNTIL TOMORROW MORNING AT 10.30 TO ALLOW CONTACTS BETWEEN THE SPONSORS OF THE DIFFERENT DRAFT RESOLUTIONS. THIS WAS AGREED WITHOUT VOTE AND THE ASSEMBLY ADJOURNED AT 6.40 P.M.

F O PASS MOSCOW 255, PARIS 260, TEL AVIV 284 AND SAVING TO AMMAN 100, DUBLIN 25, BRUSSELS 1, RAWALPINDI 5, LIMA 2 AND SOFIA 1.

LORD CARADON

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YCC

PRIVATE SECRETARY

Prime Minister - you saw.
But he can't be forgiven.
Keep for other things.
3/7.

Non-Aligned Resolution

Points made by Lord Caradon were as follows:-

1) The non-aligned resolution as now amended in the copy attached meets our requirements because it omits the time reference in para. 5 and makes minor amendments to paras. 4 and 5. Caradon therefore recommends that we should abstain and not vote against.

2) If this were agreed he would make a statement after the vote on the resolution (or resolutions).

3) The Americans do not consider that the resolution as amended is satisfactory. They do not like the reference to June 5 in para. 1 and they contrast the reference to immediate action in para. 1 with the absence of immediacy in para. 6. They will therefore continue to vote "no". They are likely to be very upset with us for changing our minds.

4) The Latin Americans at present intend to continue with their resolution. They will certainly be very distressed at our change of front. If the Yugoslav resolution is carried they may well decide not to press their own resolution to a vote.

5) It is likely that the French Africans will ~~accept~~ the non-aligned resolution as now amended so that it may well get a two/thirds majority anyway.

/ Lord Caradon .....

6) The passing of this non-aligned resolution may of course justify Security Council action by the Soviet Union and their friends based on what they can now regard as "U.N. public opinion". But there is really nothing new in the resolution which would justify drastic action in the Security Council.

Lord Caradon fully recognises the difficulty of making this last-minute change and, with others, is pressing for postponement of the vote until tomorrow. This is possible but by no means certain.

Recommendations

From the narrow U.N. point of view and certainly from the point of view of our relations with Arab States we should accept Lord Caradon's recommendation.

This would be despite the adverse reactions from the United States, from some other Western European countries and from the Latin Americans.

a U.S. Embassy has already asked us on instructions to continue to oppose this item, on the grounds that it calls for unconditional withdrawal.

P. Hayman

(P.T. Hayman)
3 July 1967

Non-aligned Draft Resolution as now amended

The General Assembly,

Having discussed the grave situation in the Middle East,

Noting that the armed forced of Israel occupy areas including territories belonging to Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic,

1. Calls upon Israel immediately to withdraw all its forces to the positions they held prior to 5 June, 1967.

2. Requests the Secretary General to ensure compliance with the present resolution and to secure, with the assistance of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation established by the Security Council, strict observance by all parties of the provisions of the general armistice agreements between Israel and the Arab countries:

3. Further requests the Secretary General to designate, at the appropriate time, a personal representative who will assist him in securing compliance with this resolution and be in contact with the parties concerned.

4. Calls upon all states to render every assistance to the Secretary General in the implementation of the present resolution, in accordance with the Charter of the U.N. — new wording

5. Requests the Secretary General to report urgently to the General Assembly and to the Security Council on ~~Israel's~~ compliance with the terms of the present resolution: — omission

6. Requests that the Security Council (~~, which is already seized of the question,~~) ~~immediately after the withdrawal of the Israel armed forces has been completed,~~ consider ~~urgently~~ all aspects of the situation in the Middle East and seek peaceful ways and means for the solution of all problems -- Legal, political and humanitarian, through appropriate channels, guided by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular those contained in Articles 2 and 33. — omission

8

SECRET

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE KING OF JORDAN AT NO. 10 DOWNING STREET AT 2.30 P.M. ON MONDAY JULY 3, 1967

Present:-

The Prime Minister
The Foreign Secretary

King Hussein

Top copy on Jordan Nov. '64.

The discussion covered the following points.

1. The Jordan internal situation

The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary expressed their regret at the disaster that had befallen Jordan and their concern at reports of the unsettled internal situation there. They also enquired about suggestions that Jordan might be thinking of negotiating a separate peace with Israel; and expressed anxiety at the possible effect this might have on King Hussein's personal position.

King Hussein said that there were naturally grave tensions and difficulties in Jordan, resulting from their military defeat, the influx of refugees and the general shock to Arab morale resulting from the war. There was also the danger of Soviet exploitation of the situation in an East-West context. But he was confident that he could hold the situation in Jordan satisfactorily, provided the Arab cause were not rebuffed at the United Nations and provided Israel were obliged to withdraw from the positions she had occupied. As regards a separate peace, his first objective was an Arab Summit Conference, to try to concert an agreed Arab strategy and a common line on what their

objectives should be - including acceptance of a peace settlement. If this failed, then he might indeed have to "go it alone" - including some kind of separate settlement with Israel. The Prime Minister commented that it would be very rough summit meeting if it took place. King Hussein agreed. The Foreign Secretary said that he thought the King had shown himself by his recent behaviour to be one of the bravest men alive; but he believed that the King could not afford, without serious risk to himself, to take any position in regard to Israel which put him too far ahead of his Arab colleagues in other countries.

2. Anti-British propaganda in Jordan

The Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary welcomed the fact that King Hussein had retracted the charge of British involvement in the fighting, but expressed their concern at the very hostile tone of Radio Amman and its continuing broadcasts of anti-British propaganda. King Hussein took note of this complaint. He said that he would have it examined and he implied that something might be done to moderate the current line of Radio Amman.

3. Israeli charges about orders to the Jordan Army

King Hussein strongly repudiated the allegation that Jordanian troops had orders to massacre Israelis in areas they occupied. This was untrue; no such orders had been issued. But he qualified this with the words "as far as I am aware".

4. Refugees

King Hussein said that he too had heard the report that the Israeli Government was prepared to advise the

the "new refugees" to return to the West Bank. He had every intention of encouraging these refugees to return.

The Prime Minister suggested that they might move into Plenary Session and they were joined by their advisers at 2.45 p.m.

Distribution:
Foreign Secretary
Sir B. Trend

July 3, 1967.

Dsmel (PL 6)

CONFIDENTIAL

Private Secretary

Emergency Session: Middle East
Overnight position, 4 July

The Assembly has adjourned until 3.30 p.m. (10.30 a.m. New York time) on 4 July. Some twenty delegates still have their names down to speak in explanation of vote. Lord Caradon expects to speak during the morning session before the vote. Unless consultations between the Latin Americans and non-aligned delegations result in a new resolution, voting is likely today.

2. At 11.00 p.m. New York time it was still unlikely that the non-aligned/Latin American consultations would result in agreement. The Latins were still demanding inclusion of a link between withdrawal and cessation of belligerence. Both groups realise that there is little or no prospect of their draft resolutions being adopted. There is therefore just an outside chance that, as the French representative has suggested, a short new resolution may emerge stating simply the principle of withdrawal coupled with the need for urgent consideration in the Security Council (and possibly the appointment of a special representative of the Secretary-General). If this happens, the U.K. Delegation will do their utmost to get the vote postponed until a subsequent day.

Non-aligned resolution

3. Lord Caradon has in confidence informed the Delegations with which he has been working of his instructions to vote against the non-aligned draft resolution after abstaining on all

the/...

CONFIDENTIAL

Flag A

the paragraphs if these are put to separate vote (but he will not now ask for such a vote). His draft text of explanation of vote (UKMIS telegram No. 1638) uses virtually the same language as in the previous draft, apart from making the essential criticism of the non-aligned resolution as unbalanced. As he says, "we shall vote for withdrawal, but we must vote for a balanced resolution". He proposes, in view of the possibility of further amendments before the resolution comes to the vote, to say only that he "cannot support" (not that he will vote against) the non-aligned draft. Lord Caradon's telegram No. 1636 sets out the thinking which led him to seek revised instructions on the new non-aligned draft.

(This is really the only significant change)

Flag B

Latin American resolution

4. The Latin Americans are still firm in their intention to bring this resolution to the vote. Lord Caradon will say in his explanation of vote that he "will certainly vote in favour" of the Latin American draft resolution. If there is a paragraph vote, he would vote for all paragraphs except the last, on Jerusalem, on which he would abstain.

5. In the event of the deletion by negative vote of paragraph 1(b) of the Latin American draft resolution (dealing with belligerency), the Latin Americans would vote against and Lord Caradon would vote with them.

Estimate/...

Estimate of vote on "Non-aligned" resolution

6. The best estimate the U.K. Delegation can make of the vote on the non-aligned resolution is 55 - 60 for and between 35 and 40 against; this would furnish a blocking third.

7. The Latin Americans will vote in a block against it. The following Western delegations have told the Delegation that their instructions last evening were to vote against the revised version: U.S.A., Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, Norway, Denmark, Austria. Among other "no" votes of which we have heard are Thailand and, on latest information, probably three French Africans. Sweden and Finland and probably seven French Africans intend to abstain.

Pakistani Draft resolution on Jerusalem

8. This is likely to be adopted by a large majority; the Delegation have instructions to vote in favour. Seven other Western delegations are known to be going to vote for it; others, including the U.S., have doubts about the propriety of calling upon Israel to rescind all its measures in Jerusalem.

R. Hayman

(P.T. Hayman)
4 July 1967

PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister.

Middle East - New York

A useful round-up just round. ?

from the telegrams referred to: how you had only had this.

RW

4/7

EN CLAIR

IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1647 4 JULY 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 1647 OF 4 JULY
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW PARIS TEL AVIV
AND SAVING TO OTTAWA AMMAN WARSAW ADDIS ABABA BELGRADE ULAN BATOR
AND KUWAIT.
MY TELNO 1631 (NOT TO ALL): MIDDLE EAST EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION.

THE ASSEMBLY RECONVENED AT 11.20 THIS MORNING. TOMOROWICZ (POLAND)
SAID THE ASSEMBLY AND THE COUNCIL HAD BEEN SUBJECTED TO CONSTAMT
PROCEDURAL MANOEUVRES, CONTRIVED BY THE U.S. DELEGATION AND
DESIGNED TO PROLONG ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF THE U.A.R., SYRIA
AND JORDAN. WITHDRAWAL WAS THE FIRST STEP TOWARDS QUOTE FURTHER
SOLUTIONS UNQUOTE, AND NO NEGOTIATION COULD TAKE PLACE UNDER
DURESS. HE QUOTED HIS PRIME MINISTER'S POLICY STATEMENT TO THE
SPECIAL SESSION, AND SAID THAT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES
STATED THEREIN, POLAND WOULD VOTE FOR THE SOVIET DRAFT RESOLUTION:
AGAINST THE U.S. DRAFT: FOR THE 22-NATION QUOTE HUMANITARIAN UNQUOTE
RESOLUTION: AGAINST THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT, AND FOR THE DRAFT
PROPOSED BY YUGOSLAVIA AND EIGHTEEN OTHER NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES,
AS IT WAS THE MOST BALANCED, GIVEN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
2. BELOKOLOS (UKRAINE) SAID THAT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
AFTER THE ISRAELI AGGRESSION POINTED TO THE EXISTENCE OF A PRE-
MEDITATED PLAN. THE SOVIET DRAFT RESOLUTION PROPOSED CLEAR MEASURES
TO BE TAKEN IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE U.N. CHARTER TO DEAL WITH
THE CONSEQUENCES OF AGGRESSION. HIS DELEGATION WOULD VOTE IN
FAVOUR OF IT. THE MOST URGENT MATTER ON WHICH ACTION WAS REQUIRED
WAS UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL BY ISRAEL. THE DRAFT PUT FORWARD BY
QUOTE NON-ALIGNED UNQUOTE NATIONS DEALT WITH THIS QUESTION AND
UKRAINE SUPPORTED IT. IT SEEMED TO BE THE MINIMUM THAT THE ASSEMBLY
COULD APPROVE AT THIS STAGE. THE U.S. DRAFT RESOLUTION SIMPLY
DEMONSTRATED AMERICAN COLLUSION WITH ISRAEL AND WAS COMPLETELY
UNACCEPTABLE. THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT PUT VICTIMS AND AGGRESSORS
ON THE SAME LEVEL. AS REGARDS THE REFUGEES, PRIME RESPONSIBILITY
LAY ON ISRAEL.

/ 3. MAKONNEN

3. MAKONNEN (ETHIOPIA) SAID HIS GOVERNMENT TRIED TO BE IMPARTIAL ON MIDDLE EASTERN MATTERS. WITHDRAWAL WAS ESSENTIAL AND MUTUALITY OF RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS MUST BE ACCEPTED BY ALL PARTIES. THE STEPS TAKEN UNILATERALLY BY ISRAEL IN CHANGING THE STATUS OF THE OLD CITY OF JERUSALEM WERE QUITE UNACCEPTABLE TO ETHIOPIA. HE WAS THEREFORE HAPPY TO SEE A CALL FOR NO CHANGE IN THE CITY'S STATUS IN THE RESOLUTION SPONSORED BY PAKISTAN AND OTHERS, WHICH ETHIOPIA SUPPORTED. HIS GOVERNMENT WAS A CO-SPONSOR OF THE QUOTE HUMANITARIAN UNQUOTE RESOLUTION. MAKONNEN THEN APPEALED TO THE ASSEMBLY TO TRY AND BRIDGE THE GAP BETWEEN OTHER RESOLUTIONS NOW LYING ON THE TABLE. ETHIOPIA BELIEVED THAT THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT WOULD HELP THE U.N. TO START ON THE RIGHT FOOT IN AN ATTEMPT TO SETTLE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEMS. THE QUOTE NON-ALIGNED UNQUOTE RESOLUTION, AS FINALLY REVISED, ALSO HAD GOOD POINTS, BUT HE DOUBTED THE WISDOM OF DIVORCING DURABLE SETTLEMENT FROM WITHDRAWAL. IT WAS STILL NOT TOO LATE, EVEN NOW, FOR THE CO-SPONSORS TO GET TOGETHER AND SPARE THE ASSEMBLY FURTHER DISCORD: THIS WAS AN OPPORTUNITY CALLING FOR THE HIGHEST DEGREE OF CONSTRUCTIVE STATESMANSHIP. MEANWHILE, ETHIOPIA WOULD NOT ADOPT A FINAL POSITION ON THE MAIN DRAFTS. HIS DELEGATION THOUGHT THAT THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT CAME NEAREST TO THEIR OWN APPROACH. THEY DID NOT DISAGREE WITH THE SUBSTANCE OF THE YUGOSLAV DRAFT, BUT HAD SOME RESERVATIONS ON SPECIFIC POINTS. THEY WOULD ABSTAIN ON THE SOVIET AND U.S. DRAFTS, AND WOULD NOT TAKE PART IN ANY PARAGRAPH-BY-PARAGRAPH VOTING.

4. DUGERSUREN (MONGOLIA) SAID HE WOULD NOT REITERATE MONGOLIAN POLICY ON THE MIDDLE EAST. AGGRESSION, HOWEVER, COULD NOT BE TOLERATED, AND WITHDRAWAL WAS A PRIME NECESSITY. MONGOLIA WOULD BE GUIDED BY THE PRINCIPLES OF SELF-DETERMINATION, CO-EXISTENCE OF ALL STATES AND OF FREE NAVIGATION THROUGH THE STRAITS (SIC). HIS DELEGATION WOULD SUPPORT THE SOVIET AND QUOTE NON-ALIGNED UNQUOTE DRAFTS, AND ALSO THOSE ON JERUSALEM AND ASSISTANCE TO THE REFUGEES.

5. EBAN (ISRAEL) SAID THAT THE YUGOSLAV DRAFT DID NOT CONTAIN A

/ SINGLE WORD

SINGLE WORD ON THE ENDING OF BELLIGERENCY, THE RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL AND THE FREEDOM OF MARITIME NAVIGATION. THE AMENDMENTS TO IT WERE OF QUOTE PURELY VERBAL SIGNIFICANCE UNQUOTE AND HAD CHANGED NOTHING OF SUBSTANCE.

THE ARABS WOULD BE ALLOWED TO ACT AS THOUGH WAR WAS STILL GOING ON, THREATENING ISRAEL WITH TERRORISM AND BLOCKADE. THIS WOULD RECONSTRUCT PRECISELY THE SITUATION WHICH AFFLICTED ISRAEL IN THE LAST WEEKS OF MAY WHEN THE VETO-LOCKED SECURITY COUNCIL REFUSED TO COUNTENANCE THE MILDEST PLEA FOR THE END TO BELLIGERENCY. ARAB GOVERNMENTS ONLY ACCEPTED THE CHARTER INSOFAR AS IT EXCLUDED ISRAEL FROM THE APPLICATION OF ITS PROVISIONS. NO ARAB STATE HAD SAID THAT IT WOULD RECOGNISE ISRAEL AS A STATE MEMBER OF THE UNITED NATIONS WITH FULL SOVEREIGNTY AND INTEGRITY WITH WHOM THEY WILL LIVE TOGETHER IN PEACE. THE SECURITY COUNCIL, ALTHOUGH UNABLE TO PREVENT HOSTILITIES, HAD AT LEAST REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE KIND OF RESOLUTION WHICH YUGOSLAVIA WAS NOW PRESENTING TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. THIS RESOLUTION STOOD AS A BARRIER TO PEACE. ONLY BY ITS REJECTION COULD PEACE POSSIBLY RETURN TO THE AREA.

6. HE SAID THAT ISRAEL WOULD SUPPORT THE DRAFT RESOLUTION ON AID TO REFUGEES BECAUSE OF THE HUMANE PURPOSES BEHIND IT. THIS WAS IN CONTRAST TO THE POLICY OF ARAB GOVERNMENTS WHO NOT ONLY WISHED TO CONQUER ISRAEL BUT ALSO TO MASSACRE THE CIVILIAN POPULATION. ARAB POPULATIONS WERE IN NO PERIL IN ISRAELI-OCCUPIED TERRITORY. MEASURES WERE BEING TAKEN TO ENSURE THE WELFARE OF THE INHABITANTS, INCLUDING THE APPOINTMENT OF A TEAM OF EXPERTS TO PREPARE PROPOSALS FOR THE REHABILITATION OF ARAB REFUGEES. HE SAID THAT THE ISRAELI DELEGATION WOULD BE GUIDED IN VOTING FOR THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT RESOLUTION BY THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES:

(A) THAT THE DISENGAGEMENT OF FORCES AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE SHOULD BE LINKED.

(B) THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR A PEACE SETTLEMENT MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF VITAL SECURITY INTERESTS.

(C) THAT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ISRAELI SHIPPING IN THE SUEZ CANAL AND THE ELIMINATION OF THE MARITIME BLOCKADE IN THE GULF

/ OF AQABA

OF AQABA SHOULD STEM FROM AN EXPRESSION OF NON-BELLIGERENCY.

(D) THAT SOVEREIGN STATES SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO FIX THEIR PERMANENT FRONTIERS BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT AMONGST THEMSELVES.

(E) THAT JERUSALEM SHOULD BE PRESERVED IN UNITY AND PEACE WITH ACCESS TO ALL TO VISIT ITS HOLY PLACES.

7. HE STATED THAT HIS DELEGATION COULD NOT ACCEPT THE PAKISTAN RESOLUTION AS JERUSALEM. THIS INTEREST IN THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM HAD NOT ARISEN IN 1947 WHEN THE ARABS BOMBARDED THE CITY AND ACCESS TO THE WESTERN WALL WAS THEN BARRED FOR TWENTY YEARS. THE PAKISTAN RESOLUTION WOULD RESTORE THE BARBED WIRE AND THE MINEFIELDS AND IT APPEARED THAT THE UNITED NATIONS HAD AN INTEREST IN CONTINUING DIVISION OF THE CITY. HIS GOVERNMENT HAD TAKEN MEASURES IN JERUSALEM TO PROTECT THE HOLY PLACES AND TO CARRY OUT AN ADMINISTRATIVE AND MUNICIPAL UNION IN AN QUOTE ECUMENICAL SPIRIT UNQUOTE. CONSULTATIONS WERE STILL GOING ON TO ELABORATE A SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENT FOR THE HOLY PLACES.

8. I THEN SPOKE IN EXPLANATION OF VOTE (TEXT SENT SEPARATELY).

9. AL-SAYIGH (KUWAIT) STATED HIS POSITION ON THE TWO DRAFT RESOLUTIONS. HE SAID THAT THE NON-ALIGNED RESOLUTION HAD AS ITS BASIC PHILOSOPHY THE MAINTENANCE OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER, WHEREAS THE LATIN AMERICAN RESOLUTION SET ASIDE THOSE PRINCIPLES. THE LATIN AMERICAN RESOLUTION, HE CONTINUED, PAID LIP SERVICE TO THE GOAL OF WITHDRAWAL BUT NOT TO AUTHENTIC WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES. IT FAILED BY EVERY TEST OF AUTHENTICITY IN THAT IT DID NOT REQUIRE COMPLETE, PROMPT AND UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL. MOREOVER, IT STUDIOUSLY AVOIDED ANY REFERENCE TO THE POSITION OF THE GAZA STRIP. IT WAS SELECTIVE IN ITS INCLUSIONS AND EXCLUSIONS AND IT ACCEPTED THAT THE WATERWAYS IN THAT AREA WERE INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS, AND THUS PRE-JUDGED THE ISSUE. HE STATED THAT HIS DELEGATION WOULD VOTE AGAINST THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT AND EACH INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH IF NECESSARY. HE ENDED BY SAYING THAT THE PASSAGE OF THIS RESOLUTION WOULD MEAN THAT NO SMALL STATE IN THE FUTURE COULD RELY UPON THE UNITED NATIONS STEPPING IN TO PROTECT IT IF IT WERE INVADED BY ANY OUTSIDE COUNTRY.

10. THE MEETING THEN ADJOURNED UNTIL 4 P.M. THIS AFTERNOON.

SEE M.I.F.T.

F.O. PASS MOSCOW 258, PARIS 263, TEL AVIV 287 AND SAVING TO AMMAN 101, WARSAW 2, ADDIS ABABA 38, BELGRADE 3, ULAN BATOR 1 AND KUWAIT 5.

LORD CARADON

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EN CLAIR
IMMEDIATE U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1648 4 JULY 1967
UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO 1648 OF 4 JULY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW PARIS TEL AVIV AND SAVING TO OTTAWA AMMAN LAGOS FREETOWN VALETTA PORT OF SPAIN AND RANGOON M.I.P.T. (NOT TO ALL): MIDDLE EAST:EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION.

THE ASSEMBLY RESUMED HEARING SPEECHES BEFORE THE VOTE AT 4.30 P.M.

2. COLE (SIERRA LEONE) SAID THAT HIS COUNTRY STRONGLY DISAPPROVED OF TERRITORIAL GAINS MADE THROUGH CONQUEST. IT LOOKED FOR WORKABLE SOLUTIONS, BRINGING A DURABLE PEACE. IN HIS VIEW, THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT RESOLUTION WAS THE BEST BEFORE THE ASSEMBLY, AS IT LAID EMPHASIS ON NEGOTIATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES. HE WOULD SUPPORT THE SWEDISH QUOTE HUMANITARIAN UNQUOTE RESOLUTION AND, BECAUSE THE INTENTION OF THE PAKISTAN RESOLUTION WAS RATHER SIMILAR, HIS DELEGATION WOULD SUPPORT THE DRAFT ON THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM.

3. GURINOVICH (BYELO-RUSSIA) SAID THAT NOBODY NOW DOUBTED THAT ISRAEL WAS THE AGGRESSOR. HIS DELEGATION FULLY SUPPORTED THE SOVIET DRAFT RESOLUTION. THEY REJECTED THE U.S. AND LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT RESOLUTIONS AND IN ADDITION TO VOTING FOR THE SOVIET RESOLUTION WOULD SUPPORT THE NON-ALIGNED DRAFT AND THE PAKISTANI RESOLUTION ON JERUSALEM.

4. ENAHORO (NIGERIA) MENTIONED BRIEFLY HIS COUNTRY'S SIX-POINT PEACE PLAN, STATED EARLIER IN THE DEBATE. IT WAS MOST UNFORTUNATE THAT A COMPROMISE RESOLUTION BETWEEN THE TWO MAIN DRAFTS HAD NOT PROVED POSSIBLE. SINCE THIS WAS SO, HIS DELEGATION HAD STUDIED THE LATIN

/ AMERICAN

AMERICAN AND NON-ALIGNED DRAFTS. IT HAD DECIDED IT COULD NOT SUPPORT THE PROPOSALS IN THE FORMER, BUT WOULD SUPPORT THE NON-ALIGNED DRAFT, ALTHOUGH IT DID NOT PROVIDE FOR AN EFFECTIVE U.N. PRESENCE. HE SAID THAT NIGERIA'S UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD NOW ADDRESS ITSELF TO THE WHOLE RANGE OF MIDDLE EAST PROBLEMS: THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE WOULD NOT BE PRECLUDED FROM CARRYING OUT HIS TASK: AND THAT INITIATIVE WOULD REST QUOTE UNEQUIVOCALLY UNQUOTE WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

5. U SOE TIN (BURMA) SAID HIS COUNTRY SUPPORTED THE SECOND OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH IN THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT. BURMA ALSO SUPPORTED UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL, BUT IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE LATIN AMERICAN RESOLUTION CALLED FOR WITHDRAWAL WITHOUT CONDITIONS. IN THE QUOTE NON-ALIGNED UNQUOTE DRAFT, OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 6 CALLED FOR THE SOLUTION OF PROBLEMS ACCORDING TO ARTICLES 2 AND 33 OF THE CHARTER. THIS WAS MOST WELCOME AND SHOULD SECURE LASTING PEACE IN THE REGION. BURMA WOULD THEREFORE ABSTAIN ON THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT, AND VOTE FOR THE QUOTE NON-ALIGNED UNQUOTE RESOLUTION.

6. PARDO (MALTA) SAID HIS COUNTRY WOULD ABSTAIN ON BOTH MAIN DRAFTS UNDER DISCUSSION, I.E. THE NON-ALIGNED AND LATIN AMERICAN, AS NEITHER WAS FULLY SATISFACTORY OR LIKELY TO BE FULFILLED. MALTA WOULD HOWEVER VOTE FOR THE QUOTE HUMANITARIAN UNQUOTE DRAFT ON REFUGEES.

7. ABDULLAH KAMIL (INDONESIA) SAID THAT HIS COUNTRY STRONGLY BELIEVED THAT MEASURES TO PROMOTE PEACE BETWEEN THE ARAB NATIONS AND ISRAEL MUST BE BASED ON IMMEDIATE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, SO THAT A FRUITFUL ATMOSPHERE FOR A LONGER TERM SETTLEMENT MIGHT BE CREATED. INDONESIA WOULD THEREFORE SUPPORT THE QUOTE NON-ALIGNED UNQUOTE RESOLUTION AND WOULD VOTE FOR ANY AMENDMENTS TO IT WHICH MADE IT MORE ACCEPTABLE TO DELEGATIONS.

8. SOLOMON (TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO) SAID THAT HE HAD POSTPONED HIS SPEECH BEFORE THE VOTE THREE TIMES IN THE LAST 24 HOURS TO SEE IF ANY UNDERSTANDING COULD BE ARRIVED AT BETWEEN THE SPONSORS OF THE ONLY TWO DRAFTS NOW UNDER SERIOUS CONSIDERATION. BUT ANY CONSENSUS MUST BE BASED ON AN HONEST APPRECIATION OF THE FACTS. HIS COUNTRY WOULD VOTE

/ AGAINST

AGAINST THE QUOTE NON-ALIGNED UNQUOTE DRAFT BECAUSE IT DID NOT GO FAR ENOUGH: IT ONLY LOOKED AT ONE SIDE OF THE PICTURE. WITHDRAWAL BY ITSELF WAS NOT SUFFICIENT: THE PARTIES MUST RENOUNCE THE STATE OF BELLIGERENCY CONTINUING BETWEEN THEM. THE STEADY REFUSAL TO ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF CESSATION OF BELLIGERENCY HAD KEPT THE TWO SIDES DIVIDED TILL NOW. HE THEN ANALYSED MAIN POINTS OF THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT. ON OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 1 (A), THE KUWAIT DELEGATE, SPEAKING THIS MORNING, HAD CLAIMED THAT IT MADE NO REFERENCE TO ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF THE GAZA STRIP. SOLOMON SAID THAT THIS HAD NOT BEEN DONE ON PURPOSE, IN HASTE, OR THROUGH IGNORANCE. THE RESOLUTION HAD NOW BEEN REVISED TO READ:

QUOTE CALLS ON ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW ALL ITS FORCES FROM ALL TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY IT AS A RESULT OF THE RECENT CONFLICT. UNQUOTE.

9. SOLOMON SAID THAT FOUR BASIC ELEMENTS WERE NECESSARY FOR ANY SOLUTION. THESE WERE WITHDRAWAL: CESSATION OF BELLIGERENCY: RECOGNITION OF THE SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE OF ALL STATES IN THE AREA: AND REFUGEES. IT SHOULD BE RECOGNISED THAT THE FAULTS WERE NOT THOSE OF ONE SIDE ALONE. IT WAS TIME THAT THE ASSEMBLY TOOK A SERIOUS LOOK AT THESE PROBLEMS, IN PARTICULAR AT THE HUMAN PROBLEM OF THE REFUGEES. IT WAS THE ASSEMBLY'S DUTY TO ACCEPT THE RESPONSIBILITY AND GET ON WITH THE JOB: THE DELAY HAD BEEN LONG ENOUGH ALREADY. IF THE ASSEMBLY FAILED TO SOLVE THIS PROBLEM, THE FUTURE WOULD BE BLEAK INDEED FOR THE WHOLE WORLD.

10. MALITZA (RUMANIA) SAID THAT THE POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR ANY SETTLEMENT WAS OBSERVANCE OF A CEASE-FIRE AND PROHIBITION OF ANY RECOURSE TO FORCE. HE SAID THAT THE NON-ALIGNED RESOLUTION GAVE PRIORITY TO THE FIRST STEP FOR A VIABLE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM, NAMELY THE WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS. HE FELT THAT PARAGRAPH 6 OF THAT DRAFT PROVIDING FOR A UNITED NATIONS MACHINERY FOR THE EXAMINATION OF ALL QUESTIONS WOULD HELP IN A SOLUTION. THE RESOLUTION, HOWEVER, WOULD ONLY BE A FIRST STEP. IT WOULD HAVE TO BE FOLLOWED BY OTHERS, IN WHICH ALL MEMBERS WOULD BE INVOLVED. HIS DELEGATION WOULD VOTE FOR THE NON-ALIGNED DRAFT AND ITS ATTITUDE TOWARDS OTHER RESOLUTIONS WOULD BE CONDITIONED BY THIS APPROACH.

11. MALECELA (UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA) SAID THE NON ALIGNED DRAFT WAS AN ATTEMPT BY SEVERAL COUNTRIES TO FIND A JUST SOLUTION. THE

/ SPONSORS

SPONSORS OF THE DRAFT HAD MADE EVERY EFFORT TO FIND AGREEMENT WITH OTHERS, BUT THIS HAD FAILED. THERE WERE FUNDAMENTAL MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE ON WHICH THE TWO SIDES COULD NOT AGREE. ONE WAS THE QUESTION OF THE STATE OF BELLIGERENCY. BELLIGERENCY COULD NOT BE ENDED BEFORE OTHER EVENTS HAD TAKEN PLACE. THE FIRST STEP WAS A CEASE-FIRE, AND THE NEXT STEP MUST BE WITHDRAWAL. THEN THE OTHER PROBLEMS COULD BE EXAMINED. HE COULD NOT SUPPORT THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT ALTHOUGH HE THANKED THE LATIN AMERICAN DELEGATES FOR THEIR SPIRIT OF CO-OPERATION. HE FELT THE FUTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAS AT STAKE.

12. IDZUMBUIR (DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO) SAID HE HOPED THAT NEITHER THE U.S.S.R. NOR THE U.S.A. WOULD PRESS THEIR RESOLUTIONS TO A VOTE. THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER MUST BE RESPECTED. BOTH THE NON-ALIGNED AND LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT RESOLUTIONS SEEMED TO DO THIS, BUT ONE WOULD GAIN BY BEING MORE BALANCED AND THE OTHER BY BEING LESS DETAILED. HE WOULD HOWEVER VOTE FOR BOTH.

13. PARTHASARATHI (INDIA) SAID THAT THERE SHOULD BE A REVERSION TO THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS AND THEN ALL OTHER PROBLEMS WOULD FALL INTO PRESPECTIVE. THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT FELL SHORT OF THE BASIC OBJECTIVE WHICH WAS TO INSIST THAT WITHDRAWAL WAS THE FIRST STEP WHICH THE ASSEMBLY COULD REQUEST AND THAT ALL OTHER STEPS SHOULD BE TAKEN BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL. NO SMALL STATE COULD EVER AGREE TO NEGOTIATE WITH FOREIGN TROOPS ON ITS SOIL. UNFORTUNATELY IT HAD BEEN IMPOSSIBLE TO FIND AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE NON-ALIGNED RESOLUTION AND THE LATIN AMERICAN RESOLUTION. THE LATIN AMERICAN RESOLUTION DID NOT INSIST ON IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL AND IT IGNORED THE PAST HISTORY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE WOULD NOT VOTE FOR THE ALBANIAN AND CUBAN AMENDMENTS TO THE NON-ALIGNED RESOLUTION, BUT HE WOULD VOTE FOR THE NON-ALIGNED RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE.

14. BOZOVIK (YUGOLSAVIA) SAID THE NON-ALIGNED DRAFT WAS A RESULT OF A BROAD EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AND IT COVERED THE FIRST AND MOST URGENT QUESTION OF THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES. THE SPONSORS HAD REVISED THEIR DRAFT AFTER CONSULTATION, BUT THEY HAD BEEN UNABLE TO MEET THE DIFFERENCES IN PRINCIPLE IN THE DRAFT PUT FORWARD BY THE LATIN AMERICAN GROUP. THERE COULD BE NO AGREEMENT WHILST ISRAELI

/ FORCES

FORCES OCCUPIED FOREIGN TERRITORY. HE WOULD VOTE AGAINST THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT AND HE COULD NOT ACCEPT ANY AMENDMENTS TO THE NON-ALIGNED RESOLUTION.

15. FAWZI (U.A.R.) SPOKE ALONG FAMILIAR LINES AND REITERATED THE U.A.R. ACCUSATIONS AGAINST ISRAEL AND HIS BELIEF THAT THE UNITED NATIONS COULD NOT ALLOW AGGRESSION TO GO UNCONDEMNED. HE SUGGESTED THAT ARAB COUNTRIES COULD NOT SEND OIL TO COUNTRIES SUPPORTING ISRAELI AGGRESSION NOR COULD THEY ALLOW THEIR MONEY TO LIE IN THE BANKS OF THESE COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY WHEN IT WOULD BE SO MUCH BETTER EMPLOYED IN FURTHERING THE DEVELOPMENT OF ARAB COUNTRIES. THE U.A.R. WOULD LIKE TO SEE OIL FLOW FROM THE ARAB COUNTRIES TO ALL THE COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD, BUT ONLY ON THE CONDITION THAT THE RIGHTS OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES WERE RESPECTED.

16. THE PRESIDENT THEN STATED THAT A REQUEST HAD BEEN MADE BY THE SPONORS OF THE NON-ALIGNED RESOLUTION THAT IT BE GIVEN PRIORITY. THE ASSEMBLY AGREED TO THIS PRIORITY WITHOUT VOTE.

17. SHAHI (PAKISTAN) THEN INTRODUCED DRAFT RESOLUTION A/L.527 REV.1 ON THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM.

18. THE VOTING ON THE VARIOUS RESOLUTIONS THEN BEGAN, (SEE M.I.F.T.). AFTER THE VOTING, THE PRESIDENT ADJOURNED THE MEETING UNTIL 3 P.M. TOMORROW, WHEN SPEAKERS IN EXPLANATION OF VOTE AFTER THE VOTE WOULD BE HEARD.

F O PASS MOSCOW 259 PARIS 264 TEL AVIV 288 AND SAVING TO AMMAN 102 LAGOS 16 FREETOWN 2 VALETTA 1 PORT OF SPAIN 6 RANGOON 1.

LORD CARADON.

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EN CLAIR
IMMEDIATE U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1649 4 JULY 1967
UNCLASSIFIED

MY TELEGRAM NO 1648.

EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

VOTING TOOK PLACE THIS EVENING IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AS FOLLOWS.

1. FIRST AMENDMENT IN A/L. 525 (CUBAN AMENDMENT TO QUOTE NON-ALIGNED UNQUOTE DRAFT RESOLUTION)

YES 20
NO 78 (INCLUDING UNITED KINGDOM)
ABSTAINED 22

THE SECOND AMENDMENT WAS NOT PUT TO THE VOTE.

2. AMENDMENTS IN A/L. 524 (ALBANIAN AMENDMENT TO QUOTE NON-ALIGNED UNQUOTE DRAFT).

YES 32
NO 66 (INCLUDING UNITED KINGDOM)
ABSTAINED 22

3. A/L. 522 (REV. 3) QUOTE NON-ALIGNED UNQUOTE DRAFT RESOLUTION PROPOSED BY YUGOSLAVIA AND 17 OTHERS. (THIS WAS GIVEN PRIORITY OVER OTHER DRAFTS WITHOUT OBJECTION):

YES 53
NO 46 (INCLUDING UNITED KINGDOM)
ABSTAINED 20

4. A/L.519 SOVIET DRAFT RESOLUTION. A PARAGRAPH BY PARAGRAPH VOTE WAS REQUESTED AND RESULTED AS FOLLOWS:

PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS

YES 36
NO 57 (INCLUDING UNITED KINGDOM)
ABSTAINED 24

1ST OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH

YES 36
NO 57 (INCLUDING UNITED KINGDOM)
ABSTAINED 23

/2ND OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH

2ND OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH

YES 45
NO 48 (INCLUDING UNITED KINGDOM)
ABSTAINED 22

3RD OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH

YES 34
NO 54 (INCLUDING UNITED KINGDOM)
ABSTAINED 28

4TH OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH

YES 36
NO 54 (INCLUDING UNITED KINGDOM)
ABSTAINED 26

THE PRESIDENT THEN DECLARED THAT AS ALL PARAGRAPHS VOTED ON INDIVIDUALLY HAD FAILED, THE RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE WOULD NOT BE VOTED UPON.

5. A/L. 520 UNITED STATES DRAFT RESOLUTION. THIS WAS NOT PRESSED TO VOTE.

6. A/L. 521 ALBANIAN DRAFT RESOLUTION.

YES 22
NO 71 (INCLUDING UNITED KINGDOM)
ABSTAINED 27

7. A/L. 523. THE QUOTE LATIN-AMERICAN UNQUOTE DRAFT RESOLUTION TABLED BY TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO AND 19 OTHER STATES.

YES 57 (INCLUDING UNITED KINGDOM)
NO 43
ABSTAINED 20

8. A/L.526. DRAFT RESOLUTION ON HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TABLED BY SWEDEN AND 25 OTHER STATES.

YES 116 (INCLUDING UNITED KINGDOM)
NO NONE
ABSTAINED 2 (CUBA, SYRIA)
DID NOT PARTICIPATE 2

/9. A/L. 527 REV.1.

9. A/L. 527 REV.1. DRAFT RESOLUTION SUBMITTED BY PAKISTAN AND FOUR OTHERS ON THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM.

YES 99 (INCLUDING UNITED KINGDOM)
NO NONE
ABSTAINED 2Ø (INCLUDING UNITED STATES)

FOREIGN OFFICE PLEASE REPEAT AS NECESSARY

LORD CARADON

SENT Ø5/Ø322Z
RECD Ø5/Ø324Z

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CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1651

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

4 JULY 1967

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 1651 OF 4 JULY
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW PARIS TEL AVIV
COPENHAGEN OTTAWA AMMAN BEIRUT BAHRAIN TUNIS JEDDA HC ADEN(PERSONAL)
KHARTOUM CAIRO KUWAIT RABAT TRIPOLI BENGHAZI AND ALGIERS.

MY TELNO 1642 (NOT TO ALL) : MIDDLE EAST EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION.

THE VOTES THIS EVENING WERE MUCH AS WE EXPECTED, EXCEPT THAT THE SO-CALLED NON-ALIGNED RESOLUTION GOT SOMEWHAT FEWER VOTES IN FAVOUR AND MORE AGAINST THAN WE HAD EXPECTED.

2. THE SWEDISH RESOLUTION ON HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE WAS PASSED PRACTICALLY UNANIMOUSLY (WITH ONLY SYRIA AND CUBA ABSTAINING).

3. THE PAKISTAN RESOLUTION ON JERUSALEM PASSED WITH A VOTE OF 99 IN FAVOUR, INCLUDING THE U.K., AUSTRIA, CANADA, DENMARK, IRELAND, THE NETHERLANDS, NEW ZEALAND, NORWAY AND SWEDEN: THERE WAS NONE AGAINST AND TWENTY ABSTENTIONS INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES.

4. THE ASSEMBLY HAS ADJOURNED UNTIL TOMORROW AFTERNOON, WHEN THERE WILL BE EXPLANATIONS OF VOTE.

5. THERE MAY BE SOME MOVE TO PROPOSE A PROCEDURAL RESOLUTION REFERRING THE WHOLE QUESTION BACK TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, BUT NO RESOLUTION TO THIS EFFECT HAS YET EMERGED. IT IS JUST POSSIBLE THAT SUCH A RESOLUTION WILL INCLUDE A RECOMMENDATION THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SHOULD BE ASKED TO APPOINT A REPRESENTATIVE TO GO TO THE MIDDLE EAST (OR A RECOMMENDATION TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD SO REQUEST THE SECRETARY-GENERAL). WE SHALL CONSULT OTHERS ABOUT THIS AND DO WHAT WE CAN TO GET SUCH A PROPOSAL PUT FORWARD. BUT WE MUST NOT GET THE PROPOSAL PUT FORWARD FORMALLY AT ALL UNLESS WE ARE ABSOLUTELY SURE OF GETTING THE NECESSARY TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY AND THE ACQUIESCENCE OF THE ARABS. IF WE ARE NOT SURE OF GETTING THE NECESSARY MAJORITY, IT WILL BE BEST TO LEAVE ALL FURTHER ACTION TO THE COUNCIL.

/ 6. ALTHOUGH

6. ALTHOUGH THE RUSSIANS AND THE ARABS WILL EXPLOIT THE RESULT IN ANTI-WEST PROPAGANDA, THE RESULTS CERTAINLY REPRESENT A REVERSE FOR THE SOVIET UNION. HAVING THEMSELVES CALLED FOR THE EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION, THE RUSSIANS RECEIVED VERY WEAK SUPPORT (APART FROM THE COMMUNISTS AND THE ARABS WHO WERE BOUND TO GO WITH THEM) FOR THEIR ATTEMPT TO CONDEMN ISRAEL AND CALL FOR UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI TROOPS. THE RESULTS ALSO REPRESENT A SERIOUS FAILURE FOR THE ARABS. AT THE SAME TIME ISRAEL CAN DRAW LITTLE COMFORT FROM THE RESULTS, SINCE THERE WAS A GENERAL DEMAND FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI TROOPS, AND IN PARTICULAR THE VOTE ON JERUSALEM MUST BE GALLING TO THEM.

7. IT IS TOO EARLY TO ESTIMATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF ALL THIS, BUT IT MAY BE WORTH SAYING NOW THAT AS THE ASSEMBLY DEBATE- WHICH STARTED WITH EMOTIONAL EXPECTATIONS- PROCEEDED ALL CONCERNED BEGAN TO BECOME MORE REALISTIC. THE CHANGES MADE IN THE NON-ALIGNED DRAFT WERE ALL IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION AND THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE SPONSORS OF THE NON-ALIGNED DRAFT AND THE LATIN AMERICANS, IN AN ATTEMPT TO FIND A LAST-MINUTE COMPROMISE, FAILED ONLY BECAUSE THE ARABS WERE INTRANSIGENT IN THEIR DEMAND THAT PRIOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL MUST BE UNCONDITIONAL (THE LATIN AMERICANS STICKING TO THEIR POINT ON BELLIGERENCY).

8. A DECISIVE FEATURE WAS THE STEADINESS AND SOLIDARITY OF THE LATIN AMERICANS ONCE THEY HAD MADE UP THEIR MINDS.

9. I DOUBT IF THERE WILL BE A MOVE TO GO BACK TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL IMMEDIATELY. EVERYONE WILL WANT SOME LITTLE TIME TO LICK THEIR WOUNDS AND THINK AGAIN. I THINK THAT THERE MAY BE SOMETHING IN THE VIEW PUT TO ME BY THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR EARLIER / IN THE

IN THE DAY THAT UNTIL ALL CONCERNED HAD SUFFERED SOME REVERSE IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO HOPE FOR ANY NEW APPROACH.
10. RESIDENT CLERK PASS TO HAYMAN AT 7.30 A.M.

F O PASS MOSCOW 260, PARIS 265, TEL AVIV 290, COPENHAGEN 125, AMMAN 144, BEIRUT 79, BAHRAIN 10, TUNIS 25, JEDDA 56, HC ADEN (PERSONAL) 129, KHARTOUM 11, CAIRO 68, KUWAIT 10, RABAT 10, TRIPOLI 6, BENGHAZI 5 AND ALGIERS 8.

LORD CARADON

SENT 05/0349Z
RECD 05/0351Z

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW, BAHRAIN AND CAIRO REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS].

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CYPHER/CAT A

FLASH FOREIGN OFFICE TO AMMAN

TELNO. 1437 4 JULY, 1967 (E)

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO AMMAN TELEGRAM NUMBER 1437 OF 4 JULY AND TO BEIRUT BAHRAIN TUNIS JEDDA H.C. ADEN ABU DHABI KHARTOUM CAIRO KUWAIT RABAT TRIPOLI BENGHAZI DOHA DUBAI ALGIERS REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO TEHRAN UKMIS NEW YORK PARIS TEL AVIV JERUSALEM ANKARA KABUL WASHINGTON MOSCOW AND COPENHAGEN.

MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 1401 TO AMMAN AND NUMBERS 3504, 3506 AND 3507 TO UKMIS NEW YORK (NOT TO ALL):

U.N. RESOLUTIONS ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHEN THE VOTE WILL BE TAKEN ON EITHER THE QUOTE NON ALIGNED UNQUOTE OR THE LATIN AMERICAN RESOLUTIONS, AND THE SPONSORS ARE STILL IN CONSULTATION WITH EACH OTHER. WE CANNOT YET BE SURE THAT EITHER RESOLUTION WILL ACTUALLY COME TO THE VOTE. MEANWHILE LORD CARADON HAS MADE A SPEECH IN EXPLANATION OF VOTE, WHICH RELATES TO THE NON-ALIGNED AND LATIN AMERICAN RESOLUTIONS.

2. THE SITUATION HAS DEVELOPED FURTHER SINCE INSTRUCTIONS UNDER / REFERENCE

REFERENCE WERE DESPATCHED. THE QUOTE NON-ALIGNED UNQUOTE RESOLUTION HAS NOWW BEEN FURTHER AMENDED BY:-

(A) THE SUBSTITUTION OF QUOTE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHARTER OF THE U.N. UNQUOTE AT THE END OF PARA 4:

(B) THE OMISSION OF QUOTE ISRAEL UNQUOTE IN PARA 5:

(C) THE OMISSION OF QUOTE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE ISRAEL ARMED FORCES HAVE BEEN COMPLETED UNQUOTE AND QUOTE URGENTLY UNQUOTE FROM PARA 6.

3. SUPERFICIALLY (B) IS AN IMPROVEMENT SINCE ISRAEL IS NO LONGER SINGLED OUT AS THE SOLE COUNTRY WHICH HAS TO TAKE ACTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RESOLUTION: AND (C) APPEARS TO REMOVE THE MOST OBJECTIONABLE FEATURE OF THE RESOLUTION, VIZ. THE SPECIFIC POSTPONEMENT OF ANY OTHER ACTION ON OTHER ASPECTS OF THE SITUATION UNTIL AFTER ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL HAD BEEN COMPLETED. BUT THESE CHANGES ARE MORE APPARENT THAN REAL. IT IS STILL THE CASE THAT ISRAEL IS TO WITHDRAW IMMEDIATELY, WHILE THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS TO CONSIDER (AND NO LONGER EVEN URGENTLY) ACTION ON OTHER POINTS. IN EFFECT, THEREFORE, THIS IS STILL A CALL FOR UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL.

4. MOREOVER, THE RESOLUTION IS LESS SATISFACTORY THAN THE LATIN-AMERICAN RESOLUTION BECAUSE IT MAKES NO MENTION OF OTHER PRACTICAL PROBLEMS, E.G. ESPECIALLY THE END OF BELLIGERENCY, AND ALSO FREEDOM OF TRANSIT THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS AND THE NEED FOR A FINAL SOLUTION OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM. THE RESOLUTION IS, THEREFORE,

/EVEN IN

EVEN IN ITS AMENDED FORM, FUNDAMENTALLY LACKING IN BALANCE. IN PARTICULAR IT IS UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT THAT IT WILL ACHIEVE AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. WE MUST STILL THEREFORE CAST A NEGATIVE VOTE AGAINST IT.

5. IT HAS FURTHER BEEN DECIDED THAT LORD CARADON SHOULD NOT PRESS FOR A PARAGRAPH-BY-PARAGRAPH VOTE ON THE QUOTE NON-ALIGNED UNQUOTE RESOLUTION SINCE OUR OBJECTION TO IT NOW RELATES TO THE INADEQUACY OF THE RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE AND CANNOT, AS PREVIOUSLY, BE SPECIFICALLY TIED TO THE SIXTH PARAGRAPH.

6. WE STILL HOPE THAT THE LATIN-AMERICAN RESOLUTION WILL COME TO THE VOTE AND WE SHALL OF COURSE VOTE IN FAVOUR OF IT EVEN THOUGH IT IS NOT ITSELF ENTIRELY SATISFACTORY. IT DOES NOT INCLUDE SPECIFIC PROVISION FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL. WE DOUBT IF IT IS WISE TO ATTEMPT TO STATE ANY IMMEDIATE CONCLUSION ON THE PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH AN INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR THE CITY OF JERUSALEM, (SEE PARA 2 OF MY TELNO 3507 TO UKMIS NEW YORK). WHEN SPEAKING ABOUT OUR SUPPORT FOR THE LATIN-AMERICAN TEXT, YOU SHOULD ALSO:

(A) NOT, REPEAT NOT, IMPLY THAT OUR SUPPORT FOR IT INVOLVES RECOGNITION THAT A STATE OF BELLIGERENCY EXISTED BEFORE THE FIGHTING BEGAN (OPERATIVE PARA 1(B): AND

(B) IF NECESSARY CLARIFY OUR UNDERSTANDING OF OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 3(B) AS MEANING THE RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE THROUGH

/ STRAITS

STRAITS RECOGNISED BY THE GENEVA CONVENTION ON THE TERRITORIAL SEA AND OF FREEDOM OF PASSAGE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL CANALS.

7. THE TEXT OF LORD CARADON'S SPEECH IS BEING TELEGRAPHED TO YOU SEPARATELY. YOU SHOULD EMPHASISE THOSE POINTS WHICH YOU CONSIDER WILL BE MOST TELLING IN LOCAL CIRCUMSTANCES.

8. YOU CAN ALSO DRAW ATTENTION TO OUR SUPPORT FOR THE FOLLOWING TWO RESOLUTIONS:-

(A) THE PAKISTAN-SPONSORED RESOLUTION ON JERUSALEM WHICH REFERS TO THE QUOTE MEASURES TAKEN BY ISRAEL TO CHANGE THE STATUS OF THE CITY UNQUOTE, DECLARES THAT THESE MEASURES ARE INVALID, CALLS UPON ISRAEL TO RESCIND ALL MEASURES ALREADY TAKEN AND TO DESIST FROM TAKING ANY ACTION TO CHANGE THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM, AND REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTION WITHIN ONE WEEK:

(B) THE SWEDISH-SPONSORED RESOLUTION WHICH CALLS UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL TO ENSURE THE SAFETY, WELFARE AND SECURITY OF THE OCCUPIED AREAS AND TO FACILITATE THE RETURN OF REFUGEES, CALLS FOR THE SCRUPULOUS RESPECT OF HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR, COMMENDS THE WORK TO DATE OF , E.G. THE RED CROSS AND UNRWA, AND CALLS FOR SPECIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNRWA AND OTHER NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS.

SOSFA SENT 2100Z 4 JULY

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EN CLAIR

IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1652 5 JULY 1967.
UNCLASSIFIED

REF. TELEPHONE CONVERSATION YOUDE/LAMBERT OF 5 JULY :
MIDDLE EAST : EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION.

THE ISRAELIS DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE VOTE ON THE PAKISTANI RESOLUTION ON JERUSALEM. THE FOLLOWING WEST EUROPEANS VOTED FOR THE RESOLUTION : FINLAND, FRANCE, GREECE, IRELAND, LUXEMBOURG, NETHERLANDS, NEW ZEALAND, NORWAY, SWEDEN, TURKEY, UNITED KINGDOM, AUSTRIA, BELGIUM, CANADA AND DENMARK. THE FOLLOWING WEST EUROPEANS ABSTAINED : ICELAND, ITALY, PORTUGAL, U.S. AND AUSTRALIA.

2. FOLLOWING IS THE VOTING ON THE NON-ALIGNED RESOLUTION :

IN FAVOUR :

SAUDI ARABIA, SENEGAL, SOMALIA, SPAIN, SUDAN, SYRIA, TUNISIA, TURKEY, UGANDA, UKRAINIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC, UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA, YEMEN, YUGOSLAVIA, ZAMBIA, AFGHANISTAN, ALGERIA, BULGARIA, BURMA, BURUNDI, BYELORUSSIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC, CAMBODIA, CAMEROON, CEYLON, CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE), CONGO (DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF), CUBA, CYPRUS, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, FRANCE, GABON, GREECE, GUINEA, HUNGARY, INDIA, INDONESIA, IRAN, IRAQ, JAPAN, JORDAN, KUWAIT, LEBANON, LIBYA, MALAYSIA, MALI, MAURITANIA, MONGOLIA, MOROCCO, NIGERIA, PAKISTAN, POLAND, RUMANIA.

AGAINST :

TOGO, TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO, UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELEND, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, URUGUAY, VENEZUELA, ARGENTINA, AUSTRALIA, AUSTRIA, BARBADOS, BELGIUM, BOLIVIA, BOTSWANA, BRAZIL, CANADA, CHILE, COLOMBIA, COSTA RICA,

/DENMARK,

DENMARK, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ECUADOR, EL SALVADOR, GAMBIA, GHANA, GUATEMALA, GUYANA, HONDURAS, ICELAND, IRELAND, ISRAEL, ITALY, JAMAICA, LESOTHO, LIBERIA, LUXEMBOURG, MADAGASCAR, MALAWI, MEXICO, NETHERLANDS, NEW ZEALAND, NICARAGUA, NORWAY, PANAMA, PARAGUAY, PERU, PHILIPPINES.

ABSTAINING :

SIERRA LEONE, SINGAPORE, SOUTH AFRICA, SWEDEN, THAILAND, UPPER VOLTA, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC, CHAD, CHINA, DAHOMEY, ETHIOPIA, FINLAND, IVORY COAST, KENYA, LAOS, MALTA, NEPAL, NIGER, PORTUGAL, RWANDA.

THE RESULT OF THE VOTE WAS 53 IN FAVOUR, 46 AGAINST, AND 20 ABSTENTIONS. THE DRAFT RESOLUTION WAS NOT ADOPTED, HAVING FAILED TO OBTAIN THE REQUIRED TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY.

LORD CARADON

SENT 1427Z 5 JULY 1967.
RCVD 1435Z 5 JULY 1967.

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CYPHER CAT/A
IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK
TELNO. 1657
RESTRICTED

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
5 JULY 1967

MY TELNO. 1649: MIDDLE EAST.
ANALYSIS OF VOTING AT END OF EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION.
VOTING ON THE ''NON-ALIGNED'' DRAFT (53-46-20) PROVIDED RATHER LESS AFFIRMATIVE VOTES, AND MORE VOTES AGAINST, THAN MOST DELEGATIONS HAD EXPECTED. THE BULK OF THE VOTE AGAINST CAME FROM THE LATIN AMERICANS (ALL EXCEPT HAITI, WHICH WAS ABSENT) AND THE WESTERN EUROPEANS EXCEPT FOR SWEDISH AND FINNISH ABSTENTIONS. THESE GROUPS WERE JOINED BY SEVEN AFRICAN AND ONE ASIAN STATE. JAPAN VOTED IN FAVOUR OF BOTH THE NON-ALIGNED AND THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFTS.
2. THE SOVIET DRAFT RESOLUTION WAS VOTED ON PARAGRAPH BY PARAGRAPH BUT NOT AS A WHOLE, NO SINGLE PARAGRAPH HAVING PASSED. THE SECOND OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH WHICH DEMANDED IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES DID BEST WITH 45 VOTES IN FAVOUR, 48 AGAINST AND 22 ABSTENTIONS.
(UGANDA, BURMA, CEYLON, CYPRUS, GREECE AND NEPAL WERE AMONG THOSE WHO MADE UP THE THE HEAVIER VOTE IN FAVOUR OF THIS PARAGRAPH).
3. THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT (57-43-20) TABLED BY TRINIDAD AND 19 OTHERS DID SOMEWHAT BETTER THAN EXPECTED WITH 57 FOR, 43 AGAINST AND 20 ABSTENTIONS. APART FROM THE LATIN AMERICANS AND WEST EUROPEANS THE VOTING IN FAVOUR INCLUDED SEVEN OCAM COUNTRIES AND SIX ENGLISH SPEAKING AFRICANS. JAPAN VOTED IN FAVOUR, AS ON THE ''NON-ALIGNED'' DRAFT. SWEDEN ABSTAINED, AS DID FRANCE. A NOTABLE VOTE AGAINST WAS CAST BY FINLAND.

/4.

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UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 1657 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

4. AS REGARDS THE SWEDISH RESOLUTION ON HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THE VICTIMS OF WAR, CUBA AND SYRIA ABSTAINED, WHILE ALBANIA AND SAUDI ARABIA DECLARED THEMSELVES NON-PARTICIPANTS IN THE VOTING.

5. ON THE DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM (99-Ø-2Ø), U.S.A. WAS THE MOST NOTABLE ABSTAINER, HAVING SUBMITTED A PROPOSED CHANGE OF THE WORDING (''RECIND'') WHICH THE ARAB CO-SPONSORS FOUND ACCEPTABLE. OTHER ABSTAINERS INCLUDED ITALY, KENYA, AUSTRALIA AND VARIOUS AFRICAN STATES. ISRAEL DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN THIS VOTE.

6. RUMANIA ABSTAINED ON THE PREAMBULAR PARAS AND OPERATIVE PARAS 1, 3 AND 4 OF THE SOVIET DRAFT RESOLUTION, ON THE ALBANIAN DRAFT AND ON BOTH THE CUBAN AND ALBANIAN AMENDMENTS TO THE ''NON-ALIGNED'' DRAFT.

7. F.O. PLEASE REPEAT AS NECESSARY.

LORD CARADON

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RECD Ø5/2115Z

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Lord Reid (Chairman)

VD.

CONFIDENTIAL

July 6, 1967

As you will have heard it was agreed in Cabinet this morning that a message of congratulations should be sent, on behalf of the Government, to Lord Caradon. I enclose a draft message from the Prime Minister and he would be grateful if, provided the Foreign Secretary concurs in its terms, it could be despatched to Lord Caradon forthwith.

A T. Pallser

D.J.D. Maitland, Esq., C.M.G., O.B.E.,
Foreign Office.

Israel Pt 6

PRIME MINISTER'S PERSONAL MESSAGE SERIAL No T 201/67

T. 201/67.

July 6, 1967
From the President to the Prime Minister

SECRET

Dear Prime Minister,

We are now in the process of mopping up after Mr. Kosygin's onslaught in the General Assembly. You will have seen the results of the voting yesterday from which we can conclude that the Russians and the more extreme Arabs will not be able to get the United Nations to favor a return to the previous state of belligerence. Ambassador Dobrynin asked Ambassador Goldberg earlier today for a 48-hour delay in the General Assembly to permit some further reconciliation of views. More significantly, he added that Mr. Gromyko needed the additional time for consultations with Moscow. I have some doubt that another 48-hours can significantly narrow the gap between the two principal resolutions before the Assembly.
My doubt is based principally upon some skepticism that the Russians would be willing to go very far beyond the Arab point of view. Although there are some signs that second thoughts are taking hold among some of the Arabs, they may require a little more time before they dare to be reasonable. However, we are inclined to give the Russians their additional 48-hours, as a matter of comity, in view of Dobrynin's remarks. The most likely prospect is that the Middle East will go back to the Security Council, where it belongs, and that results will have to be negotiated out behind the scenes.

I continue to be much preoccupied with your East of Suez decision. The ASPAC countries are now meeting in Bangkok with the prospect that they will register a

growing sense of solidarity among the free nations of Asia. Hanoi seems to be calling home a number of its key ambassadors - whether this means a policy review, we do not know. Meanwhile, Burma is under new pressures from a China which continues in turmoil.

Tonight Bob McNamara and Nick Katzenback go off to Saigon. On their return we shall face here - and among our fighting allies - some difficult and critical manpower decisions.

It just does not seem to me that this is the time for Britain to make or to announce a decision that it is sharply reducing its presence in South East Asia. I do hope that you can find some way to put this matter off for a time and not take a step which would be contrary to your and our interests and to the interests of the free nations of Asia.

The stakes are very high in the Western Pacific these days and it is most important that we all try to stay steady on course.

Cordially yours,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON.

Subject

No 70 D. S.

10.

S E C R E T COPY NO ...

CYPHER/CAT. A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

TELNO. 7547 6 JULY 1967 (PS)

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No T 201/67

SECRET

FOLLOWING IS MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO PRIME MINISTER RECEIVED 6 JULY OVER THE PRIVATE WIRE.

WE ARE NOW IN THE PROCESS OF MOPPING UP AFTER MR. KOSYGIN'S ONSLAUGHT IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. YOU WILL HAVE SEEN THE RESULTS OF THE VOTING YESTERDAY FROM WHICH WE CAN CONCLUDE THAT THE RUSSIANS AND THE MORE EXTREME ARABS WILL NOT BE ABLE TO GET THE UNITED NATIONS TO FAVOUR A RETURN TO THE PREVIOUS STATE OF BELLIGERENCE. AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN ASKED AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG EARLIER TODAY FOR A 48-HOUR DELAY IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO PERMIT SOME FURTHER RECONCILIATION OF VIEWS. MORE SIGNIFICANTLY, HE ADDED THAT MR. GROMYKO NEEDED THE ADDITIONAL TIME FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH MOSCOW. I HAVE SOME DOUBT THAT ANOTHER 48-HOURS CAN SIGNIFICANTLY NARROW THE GAP BETWEEN THE TWO PRINCIPAL RESOLUTIONS BEFORE THE ASSEMBLY. MY DOUBT IS BASED PRINCIPALLY UPON SOME SKEPTICISM THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD BE WILLING TO GO VERY FAR BEYOND THE ARAB POINT OF VIEW. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE SOME SIGNS THAT SECOND THOUGHTS ARE TAKING HOLD AMONG SOME OF THE ARABS, THEY MAY REQUIRE A LITTLE MORE TIME BEFORE THEY DARE TO BE REASONABLE. HOWEVER, WE ARE INCLINED TO GIVE THE RUSSIANS THEIR ADDITIONAL 48-HOURS, AS A MATTER OF COMITY, IN VIEW OF DOBRYNIN'S REMARKS. THE MOST LIKELY PROSPECT IS THAT THE MIDDLE EAST WILL GO BACK TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WHERE IT BELONGS, AND THAT RESULTS WILL HAVE TO BE NEGOTIATED OUT BEHIND THE SCENES.

I CONTINJE TO BE MUCH PREOCCUPIED WITH YOU EAST OF SUEZ DECISION. THE ASPAC COUNTRIES ARE NOW MEETING IN BANGKOK WITH THE PROSPECT THAT THEY WILL REGISTER A GROWING SENSE OF SOLIDARITY AMONG THE FREE NATIONS OF ASIA. HANOI SEEMS TO BE CALLING HOME A NUMBER OF ITS KEY AMBASSADORS WHETHER THIS MEANS A POLICY REVIEW, WE DO NOT KNOW. MEANWHILE, BURMA IS UNDER NEW PRESSURES FROM A CHINA WHICH CONTINUES IN TURMOIL.

TONIGHT BOB MCNAMARA AND NICK KATZENBACK GO OFF TO SAIGON.

/ON

ON THEIR RETURN WE SHALL FACE HERE - AND AMONG OUR FIGHTING ALLIES - SOME DIFFICULT AND CRITICAL MANPOWER DECISIONS.

IT JUST DOES NOT SEEM TO ME THAT THIS IS THE TIME FOR BRITAIN TO MAKE OR TO ANNOUNCE A DECISION THAT IT IS SHARPLY REDUCING ITS PRESENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. I DO HOPE THAT YOU CAN FIND SOME WAY TO PUT THIS MATTER OFF FOR A TIME AND NOT TAKE A STEP WHICH WOULD BE CONTRARY TO YOUR AND OUR INTERESTS AND TO THE INTERESTS OF THE FREE NATIONS OF ASIA.

THE STAKES ARE VERY HIGH IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC THESE DAYS AND IT IS MOST IMPORTANT THAT WE ALL TRY TO STAY STEADY ON COURSE.

SOSFA SENT 1345Z/6 JULY 1967
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PRISEC (F.O.)

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TWO PAPERS EXTRACTED AND TEMPORARILY RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4) PENDING COMPLETION OF REVIEW

(date) 17.3.99
(Signed) J. R. Green

11

file

S E C R E T

CYPHER/CAT. A

F L A S H FOREIGN OFFICE TO AMMAN

TELNO. 1458 6 JULY 1967 (E)

SECRET.

ADDRESSED TO AMMAN TELEGRAM NUMBER 1458 OF 6 JULY 1967
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO TEL AVIV, UK MISSION NEW YORK,
WASHINGTON, PARIS, JEDDA, TRIPOLI, BENGHAZI, ALGIERS.
RABAT, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN (RESIDENCY) TEHRAN, TUNIS.

KING HUSSEIN'S DISCUSSIONS IN LONDON.

FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF KING HUSSEIN'S CONVERSATION WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND MYSELF ON 3 JULY.

SETTLEMENT.

2. KING HUSSEIN ADMITTED THAT THERE WERE CONSIDERABLE TENSIONS WITHIN JORDAN BUT FELT CONFIDENT THAT IF THE ARABS WERE NOT REBUFFED AT THE UNITED NATIONS AND PROVIDED ISRAEL WERE OBLIGED TO WITHDRAW FROM THE POSITION SHE HAD OCCUPIED HE COULD HOLD THE SITUATION. HIS FIRST OBJECT WAS TO CONCERT AN AGREED ARAB STRATEGY AND A COMMON LINE IN AN ARAB SUMMIT. IF THIS FAILED THEN HE MIGHT HAVE TO QUOTE GO IT ALONE UNQUOTE.

3. THE ARABS HAD REACHED A CROSS-ROADS. THEY HAD THE CHOICE OF RE-ARMING FOR ANOTHER FIGHT OR OF CONCENTRATING THEIR EFFORTS ON PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT. HE HAD NO DOUBT WHAT THE CHOICE SHOULD BE, BUT HIS OWN POSITION WAS DIFFICULT. THE ARABS HAD SUFFERED DEFEAT BUT A SETTLEMENT COULD NOT BE BASED ON FORCE AND MUST BE A JUST AND HONOURABLE PEACE. IT MUST COVER ALL OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS.

4. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD KING HUSSEIN'S INTENTION WAS TO GET GENERAL ARAB AGREEMENT ON THE POLICY TO BE FOLLOWED FROM NOW ON, FAILING WHICH HE WOULD HAVE TO PROCEED ON NATIONAL LINES WITH JORDAN'S ARAB FRIENDS. WE HOPED HE WOULD LET US KNOW IF THERE WERE WAYS IN WHICH WE COULD HELP HIM.
WE HAD DONE SOMETHING TO MEET THE IMMEDIATE POST-WAR NEEDS OF

/JORDAN AND

S E C R E T

JORDAN AND IF THERE WAS MORE WE COULD DO IN THIS DIRECTION HE HOPED KING HUSSEIN WOULD TELL US. WE DID NOT THINK THERE WOULD BE ANY QUICK SETTLEMENT BUT AGREED THAT ANY SETTLEMENT WOULD HAVE TO COVER ALL PROBLEMS.

ANTI- BRITISH PROPAGANDA.

5. KING HUSSEIN SAID HE WOULD LOOK INTO THE QUESTION OF ANTI-BRITISH PROPAGANDA ON AMMAN RADIO.

JORDANIAN OPERATIONAL ORDERS.

6. KING HUSSEIN DECLARED THAT AS FAR AS HE KNEW NO ORDERS WERE GIVEN TO MASSACRE ISRAELIS.

REFUGEES.

7. KING HUSSEIN WELCOMED THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT THAT REFUGEES WHO HAD LEFT THE WEST BANK BEFORE 4 JULY COULD RETURN AND HE HAD EVERY INTENTION OF ENCOURAGING THEM TO DO SO. IT WOULD BE A GREAT HELP WITH THE REFUGEE PROBLEM BUT OF COURSE NOT ALL WOULD WANT TO COME BACK, AND IT REMAINED TO BE SEEN HOW THE ISRAELIS INTERPRETED THEIR DECISION.

JERUSALEM.

8. THE FOREIGN SECRETARY WAS ANXIOUS THAT KING HUSSEIN SHOULD UNDERSTAND WHAT WE HAD BEEN TRYING TO DO ABOUT JERUSALEM. WE HAD TRIED VERY HARD PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY TO STOP THE ISRAELIS FROM TAKING THE ACTION THEY HAD DONE. WE WOULD BE WILLING TO SUPPORT INTERNATIONALISATION, BUT UNDERSTOOD THAT KING HUSSEIN WAS NOT IN FAVOUR. THE FACT WAS, HOWEVER, THAT ISRAEL WAS IN CONTROL OF JERUSALEM. WHAT WOULD KING HUSSEIN LIKE HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT TO DO ON THIS PROBLEM? KING HUSSEIN SAID THAT JORDAN HAD BEEN CARRYING ON A TRADITION WHICH HAD LASTED FOR MORE THAN 1,000 YEARS AND UNLESS SHE COULD AGAIN BECOME

/CUSTODIAN OF

CUSTODIAN OF THE HOLY PLACES FOR EVERYONE, THIS MIGHT BE THE START OF YET ANOTHER CONFLICT WHICH WOULD AFFECT THE WHOLE OF THE MOSLEM WORLD. THE JEWS HAD NOT HAD ACCESS TO THE HOLY PLACES IN RECENT YEARS BECAUSE THERE HAD BEEN NO PEACE SETTLEMENT.

ARMS.

9. I SAID THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO QUESTION OF A RETURN TO THE COMPETITIVE ARMING OF THE STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. KING HUSSEIN REPLIED THAT OF COURSE JORDAN WOULD NEED SOME MILITARY RE-EQUIPMENT BUT THE ARABS MUST AVOID ONCE AGAIN MORTGAGING THEIR FUTURE FOR YEARS TO COME IN ORDER TO BUY ARMS.

SOSFA SENT 1755Z/6 JULY 1967

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COPY NO. 12

(Personal)

FLASH FOREIGN OFFICE TO UKMIS NEW YORK

TELNO 3603 6 JULY 1967

CONFIDENTIAL.

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FROM PRIME MINISTER FOR LORD CARADON.

BEGINS.

I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT WHEN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY REPORTED THIS MORNING TO HIS COLLEAGUES ON THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN THE U.N. DISCUSSION ON THE MIDDLE EAST, THERE WAS WARM AND UNANIMOUS APPROVAL OF THE SKILL AND ABILITY WITH WHICH YOU HAVE CONDUCTED, ON BEHALF OF YOUR COLLEAGUES HERE, THIS EXCEEDINGLY DELICATE DIPLOMATIC OPERATION. WE ARE GREATLY IN YOUR DEBT. I SEND YOU ON BEHALF OF US ALL OUR SINCERE THANKS AND CONGRATULATIONS.

ENDS.

SOSFA SENT 2206Z 6 JULY 1967

P R I S E C (F.O.)

COPY NO. 12

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Pattison
(Personal)

CYPHER/CAT A

PRIORITY U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1678 DATED 6 JULY 1967.

CONFIDENTIAL

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 3603.

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR PRIME MINISTER FROM LORD CARADON.

ALL OF US IN THIS MISSION GREATLY APPRECIATE YOUR MESSAGE. I AM LUCKY TO HAVE SUCH A GOOD TEAM WORKING WITH ME.

2. WE ARE DISAPPOINTED THAT WE HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO CONTRIBUTE MORE POSITIVE RESULTS. BUT WE ARE NOT WHOLLY PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE FUTURE, SINCE ALL THOSE CONCERNED NOW REALISE THAT NO ONE CAN HAVE IT ALL HIS OWN WAY

LORD CARADON DESP. 0049Z 7 JULY 1967.
RECD. 0052Z 7 JULY 1967.

[COPIES SENT TO NO. 10, DOWNING STREET]

PRISEC (F.O.)

CONFIDENTIAL

R.V.

Published paper(s)

At this point on the file, there was enclosed a copy of the following published paper(s), a copy of which may be found elsewhere in the Public Record Office:

House of Commons Hansard, Cols 2003 & 2124
dated 6 July 1967
"Middle East"

The copy enclosed on this file has been removed and destroyed

Signed J. R. Green Date 21.1.97

JR Green
Prime Minister's Office
10 Downing Street

PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister.

Your way like to know that Elton will be coming through Aberdeen Airport this morning on his way home.

He has not asked for any argument; Foreign Sec. had two long talks with him in New York: and does not propose to say any more today.

7/7

Free

EN CLAIR

IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1697 8 JULY 1967
UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1697 OF 8 JULY
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, AMMAN, TEL AVIV, BEIRUT, AND SAVING TO OTTAWA AND CAIRO.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 1696.

MIDDLE EAST : SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING.

THE COUNCIL CONVENED AT 6.40 P.M. AT THE URGENT REQUEST OF THE U.A.R. AND ISRAEL REPRESENTATIVES. AFTER A PROLONGED PROCEDURAL ARGUMENT PROVOKED BY A SOVIET DEMAND THAT THE AGENDA, WHICH WAS THE SAME AS THAT OF EARLIER MEETINGS IN JUNE (S/1365), SHOULD BE RESTRICTED TO THE U.A.R. LETTER ASKING FOR THIS MEETING, THE COUNCIL AGREED THAT BOTH THE UAR AND ISRAELI LETTERS SHOULD BE ADDED TO THE PREVIOUS AGENDA.

2. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL WAS THEN INVITED TO MAKE A STATEMENT (TEXT IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM).

3. EL KONY (UAR) THEN SPOKE TO THE LETTER OF COMPLAINT HE HAD ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT (S/8043) (TEXT IN MY SECOND IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM). THIS CLAIMED THAT ISRAELI FORCES ATTACKED UAR UNITS STATIONED SOUTH OF PORT FUAD ON THE EASTERN BANK OF THE SUEZ CANAL, AND ALSO HEAVILY SHELLED PORT FUAD, AT 10.15 CAIRO TIME THIS MORNING. ISRAEL THEN FOLLOWED UP WITH AIR ATTACKS AGAINST CONTROL STATIONS AT EL TINA, RAS EL ESH AND EL KAP IN THE SUEZ CANAL AREA WHICH WERE DESTROYED. THEREAFTER THE ISRAELIS INDISCRIMINATELY BOMBARDED HEAVILY POPULATED AREAS IN PORT SAID, KANTARA AND RAS EL ESH. HE CLAIMED THAT BY THESE ACTS, ISRAEL WAS CLEARLY DETERMINED

/ TO ESCALATE

TO ESCALATE THE MILITARY SITUATION, SUPPORTED OF COURSE BY ''CERTAIN POWERS'', FIRST AND FOREMOST THE U.S. HE MENTIONED A PROVOCATIVE STATEMENT BY THE ISRAEL DEFENCE MINISTER, IN WHICH DAYAN WAS ALLEGED TO HAVE SAID THAT THE GAZA STRIP WOULD BE ANNEXED. THE COUNCIL SHOULD NOT ADJOURN BEFORE COMING TO A ''CONCLUSIVE DECISION'' WHEREBY ISRAEL WOULD BE BOUND TO OBSERVE THE CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTIONS.

4. RAFAEL (ISRAEL) ELABORATED ON HIS LETTER (S/8044) (TEXT IN MY TELEGRAM NO. 1700) HE SAID THAT MORE THAN 40 ISRAELI SOLDIERS HAD BEEN KILLED OR WOUNDED AS A RESULT OF TODAY'S INCIDENTS IN THE CANAL ZONE, WHICH CONSTITUTED A CLEAR BREACH OF THE CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTIONS BY THE UAR. THIS INCIDENT WAS THE CULMINATION OF A SERIES IN THE AREA, THE HISTORY OF WHICH HE RECOUNTED FROM THEIR OUTBREAK ON 1 JULY. THESE AMOUNTED TO ANOTHER ROUND OF BELLIGERENCY BY THE UAR, ADAPTED TO THE NEW CIRCUMSTANCES PREVAILING SINCE 8 JUNE. BOMBARDMENTS IN THE CANAL AREA BY UAR ARTILLERY WERE BECOMING MORE INTENSIVE THAN THEY HAD BEEN EARLIER IN THE WEEK. THIS POLICY OF BELLIGERENCY HAD OMINOUS IMPLICATIONS. ISRAEL WANTED THE CEASE-FIRE TO BE EFFECTIVE AND WOULD COOPERATE WITH THE COUNCIL TO THAT END.

5. KEITA (MALI) THEN PROPOSED A SUSPENSION OF THE MEETING FOR HALF AN HOUR SO THAT DELEGATIONS MIGHT CONSULT.

6. AFTER CONSULTATIONS, THE COUNCIL ADJOURNED TILL 4.30 P.M. TOMORROW.

FO PASS MOSCOW NO. 269, PARIS NO. 275, AMMAN NO. 152, TEL AVIV NO. 297, BEIRUT NO. 86 AND SAVING TO CAIRO NO. 83.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT 0405Z/09 JULY
RECD AT 0406Z/09 JULY

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EN CLAIR
IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 1698 8 JULY, 1967
UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1698 OF 8 JULY, RFI TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, AMMAN, TEL AVIV, BEIRUT AND SAVING TO OTTAWA AND CAIRO.

M.I.P.T.

MIDDLE EAST: SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SECRETARY-GENERAL'S STATEMENT TO THE COUNCIL.

"IT IS A MATTER OF GREAT REGRET TO ME THAT I AM NOT IN A POSITION TO PROVIDE THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WITH THE NEEDED INFORMATION ABOUT THE REPORTS OF A NEW OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING ON 8 JULY BETWEEN THE ARMED FORCES OF ISRAEL AND THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC IN THE SUEZ CANAL SECTOR, WHICH WOULD BE BASED ON OBSERVATIONS AND INVESTIGATIONS BY UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS. I WAS SIMILARLY UNABLE TO GIVE THE COUNCIL ANY INFORMATION ABOUT THE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED FIGHTING IN THE CANAL SECTOR ON 1 JULY AS CALLED TO THE ATTENTION OF THE COUNCIL IN THE LETTERS ASSERTING VIOLATIONS AND BREACHES OF THE CEASE-FIRE PRESENTED BY THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC (S/8025) AND OF ISRAEL (S/8026). THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WILL REALIZE, OF COURSE, THE REASON FOR MY INABILITY TO INFORM THEM. AS I REPORTED TO THE COUNCIL ON 4 JULY 1967 (S/7930/ADD.19, PARAGRAPH 3) NO UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OBSERVERS ARE STATIONED IN THE SUEZ AREA AND, THEREFORE, I RECEIVE NO VERIFIED INFORMATION ABOUT HOSTILE ACTIVITIES THERE.

"THE COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION OF 12 JUNE 1967 (S/RES/236), RELATING EXCLUSIVELY TO THE CEASE-FIRE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA, IN ITS PARAGRAPH 5, EXPLICITLY INVOKED THE ASSISTANCE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF UNTSO AND THE UNTSO MILITARY OBSERVERS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE IT HAD DEMANDED. THE COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION OF 9 JUNE (S/RES/235), ALSO RELATING TO THE CEASE-FIRE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA, IN ITS PARAGRAPH 3, INVOKED THE ASSISTANCE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN ACHIEVING COMPLIANCE OF THE PARTIES WITH THE CEASE-FIRE. UNLIKE THOSE TWO RESOLUTIONS, HOWEVER, THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S GENERAL CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTIONS OF 6 AND 7 JUNE

/(S/RES/233

(S/RES/233 AND S/RES/234) WHICH ARE APPLICABLE TO THE CEASE-FIRE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, REQUEST THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO KEEP THE COUNCIL INFORMED ABOUT THE SITUATION BUT MAKE NO PROVISION FOR ANY ASSISTANCE WITH REGARD TO IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE.

''REALIZING THAT I COULD NOT DISCHARGE MY REPORTING RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THESE LATTER TWO RESOLUTIONS WITHOUT ANY MEANS OF OBTAINING RELIABLE INFORMATION, AND, MORE IMPORTANT, THAT A CEASE-FIRE WITHOUT ANY OBSERVATION OR POLICING ASSISTANCE IN ITS IMPLEMENTATION IS INEVITABLY VULNERABLE, I DECIDED ON 4 JULY TO TAKE AN INITIATIVE TOWARD A POSSIBLE ALLEVIATION OF THIS SITUATION. ON THAT DATE, I UNDERTOOK TWO EXPLORATORY TALKS. IN AN AFTERNOON MEETING WITH DR. MAHMOUD FAWZI, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, I ENQUIRED OF HIM WHAT THE REACTION OF HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD LIKELY BE TO A SUGGESTION FROM ME THAT UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OBSERVERS MIGHT BE STATIONED IN THE SECTOR OF THE SUEZ CANAL WHERE THERE IS NOW CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC AND THOSE OF ISRAEL. SUCH OBSERVERS, OF COURSE, WOULD HAVE TO BE STATIONED ON BOTH SIDES, AS HAS BEEN DONE IN THE SECTOR WHERE THE FORCES OF ISRAEL AND SYRIA ARE IN CONFRONTATION. THIS, I EXPLAINED, WOULD BE EXPECIALLY NECESSARY IF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IS TO BE ENABLED TO FULFILL HIS REPORTING RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS OF 6 AND 7 JUNE. DR. FAWZI ADVISED ME THAT HE WOULD BRING THIS IDEA TO THE ATTENTION OF HIS GOVERNMENT AND OBTAIN THEIR REACTION TO IT. IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE MEETING WITH DR. FAWZI I HAD A SIMILAR DISCUSSION WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ABBA EBAN OF ISRAEL AND ADVANCED THE SAME SUGGESTION TO HIM. THE FOREIGN MINISTER ALSO ASSURED ME THAT HE WOULD SEEK HIS GOVERNMENT'S REACTION TO THIS IDEA.

''AS OF NOW, I HAVE HAD NO WORD ABOUT THE REACTION OF EITHER GOVERNMENT TO THIS SUGGESTION WHICH I CONSIDER TO BE CONSTRUCTIVE AND HELPFUL IN THE LIGHT OF THE PREVAILING CIRCUMSTANCES AND IN THE REPORTING CONTEXT OF THE RELEVANT

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS.

''IF IT SHOULD BE AGREED THAT UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS SHOULD PROCEED TO SINAI AND THE SUEZ SECTOR, THIS COULD BE QUICKLY DONE, ACCORDING TO INFORMATION FROM THE CHIEF OF STAFF, GENERAL BULL, WITHIN HIS PRESENT OBSERVER STRENGTH BUT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF OBSERVERS AVAILABLE TO HIM AT A VERY EARLY DATE THEREAFTER.''

FO PASS ROUTINE TO MOSCOW NO.270, PARIS NO.276, AMMAN NO.153, TEL AVIV NO.298, BEIRUT NO.87 AND SAVING TO CAIRO NO.84.

LORD CARADON

SENT 09/0506Z
RECD 09/0507Z

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IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1699 8 JULY 1967
UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1699 OF 8 JULY
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW AND PARIS AND
SAVING TO OTTAWA, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, BEIRUT AND AMMAN.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 1697.
MIDDLE EAST : SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UAR TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL CIRCULATED AS DOCUMENT S/8043 OF 8 JULY, ASKING FOR AN EMERGENCY SESSION OF THE COUNCIL TO CONSIDER ISRAELI VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASE-FIRE:

QUOTE.

I HAVE THE HONOUR TO INFORM YOU THAT ISRAEL, IN LINE WITH ITS ESTABLISHED AGGRESSIVE POLICY, HAS TODAY AS IN THE PAST VIOLATED THE CEASE-FIRE ORDER WHEN AT 10.15 THIS MORNING ITS ARMED FORCES LAUNCHED AN ATTACK AGAINST THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC STATIONED SOUTH OF PORT FOUAD ON THE EASTERN BANK OF THE SUEZ CANAL HEAVILY SHELLING BY ARTILLERY PORT FOUAD. NOT SATISFIED WITH THIS FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE AND IN PURSUANCE OF ITS CONSISTENT POLICY OF AGGRESSION, ISRAEL HAS FURTHERMORE CARRIED AERIAL RAIDS AGAINST THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC CONTROL STATIONS IN EL TINA, RAS EL ESH AND EL KAP IN THE SUEZ CANAL AREA WHICH WERE DESTROYED AS A RESULT OF THIS UNPROVOKED ATTACK. SIMULTANEOUSLY, THE ISRAELI AIR FORCE INDISCRIMINATELY BOMBARDED THE EASTERN BANK, THE HEAVILY POPULATED AREAS IN PORT SAID, KANTARA AND RAS EL ESH, CAUSING SEVERAL HUMAN CASUALTIES AND PROPERTY DAMAGE.

THIS LATEST VIOLATION BY ISRAEL OF THE CEASE-FIRE IS BUT ONE OF A PREMEDITATED SERIES OF VIOLATIONS CARRIED OUT PERSISTENTLY SINCE THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADOPTED ITS RESOLUTIONS 233, 234, 235 AND 236 ON THE CEASE-FIRE.

THESE GRAVE VIOLATIONS PROVE BEYOND ANY DOUBT AND CONCLUSIVELY

/ THAT

THAT ISRAEL IS STILL PURSUING ITS ORIGINAL AGGRESSIVE PLANS AND UNLESS THE SECURITY COUNCIL TAKES THE NECESSARY MEASURES TO FORCE ISRAEL TO COMPLY WITH THE DECISIONS OF THE COUNCIL, WE WILL BE FACED WITH A SITUATION WHERE THE PRESTIGE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND OF THE UNITED NATIONS AS A WHOLE WILL BE JEOPARDIZED. CONSEQUENTLY, THE COUNCIL SHOULD, IN OUR OPINION, BE ABLE TO DISCHARGE ITS RESPONSIBILITIES AS STIPULATED IN THE CHARTER TO MAINTAIN PEACE AND ORDER.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS DUTY BOUND TO CALL UPON ISRAEL TO PROMPTLY AND FULLY COMPLY WITH THE DECISIONS OF THE COUNCIL AND REFRAIN FROM ALL MILITARY OPERATIONS.

MOREOVER, THE COUNCIL SHOULD BE IN A POSITION TO CHECK ANY ISRAELI SCHEMES FOR EXPANSION AND FURTHER AGGRESSION.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL COULD NOT BUT ACT URGENTLY, TO AVOID ANY FURTHER DETERIORATION OF A SITUATION WHICH IS ALREADY PREGNANT WITH ALL ELEMENTS ENDANGERING NOT ONLY THE PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST BUT ALSO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE WHOLE WORLD.

UPON INSTRUCTIONS FROM MY GOVERNMENT, I HAVE THE HONOUR TO REQUEST THAT AN EMERGENCY SESSION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL BE CONVENED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

UNQUOTE.

FO PASS MOSCOW NO. 271, AND PARIS NO. 277 AND SAVING TO CAIRO NO. 85, TEL AVIV NO. 16, BEIRUT NO. 69 AND AMMAN NO. 104.

LORD CARADON

SENT 09/0415Z
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IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 1700 8 JULY, 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1700 OF 8 JULY, RFI TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS AND SAVING TO OTTAWA, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, BEIRUT AND AMMAN.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 1697:MIDDLE EAST: SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL:

I HAVE THE HONOUR TO BRING TO YOUR ATTENTION A FURTHER VERY SERIOUS BREACH OF THE CEASE-FIRE COMMITTED BY THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC ON 8 JULY 1967.

AT APPROXIMATELY 0925 HOURS LOCAL TIME THIS MORNING, FIRE WAS OPENED BY UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC FORCES ON ISRAELI TROOPS STATIONED IN THE AREA OF RAS EL 'ISH, SOME FIFTEEN KILOMETRES SOUTH OF PORT SAID. IN ADDITION TO ARTILLERY SHELLING, OTHER DIRECT TRAJECTORY WEAPONS, MAINLY RECOILESS-GUNS, WERE USED FROM GUN EMPLACEMENTS IN THE AREA OF PORT SAID AND PORT FUAD. FIRE WAS RETURNED. THE EXCHANGE OF FIRE CONTINUED UNTIL 1130 HOURS. ISRAEL CASUALTIES AT THIS STAGE INCLUDED TWO KILLED AND THIRTEEN WOUNDED.

AT 1130 HOURS THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC FORCES DIRECTED FI... ON ISRAELI TROOPS AT KANTARA, AND THUS EXTENDED THE AREA OF THE INCIDENT.

FOLLOWING THAT, A UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC ARMOURED COLUMN MOVED FROM PORT SAID IN A SOUTHERLY DIRECTION ON THE WEST BANK OF THE SUEZ CANAL, AND OPENED FIRE ON ISRAELI TROOPS ON THE

/ EAST BANK

EAST BANK OF THE CANAL, MAINLY MORTAR FIRE. AS A RESULT MORE HEAVY CASUALTIES WERE CAUSED TO THE ISRAELI TROOPS, BRINGING THE TOTAL TO TWO KILLED AND TWENTY WOUNDED. IN ORDER TO REPEL THESE CONTINUING ATTACKS AND TO PROTECT THE SAFETY OF THE ISRAELI TROOPS, A LIMITED NUMBER OF ISRAELI PLANES TOOK ACTION AGAINST THE EGYPTIAN GUN POSITIONS WHICH INCLUDED NAVAL GUNS OUTSIDE PORT SAID FROM WHICH FIRE HAD BEEN DIRECTED AGAINST THE ISRAELI TROOPS.

EGYPTIAN FIRE CONTINUED INTERMITTENTLY ESPECIALLY IN THE AREA OF RAS EL 'ISH UNTIL 1500 HOURS. AT 1540 EGYPTIAN FIRE WAS RESUMED AT RAS EL 'ISH, AND AT 1545 AT KANTARA.

BOTH RAS EL 'ISH AND THE KANTARA AREAS HAVE BEEN THE SCENES OF EARLIER BREACHES OF THE CEASE-FIRE BY THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC WHEN EGYPTIAN FORCES ATTACKED ISRAELI TROOPS. ON 1 JULY 1967 I REPORTED A SERIOUS BREACH OF THE CEASE-FIRE WHICH OCCURRED ON THAT DATE WHEN EGYPTIAN FORCES OPENED MORTAR FIRE ON ISRAELI TROOPS IN THE VICINITY OF RAS EL 'ISH (S/8026). SIMILAR INCIDENTS OCCURED ON 2 JULY AT BOTH KANTARA AND RAS EL 'ISH AND ON 3 JULY NORTH OF KANTARA.

DESPITE THESE CONTINUING GRAVE BREACHES, IT REMAINS THE POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL TO DO EVERYTHING IN ITS POWER TO MAINTAIN THE CEASE-FIRE SCRUPULOUSLY, ON CONDITION OF RECIPROCITY, AND IT REAFFIRMS ITS UNDERTAKING TO ABIDE BY ITS ACCEPTANCE OF THE CEASE-FIRE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

THESE AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS AND THE MANNER IN WHICH THEY ARE PRESENTED IN PUBLIC EGYPTIAN STATEMENTS PROVE THAT IT REMAINS THE POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC TO MAINTAIN A CONTINUED STATE OF BELLIGERENCE AGAINST ISRAEL.

IN THE LIGHT OF THIS SITUATION, I HAVE THE HONOUR TO REQUEST AN URGENT MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO DISCUSS THE ISRAEL COMPLAINT OF SERIOUS VIOLATIONS BY THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC OF THE CEASE-FIRE.

FO PASS ROUTINE TO MOSCOW NO.272, PARIS NO.278 AND SAVING TO CAIRO NO.86, TEL AVIV NO.17, BEIRUT NO.70, AND AMMAN NO.105.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT 0447Z/09 JULY
RECD AT 0448Z/09 JULY

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EN CLAIR

IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1703

UNCLASSIFIED

EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION :
MIDDLE EAST.

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

9 JULY

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MY STATEMENT IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL THIS EVENING. PLEASE REPEAT AS NECESSARY.

QUOTE.

MR. PRESIDENT,

WITH YOUR PERMISSION, SIR, I SHOULD LIKE TO TURN FOR A SHORT WHILE TO REFLECT ON THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE CONFLICT AND IN THE TURMOIL AND IN THE SUFFERING OF THE NEAR EAST.

WE HAVE JUST LISTENED TO A SPEECH WHICH I AM SURE HAS DEPRESSED US ALL, A SPEECH OF VIOLENCE, AND INTEMPERATE, A SPEECH WHICH CAN SURELY NOT HAVE ASSISTED US IN FINDING A WAY OUT OF THE DIFFICULTIES WE FACE BUT I ON MY PART WILL SPEAK IN A WAY WHICH WILL NOT OFFEND OR ANTAGONISE ANYONE. IT IS SURELY OUR DUTY NOT TO INCREASE ANIMOSITY

RATHER OUR MAIN PURPOSE SHOULD BE THAT STATED BY MR. BREZHNEV FOUR DAYS AGO SPEAKING FORMALLY ON BEHALF OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS WHEN HE SAID THAT WE MUST ALL DO EVERYTHING SO THAT THE FLAMES OF WAR DO NOT BREAK OUT AGAIN. SURELY WE SHOULD ALL SET THAT AS OUR OVERRIDING AIM. BUT IF WE ARE TO ACHIEVE IT WE SHALL NEED TO AVOID SAYING OR DOING ANYTHING WHICH FANS THE FLAMES OF HATE. WE MUST TURN OUR MINDS AND, IF WE CAN, THE MINDS OF OTHERS FROM PAST BITTERNESS TO FUTURE HOPE, AND FROM RECRIMINATION TO RECONSTRUCTION - RECONSTRUCTION OF CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY ON A BASIS FAR FIRMER THAN EVER BEFORE. AND WHAT IS MORE WE MUST BE CONTENT FIRST OF ALL TO TAKE SMALL STEPS IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.

/ THE FIRST

THE FIRST ACTION OF THIS COUNCIL WHEN THE CONFLICT STARTED WAS TO CALL FOR AND ESTABLISH A CEASE-FIRE. WE MUST SEE THAT THE CEASE-FIRE IS OBSERVED. WE MUST CONDEMN ANY AND EVERY BREACH OF IT. WE CAN MAKE NO PROGRESS AT ALL TILL THAT FIRST ADVANCE ON TO FIRM GROUND HAS BEEN CONSOLIDATED.

I SHALL NOT ATTEMPT TODAY TO GO OVER ALL THE WIDER ARGUMENTS AND CONTROVERSIES WHICH HAVE RECENTLY BEEN THE SUBJECT OF THE DEBATE IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. BUT I WOULD WISH TO MAKE ONE GENERAL COMMENT

THROUGHOUT THE LONG DEBATE IN THIS COUNCIL AND THEN IN THE ASSEMBLY THE PUBLIC SPEECHES MIGHT OFTEN HAVE LED US TO DESPAIR. MORE IMPORTANT STILL, MILLIONS OF PEOPLE WHO STILL PUT FAITH IN OUR ORGANISATION MIGHT DESPAIR TOO.

I HAVE OFTEN REMEMBERED AS I LISTENED TO THE DEBATES THE WORDS OF AN ENGLISH POET AND I REMEMBERED THESE WORDS AGAIN AS I LISTENED TO THE SPEECH OF THE DISTINGUISHED DELEGATE OF THE SOVIET UNION JUST NOW

''EARTH IS SICK
AND HEAVEN IS WEARY OF THE HOLLOW WORDS
WHICH STATES AND KINGDOMS UTTER
WHEN THEY SPEAK OF TRUTH AND JUSTICE''

BUT IT IS COMFORTING TO HOPE THAT WE SHALL NOT BE JUDGED BY OUR PUBLIC SPEECHES AND I HOPE THIS MAY BE SOME COMFORT TO MY DISTINGUISHED FRIEND OF THE SOVIET UNION. WE MAY HOPE THAT WHAT WE DO WILL SPEAK SO LOUD THAT THE WORLD WILL NOT HEAR WHAT WE SAY.

WHAT HAS BEEN HAPPENING HERE AT THE UNITED NATIONS WHILE THE PUBLIC DEBATE HAS DRAGGED ON? MAKE NO MISTAKE ABOUT IT. A GREAT DEAL HAS BEEN HAPPENING.

BELOW THE ROUGH SURFACE OF WORDS THERE HAS BEEN PERSISTENT, ANXIOUS SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND OF AGREEMENT.

DISAGREEMENT ON SOME ESSENTIAL QUESTIONS PERSISTED. BUT THERE WAS A WIDE AREA OF GROWING AGREEMENT.

WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORY. WIDELY AGREED. THE NEED NOT ONLY TO PRESERVE THE CEASE FIRE BUT TO MAKE SURE THAT FIRING NEVER STARTS AGAIN. WIDELY AGREED. NECESSITY TO DEAL URGENTLY WITH ALL THE OTHER ISSUES. WIDELY AGREED. A

/ PRESSING

PRESSING NEED TO BRING SUCCOUR TO THOSE IN DISTRESS AND TO GIVE THEM NOT ONLY RELIEF BUT JUSTICE TOO. WIDELY AGREED. THE NEED TO GIVE FREEDOM TO WORSHIP TO ALL RELIGIONS IN THE HOLY CITY. WIDELY AGREED. THE NEED TO SECURE FREEDOM OF PASSAGE ON INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS. WIDELY AGREED. THE NEED TO PREVENT THE SQUANDERING OF RESOURCES SO DESPERATELY NEEDED FOR DEVELOPMENT ON A RENEWED ARMS RACE. WIDELY AGREED. THE NEED TO STRENGTHEN THE UNITED NATIONS PRESENCE IN THE NEAR EAST. WIDELY AGREED.

I PAY MY RESPECTFUL TRIBUTE TO ALL THOSE OF ALL GROUPS, YES OF ALL GROUPS, WHO HAVE WORKED FOR THESE PURPOSES. THE WORK THEY HAVE DONE IN RECENT WEEKS WILL NOT BE LOST. IT WILL FORM THE BASIS OF THE WORK NOW AHEAD OF US IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE WEEKS OF DEBATE HERE IN THE UNITED NATIONS HAVE NOT BEEN WASTED. THEY HAVE NOT DRIVEN US FURTHER APART. I TRUST THAT THEY HAVE BROUGHT US ALL CLOSER TOGETHER.

MR PRESIDENT, WE ARE OFTEN REMINDED OF THE WISDOM OF THOSE WHO DREW UP OUR CHARTER. TIME AND AGAIN WE BENEFIT BY RECOURSE TO THE PRINCIPLES THEY LAID DOWN.

ALL OF US, EVERY ONE OF US, SUBSCRIBE TO THE CHARTER. WE SUB-SCRIBE TO A DOCUMENT WHICH STATES THE PRINCIPLE OF THE SOVEREIGN EQUALITY OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THIS ORGANISATION. WE ALL SUBSCRIBE TO A PLEDGE WHICH REQUIRES US TO SETTLE OUR INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES BY PEACEFUL MEANS IN SUCH A MANNER THAT INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY, AND JUSTICE, ARE NOT ENDANGERED. WE ARE PLEDGED, ALL OF US, PLEDGED TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF ALL FORCE, AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STATE.

I COME BACK TO THE IMMEDIATE QUESTION BEFORE US, THE QUESTION OF WHAT PRACTICAL STEP CAN BE TAKEN NOW, IMMEDIATELY AND EFFECTIVELY. I TRUST THAT WE SHALL ALL HEED WHAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAID TO US YESTERDAY AND ACT AT ONCE ON THE PRACTICAL SUGGESTION HE PUT TO US.

FROM THE FIRST, MY GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN ANXIOUS TO CONCENTRATE ATTENTION NOT ON ACCUSATIONS AND ON GENERALISATIONS BUT ON THE

/ PRACTICAL

PRACTICAL STEPS REQUIRED TO ESCAPE FROM VIOLENCE AND START OUT ON THE HARD ROAD TO A STABLE AND SECURE SETTLEMENT. SUCH STEPS CAN BE TAKEN, SO I BELIEVE, ONLY IN THE UNITED NATIONS.
IT IS FASHIONABLE TO DECRY THE EFFORTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS. BUT AS WE LOOK BACK WE SHOULD REALISE THAT WHENEVER THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION HAS BEEN GIVEN HALF A CHANCE IT HAS SERVED US ALL VERY WELL.

THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE KEPT THE PEACE ON THE BORDERS OF ISRAEL AND THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC FOR TEN YEARS. THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND GENERAL BULL AND HIS UNITED NATIONS STAFF PLAYED AN INVALUABLE PART IN STOPPING THE FIRING. MR MICHELMORE AND HIS UNITED NATIONS STAFF HAVE BEEN WORKING DAY AND NIGHT TO RELIEVE SUFFERING AND HARDSHIP.

WE WARMLY WELCOME THE DECISION OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO SEND A SPECIAL EMISSARY TO REVIEW THE WHOLE QUESTION OF RELIEF AND TO MAKE PRACTICAL PROPOSALS FOR DEALING WITH THAT VAST PROBLEM. WE BADLY NEED NOT LESS BUT MORE INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT AND INTERNATIONAL ACTION.

THAT BRINGS ME, MR PRESIDENT, TO THE MAIN ARGUMENT I WISH TO LEAVE IN OUR MINDS TODAY. THOSE WHO SEEK STABILITY AND SECURITY CAN, SO I SUGGEST TO THEM, HOPE TO ACHIEVE THOSE AIMS ONLY BY INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY. THOSE WHO SEEK RELIEF AND JUSTICE CAN ALSO ACHIEVE THOSE AIMS ONLY BY INTERNATIONAL ACTION.

EXPERIENCE HAS WELL SHOWN HOW EFFECTIVELY THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION CAN ACT WHEN WE GIVE THE NECESSARY AUTHORITY.

WE SHOULD AT ONCE AUTHORISE THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO SEND OBSERVERS TO SINAI AND THE CANAL AND I TRUST THAT WE SHALL DO SO WITHOUT DELAY AND WITHOUT RESERVATION. I HOPE THAT WE CAN ALSO AUTHORISE HIM TO SEND HIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE AREA TO MAKE PROGRESS IN DEALING WITH ALL ASPECTS OF THE SITUATION, INCLUDING CERAINLY DISENGAGEMENT AND WITHDRAWAL. WE HAVE LONG BEEN PRESSING THAT THIS SHOULD BE DONE. INDEED WE SEE NO OTHER PRACTICAL WAY OF PROCEEDING. WE HOPE MOREOVER THAT FOLLOWING

/ THE ACTION

THE ACTION THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAS ALREADY TAKEN, ACTION TO DEAL WITH THE HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS, A NEW INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVE CAN SOON BE STARTED IN THE WHOLE FIELD OF RELIEF AND REHABILITATION. TO ALL CONCERNED I WOULD SAY THAT THE ONLY HOPE FOR US ALL IS TO BACK NOT ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER, BUT TO BACK THE CAUSE OF EFFECTIVE, PRACTICAL, IMMEDIATE AND IMPARTIAL UNITED NATIONS ACTION.

WE TOOK THE ESSENTIAL FIRST STEP IN THIS DIRECTION WHEN WE IN THE COUNCIL CALLED FOR AND INSISTED ON A CEASE FIRE. I TRUST THAT WE SHALL NOW TAKE A SECOND PRACTICAL STEP IN RESTORING AND MAINTAINING INTERNATIONAL ORDER SO THAT, IN THE RUSSIAN PHRASE, THE FLAMES OF WAR DO NOT BREAK OUT AGAIN.

UNQUOTE.

LORD CARADON.

SENT AT Ø147Z/10
RECD AT Ø148Z/10

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BF 101/1

WFO

Israel MP 6

July 11, 1967

I gather that the Prime Minister has suggested to the Chancellor that he might see Mr. Marcus Sieff to hear his suggestions about the use of oil revenues towards a Middle East settlement.

I think this must arise out of a memorandum by Sieff, a copy of which was sent to the Prime Minister, and which I sent to Donald Maitland in the Foreign Office on July 3. I enclose a copy of this memorandum.

I am sending a copy of this letter without the enclosure to Maitland.

Richard Pollen

P.R. Baldwin, Esq.,
H.M. Treasury.

E.R.

SECRET

PRIME MINISTER

Arab attitudes and British economic interests in the Middle East

(C(67) 123)

The oil supply situation

(C(67) 126)

Copy on Middle East (Gen) June 1967.

On Middle East (Gen) June '67.

It may be convenient to take these two memoranda together, starting with that by the Foreign Secretary.

2. This is essentially a situation paper, discussing our policy on broad lines; and it does not call for any immediate action, except in so far as its conclusions, if endorsed, point pretty clearly the direction which we should seek to take at the United Nations. Very briefly, it points out that our material interests in the Middle East lie very largely in the Arab countries, mainly by reason of our dependence on their oil supplies; but that two factors make it impractical for us to base our policy solely on this important fact. The first is that neither moral considerations nor public opinion in this country (nor for that matter our interests in world-wide stability) would make it possible for us to align ourselves decisively with the Arabs or to accept that Israel should be simply crushed. The second is that the history of our dealings with Israel, including our part in establishing Palestine and the role which we played internationally over Suez and over the Gulf of Aqaba, have made the Arabs almost pathologically suspicious of our attitude. A third consideration, which is not referred to in the paper but is very relevant, is that, as long as the albatross of Aden is round our necks, our policy is bound to be particularly suspect with the "revolutionary" Arab countries.

3. Time may be reasonably relied upon to clear the latter two problems; but not the first. In these circumstances the Cabinet may agree with the Foreign Secretary's conclusion that (a) we have a strong interest in rebuilding our relations with the Arabs but are inhibited in doing so by the other considerations; and (b), given that the Israelis are at present able to look after themselves without our support, our best course is to lie low and say as little as possible.

E.R.

4. It is against the background of this paper that the Cabinet will wish to consider the Minister of Power's paper on our oil supplies. Paragraph 7 is optimistic in forecasting a return to a normal level of supply for Western Europe during September. Even so, the stock forecast in paragraph 13 suggests that by then stocks will have fallen to a level which can give rise to "local supply difficulties and difficulties with particular products". Moreover, as long as the Suez Canal remains closed, there will be substantial additional costs to our balance of payments, which the Minister does not mention but the Chancellor of the Exchequer is unlikely to be content to pass over in silence.

5. The paper does not call for decisions by the Cabinet at present; and, given the extent to which the position can change, either way, at short notice, the Cabinet may wish to concentrate discussion on the possibility of obtaining Russian and Roumanian oil in the short term (on which the Minister of Power has just sent you a minute and will report orally to Cabinet). But, with one eye on the contingent need to introduce rationing before stocks fall too low or the balance of payments is too seriously affected, they may also wish to keep the Ministry of Power up to the mark by asking for comparable reports at weekly intervals henceforward until the situation looks like being restored to normal.

6. Our other Achilles heel in the Middle East is the sterling balances of the Arabian countries. Are we watching these as closely as oil supplies; and are we no less prepared to deal with an emergency, if one develops ?

10th July, 1967

SECRET - GUARD

CYPHER/CAT A
PRIORITY WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2322
SECRET AND GUARD

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
11 JULY 1967

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 2322 OF 11 JULY
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION SAVING TO AMMAN, POL.RESIDENT BAHRAIN, BEIRUT, JEDDA, JERUSALEM, KUWAIT, MOSCOW, TELAVIV, UKMIS NEW YORK.
YOUR TELS. 7541 AND 7703 (NOT TO MOSCOW OR UKMIS NEW YORK):
DRAFT PAPERS ON QUOTE THE FUTURE OF JORDAN UNQUOTE AND QUOTE BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS JORDAN . UNQUOTE
A COPY OF THE FIRST OF THESE TWO PAPERS PLUS THE ANNEX HAS BEEN PASSED TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT, WHO THOUGHT IT WOULD BE A VERY USEFUL BASIS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS ON JORDAN. WE ALSO DELETED THE PHRASE QUOTE ADOPTED BY THE AMERICANS UNQUOTE FROM PARAGRAPH 4 AND WILL REPORT AMERICAN COMMENTS AS SOON AS THEY HAVE BEEN ABLE TO STUDY IT.
2. WHEN WE MENTIONED THE APPARENT DIVERGENCE BETWEEN AMERICAN AND BRITISH VIEWS ON THE CONSEQUENCES FOR KING HUSSEIN OF ENTERING INTO BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS, THE DESK OFFICER FOR JORDAN EXPRESSED SATISFACTION THAT THE PAPER HAD PUT THE DANGERS SO FORCEFULLY SMICLN HE THOUGHT IT WOULD PROVIDE VALUABLE AMMUNITION FOR HIM IN HIS ATTEMPTS TO CONVINCE HIS OWN SUPERIORS OF THE RISK FOR KING HUSSEIN OF EMBARKING ON THIS COURSE.
3. I HAVE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ON THE FIRST PAPER. WHILE I REALIZE THE NEED TO SET SOME LIMIT ON THE GROUND IT COVERS, I WONDER IF IT IS REALISTIC TO LOOK AT THE FUTURE OF JORDAN EXCLUSIVELY IN THE ARAB/ISRAEL CONTEXT. YOU WILL RECALL (MY TEL. NO.2216) MR. RUSK'S EMPHASIS ON THE LACK OF REALISM OF LOOKING AT ANY ASPECT OF THE MIDDLE EAST EXCEPT IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THREE OF THE FOLLOWING FACTORS:
(A) THE ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE:
(B) ARAB MODERATES VERSUS ARAB QUOTE PROGRESSIVES UNQUOTE :
(C) SOVIET PENETRATION.
4. IF WE SEE SO LITTLE CHANCE OF PROGRESS UNDER (A) BETWEEN JORDAN AND ISRAEL, IN THE SHORT TERM IT MUST SURELY BE (B) AND (C) WHICH WILL MOST AFFECT JORDAN'S FUTURE: (B) PRESUMABLY DEPENDS VERY MUCH ON (C).
5. WE DO NOT YET HAVE A CLEAR PICTURE OF SOVIET INTENTIONS, BUT IT SEEMS PROBABLE THAT THE RUSSIANS MAY BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE

CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL WHILE WORKING STILL HARDER FOR THE CREATION OF QUOTE PROGRESSIVE SOCIALIST UNQUOTE REGIMES THROUGHOUT THE ARAB WORLD. IF THEY CAN CARRY THE EXISTING REGIMES WITH THEM OR POSSIBLY PUSH THEM FURTHER TO THE LEFT AND THUS TURN THEM INTO MORE DEPENDABLE INSTRUMENTS FOR THEIR PURPOSES (IN THIS CONTEXT THE ARTICLE FROM THE SOVIET PRESS QUOTED IN YOUR GUIDANCE 167 OF 30 JUNE IS OF PARTICULAR INTEREST), THERE IS LIKELY TO BE INCREASING PRESSURE FROM ALGERIA ON MOROCCO AND TUNISIA, AND FROM SYRIA AND THE U A R ON JORDAN, LIBYA, KUWAIT AND SAUDI ARABIA. AT ALL EVENTS THIS IS THE SORT OF DEVELOPING PICTURE THE AMERICANS (SEE MY TALK WITH HARRIMAN) FEAR. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND IT MIGHT SUIT THE RUSSIANS TO SEE KING HUSSEIN WITH AMERICAN ENCOURAGEMENT TRY YOUR COURSE (A) AND DESTROY HIMSELF IN THE PROCESS.

6. IF YOU HAVE ANY THOUGHTS ON THESE WIDER IMPLICATIONS IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE THEM AGAINST THE TIME WHEN THE AMERICANS ARE READY TO DISCUSS FURTHER WITH US.

7. IN THE SECOND PAPER ON BRITISH POLICY ONE SPECIFIC POINT DISTURBS ME, ALTHOUGH IT MAY ONLY BE A QUESTION OF THE PHRASING OF THE FINAL SENTENCE OF THE CONCLUSIONS WHICH SUGGESTS A RATHER MORE ACTIVE ATTEMPT ON OUR PART TO DERIVE ADVANTAGE FROM DIFFERENCES WITH THE AMERICANS OVER OUR APPROACH TO THE MIDDLE EAST THAN IS PROPOSED IN THE BODY OF THE PAPER E.G. IN THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 12.

8. IT IS QUITE TRUE THAT ON 19 JUNE MCGEORGE BUNDY EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING OF OUR NEED TO PRESENT A RATHER DIFFERENT IMAGE TO THE ARAB WORLD FROM THAT OF THE UNITED STATES. HIS VIEW WOULD, I THINK, BE SHARED BY THE ADMINISTRATION AT THE TOP. BUT HE MADE IT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THEN AND AGAIN TODAY THAT THE DIFFERENCE SHOULD BE MORE APPARENT THAN REAL AND SHOULD NOT FOR EXAMPLE INCLUDE AN OPEN DIVERGENCE ON THE TERMS OF A UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION (MY TEL. TO UKMIS NEW YORK 282)OR ON A QUESTION OF MAJOR POLICY. I AM SURE IT WOULD BE MOST UNWELCOME TO THE AMERICANS IF OUR DIFFERENCES WERE TO EXTEND TO MATTERS OF BASIC POLICY OR IF WE WERE TO SEEK TO EXPLOIT THEM FOR OUR OWN ADVANTAGE WITH THE

/ARABS

ARABS UNLESS AMERICAN AGREEMENT HAD BEEN OBTAINED IN ADVANCE. ANY ATTEMPT TO DO SO (HOWEVER DISCREET) WITHOUT TELLING THE AMERICANS WHAT WE WERE UP TO WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY GET BACK TO THEM AND MIGHT UNDERMINE THEIR CONFIDENCE IN US IN OTHER AND EVEN MORE IMPORTANT FIELDS.

9. PLEASE SEE M.I.F.T.

F O PASS SAVING TO AMMAN 12, POL RES BAHRAIN 7, BEIRUT 32 JEDDA 20, JERUSALEM 8, KUWAIT 47, TEL AVIV 10 AND MOSCOW 61.

SIR P. DEAN

SENT AT 0100Z/12 67
RECD AT 0101Z/12 67

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A
IMMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO. 1738 12 JULY 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1738 OF 12 JULY, RFI TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PARIS, TEL AVIV, AMMAN, BEIRUT, JEDDA AND SAVING TO OTTAWA AND CAIRO.

M.I.P.T.: MIDDLE EAST: EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION:

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

CONSIDERING THAT THERE WAS VIRTUAL UNANIMITY IN AGREEING THAT THE CRISIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST MERITS THE ATTENTION OF ALL MEMBER STATES IN EVERY PART OF THE WORLD, AND INDEED REQUIRES THE FULL PARTICIPATION OF ALL MEMBERS TO ACHIEVE RESULTS,

1. DECLARES THAT TIME HAS COME WHEN PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST MUST BE MADE, FINALLY AND FOR ALL TIME:

2. REAFFIRMS THAT THE EFFORT TO ACHIEVE FINAL PEACE AND FINAL SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM CAN BE HOPED FOR ONLY WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS:

3. UPHOLDS THE PRINCIPLE THAT CONQUEST OF TERRITORY BY WAR IS INADMISSIBLE IN OUR TIME AND UNDER OUR CHARTER AND CONSEQUENTLY THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES TO THEIR ORIGINAL POSITIONS IS EXPECTED:

4. DECLARES THAT THE POLITICAL SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF MEMBER STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST ALLOW THEM A RIGHTFUL FREEDOM FROM THREAT OF BELLIGERENCY:

5. REQUESTS THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO CONTINUE EXAMINING THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST WITH A SENSE OF URGENCY,

/WORKING

CONFIDENTIAL

UK MISSION NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 1738 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

WORKING DIRECTLY WITH THE PARTIES AND RELYING ON THE PRESENCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO ACHIEVE AN APPROPRIATE AND FULL SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM, BRINGING TO AN END THE LONG DEFERRED ONE OF THE REFUGEES, BOTH AS A HUMANITARIAN AND AS A POLITICAL PROBLEM.

FOREIGN OFFICE PASS MOSCOW 293, PARIS 300, TEL AVIV 313, AMMAN 172, BEIRUT 103, JEDDA 64 AND SAVING TO CAIRO 101.

LORD CARADON

SENT 0153Z 13 JULY

RECD 0241Z 13 JULY

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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Mideast(SD) Pt 6

COPY NO..... 17

S E C R E T

PRIME MINISTER'S
PERSONAL MESSAGE
SERIAL No T 209/67

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

TELNO 7863 13 JULY 1967 (PS)

SECRET

MY TELEGRAM NO 7547.

THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE HAS BEEN SENT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER OVER THE DIRECT WIRE.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF JULY 6.

AS YOU KNOW, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY HAS BEEN HAVING A WEEK'S BREATHING SPACE IN WHICH TO SEE WHETHER AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED ON ANY FORM OF WORDS. BUT ALL THE SIGNS SO FAR BEAR OUT YOUR DOUBTS ABOUT THE LIKELIHOOD OF ANY SIGNIFICANT CLOSING OF THE GAP BETWEEN THE TWO POSITIONS TAKEN IN THE ASSEMBLY ON THE MAIN ISSUE. I HAVE FOUND IT REASSURING THAT A SUBSTANTIAL PART OF THE MEMBERSHIP- AND NOTABLY THE LATIN AMERICANS - INSISTED ON A BALANCED RESOLUTION (PROVIDING FOR AN END TO THE STATE OF BELLIGERENCY AS WELL AS ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWL), OR NONE. THE SOVIET UNOIN AND THE LESS REASONABLE ARABS HAVE CERTAINLY BEEN GIVEN GOOD CAUSE FOR RECONSIDERING, THOUGH I ALSO AGREE WITH YOU THAT IT MAY BE A LITTLE TIME BEFORE ANY SHIFT BECOMES DISCERNIBLE. BUT AT LEAST THE ATMOSPHERE IS NOW VERY DIFFERENT FROM WHAT IT WAS WHEN THE SLANGING MATCH FIRST BEGAN. IT IS ALSO A GOOD SIGN THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAVE NOW AGREED TO PERMIT U THANT TO ARRANGE WITH THE ISRAELIS AND EGYPTIANS FOR UNITED NATIONS TROOPS TO BE STATIONED ALONG THE SIDES OF THE CANAL. THIS AGREEMENT SHOULD BE USED AS A FIRST STEP TOWARDS ESTABLISHING A U.N. PRESENCE ELSEWHERE IN THE AREA. IT IS A HOPEFUL SIGN TOO THAT U THANT HAS NOW APPOINTED A SWEDE TO PURSUE THE REFUGEE PROBLEM. A REALLY DETERMINED AND IMAGINATIVE EFFORT BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IS NOW NEEDED TO SOLVE THIS PROBLEM.

WE OUGHT TO PERHAPS TO EXAMINE WHAT PART A COMPREHENSIVE DEVELOP-MENT PLAN MIGHT PLAY IN ALL THIS. IN GENERAL I THINK WE SHOULD GO ON CONCENTRATING THROUGH THE SECURITY COUNCIL, ON DISCUSSION OF PRACTICAL MATTERS, PRESSING PARTICULARLY FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL, DEVELOPING ON THE UN PRESENCE IN THE AREA AND TACKLING THE ISSUES AFFECTING FREEDOM OF PASSAGE THROUGH THE WATER-WAYS.

AS REGARDS THE FAR EAST WE HAVE, AS I AM SURE YOU KNOW, BEEN

/GIVING

S E C R E T

Subject copy on
Far East (Gen)
Defence Pt 6.

GIVING VERY EARNEST AND DEEP CONSIDERATION TO THIS PROBLEM SINCE I SAW YOU LAST MONTH. WE HAVE DISCUSSED IT HERE WITH HAROLD HOLT, MARSHALL FROM NEW ZEALAND, HARRY LEE FROM SINGAPORE AND , MOST RECENTLY , WITH THE TUNKU. ALL HAVE EXPRESSED THEIR CONCERN ABOUT OUR LONGER-TERM INTENTIONS AND, WHILE THE CONSIDERATIONS THAT YOU AND THEY HAVE IN MIND DIFFER IN MANY RESPECTS FROM COUNTRY TO COUNTRY (AS ONE WOULD EXPECT), WE FULLY UNDERSTAND THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCERN THAT IS SHARED IN COMMON BY YOU ALL. AND, AS I EXPLAINED TO YOU, WE NOT ONLY UNDERSTAND THIS BUT WE SYMPATHISE WITH IT AND WISH TO DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO MITIGATE IT. WE HAVE PLANNED TO PHASE OUR WITHDRAWAL OVER A PERIOD OF YEARS SO AS TO REDUCE THE LIKLIHOOD OF ANY LASTING SETBACKS TO THE ECONOMIES OF THE COUNTRIES IN THE AREA: AND OUT MITIGATING AID COUPLED WITH THEIR OWN DETERMINATION TO HELP THEMSELVES WILL CONTRIBUTE POSITIVELY TO THE KIND OF SELF-RELIANT FUTURE AT WHICH THE WHOLE AREA SHOULD AIM

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAVE HAD TO REACH THEIR DECISIONS, AFTER THE FULLEST CONSULTATION WITH THEIR FRIENDS AND ALLIES AND TAKING DUE ACCOUNT OF THEIR VIEWS, ON THE BASIS OF THEIR OWN BEST JUDGMENT OF WHAT IS POLITICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY RIGHT FOR THIS COUNTRY. THE DECISION WE HAVE NOW TAKEN HAS BEEN REACHED IN THE LIGHT OF THE BEST ASSESSMENT WE CAN MAKE OF THE LIKELY DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS IN THE AREA IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE NEXT DECADE: AND OF THE ECONOMIC REQUIREMENTS IF BRITAIN IS TO PLAY ANY CONTIN-UING PART THERE AT THAT TIME. WE IN THIS COUNTRY WILL BE UNABLE TO PLAY ANY SUCH PART - OR INDEED ANY EFFECTIVE PART IN WORLD AFFAIRS AS A WHOLE- UNLESS WE GET OUR ECONOMY STRAIGHT NOW: AND TO DO THIS WE HAVE NO OPTION BUT TO BRING OUR DEFENCE SPENDING INTO LINE WITH OUR RESOURCES, WHILE MAKING FULL USE OF THESE RESOURCES TO ACHIEVE OUR POLITIAL OBJECTIVES. IF THIS IS TO BE ACHIEVED, IT REQUIRES LONG TERM DECISIONS ABOUT THE OVERALL SHAPE OF OUR FORCES AND ABOUT WEAPON SYSTEMS WHICH WE MUST TAKE NOW. I REPEAT THAT THE VIEWS THAT YOU AND THE HEADS OF THE COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED HAVE EXPRESSED TO US HAVE BEEN TAKEN INTO THE FULLEST ACCOUNT AND WE ARE GRATEFUL FOR THE FRANKNESS, AND ALSO FOR THE SPIRIT, OF FRIENDLY UNDERSTANDING,

/IN

IN WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN EXPRESSED. MY COLLEAGUES AND I HAVE DECIDED THAT IT IS POLITICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY RIGHT FOR US TO REDUCE OUR FORCES IN SINGAPORE AND MALAYSIA TO ABOUT HALF THE CURRENT LEVELS BY 1970-71 AND TO PLAN ON LEAVING THE MAINLAND OF SOUTH EAST ASIA ENTIRELY BY THE MIDDLE SEVENTIES. BUT BECAUSE WE ARE EQUALLY RESOLVED THAT BRITAIN SHALL HAVE A CONTINUING PART TO PLAY IN THE AREA, THOUGH ONE THAT MUST BE COMMENSURATE WITH OUR RESOURCES, WE SHALL ALSO PLAN TO RETAIN A SOPHISTICATED MILITARY CAPABILITY FOR USE IF REQUIRED IN THE FAR EAST AFTER THAT TIME. FOR IT REALLY IS NONESENSE FOR US TO OFFER TO PROVIDE INDEPENDENTLY GROUND TROOPS TO DEFEND ASIAN COUNTRIES WHO HAVE IT IN THEIR POWER TO TRAIN AND PROVIDE THEIR OWN. WHAT WE CAN DO AND INTEND TO DO IS TO MAINTAIN A MILITARY CAPABILITY FOR USE IN THE AREA WHICH PROVIDES THE SOPHISTICATED SEA-AIR SUPPORT WHICH THEY CANNOT AFFORD TO PROVIDE AS AN ASSURANCE AGAINST EXTERNAL AGGRESSION. IN THE FURTHER ROUND OF CONSULTATIONS JUST COMPLETED, THE COMMONWEALTH PRIME MINISTERS HAVE, I THINK, BEEN IMPRESSED BY THE LIKELY SCALE AND CHARACTER OF THIS CAPABILITY. NOW THAT WE HAVE TAKEN THIS DECISION, THE QUESTION ARISES- AGAIN IN THE LIGHT OF WHAT YOU AND OUR COMMONWEALTH COLLEAGUES HAVE SAID- WHETHER WE CAN AVOID ANNOUNCING IT PUBLICLY AT THIS TIME. THE FACT IS THAT SO MUCH HAS APPEARED PUBLICLY IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE WORLD ABOUT OUR LONG-TERM INTENTIONS (AND THIS WAS CERTAINLY NOT SOMETHING THAT WE EITHER WISHED OR ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY FOR) THAT IT IS SIMPLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR US NOW TO AVOID GIVING SOME PUBLIC INDICATION OF WHAT THEY ARE. OTHERWISE THERE IS A REAL RISK THAT IT MAY BE BELIEVED THAT WE ARE PLANNING A MORE RAPID RUNDOWN THAN IS IN FACT THE CASE. IN ANY EVENT, WE MUST IN ALL FAIRNESS GIVE OUR ARMED FORCES SOME IDEA OF THEIR LONG TERM SIZE, SHAPE AND EQUIPMENT WHEN THE PROCESS IS COMPLETED IN THE MIDDLE 1970S, PARTICULARLY AS THE CAREERS OF MANY ARE INVOLVED. THIS IS DIFFICULT UNLESS WE INDICATE THE MAJOR PREMISE ON WHICH OUR PLANNING IS BASED. IN ANY CASE, AS THE PROCESS GETS UNDER WAY IN THE COMING MONTHS, OUR LONG TERM INTENTIONS ARE BOUND TO BECOME KNOWN. EVEN IF WE OURSELVES ATTEMPTED TO DISUISE THEM, OTHER

/GOVERNMENTS

GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO AVOID SOME DISCLOSURES IN ORDER TO KILL RUMOURS AND SPECULATION AND TO EXPLAIN THE CONSEQUENTIAL ADJUSTMENTS TO THEIR OWN POLICY. I BELIEVE A CONTINUATION OF THE PRESENT UNCERTAINTY WOULD BE DAMAGING TO US ALL. BUT WE ARE ANXIOUS TO DO ALL WE CAN TO MEET YOUR CONCERN BY AVOIDING ANYTHING TOO SPECIFIC. ACCORDINGLY, IN THE DEFENCE WHITE PAPER THAT WE SHALL BE PRESENTING TO PARLIAMENT SHORTLY, WE PROPOSE TO SAY THAT WHILE WE PLAN TO WITHDRAW ALTOGETHER FROM OUR BASES IN SINGAPORE AND MALAYSIA IN THE MIDDLE 197ØS , THE PRECISE TIMING OF OUR EVENTUAL WITHDRAWAL WILL DEPEND ON PROGRESS MADE IN ACHIEVING A NEW BASIS FOR STABILITY IN SOUTH EAST ASIA AND IN RESOLVING OTHER PROBLEMS IN THE FAR EAST. I KNOW THAT THIS WILL BE UNWELCOME NEWS TO YOU BUT THESE DECISIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN FOR REASONS WHICH SEEM RIGHT TO US AND AFTER THE MOST PROLONGED CONSIDERATION AND CONSULTATION. I AM CONVINCED THAT, IF THIS COUNTRY IS IN THE FUTURE TO BE THE SAME KIND OF EFFECTIVE PARTNER FOR HER FRIENDS AND ALLIES IN THE WORLD AS SHE HAS, I HOPE, BEEN IN THE PAST, THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REALITIES MUST BE FACED AND NOT FUDGED: AND, IN PARTICULAR, THAT OUR ESSENTIAL OBJECTIVE OF BUILDING AN UNSHAKEABLE ECONOMIC BASE FOR BRITAIN IS THE RIGHT ONE NOT ONLY FOR THIS COUNTRY BUT FOR ALL OUR ALLIES AS WELL. I BELIEVE THAT, IN DECIDING AND ANNOUNCING NOW OUR INTENTION TO MAINTAIN A MILITARY CAPABILITY FOR USE IN THE FAR EAST AFTER THE MID 197ØS , WE ARE DEMONSTRATING OUR CONTINUED INTEREST IN THE AREA. THE TWO ASIAN GOVERNMENTS MOST DIRECTLY CONCERNED HAVE DEMONSTRATED AN IMPRESSIVE STEADINESS IN THIS NEW SITUATION. THEY HAVE RECOGNISED THE INEVITABILITY OF CHANGE: THEY TAKE THE POINT I HAVE MADE ABOVE ABOUT THE NEED FOR THEM TO MAKE THE CONTRIBUTION TO THEIR OWN DEFENCE THAT BEST ACCORDS WITH THEIR OWN RESOURCES, WHILE WE HELP WITH A MORE SOPHISTICATED CAPABILITY: AND THEY HAVE SHOWN A READINESS TO CO-OPERATE WITH US IN EFFECTING AN ORDERLY TRANSITION TO THE NEW BASIS FOR STABILITY IN SOUTH EAST ASIA WHICH IS OUR AIM. THE FACT THAT IT IS VERY MUCH IN THEIR INTEREST THAT THEY SHOULD DO SO DOES NOT DETRACT FROM THE VALUE OR SIGNIFICANCE OF THE WISE WAY IN WHICH THEY HAVE REACTED

/TO

TO OUR NEW POLICY. I AM SURE THAT WE CAN COUNT ON THE SAME DEGREE OF UNDERSTANDING AND POSITIVE CO-OPERATION FROM OUR OTHER ALLIES. I HAVE GONE INTO ALL THIS AT CONSIDERABLE LENGTH AND DETAIL BECAUSE OF THE FRANKNESS AND STRAIGHTFORWARD APPROACH THAT HAS ALWAYS CHARACTERISED THE EXCHANGES BETWEEN US. BUT YOU WILL REALISE HOW ESSENTIAL IT IS TO HOLD THIS INFORMATION VERY TIGHT UNTIL OUR WHITE PAPER IS PUBLISHED. I KNOW I CAN RELY ON YOUR TOTAL DISCRETION HERE.

SOSFA SENT 1946Z 13 JULY 1967

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(date) 17-3-97
(Signed) T.R. Green

TOP SECRET - GUARD

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Cypher/Cat A

IMMEDIATE AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 852 13 July 1967

TOP SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 852 of 13 July.
Repeated for information to Washington, UKMIS New York and Tel Aviv.

GUARD

My telegram No. 834: [?843 intended]

Jordan/Israel.

My United States colleague informs me that King Hussein spoke to him in similar terms. But the King added that Messrs. Katzenbach and Bundy had indicated to him in Washington that they might be prepared to help with arrangements for negotiations if he decided to take that course. The King has now enquired whether either of these gentlemen or another senior United States official could come urgently to Amman to advise him.

2. Mr. Burns told me that he had informed the King that he thought this would be most unwise. He is planning himself to leave for Washington tonight in order to brief the State Department orally. He believes that they may be prepared to provide facilities for a Jordanian/Israeli dialogue and intends to recommend that his Government keep in very close touch with us on the whole question .

3. The American Ambassador sees great dangers (as we do) in the course of action which King Hussein is considering, particularly in view of the virtual impossibility of conducting any negotiations in secret, but he is inclined to think that the King is right in concluding that if he does not make some attempt to secure peace with Israel he may as well give up. My colleague spoke in the strictest confidence and has asked particularly that we should not betray it.

Foreign Office pass Immediate to Washington as my telegram No. 151, UKMIS New York as my No. 103 and Tel Aviv as my No. 168.

Mr. Adams Sent 1430Z 13 July
Recd 1628Z 13 July

[Repeated as requested]

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TOP SECRET - GUARD

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T O P S E C R E T

CYPHER/CAT. A AND BY BAG

F L A S H FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

TELNO. 7915 14 JULY 1967 (EASTERN)

TOP SECRET.
ADDRESSED TO WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NUMBER 7915 OF 14 JULY
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO AMMAN, AND UKMIS NEW YORK,
AND SAVING TO TEL AVIV.
YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 2349: JORDAN/ISRAEL.
WE AGREE THAT THE CHOICES OPEN TO KING HUSSEIN ARE LIMITED, THAT THE PROSPECTS FOR HIS REGIME ARE NOT GOOD IF THERE IS NO MOVEMENT TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT WHICH BRINGS BACK THE WEST BANK, AND THAT HE IS THEREFORE BASICALLY RIGHT TO BE THINKING IN THESE TERMS. BUT TIMING AND METHOD ARE OF THE ESSENCE IN THIS AND, WHILST IT IS BY NO MEANS EASY TO WEIGH ALL THE FACTORS, WE THINK THAT BOTH THE AMERICANS AND HUSSEIN SHOW SIGNS OF BEING DANGEROUSLY AND UNNECESSARILY PRECIPITATE.
2. IT IS IN KING HUSSEIN'S CHARACTER THAT HE SHOULD REACT IMPULSIVELY AND UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF DEPRESSION: AND HE SEEMS NOW TO BE SO REACTING TO THE FAILURE OF HIS MISSION TO CAIRO.
3. WE AGREE THAT THE CHANCES ARE POOR OF GETTING FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY ARABS EVEN TACIT ACQUIESCENCE IN A NEGOTIATION. EVEN IF THE STATE OF MIND ATTRIBUTED TO NASSER IN AMMAN TELEGRAM NUMBER 851 IS GENUINE AT PRESENT, WE DOUBT IF IT WILL LAST LONG AND WHETHER NASSER CAN AFFORD TO BE OUTFLANKED ON HIS LEFT BY BOUMEDDIENNE. WE ALSO DO NOT DISCOUNT ROGER DAVIES'S SUSPICION (YOUR PARAGRAPH 7) THAT NASSER MAY HAVE SAID THINGS WHICH HE KNEW WOULD ENCOURAGE HUSSEIN TO GO IT ALONE, WITH THE CYNICAL INTENTION OF STABBING HIM IN THE BACK. THE PARALLEL WITH THE NURI SAID/SALAH SALEM AGREEMENT ON THE BAGHDAD PACT IN 1954 SPRINGS TO MIND.
4. NEVERTHELESS, WE THINK THERE ARE OTHER FACTORS WHICH ARGUE STRONGLY IN FAVOUR OF HUSSEIN TAKING THINGS MORE SLOWLY, AND TRYING TO WORK WITH THE BACKING OF A GROUP OF MODERATE ARAB GOVERNMENTS

/INSTEAD

INSTEAD OF EMBARKING ON WHAT WE STILL THINK (AND THE AMERICANS ALSO APPEAR TO HAVE NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT IT) IS A SUICIDAL COURSE:-

(A) ETHICS APART, KING HUSSEIN'S OWN JUDGMENT OF HIS CHANCES OF SUCCEEDING IS LIKELY TO BE DISTORTED IF THE AMERICANS ENCOURAGE HIM TO GO AHEAD WITHOUT GIVING HIM THEIR ASSESSMENT THAT HIS CHANCES ARE ABOUT 1 IN 10, OR SOME HONEST ESTIMATE.

(B) WE DOUBT IF THE IMPORT OF THE MAGNITUDE OF THE ARAB DEFEAT AND THE LACK OF ALTERNATIVES OPEN TO THEM ARE YET FULLY REALISED BY THE ARABS (SEE AMMAN TELEGRAM NUMBER 841), AND CONSIDER THAT THIS ARGUES IN FAVOUR OF A SLOWER TIME TABLE.

(C) THERE IS NOW SOME SOLID EVIDENCE THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE PRESSING THE ARABS TO AGREE TO THE END OF BELLIGERENCE. EVEN IF, AS SEEMS LIKELY, THEY DO NOT CARRY THEIR REVOLUTIONARY CLIENTS ON THIS, THEIR ATTITUDE, WHICH IS BECOMING PUBLICLY KNOWN, IS LIKELY TO CREATE A BETTER CLIMATE FOR INDIRECT NEGOTIATION, PERHAPS THROUGH A U.N. MEDIATOR. THIS WOULD HAVE A BETTER CHANCE OF SUCCESS AND WOULD NOT EXPOSE JORDAN UNDULY.

(D) ALTHOUGH WE AGREE THAT IN THE LONGER, OR EVEN MEDIUM TERM, THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE ISRAELI HOLD ON THE WEST BANK WILL MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO UNSCRAMBLE THE NEW FAIT ACCOMPLI, IT SEEMS TO US THAT FOR THE NEXT, SAY, TWO MONTHS, THE TREND ON THE ISRAEL SIDE IS TOWARDS A MORE FAVOURABLE SITUATION FOR NEGOTIATION.

IMMEDIATELY AFTER THEIR VICTORY THE ISRAELIS WERE FAIRLY SURE OF THEIR TOTAL MASTERY OF THE SITUATION: AS THE EFFECTS OF THIS WEAR OFF, THEY SEEM TO BE BECOMING MORE CONSCIOUS OF THE DISADVANTAGES OF THEIR SITUATION, AND THIS MIGHT MAKE THEM LESS RIGID IN THEIR NEGOTIATING POSITION.

5. OUR PRESENT THINKING THEREFORE IS THAT WE MIGHT INSTRUCT H.M. AMBASSADOR AMMAN TO BE GUIDED BY THE ABOVE ARGUMENTS IN ANSWERING KING HUSSEIN AND TO SPEAK ON THE FOLLOWING LINES:-

WE THINK THAT HIS ADHERANCE TO THE VIEW THAT THE ARABS SHOULD WORK FOR A SETTLEMENT, IN SPITE OF THE DISAPPOINTING RESULT OF HIS

/CONTACTS

CONTACTS IN CAIRO, IS STATESMANLIKE. SINCE THE DECISIONS HE HAS TO MAKE ARE COMPLEX AND DIFFICULT, AND SINCE HIS OWN FUTURE AND THAT OF HIS COUNTRY ARE AT STAKE, IN THE LAST RESORT THEY MUST REST ON HIS OWN JUDGMENT OF THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN JORDAN AND THE EXTERNAL THREATS. WE ARE STILL VERY CONSCIOUS OF THE RISKS INVOLVED IN HIS GOING IT ALONE. HE WAS PROBABLY WISE TO CONSULT PRESIDENT NASSER ABOUT THE ATTITUDE OF THE REVOLUTIONARIES, BUT WE THINK HE WOULD ALSO BE WISE NOT TO PUT MUCH FAITH IN ASSURANCES THAT NASSER WOULD NOT MAKE TROUBLE FOR HIM. SHOULD HE NOT NOW PREPARE THE GROUND FURTHER BY TALKING TO THE MODERATE ARAB GOVERNMENTS ESPECIALLY KING FEISAL ?

WHAT METHOD OF NEGOTIATION DOES HE PROPOSE ?

WE THINK THAT THERE IS HOPE FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A U.N. MEDIATOR AND WE THINK THAT THIS WOULD PROVIDE A USEFUL COVER FOR COMING AND GOING TO ALL THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS AND GETTING AT LEAST SOME OTHERS INVOLVED. IN 1948/1949 KING ABDULLA CAME UNDER HEAVY ATTACK FOR HIS DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS, WHILST FOUR ARAB GOVERNMENTS SUCCESSFULLY NEGOTIATED ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS IN RHODES UNDER THE AEGIS OF A U.N. MEDIATOR.

6. WE SHOULD HAVE TO DECLINE ANY INVITATION TO US TO ACT AS INTERMEDIARIES.

7. AS REGARDS THE TERMS WHICH THE ISRAELIS MIGHT SETTLE FOR, WE WOULD STRESS THAT WE HAVE NOT DISCUSSED THIS WITH THEM AND ANYTHING WE SAY MUST BE VERY SPECULATIVE. WITH THIS PROVISO, WE WOULD GIVE THE FOLLOWING VIEWS:-

WE THINK THE ISRAELIS WOULD BE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE A SEPARATE PEACE WITH JORDAN, THOUGH THEY WOULD OF COURSE PREFER TO HAVE A SETTLEMENT WITH ALL THEIR ARAB NEIGHBOURS, AND MIGHT BE READY TO MAKE LARGER CONCESSIONS FOR A GENERAL SETTLEMENT.

THEY WOULD NOT BE INTERESTED IN ANOTHER ARMISTICE AGREEMENT: IT WOULD HAVE TO BE A FULL PEACE TREATY, PUBLICLY AND FORMALLY

/CONCLUDED.

CONCLUDED.
THEY WOULD PROBABLY BE WILLING TO WITHDRAW FROM THE WEST BANK TERRITORY, WITH SOME MINOR TERRITORIAL ADJUSTMENTS (E.G. THE LATRUN ROAD) AND WITH THE MAJOR EXCEPTION OF JERUSALEM.
ON JERUSALEM, WE THINK IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO DISLODGE THE ISRAELIS. A RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE IS PROBABLY IMPOSSIBLE, BUT WE WOULD HOPE THAT THEY COULD BE PERSUADED TO ACCEPT SOME ARRANGEMENT WHICH SAFEGUARDED JORDAN'S ECONOMIC INTEREST IN THE TOURIST TRADE AND PROVIDED ACCESS FOR ALL TO THE HOLY PLACES.
(WE THINK THE PROPOSAL IN PARAGRAPH 5 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE WOULD BE A FAIR ONE: BUT WHETHER IT IS ATTAINABLE WOULD DEPEND PRIMARILY ON U.S. ABILITY TO EXTRACT SUCH FAR-REACHING CONCESSIONS).
8. THERE SEEMS TO BE A CONSIDERABLE DIVERGENCE OF VIEW BETWEEN OUR PRESENT THINKING AND THAT OF THE AMERICANS ON THE TIMING AND METHOD OF ANY INITIATIVE BY HUSSEIN, AND WE THINK YOU SHOULD EXPLORE THIS FURTHER. BY DOING SO, WE MAY ALSO STRENGTHEN THE HAND OF THOSE AMERICAN OFFICIALS WHO SHARE OUR VIEW THAT BY BETTING ON A VERY OUTSIDE CHANCE OF A BREAKTHROUGH TO A SETTLEMENT THEY MAY FURTHER ENDANGER WESTERN INTERESTS AND INVESTMENTS IN THE ARAB STATES. EVEN, IF THE AMERICANS ACT WITHOUT US, WE THINK OUR INTERESTS WOULD BE PUT AT RISK. YOU SHOULD THEREFORE PUT THESE VIEWS FRANKLY TO ROSTOW AND BATTLE AND REPORT THEIR REACTION BEFORE WE SEND INSTRUCTIONS TO AMMAN.

SOSFA

SENT 1950Z/14 JULY 1967

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TOP SECRET

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Cypher/Cat A

IMMEDIATE AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 863 15 July 1967

TOP SECRET

Addressed to F.O. telegram No. 863 of 15 July
Repeated for information to: Washington, U.K. Mission New York,
and Saving to Tel Aviv.

Your telegram No. 7915 to Washington: Jordan/Israel.

We agree generally with your line of thought and particularly that it would be unwise for King Hussein to take precipitate action. Unrealistic though the present Arab war fever may be it lessens the chances of his being able to get away with a separate settlement.

2. With reference to paragraph 5 of your telegram:

(a) King Hussein is likely to say that he can in any case count on the support of the moderate Arabs (it has been the extremists he has been hoping to win over e.g. at a summit conference) and he prefers for security reasons not to broach the matter with them.

(b) As to the method of negotiation I think he has an open mind and is hoping for suggestions from us.

(c) We think there might be advantage in the appointment of a U.N. mediator although we should not be too optismistic about his chances of involving the other Arabs who took part in the war as they are all extremists: the moderates seem to have no locus standi at this stage.

3. The estimate of Israeli terms given in paragraph 7 of your telegram will be very disappointing to King Hussein and his principal advisers. It is becoming increasingly clear that it is the return of Jerusalem that they are after and that the West Bank is of secondary importance. The King may well consider if the return of Jerusalem is a non-starter that he should not embark upon the hazardous course of negotiations.

F.O. pass Immediate Washington 152, U.K. Mission New York 104 and Saving to Tel Aviv 5.

Mr. Adams Sent 2126Z 15 July
Recd 2257Z 15 July
[Repeated as requested]
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TOP SECRET

CYPH CAT A
FROM PRIORITY WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NO 2387
T O P S E C R E T
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 2387 OF 17 JULY
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION PRIORITY TO AMMAN AND UK MIS NEWYORK
AND SAVING TO TEL AVIV.
MY TEL NO 2386: JORDAN.
BURNS SAID THAT HIS VIEWS ON THE JORDANIAN INTERNAL SITUATION COINCIDED CLOSELY WITH THOSE OF MR ADAMS.
2. THE SITUATION WAS BAD AND NOT GETTING BETTER. IT MIGHT LAST THIRTY DAYS OR EVEN SEVERAL MONTHS SEMICOLON NO ONE COULD TELL. BUT THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT KING HUSSEIN NEEDED SOME DRAMATIC EVENT TO SAVE HIS OWN POSITION.
3. SHORTLY BEFORE THE KING WENT TO CAIRO THE JORDANIAN DIRECTOR OF GENERAL INTELLIGENCE HAD TOLD THE AMERICANS THAT THE ONLY HOPE WAS A SETTLEMENT WITH THE ISRAELIS. THE INITIAL NUMBNESS OF DEFEAT WAS GIVING WAY TO FRUSTRATION AND BITTERNESS AND PEOPLE WERE READY TO CLUTCH AT ANY STRAW, EVEN A SEPARATE PEACE WITH THE ISRAELIS.
4. MR BURNS SAID THAT HE HAD HAD SOME OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS WITH KING HUSSEIN THE SORT OF TERMS FOR A SETTLEMENT HE MIGHT BE WILLING TO ACCEPT. THE KING BELIEVED THAT THE ISRAELI POSITION WAS SOLIDIFYING AND THAT THE LONGER HE LEFT IT, THE LESS CHANCE HE HAD OF GETTING THE SORT OF PEACE HE WISHED. BASICALLY HE WANTED A RETURN TO THE SITUATION BEFORE 5 JUNE. HE COULD ACCEPT MINOR RECTIFICATIONS ALONG THE BORDER, BUT COULD NOT FOR EXAMPLE AGREE TO CEDE THE WEST BANK HEIGHTS. HE HAD ALSO SAID HE COULD LIVE WITH A DE-MILITARISED ZONE OF A FEW MILES, BUT MR. BURNS THOUGHT THAT HE MIGHT EVENTUALLY COME TO ACCEPT DE-MILITARISATION FOR THE WHOLE OF THE WEST BANK. ON JERUSALEM THE KING HAD SAID HE KNEW THIS WOULD BE THE HARDEST PROBLEM OF ALL SEMI COLON '' THE EYES OF THE WHOLE MOSLEM WORLD WILL BE ON ME''. HE COULD CERTAINLY NOT REPEAT NOT ACCEPT THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF JERUSALEM (HE HAD BEEN MISQUOTED IN THE PRESS ON THIS) SEMICOLON HE THOUGHT THIS WAS THE ONE THING ON WHICH THE JORDANIANS AND THE ISRAELIS WERE AGREED. BURNS' PERSONAL OPINION WAS THAT HE COULD SCARCELY ACCEPT LESS THAN THE RETURN OF THE OLD CITY TO JORDAN. THE TROUBLE WAS

/THAT THE

THAT THE JORDANIANS WOULD REQUIRE MORE FROM A UNILATERAL THAN FROM A MULTILATERAL SETTLEMENT.

5. BURNS HAD ASKED THE KING BEFORE HE LEFT WHETHER HE THOUGHT HIS ARMY AND PEOPLE WOULD FOLLOW HIM IF HE WENT FOR A SETTLEMENT. KING HUSSEIN HAD REPLIED THAT HE WAS PROPOSING TO START FINDING OUT THE ANSWER AT ONCE. BURNS' OWN IMPRESSION FROM TALKS MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF HAD HAD WITH JORDANIAN OFFICERS WAS THAT IN THE ARMY THOSE WHO HAD ACTUALLY FOUGHT THE ISRAELIS WERE IN FAVOUR OF A SETTLEMENT SEMICOLON BUT THAT THOSE WHO HAD NOT (AND THEY WERE IN A MAJORITY) STILL TALKED ABOUT FIGHTING AGAIN. HOWEVER ONE JORDANIAN MAJOR AT THE STAFF COLLEGE IN TOUCH WITH MORE JUNIOR OFFICERS HAD SAID THAT AT HEART EVEN THOSE WHO WERE TALKING OF FIGHTING REALLY WANTED PEACE. BURNS SAID THAT KING HUSSEIN'S GREAT STRENGTH IN THE PAST HAD BEEN HIS CAPACITY TO EVOKE THE SUB-CONSCIOUS DESIRES OF HIS PEOPLE AND HE WOULD NEED TO DO JUST THIS IF HE WERE TO RALLY SUPPORT FOR A SETTLEMENT.

6. KING HUSSEIN FACED THREE IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS IF HE WERE TO GO FOR A SETTLEMENT:

A) THE NEED TO FIND ENOUGH SUPPORT FOR IT WITHIN JORDAN TO MAKE IT FEASIBLE AT ALL SEMICOLON

B) THE NEED TO GET RID OF THE IRAQI FORCES ON JORDANIAN SOIL. HE HAD ALREADY ASKED PRESIDENT AREF TO WITHDRAW THEM (KING HUSSEIN HAD TOLD BURNS THAT NASSER WOULD EXPLAIN THE WHOLE MATTER TO AREF AND SEEMED SURE HE WOULD COMPLY) SEMICOLON HOWEVER AREF AND THE OTHER ARAB LEADERS KNEW EXACTLY WHY THE KING WAS ASKING THIS AND BURNS WONDERED IF THE IRAQIS WOULD AGREE SEMICOLON

C) TO FIND OUT WHETHER THE ISRAELIS WOULD PLAY.

7. BURNS SAID THAT AS HE SAW IT THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM WAS SOMEHOW OR OTHER TO KEEP KING HUSSEIN GOING. FOR THIS HE NEEDED MILITARY ASSISTANCE. KHAMMASH, WHO WAS CERTAINLY SPEAKING FOR THE KING, SAID THAT THE ARMY WAS UNDER INCREASING PRESSURE TO REPLACE WHAT HAD BEEN LOST ESPECIALLY IN THE LIGHT OF SOVIET SUPPLIES TO THE 'PROGRESSIVE' ARAB STATES, IF KING HUSSEIN SUCCEEDED IN GETTING THE IRAQIS OUT THE PRESSURE WOULD GROW STRONGER, AS JORDANIAN PUBLIC OPINION REGARDED THEM AS AN ESSENTIAL PROTECT-

/ION AGAINST

ION AGAINST ISRAEL.
8. KHAMMASH HAD SAID THERE WERE TWO IMMEDIATE NEEDS:
I) CRITICAL SPARE PARTS FOR EQUIPMENT ALREADY IN JORDANIAN HANDS SEMICOLON
II) A NEW AIR FORCE. THE JORDANIANS HAD ENDED THE WAR WITH ONE HAWKER HUNTER SEMICON A TOTAL OF 4 (2 BEING REFURBISHED AND 2 OTHERS TO REPLACE LOSSES AFTER SAMU) WERE ON THEIR WAY FROM THE U.K. JORDANIANS HAD ASKED US FOR 36, BUT ONLY HAD PILOTS FOR 18. WITH THE ONE THAT REMAINED AND THE 4 ALREADY ON THEIR WAY, THIS MEANT THAT 13 MORE WERE NEEDED NOW, EVEN IF IT WERE POSSIBLE FOR US TO LEND THEM, THIS WOULD BE OF IMMENSE HELP. WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS A GESTURE AND THE ONLY AIRCRAFT THE JORDANIANS COULD FLY AT ONCE WAS THE HUNTER.
9. AS FAR AS ARMS FROM THE AMERICANS WERE CONCERNED KHAMMASH HAD MADE UP WHAT HE CALLED A NON-LETHAL PACKAGE SEMICOLON IF IT WERE AGREED, HE HAD SAID HE WOULD PUT IT ABOUT THAT THIS WAS ONLY THE FIRST INSTALMENT AND THAT MORE WOULD FOLLOW.
1Ø. STRESSING THAT I WAS SPEAKING PERSONALLY, I SAID THAT I KNEW HUNTERS WERE IN EXTREMELY SHORT SUPPLY AND THAT I DOUBTED WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR US TO MEET THE JORDANIANS. I SHOULD HOWEVER BE GRATEFUL FOR FURTHER GUIDANCE ON WHAT TO SAY TO THE AMERICANS ABOUT THIS SINCE THE MATTER IS BOUND TO COME UP AGAIN

F O PASS PRIORITY AMMAN 68, AND SAVING TO TEL AVIV 13.

SIR P DEAN

SENT 18/Ø22ØZ
RECD 18/Ø222Z

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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IMMEDIATE AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 867 17 July, 1967

TOP SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 867 of 17 July.
Repeated for information to: Washington, Tel Aviv, U.K.Mission New York

My telegrams Nos. 843 and 844: Jordan/Israel.

King Hussein saw my First Secretary yesterday evening and spoke further on the subjects which he had discussed with me on 12 July, the day after his return from Cairo.

2. Regarding Egypt, King Hussein said that President Nasser had told him that

(a) he now regretted cutting his links so completely with the West. In the interests of the Arabs as a whole, he agreed that Jordan should maintain her relations with the West (my telegram No. 851 of 13 July). One reason for his resignation had been that he had hoped that Muhi-id-Din, his successor, would be able to re-build Egyptian relations with the West:

(b) he himself was completely dependent on the U.S.S.R. To maintain his and Egypt's position he was prepared if necessary to make a defence agreement with the U.S.S.R. in which he would give them bases in Egypt.

3. On what Nasser had said to him about negotiations between Jordan and Israel, King Hussein said that:

(a) This had first been discussed when only Boumedienne had been present.

(b) Later he had sent a message to Nasser asking that Nasser should put his agreement in writing. Nasser had said that he did not want such a piece of paper to exist, as extremists in Egypt might exploit it against him (Nasser): but he was however, willing to repeat his views in front of the delegations.

(c) Later in front of the Egyptian, Algerian and Jordanian delegations (about eighteen persons in all), he (Hussein) had expounded the problems facing Jordan as a result of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank. Nasser had said that a military solution was not possible for Jordan, and that in view of Jordan's special difficulties and of the plight of the Arabs on the West Bank, Jordan should attempt a political solution of these problems. Nasser had suggested that Hussein should get in touch with the Americans with a view to negotiations with the Israelis.

3. [sic] It seemed that the King was not entirely clear to what exactly Nasser had agreed in front of the three delegations, and my First Secretary pointed out that Nasser still seemed to have scope,

/should

should he so wish, to turn on the King in the future and say that though he had agreed that the King should seek a political solution, he had not imagined that the King would then betray the Arabs by doing whatever it was that the King might now do.

4. It was apparent that King Hussein's ideas on the presentation of the negotiations were still forming. He said that:

(a) several leading personalities had recently visited him from the West Bank. It had been agreed with them that they would call for the King to try and get back the West Bank, if necessary by negotiations with Israel.

(b) he saw merit in the idea that he should appear to respond to a call by the Jordanians to negotiate, and that this call might be engineered through, for example, a meeting of leading Jordanians from both Banks.

(c) he did not intend to negotiate behind the backs of the Arab people (too risky for his position). He would see that they knew in advance that he intended to negotiate, and he would, he hoped, get their tacit acceptance of the fact (but see paragraph 8 below regarding Syria).

(d) the negotiations themselves, and their mechanics, must be secret.

5. Without instructions my First Secretary did not raise the subject of the mechanics. But it was clear that the King was thinking in terms of indirect negotiations, that he felt that these were dangerous enough for his position, and that he ruled out the possibility or desirability of direct negotiations.

6. On the possible terms for an agreement, the King said that Jerusalem was the crux. He was prepared to agree to any plans for access, etc., but his position was so difficult and Arab feelings about Jerusalem so strong, that he was sure that he could not get away with less than that the ultimate sovereignty over Jerusalem should rest with Jordan. My First Secretary reminded him that I had given as my personal opinion (paragraph 4 of my telegram No.843) that it was unlikely that the Israelis would surrender sovereignty over Jerusalem. The King said (as I forecast in paragraph 3 of my telegram No. 863) that if the return of Jerusalem was a non-starter, then there was no point in his entering into negotiations, he would have to hang on and hope that developments would save Jordan and its present moderate régime.

7. He was very concerned at growing Soviet influence and power in the area. He felt that the U.S.S.R. wanted to revert to the more profitable pursuit - for them - of encouraging extremists to undermine and overthrow the moderate régimes in the area. Syria was, in his estimate, a Soviet satellite.

8. His ex-Ambassador to Syria, who was resident there, had just visited him to tell him about two conversations. The first had been with Khalid Jundi, the notorious Syrian Trades Union leader, who had said bluntly that the Syrians were well aware that it was now King Hussein alone who was holding Jordan together; they had plans prepared which they would not hesitate to put into

/effect

effect should Jordan step out of line. He (the King) had interpreted this to mean that if he embarked on any action which was too far from what the Syrians thought proper, then they would attempt to assassinate him and then take over what areas of Jordan they could. The second conversation had been with the Soviet Ambassador in Damascus who had said much the same though putting it less crudely.

9. The King said that the Syrian army had emerged relatively unscathed from the war compared with the Jordanians. He felt defenceless against them, particularly without an air force. This was one of the reasons why he hoped strongly that Her Majesty's Government would meet his request for up to thirty-six Hunters. My First Secretary said that a difficulty was that though the will to help was surely there, the Hunters were not. The King again mentioned the possibility of diverting those earmarked for India (paragraph 6 of my telegram No. 843 and my telegram No. 966).

10. Regarding the Iraqi troops in Jordan, the King said that he had written politely and gratefully to President Arif saying that Nasser had doubtless informed him that a military solution to Jordan's difficulties with Israel was not practicable and that a political one must be sought. In the circumstances, the Iraqi troops could now be withdrawn from Jordan.

11. It was apparent from the conversation that the King believes that a turning point has been reached in the Middle East, and that the type of moderate régime which he wants for the Arabs (including Jordan) may well disappear. He abhors the idea that extremism and Soviet influence should dominate the Arabs, and genuinely seems to feel that it is his duty as an Arab leader with a strong personality to do what he can to prevent this. He said that he needed all the support and practical help he can get, and that he looked to the United Kingdom and United States for this. Though obviously determined not to go down without a struggle, he had no illusions that his own future was anything but uncertain. And he agreed with Jundi (paragraph 8 above) that it was he alone who was now holding Jordan together.

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Mr. Adams

Sent 1750Z 17 July
Recd. 2018Z 17 July

[Repeated as requested]

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TELEGRAM NUMBER 1795
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TO FOREIGN OFFICE
18 JULY

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1795 OF 18 JULY
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, AMMAN, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV AND SAVING TO CAIRO AND OTTAWA.

MIDDLE EAST : EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION.

THE VARIOUS INITIATIVES IN SEARCH OF A COMPROMISE RESOLUTION SEEM TO BE FAILING, AND THE LATIN AMERICANS HAVE WRITTEN TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY CONFIRMING THAT THEIR EFFORTS HAVE NOT BEEN SUCCESSFUL. (TEXT AND ENCLOSURES IN MY I.F.T.). IT MAY BE THAT THE RUSSIANS (GROMYKO IS STILL HERE) WILL MAKE A LAST MINUTE ATTEMPT BUT THE GENERAL ASSUMPTION TONIGHT IS THAT THE EMERGENCY SESSION WILL FINISH ON THURSDAY OR FRIDAY WITH NO MORE THAN A PROCEDURAL RESOLUTION REFERRING THE WHOLE QUESTION BACK TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

2. DOBRYNIN YESTERDAY ASKED TO SEE GOLDBERG AND ENQUIRED WHETHER THE LATEST LATIN AMERICAN TEXT WAS ACCEPTABLE TO THE AMERICANS. GOLDBERG SAID YES, AND DOBRYNIN UNDERTOOK TO REPORT TO HIS GOVERNMENT. GOLDBERG TOLD ME THAT HIS IMPRESSION WAS THAT THIS VISIT WAS MERELY EXPLORATORY AND NOT WITH THE INTENTION OF NEGOTIATION. HE THOUGHT THAT THE RUSSIANS NOW REALISED THAT THE ORIGINAL LATIN AMERICAN TEXT WAS SOUND AND REGRETTED HAVING OPPOSED IT. GOLDBERG ALSO SAID THAT HE DID NOT NOW EXPECT ANYTHING MORE THAN A PROCEDURAL RESOLUTION.

FO PASS PARIS NO. 326, MOSCOW NO. 314, AMMAN NO. 195, BEIRUT NO. 125, TEL AVIV NO. 328 AND SAVING TO CAIRO NO. 114.

LORD CARADON

SENT AT Ø311/19 JULY
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[REPETITION TO MOSCOW REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION. REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS.]

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EN CLAIR

PRIORITY UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1798 18 JULY

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1798 OF 18 JULY

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, AMMAN, TEL AVIV, AND SAVING TO CAIRO AND OTTAWA.

M.I.P.T.

INFRINGEMENTS OF CEASE-FIRE IN THE SUEZ CANAL AREA.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SOVIET LETTER.

QUOTE.

I CONSIDER IT NECESSARY TO DRAW THE ATTENTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO ISRAEL'S CONTINUED ACTS OF AGGRESSIVE MILITARY PROVOCATION IN THE SUEZ CANAL AREA. THE LETTER SENT BY THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE U.A.R. TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE 13TH, 14TH AND 15TH JULY, 1967, CITE SPECIFIC NEW INSTANCES OF GROSS VIOLATIONS BY ISRAEL OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S RESLOLUTIONS COVERING THE CEASE-FIRE. IN RECENT DAYS ISRAEL'S ARMED FORCES HAVE ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS SHELLED AND BOMBED TOWNS AND VILLAGES IN THE U.A.R. ALONG THE SUEZ CANAL. THIS HAS CAUSED CASUALTIES AMONG THE CIVILIAN POPULATION AND DAMAGE TO PROPERTY. EVENTS IN THE SUEZ CANAL AREA SHOW THAT ISRAEL HAS NOT ABANDONED THE ATTEMPT TO FOLLOW THE POLICY OF AGGRESSION AGAINST THE U.A.R. AND OTHER ARAB STATES. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS THAT THE MILITARY CLASHES PROVOKED BY ISRAEL IN THE SUEZ CANAL AREA ARE EXTREMELY DANGEROUS AND COULD GROW INTO A WIDER MILITARY CONFLICT. ISRAEL'S CONTINUED OCCUPATION OF TERRITORY SEIZED FROM ARAB COUNTRIES BY AGGRESSION IS A DEFIANCE OF THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE U.N. CHARTER AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AN INFRINGEMENT OF THE SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE ARAB STATES. IN ORDER TO PREVENT FURTHER MILITARY CLASHES AND REMOVE THE DANGER OF A RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES IN THE NEAR EAST, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT ISRAEL

/SHOULD

SHOULD IMMEDIATELY WITHDRAW ITS FORCES FROM THE TERRITORY OF THE ARAB STATES THAT IT HAS OCCUPIED. THIS IS THE AIM THAT THE UNITED NATIONS SHOULD SEEK TO ACHIEVE. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD CIRCULATE THIS LETTER TO MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS A SECURITY COUNCIL DOCUMENT.

FOREIGN OFFICE PLEASE PASS PARIS 329, MOSCOW 317, AMMAN 198, TEL AVIV 331 AND SAVING TO CAIRO 117.

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Extract from Hansard 18th July 1967.

COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES (UNPROVOKED AGGRESSION)

Q2. **Mr. Blaker** asked the Prime Minister what is the policy of Her Majesty's Government, as distinct from their obligations under specific agreements, in regard to coming to the assistance of a Commonwealth country which is the victim of aggression.

The Prime Minister: Her Majesty's Government would take all appropriate action to help any fellow member of the Commonwealth which was the victim of unprovoked aggression.

Mr. Blaker: Will the Prime Minister give an assurance that there has been no change in policy about giving assistance to Commonwealth countries since the Labour Government came to power? On the other hand, is it not apparent that our ability to give assistance will be reduced gravely if the reductions East of Suez in our Forces foreshadowed in today's White Paper are carried out?

The Prime Minister: There has been no change of policy in this matter. Each case has to be considered on its merits, as has always been the case; for example, in a case not long ago when two Commonwealth countries were involved in conflict one with the other. As to the second part of the hon. Gentleman's supplementary question, I am sure that he will wish to study the White Paper before forming conclusions.

Dr. Gray: Has my right hon. Friend considered giving an assurance to India, and has he tried to persuade India to accept such an assurance so that she might be more ready to sign the non-proliferation agreement on nuclear weapons?

The Prime Minister: I do not think that the question of a unilateral undertaking to India in a nuclear sense is one which arises, and I am quite sure that it would not be acceptable to India. I agree that this is part of the discussions which must go on and continue at Geneva for giving assurances to non-nuclear Powers so that they are willing to sign the non-proliferation treaty.

MIDDLE EAST

Q3. **Mr. G. Campbell** asked the Prime Minister whether he will make a statement on the present effects on Great Britain, including the petroleum position, of recent events in the Middle East.

The Prime Minister: I would refer the hon. Member to the Answer I gave on the 13th July to a Question by my right hon. Friend the Member for Derby, South (Mr. Philip Noel-Baker) and to the information already given to the House by my right hon. Friend the Minister of Power.—[Vol. 750, c. *137*.]

Mr. Campbell: Can the Prime Minister give an estimate of the effect of the Middle East war on our balance of payments position, since it is better that the House should be informed from official sources than to have to depend upon conjecture in the Press and elsewhere?

The Prime Minister: Yes. I think that the hon. Gentleman is right about that. It is not possible at this stage to say what is the net cost to our balance of payments of the Middle East fighting. Obviously, there will be some effect, but not as great as has been forecast in some quarters.

Mr. Raphael Tuck: Has my right hon. Friend anything to say about the 270 Arab personnel who are at present receiving training in Army, Navy and Air Force establishments in this country? Does he not think, as the war is not over, that it is about time that we stopped training Arabs to kill Israelis?

The Prime Minister: I have nothing to say about that position. If my hon. Friend would care to put down a Question to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence, who is responsible for the training of overseas personnel in this country, no doubt he would get a reply.

Mr. Heath: Can the Prime Minister be more explicit about the actual cost per month on the balance of payments, at least with regard to imports? I understand the difficulty about exports, but figures have been given as high as £180 million a year for imports alone. Can he correct this more explicitly?

Extract from Hansard 18th July 1967.

The Prime Minister: I think that it is too early to make an estimate. Any figure of that kind would be an extraordinary estimate on anything that we know at the present time. It is too early to say even what was the effect on our June import position of the non-arrival of cargoes, for example because of the closure of the Suez Canal, but anything like the rate mentioned by the right hon. Gentleman is far beyond any estimate that I have seen.

Q8. **Mr. Molloy** asked the Prime Minister what proposals Her Majesty's Government will be advancing to achieve a lasting settlement in the Middle East.

The Prime Minister: I have nothing to add to the Answers to Questions given yesterday by my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary.—[Vol. 750, c. 1510.]

Mr. Molloy: Would my right hon. Friend agree that any proposal which might be put forward to achieve a lasting peace in this area must include the fact that the ordinary Arabs should share in the revenues from oil and that this, allied to the inter-change of ideas and information between the Israelis and Arabs, could lead both of them together to launch a real attack on the problems of that area, which are ignorance, disease and poverty?

The Prime Minister: I think that that objective would be supported by hon. Members on both sides of the House. A more equitable share of the oil revenues was a point often made by Aneurin Bevan when we debated Middle Eastern issues in this House and certainly Israel has shown that she has a great deal to contribute to world development once the political bars to co-operation between Jew and Arab are removed.

Mr. Tapsell: How does the Prime Minister explain the contrast between his rush forward to make his ill-advised statement about the Straits of Tiran and his present passive attitude to the far greater importance of the international right of way through the Suez Canal?

The Prime Minister: I am sorry if the hon. Gentleman did not approve of the statement that I made about the Straits of Tiran, which was fully supported by his Front Bench in the debate that immediately followed, and by Opposition Front Bench spokesmen. The question of the Suez Canal was dealt with yesterday by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. It is necessary to create the political conditions—we have to be realistic about this, including the question of possible military activity on both sides of the Canal—before we are likely to see a rapid movement towards clearing the Canal. As my right hon. Friend said, the agreement to have United Nations observers on the Canal is a useful step towards this.

Mr. Grimond: Can the Prime Minister give us an assurance that Her Majesty's Government's representatives at the United Nations will press that in any lasting settlement in the Middle East the situation in the Yemen will be dealt with, where reports of the use of poison gas are horrifying, and do not seem to receive the attention they deserve?

The Prime Minister: I think that they have received the attention they deserve. As the right hon. Gentleman knows, they have frequently been condemned by my right hon. Friend and other members of the Government, and also at the United Nations where this matter was the subject of some debate recently. This is a deplorable development. Any final settlement for the Middle East must take up the question of the Yemen, but the question of atrocities in warfare is a matter which should be dealt with separately, and should be dealt with by universal condemnation by the whole of mankind.

Mr. Winnick: Is my right hon. Friend aware that there is still a great deal of concern about the position of Arab refugees arising from the last armed clash? Can my right hon. Friend say what kind of international action can be taken and should be taken quickly to alleviate the hardship and misery of so many Arab refugees in the Middle Eastern area?

The Prime Minister: My hon. Friend is right, and indeed from the earliest debates that we have had on the present crisis, even before the fighting began, I think hon. Members on both sides stressed this as a matter of urgency, which has been made much more urgent by the increase in the number of refugees. This was one of the subjects dealt with in a Resolution of the General Assembly

of the United Nations. We are giving what help we can to the refugees on the West Bank, and there is, I think, a sense of urgency among those concerned to try to get this problem dealt with as a humane operation first, and then settled as a political operation afterwards.

MARINE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Q4. **Mr. Hugh Fraser** asked the Prime Minister whether he will now set up a body draw from scientists and businessmen and chaired by a person outside Parliament urgently to recommend to him the outlines of a national programme for sea use and marine science and technology.

The Prime Minister: I think we should await the outcome of the reviews referred to by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Education and Science in answer to a Question by my hon. Friend the Member for West Lothian (Mr. Dalyell) on the 3rd of July.—[Vol. 749, c. *195.*]

Mr. Fraser: Would the Prime Minister agree that at the moment the gap between technology and science is widening the failure to identify targets, and, what is more, that one has little cause to appreciate what use his Ministers are in this process? They have had two years to sort it out, and the truth is that they have failed.

The Prime Minister: The right hon. Gentleman initiated a useful debate on this subject not long ago and I have nothing to add to what was said then. As the right hon. Gentleman knows, the Natural Environment Research Council, which was set up after we came to office, is examining various research projects which promise to lead to economic benefit. It will be some little time before it can identify its targets in this field.

Mr. Maxwell: Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind that oceanography is a science which we as an island nation should support very strongly as it has tremendous potential not just for purposes of defence, but also for purposes of agriculture, environment, weather control, and all these things to which at present we are not devoting anything like the resources that we should devote——

Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Member must be brief, or he will get into deep water.

The Prime Minister: I agree with my hon. Friend about the importance of oceanography and indeed about underwater geology which is now yielding valuable results. It is a question of how much of our resources, financial and otherwise, can be devoted to this compared with competing claims on our science and technology budget.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS (SPEECH)

Q6. **Mr. Ian Lloyd** asked the Prime Minister whether the speech by the First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Economic Affairs at Birmingham on 25th June on the extension of public ownership represents the policy of Her Majesty's Government.

Q7. **Mr. John Lee** asked the Prime Minister whether the public speech by the First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Economic Affairs at Birmingham on 25th June on the further extension of the public sector of the economy represents the policy of Her Majesty's Government.

Q9. **Mr. Alec Jones** asked the Prime Minister whether the public speech by the First Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Economic Affairs at Birmingham on 25th June on extensions of public ownership represents Government policy.

The Prime Minister: Yes, Sir.

Mr. Lloyd: As all Governments are demonstrably less efficient at controlling the dissipation of resources in the public sector than in inhibiting the creation of wealth in the private sector, can the Prime Minister say why the current annual rates of 9 per cent. and 16 per cent. in current and capital expenditure in the public sector should not be taken to indicate a grave deterioration in national solvency of a far graver kind than that in the balance of payments deficit which the Prime Minister laments with such monotonous regularity?

The Prime Minister: While not wanting to compete with the hon. Gentleman's polysyllabic preamble, still less to agree

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SOVIET UNION
20 July, 1967
Section 1

THE SOVIET ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS

Sir Geoffrey Harrison to Mr. Brown. (Received 20 July)

SUMMARY

The Soviet leaders now have the opportunity to look back upon what must be regarded as a bad six weeks for the Soviet Union. (Paragraphs 1–2.)

2. Preliminary blunders: the build-up of arms supplies to the Arabs; the commitment to Syria; and the statement, apparently made to a visiting UAR Parliamentary delegation, that there was a premeditated Israeli plan to invade Syria. (Paragraphs 3–4.)

3. Before the outbreak of hostilities, the Russians may well have concluded that they could only draw advantage from the situation. The short-sightedness of this conclusion was brought home by the successful Israeli campaign. (Paragraphs 5–7.)

4. Soviet diplomatic activity since the cease-fire, and more especially at New York, has not prevented the piling of a political on top of a military humiliation. When the crunch came, the United States effectively stood by their friends: the Soviet Union did not. (Paragraphs 8–10.)

5. The conclusions which the Soviet leadership will draw. There is no sign of cleavage at the top and, short of a palace revolution, it is not to be expected that the Soviet leadership will admit that they had been in error, that they had been committed beyond their capacities, or that they had failed to meet their obligations. The leadership has decided against cutting its losses. (Paragraphs 11–13.)

6. It is harder to judge how far they have decided to raise their bets. Politically, the commitment to the Arabs has undoubtedly increased. And, although the leadership will seek to avoid being pushed too far along a road which could lead to a direct military confrontation with the United States, the pressures on them are considerable. The ideological spectacles through which the Soviet leadership view the long-term nature of the struggle may affect their ability to resist these pressures. (Paragraphs 14–17.)

(No. 20. Confidential) *Moscow, 19 July, 1967.*

Sir,

The Middle East crisis is only too clearly not over. But the present transitional period has probably provided the Soviet leaders with their first real opportunity, after the hectic activities of the last six weeks, to stand back, assess the role they have played in these events and calculate, as dispassionately as possible, what their future course should be. In this despatch I shall attempt to do the same, in so far as this is possible for an observer without access to the secrets of the Kremlin or to the fuller information available to your department.

2. The first conclusion which they and, indeed, even the most superficial observer must draw is that this has been a bad six weeks for the Soviet Union. If there is some compensatory glimmer among the dust

and rubble in the prejudice suffered by "imperialist" interests and influence in the Arab world and in the abjectness of present Arab dependence on Soviet succour and support, the outstanding impression must be one of high hopes collapsed, confidence crumbled and a heavy bill to repair dilapidations. Whatever brave face they show to the world, among themselves the Soviet leadership must know that someone, if not the whole leadership, has blundered.

3. The original mistake can, perhaps, be traced back before their time, to the vast build-up of arms supplies to the Arabs over the last 10 years without adequate political safeguards on their use. But, even if one confines oneself to immediate causes, I think one must identify the present leadership's first blunder as far back as February 1966—to the decision to accept the new Left-wing Syrian régime as an outpost in the Middle East of the "Socialist" heartland, a fraternal Government deserving the unquestioning support of its "Socialist" brothers. This in itself involved a short-term, current commitment to underwrite the vagaries of a distant and highly unstable emotional group. It was a considerable deviation from the long-term aim of superseding Western influence in the Middle East which had underlain, but not dominated, previous Soviet relations with the Governments in the area. It carried with it, at the end of 1966, what was, I now estimate, the second blunder; a demonstration to Israel that, if she sought satisfaction against Syria, she must look to her own resources rather than to international action through the Security Council.

4. If these two blunders laid the powder train for a possible explosion, some mystery still hangs in my mind, with the information at my disposal here, why it should apparently have been a Soviet agent who set a match to it by telling the United Arab Republic parliamentary delegation which left Moscow on the 14th of May that, in President Nasser's words, there was a premeditated Israeli plan to invade Syria. As far as I am aware there was no truth in this allegation, but it would seem from President Nasser's speech of the 29th of May that he believed it and his public disclosure of it has never evoked a public Soviet denial. With their knowledge (and public approval) of the recently signed Defence Agreement between the UAR and Syria, the Russians must have been aware that this information could not fail to oblige President Nasser into some gesture of counter-menace. Whether or not the Russians correctly estimated that this would take the form of demanding the withdrawal of UNEF, followed by U Thant's immediate capitulation, the reoccupation of Sharm el Sheikh and the closure of the Straits of Tiran, it is difficult not to suppose that they believed this the moment for some kind of showdown and should have been able to predict the logic of subsequent events. In so far as the outcome by mid-June showed that this belief was based on disastrous miscalculations, the tip-off must be regarded as the third grave blunder which the Russians made.

5. The miscalculations are obvious now. They were not so obvious then. The moment could have seemed ideal; Arab unity was at an apparent *optimum;* there seemed well-founded grounds for believing that the rest of the world would not unite to prevent Nasser scoring a *fait accompli* off the Israelis; and the staggering wealth of Soviet armaments in Arab hands could surely be expected to deter Israel from preventing this herself. As I reported in my telegram No. 948 of the 31st of May, there were intelligent observers ready to accept as valid a Russian calculation that they were bound to draw advantage from the situation, however it developed; that they could afford therefore to adopt a relatively passive role, a role of "wait and see". If the United States and United Kingdom intervened on Israel's side, they would severely damage their position in the Middle East to the advantage of the Soviet Union. If they did nothing, the Arabs would be left with a significant gain and Soviet prestige would rise. The short-sightedness of this calculation, if (as I can well believe) it is the calculation the Russians made, was demonstrated tragically on the 5th of June.

6. It had been short-sighted to assume that the strangling of Eilath (which, as Mr. Hadow has pointed out in his most interesting despatch No. 18, had long been regarded by Israel as a *casus belli*) could be achieved without the risk of an aftermath. It had been short-sighted to imagine that the Arabs themselves could be kept back content with one remarkable but limited success, that this would not lead inexorably, as Mr. Hadow points out, to the piling of one potential *casus belli* on another. If not so much an act of short-sightedness as of

the self-deception of selective vision, it appears that they must equally have put a quite unrealistic reliance on the ability of the United States to dissuade Israel from counteracting, however strong the cumulative provocation. Perhaps the same rose-tinted glasses misled them into convincing President Nasser that he could afford the luxury of waiting to react, so that Israel could be branded as " aggressor ". Certainly the final and most serious miscalculation of all was to rely on the deterrent value of Soviet arms in Arab hands to prevent the bluff being called.

7. The bill for all these mistakes was presented on the 5th of June and it apparently caught the Soviet leadership with a shock and disorientation from which they have still not wholly recovered. In the weeks that followed they pulled every lever in sight. They have lavished the maximum Kremlin flattery of attention and consultation on Arab leaders coming to Moscow; they have sent one of their triumvirate, Mr. Podgorny, in person round the Arab capitals; they have summoned their Eastern European brethren twice in solemn conclave, here and in Budapest; they have sent another triumvir to Glassboro and to the United Nations, where they have tried virtually every stop in turn; and they certainly committed themselves, if not their Eastern European colleagues also, to what will be a most costly programme of military and economic rehabilitation of their friends in the Middle East.

8. Given the military inheritance of their blunders prior to the 5th of June and the need " after losing the war to win the peace ", it cannot even be said that their political manoeuvrings to this end were notable for dexterity. Their capitulation when they finally accepted the unconditional call for a cease-fire in the night of the 6th of June came too late to save Sinai or the left bank of the Jordan and yet without sufficient consultation with the Arabs, as I understand it, to avoid the accusation of going behind their backs. A similar lack of consultation before calling the United Nations into extraordinary Assembly evoked more justifiable doubts among their clients. The fanfare with which they then drummed up the Third World only to find that a substantial portion of it wanted to see two sides to the question; the Soviet inability either to carry through the brave words of their draft resolution or to let them go unrejected *seriatim* by vote; the lack of calculation shown in determing what would have to be jettisoned to make a viable " non-aligned " compromise; all these had the cumulative effect of piling a political on top of the military humiliation.

9. One must recognise that this second humiliation was of a different order of magnitude, as of gravity in the longer term. In those first, desperate days it may well have been thought worth this price simply to gain time and to keep from the doors of the Kremlin the creditors who were calling for military counter-measures. By summoning the Assembly, the Russians could spread the load they had taken on themselves not only as the Arabs' principal ally in arms but also as their only permanent friend on the Security Council. They could hope that the hard lessons of what they had brought upon themselves could be taught to the Arabs by others than the Soviet Union. But still the manner of their conduct at New York showed a heavy-handedness which was certainly not in the best interests of their clients, has not enhanced their own international prestige and—if this matters to them—has done the Organisation itself no good.

10. Above all, neither this episode at New York, nor indeed any of the other somewhat feverish activities in which the Soviet leadership have been engaged, have yet really done much to rid them of the bitter knowledge that their chosen clients have been disastrously humiliated, that these clients now look to them to effect a reversal of fortune virtually impossible to secure in any immediate future, and that not only they but all other actual or potential clients of the Soviet Union have drawn a most uncomfortable conclusion; when the crunch came, the United States effectively stood by their friends; the Soviet Union did not. From the leadership's point of view, as the self-appointed focus of world Communism, under challenge from Peking and even from so insignificant a centre as Havana, this is probably the most grievous blunder of all.

11. If my analysis of their mistakes is even partially correct and if they themselves have the objectivity to carry out the same analysis, it remains to examine what conclusions the Soviet leadership will draw for the future. In a recent article in the *International Herald Tribune*, I see Mr. Joseph Alsop has said: " In the Middle East, one must begin by noting, Soviet policy

has suffered the kind of reverse that would have caused a shattering and total political upheaval in this country." I can dispose rapidly of any conclusion which may be drawn in regard to internal developments by saying that, not altogether surprisingly, there is little immediate prospect of any such political upheaval here. It is not yet clear whether the head of the Deputy Foreign Minister in charge of Middle East affairs, Semeonov, will roll or not. There must be some very red faces in the Soviet Military Intelligence; and there is good reason to suppose that too outspoken criticism of the handling of Middle East affairs may have contributed to the demotion of such " Young Turks " as Egorichev and even Shelepin, which I have reported elsewhere. But there is no sign of cleavage in the top triumvirate and the public line set out by all three of them and duly echoed in all available or organisable popular demonstrations is unequivocably that the role played by the Soviet Government and party was and is in every way the right one.

12. It is more significant to look for signs of the conclusions drawn in regard to foreign and inter-party affairs. To quote again from Mr. Alsop: " When such a reverse has been experienced, there are three possible courses to take. You can admit your error and cut your losses, as President Kennedy did after the Bay of Pigs. Or you can fudge a bit and patch a bit, to put the best face possible on the resulting situation. Or you can double your bet, in order to try to recoup your losses by a policy of still higher risks."

13. The first alternative has, as I have said, quite clearly not been adopted. In private, highly placed Russians may be prepared to admit that a grave miscalculation had been made. But it would be ritualistically impossible, in any way other than by palace revolution, for the Soviet leadership to admit that they had been in error, that they had been committed beyond their capacities or that they had failed to meet their obligations. They might concede, as Mr. Brezhnev did in his speech to military graduates on the 5th of July, that the struggle of " fighters for freedom " is bound to have its ups and downs. They might go so far as to imply (as so far has only been publicly implied in the Press, but may have been said more directly by Mr. Podgorny during his visits to the Arab capitals) that the Arab " fighters for freedom " owed their reverses to impurities in their own political make-up. But this is the most that could be expected. Nor is it so much to cut losses as to admit that it will take time to win.

14. It is less clear which of Mr. Alsop's other two alternatives are now dominant in the Soviet leaders' minds. It is possible that they may be trying a bit of both. So far as pure politics is concerned, Mr. Brezhnev's speech to the military graduates (presumably prepared after consultation with Mr. Kosygin and Mr. Podgorny on their return respectively from Glassboro and the Middle East) seems to nail Soviet colours to the mast of Arab liberation from the thralls of imperialism. Mr. Podgorny has admittedly dropped hints (which I have reported separately) that the Arabs must be realistic and brought to live with Israel. But the Soviet leaders do not seem to have left themselves much freedom of manoeuvre in bringing this about. By convoking the General Assembly and pursuing there the formula of Israeli withdrawal unbalanced by any Arab move of conciliation—indeed by their whole behaviour over the period—they have only tied themselves more firmly to the Arabs' chariot. Politically, at least, they seem to have doubled their bet.

15. But the question whether they have also doubled their military bets is more difficult to answer. We do not know here the nature of the supplies now flowing from the Soviet Union and other " Socialist " countries into the UAR, Syria and Algeria. On this the last information I have seen is contained in the version released to NATO of JIC (67) (S.A.) 76 of the 21st of June. I would agree with the conclusions drawn by its drafters on the information then available: that Soviet intentions are to balance the maximum restoration of their image—with the Arabs as with other potential or actual clients—by a deliberate avoidance of any such build-up in the Middle East as would allow the Arab Governments to launch a potentially escalatory fourth round on their own initiative. I would expect the Soviet leaders to come under increasingly heavy pressure from the Arabs to provide them with the tools to achieve by military means what diplomacy does not appear to be yielding them. But I shall be surprised if the Soviet leaders allow themselves to be drawn further than they judge safe along a path which could lead next time to direct involvement in a military confrontation with the United States.

16. For the Soviet leadership to steer thus between the rocks of hopes disappointed and undesired involvement will require a very sensitive hand on the tiller and clear vision on the bridge. I confess I should feel more assurance for the future if I were more confident that these attributes were at the disposal of the present Soviet leadership. I cannot escape the impression that the mistakes and miscalculations of the past must be attributed in part at least to ideological myopia. Clear-sighted as leaders such as Mr. Kosygin can be in the tactical middle view, there is none of them, I believe, who does not put on ideological spectacles to scan the horizon. It is this, I suggest, that led them to see developments in the Middle East in the artificial terms of a political struggle between "imperialism" on the one hand and progressive Governments and liberation movements on the other. As a result, they have over-rated and idealised the capacities of the Arabs and they have dangerously exaggerated their own necessary commitment to unequivocal support.

17. Regarded in this light, Soviet arming of the Arabs can be seen as part of a political strategy rather than a military one—exploiting Arab-Israel hostility to draw the Arabs into the "Socialist" political orbit, rather than thinking through all the military implications. It would be reassuring if Mr. Podgorny's hints about the Arabs learning to live with Israel could be taken as an indication that the Soviet leadership now realises that co-existence must be the right solution in the Middle East. But I doubt if we should put too heavy a reliance on this. And even if they do realise it, it would be wrong to under-estimate the counter-pressures. These derive not only from their Arab clients, who refuse to accept the consequences of military defeat. More insidiously, they are, I suspect, being increasingly exerted by those, both within the Soviet Union and outside, who are convinced that co-existence as practised by the present leadership may benefit Soviet short-term interests, but is unduly prejudicial in the longer view to the "strugglers against imperialism" in the four quarters of the globe.

18. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Amman, Beirut, Paris, Tel Aviv and Washington, to the United Kingdom Representatives to the United Nations at New York and to NATO, and also to the British Interests Section in Cairo.

I have, &c.

GEOFFREY HARRISON.

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER:CAT 'A'
!MMEDIATE UK MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1812 19 JULY
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1812 OF 19 JULY
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, AMMAN, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV AND SAVING TO CAIRO AND OTTAWA.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 1795.

MIDDLE EAST EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION.

THE VARIOUS INITIATIVES FOR A COMPROMISE RESOLUTION SEEM TO HAVE RUN OUT (BUT I STILL DO NOT ALTOGETHER RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A LAST MINUTE SURPRISE TOMORROW).

2. THE ONLY NEW DEVELOPMENT TODAY IS DISCUSSION OF A DRAFT INDIAN PROCEDURAL RESOLUTION TO REFER THE MATTER BACK TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND TO BRING ABOUT THE ADJOURNEMENT OF THE SESSION. THE TEXT THEY ARE WORKING ON IS GIVEN IN M.I.F.T.

3. A FEW DELEGATIONS HAVE BEEN IN FAVOUR OF BRINGING THE SESSION TO A FINAL END BUT I THINK THE GENERAL WISH IS THAT THE ASSEMBLY SHOULD BE ADJOURNED SINE DIE. I DOUBT IF ANYONE WILL WANT TO CALL THE EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION BACK INTO BEING BUT THE RUSSIANS AND SOME OTHERS WOULD PREFER TO KEEP THE POSSIBILITY ALIVE. ON JERUSALEM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IS REQUIRED TO REPORT BOTH TO THE ASSEMBLY AND TO THE COUNCIL, AND THE HUNGARIAN AMBASSADOR MADE THE POINT TODAY THAT THERE MUST BE AN ASSEMBLY TO REPORT TO.

4. IT IS JUST POSSIBLE THAT AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE INDIAN RESOLUTION OR (MORE LIKELY) IN ADDITION TO IT, THE PRESIDENT WILL MAKE SOME WINDING UP STATEMENT OF HIS OWN.

5. SEVERAL WEARY DELEGATES HAVE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THERE WILL NOW BE AN INTERVAL FOR A WEEK OR TWO WHILE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES MAINLY CONCERNED CONTINUE (AND A GOOD NUMBER ARE DISPERSING FROM NEW YORK), BUT IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE COUNCIL

/WILL BE

WILL BE CALLED SOON PERHAPS TO DEAL FIRST WITH JERUSALEM.
NO DOUBT THE COUNCIL WILL BE CALLED AT ONCE IF THERE IS ANY SERIOUS RECURRENCE OF FIGHTING ON THE CANAL OR ELSEWHERE.

FO PASS PARIS NO. 333, MOSCOW NO. 320, AMMAN NO. 201, BEIRUT NO. 130 TEL AVIV NO. 333 AND SAVING TO CAIRO NO. 120.
LORD CARADON
SENT AT 0015Z/20 RECD AT 0017Z/20

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED].

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file. Israel (Disputes) Pt. 6

23A

SECRET

CYPHER/CAT A

FOREIGN OFFICE TO TEL AVIV

TELNO 1563 20 JULY 1967 (E)

SECRET

ADDRESSED TO TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NUMBER 1563 OF 20 JULY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO AMMAN, WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

ISRAEL AMBASSADOR'S CALL, 18 JULY.

THE ISRAEL AMBASSADOR CALLED ON ME AT HIS REQUEST TO BRIEF HIMSELF ON HMG'S ATTITUDE ON A NUMBER OF LONG-TERM PROBLEMS WHICH HE EXPECTS TO DISCUSS WITH HIS GOVERNMENT WHEN HE VISITS JERUSALEM FOR CONSULTATIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE (DATE NOT YET FIXED).

2. HE SAID THAT THEY WOULD BE CONSIDERING SOURCES OF SUPPLY FOR THE NEXT GENERATION OF EQUIPMENT FOR THEIR AIR FORCE, ARMOURED FORCES AND NAVY FOR DELIVERY IN BETWEEN 5 AND 10 YEARS TIME, AND ASKED WHETHER HMG COULD BE REGARDED AS A POTENTIAL SUPPLIER TO ALL OF THESE FORCES. I SAID THAT MY FIRST CONCERN WOULD CONTINUE TO BE TO WORK FOR AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT ON LIMITATION AND CONTROL OF ARMS SUPPLIES TO THE AREA, BUT THAT SHOULD SUCH AN AGREEMENT FAIL TO MATERIALISE, WE WOULD CONTINUE TO BE PREPARED TO SUPPLY ARMS TO ISRAEL. THIS APPLIED TO NAVAL, ARMY AND AIR FORCE EQUIPMENT. MR. REMEZ WOULD UNDERSTAND THAT THIS WAS AN INDICATION OF OUR GENERAL VIEW AND INVOLVED NO SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS. I SAID THAT QUESTIONS OF EXPLORATORY VISITS BY IDF TEAMS, CO-OPERATION ON MODIFICATION OF EQUIPMENT, ETC. WERE SUBSUMED IN OUR GENERAL ANSWER ON THE PRINCIPLE OF CONTINUED ARMS SUPPLIES BUT THAT EACH CONCRETE PROPOSAL WOULD HAVE TO BE STUDIED IN THE LIGHT OF THE POLITICAL CONTEXT AT THE TIME.

3. TURNING TO THE QUESTION OF JERUSALEM'S STATUS, I SAID THAT WE VIEWED THIS AS A SEPARATE PROBLEM FROM THE GENERAL ONE OF ISRAEL WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, AND THAT WE REGARDED IT AS ITSELF COMPRISING TWO SEPARATE QUESTIONS, NAMELY, (A) ACCESS TO THE HOLY PLACES, AND (B) ISRAEL MOVES TOWARDS ANNEXING THE OLD CITY OF JERUSALEM INTO THE STATE OF ISRAEL. I ASKED MR. REMEZ TO MAKE CLEAR TO MR. EBAN THAT I WAS CONVINCED THAT UNILATERAL ISRAEL ACTION ON THIS LAST ISSUE WAS A GRAVE MISTAKE AND WOULD REMAIN A MOST POTENT CAUSE OF TROUBLE IN THE FUTURE.

/ 4.

SECRET

Copy in Middle East (Prior) (Dec. '64)

S E C R E T

FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 1563 TO TEL AVIV

4. I SAID THAT OUR IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE RETURN OF THE REFUGEES TO WEST BANK JORDAN WAS BEING SUBJECTED TO BUREAUCRATIC OBSTRUCTION. I EMPHASISED TO MR. REMEZ MY CONCERN THAT THE REFUGEES' RETURN SHOULD BE FACILITATED AND MY BELIEF THAT ISRAEL WOULD LOSE A GREAT DEAL OF WORLD SYMPATHY IF SHE WERE SEEN TO BE FRUSTRATING THIS.

5. RECORD FOLLOWS BY BAG.

SOSFA SENT 1103Z 20 JULY

FO(S)/CO(S)/WH(S) DISTRIBUTION

EASTERN DEPT.

S E C R E T

NNNNN

BF. 257/67

Subject

Israel (Pt 6)

10, Downing Street,
Whitehall

Prime Minister's
Personal Minute
No. M93/67

CONFIDENTIAL

FOREIGN SECRETARY

You will have seen that I was questioned in the House on July 18, and came under some pressure from Heath, about the effects on this country of the Middle East war. A key factor is, of course, the continued closure of the Suez Canal, about which you too were hard pressed the previous day.

I should be grateful for your assessment - and I realise how speculative this is bound to be - of the length of time for which we must prudently expect the Canal to be closed; and of what, if anything, we and our friends can do internationally to speed up its re-opening. For example, what leverage could be exerted on Israel to withdraw sufficiently from the Canal to enable the Egyptians to re-open it without loss of face?

The political prospects here are important because of their obvious impact on our interests. So far, although considerable work has been done on the question of our oil supplies, we have not looked at the implications for British interests as a whole, financial and economic as well as political, of any prolonged closure. If your assessment is reassuring,

this might not be essential, though it would no doubt be desirable, as a precaution. But, if, as seems possible from what you told us in Cabinet this morning, we must expect the present situation to continue for six months or more, then I think some urgent studies should be set in hand. There is also the question whether, looking to the future, we should not in any case re-examine our perhaps excessive dependence on the Canal so far.

We might discuss this next week with our colleagues concerned, possibly in O.P.D. Meanwhile, it would be helpful if you could circulate a short assessment on the lines I have indicated.

I am sending copies of this minute to the First Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Commonwealth Secretary, the Defence Secretary, the President of the Board of Trade, the Minister of Power and Sir Burke Trend.

HW.

HAROLD WILSON

July 20, 1967

SECRET

CYPHER/CAT(A)
FLASH WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NO.2425

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
21 JULY 1967

SECRET
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO.2425 OF 21 JULY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO AMMAN AND TEL AVIV.
MIDDLE EAST.
I HAVE JUST LEARNED FROM EUGENE ROSTOW THAT THE US AMBASSADOR IN JORDAN LEFT THIS MORNING FOR AMMAN WITH DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS WHICH HAD BEEN APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT AND ARE TO BE TRANSMITTED TO KING HUSSEIN ABOUT THE NEXT PHASE IN JORDAN/ISRAEL RELATIONS. I WILL BE SENDING BY IMMEDIATE TELEGRAM A FULL ACCOUNT OF WHAT ROSTOW SAID. BURNS IS BREAKING HIS JOURNEY IN LONDON TO TALK TO KHAMMASH. THE US EMBASSY WILL KNOW HIS WHEREABOUTS AND DETAILS OF HIS ONWARD FLIGHT TO AMMAN. YOU WILL NO DOUBT WISH TO CONTACT HIM.
2. THE STATE DEPARTMENT ARE SENDING A PARALLEL TELEGRAM TO THIS TO THE US EMBASSY, LONDON
3. RESIDENT CLERK PLEASE INFORM BRENCHLEY AT ONCE.

FO PASS IMMEDIATE AMMAN 7Ø TEL AVIV 81
SIR P. DEAN.

SENT 2200/21Z JULY
RECD 2204/21Z JULY

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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TOP SECRET

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TEL NO 2428 21 JULY, 1967.
TOP SECRET
ADDSD TO FOREIGN OFFICE TEL NO 2428 OF 21 JULY, REPTD FOR INFMN TO AMMAN, TEL AVIV AND UKMIS NEW YORK.
MY TEL NO 2425: JORDAN/ISRAEL.
RESIDENT CLERK PLEASE ACT IN THE LIGHT OF MR. BRENCHLEY'S COMMENTS ON MY TEL UNDER REFERENCE.

GENE ROSTOW SAID THE AMERICANS WERE UNDER NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE RISKS INVOLVED IN GOING AHEAD WITH BILATERAL JORDANIAN-ISRAEL NEGOTIATIONS. BUT THEY FELT THERE WAS REALLY NO OTHER CHOICE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE PRESIDENT HAD TODAY GIVEN HIS APPROVAL TO KING HUSSEIN BEING TOLD THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE INTERESTED IN NEGOTIATING WITH JORDAN.

2. MR. BARBOUR HAD SEEN MR. ESHKOL AND MR. EBAN ON THE MATTER BEFORE HE CAME BACK TO WASHINGTON. IN THE LAST FEW DAYS THERE HAD BEEN DISCUSSIONS WITH EBAN IN NEW YORK (IN WHICH MCGEORGE BUNDY HAD TAKEN PART), MR. RUSK HAD ALSO SEEN EBAN. THE ISRAELIS HAD INDICATED A DEFINITE INTEREST IN BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE JORDANIANS. THEIR PREFERENCE WAS THAT EACH SIDE SHOULD DESIGNATE A REPRESENTATIVE, THEY COULD MEET SECRETLY EITHER IN THE AREA OR ELSEWHERE, BUT THE ISRAELIS WERE NOT GOING TO BE RIGID ABOUT THIS. NOR HAD THEY MADE UP THEIR MINDS ON THE SORT OF TERMS THEY COULD OFFER, BUT PRELIMINARY INDICATIONS WERE QUITE FAVOURABLE, EXCEPT OVER JERUSALEM. ROSTOW THOUGHT THIS WAS MORE HOPEFUL THAN IF THEIR POSITION HAD BEEN FROZEN FROM THE BEGINNING. EBAN, WHO HAD HAD SUFFICIENT TIME TO REFER TO HIS GOVERNMENT FOR INSTRUCTIONS, WAS CAREFUL NOT TO CREATE FALSE HOPES BUT HE WAS ALSO MILDLY ENCOURAGING. BARBOUR WOULD BE INSTRUCTED ON HIS RETURN TO TEL AVIV TO URGE THE ISRAELIS TO KEEP THE TALKS GOING AND NOT SLAM THE DOOR. THE AMERICANS FELT THAT IT WOULD BE BEST IF THE JERUSALEM ISSUE WERE LEFT TO THE END, BUT CLEARLY THIS WOULD DEPEND ON HOW THE TALKS DEVELOPED.

3. BARBOUR HAD REPORTED DIVIDED VIEWS IN ISRAEL ON THE DESIRABILITY / OF PRESERVING

OF PRESERVING KING HUSSEIN, BUT FELT THAT ON BALANCE THE ISRAELIS WOULD COME DOWN IN FAVOUR OF KEEPING THE HASHEMITE REGIME IN BEING TO AVOID ITS REPLACEMENT BY A MORE HOSTILE SUCCESSOR DOMINATED BY EITHER SYRIA OR THE U.A.R.

4. THE ISRAELI POSITION ON JERUSALEM REMAINED VERY HARD. ESHKOL HAD TOLD BARBOUR BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE THAT A UNIFIED JERUSALEM UNDER ISRAELI CONTROL WAS INDISPENSABLE AND THAT ANY RETURN TO A DIVIDED CITY AS KING HUSSEIN WISHED WAS UNACCEPTABLE. ROSTOW MENTIONED THE ISRAELI OFFER TO THE KING OF THE ROLE OF PROTECTOR OF THE MOSLEM HOLY PLACES AND WONDERED HOW MUCH MORE HE WOULD FEEL HE NEEDED FOR POLITICAL REASONS. BARBOUR THOUGHT THE ISRAELIS MIGHT RE-DRAW THE MAP OF JERUSALEM. THE AMERICANS HAD ALSO BEEN WORKING ON VARIOUS POSSIBLE PLANS, ROSTOW UNDERTOOK TO LET ME HAVE SIGHT OF THESE. BARBOUR THOUGHT THAT ON ALL OTHER POINTS, E.G. THE WEST BANK, ECONOMIC ARRANGEMENTS, THE ISRAELIS WOULD BE PREPARED TO GO A LONG WAY TO MEET THE JORDANIANS.

ROSTOW ALSO MENTIONED THAT BUNDY HAD HAD SOME SHARP TALKS WITH EBAN ABOUT ARMS FOR JORDAN AND HAD ASKED THE ISRAELIS WHETHER THEY WOULD PREFER THAT THE RUSSIANS SUPPLIED JORDAN. EBAN HAD TAKEN NOTE OF AMERICAN INTENTIONS REGARDING ARMS SUPPLIES TO JORDAN BUT HAD SAID THAT HE COULD NOT APPROVE THEM.

5. FINDLEY BURNS WAS RETURNING A DAY EARLIER THAN EXPECTED TO AMMAN AND WOULD BE SEEING KING HUSSEIN OVER THE WEEKEND TO INFORM HIM THAT HIS MESSAGE HAD BEEN TRANSMITTED TO THE ISRAELIS AND THAT THEY HAD INDICATED INTEREST IN NEGOTIATIONS. BURNS HAD ALSO BEEN TOLD TO STRESS TO THE KING THE DANGER THAT NASSER MIGHT TRY TO SPRING A TRAP. IN THE LAST DAY OR TWO THE AMERICANS HAD HAD TWO TELEGRAMS FROM AMMAN INDICATING THAT KING HUSSEIN WAS GETTING NERVOUS ABOUT THE ANSWER, THIS WAS WHY BURNS WAS HURRYING BACK.

6. BURNS WOULD BE SEEING GENERAL KHAMMASH IN LONDON ON 22 JULY, A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WOULD ALSO BE PRESENT AT THE TALKS. THE AMERICANS HAD NOT WANTED KHAMMASH TO COME TO WASHINGTON AND THEY WOULD BE PROCEEDING QUOTE VERY

/ GINGERLY

WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO. 2428 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

GINGERLY UNQUOTE OVER SUPPLIES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT. THEY WERE PROPOSING TO ALLOW A QUOTE NON-LETHAL UNQUOTE PACKAGE VALUED AT ABOUT DOLLARS ONE POINT EIGHT MILLION (ROSTOW WAS NOT QUITE SURE OF THE EXACT FIGURE), WHICH HAD ALREADY BEEN NEGOTIATED BEFORE HOSTILITIES OCCURRED, TO GO THROUGH. BURNS WAS ALSO AUTHORIZED TO DISCUSS A FURTHER DOLLARS SIX MILLION PACKAGE, AGAIN NON-LETHALITY WOULD BE THE CRITERION AND IT WOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE GENERAL SITUATION ABOUT ARMS SUPPLIES, OVER WHICH AS YOU KNOW THE ADMININSTRATION IS HAVING SERIOUS TROUBLE WITH CONGRESS AT THE MOMENT, BEING CLEARED UP HERE. ROSTOW SAID THAT THE AMERICANS WISHED TO BE AS HELPFUL TO THE JORDANIANS AS THEY COULD, BUT THEY ALSO THOUGHT THAT THE JORDANIANS WOULD HAVE TO CUTDOWN THEIR ARMY TO ABOUT 20,000 MEN IN THEIR NEW AND REDUCED CIRCUMSTANCES. HE ADDED THAT, AS WE DOUBTLESS KNEW, THE JORDANIANS INTENDED PRESSING US VERY HARD ON HUNTERS.

7. I ASKED ROSTOW WHETHER THE AMERICANS WERE CONTEMPLATING ANY OTHER ACTION TO SHORE UP JORDAN IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. HE REPLIED THAT BURNS HAD LAID GREATER STRESS ON THEIR NEED FOR MILITARY THAN FOR ECONOMIC AID. JORDAN HAD SUBSTANTIAL MONETARY RESERVES AND HAD ALSO RECEIVED SOME ADDITIONAL MONEY FROM ARAB SOURCES. ROSTOW THOUGHT THE NEXT QUARTERLY INSTALMENT OF U.S. BUDGETARY AID WOULD ALSO GO THROUGH.

8. HE SAID THAT THE AMERICANS WERE TRYING NOT TO BECOME DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, BUT SAW THEMSELVES AS GIVING THINGS A PUSH AT ONE REMOVE. THEY HAD OF COURSE HOPED THAT A UNITED NATIONS MEDIATOR MIGHT PLAY A USEFUL ROLE.

9. ROSTOW ALLUDED TO AMERICAN CONCERN OVER THE POSSIBILITY THAT IRAQ OR SYRIA OR BOTH MIGHT ATTACK JORDAN AND THAT THIS WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY A JORDANIAN APPEAL TO THE UNITED STATES FOR ASSISTANCE. THE AMERICANS HAVE CLEARLY NOT THOUGHT THROUGH HOW THEY WOULD REACT IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES.

10. ROSTOW ALSO MENTIONED THAT THE AMERICANS HAD HAD FOUR OR FIVE TALKS WITH GROMYKO AND DROBRYNIN AT SOVIET

/ INITIATIVE

WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO. 2428 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

INITIATIVE IN THE UNITED NATIONS DURING THE LAST TWO DAYS. THE RUSSIANS HAD BEEN FRANK AND THE TALKS WELL WORTHWHILE, THE AMERICANS WERE HOPEFUL THAT THEY MIGHT PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR FUTURE WORK IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

F.O. PASS IMMEDIATE TO AMMAN 71 AND TEL AVIV 82.

SIR P. DEAN

SENT 0208/22Z JULY
RECD 0208/22Z JULY

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IMM[redacted]TE FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

TELNO. 8169 22 JULY 1967 (E)

SECRET
ADDRESSED TO WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO 8169 OF 22 JULY REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION TO AMMAN TEL AVIV AND UKMIS NEW YORK.
YOUR TELEGRAMS NOS 2425 AND 2428 : JORDAN/ISRAEL.
AMERICAN EMBASSY HERE WILL BE BRINGING BURNS TO SEE BRENCHLEY AT 1215 BST TODAY. HE WILL NOT THEN HAVE MET KHAMMASH.
2. AMERICAN ACTION IN DESPATCHING BURNS POST HASTE WITH PRESUMABLY IRREVOCABLE PRESIDENTIAL ORDERS AND THEN MERELY INFORMING YOU AFTER HE HAD LEFT RUNS COMPLETELY COUNTER TO THE ASSURANCE BATTLE GAVE YOU ON 17 JULY THAT THEY WOULD MAKE NO MOVE WITHOUT CONSULTING US AND THAT HE WOULD KEEP IN THE CLOSEST TOUCH WITH YOU (YOUR TELEGRAM NO 2386). BURNS' STOPOVER IN LONDON IS TO SEE KHAMMASH AND ANY TALK HE HAS WITH US IS CLEARLY A BY PRODUCT.
3. THIS LEAVES US IN A DIFFICULT POSITION.WE HAVE NOT YET INSTRUCTED H M AMBASSADOR AMMAN ON HOW TO REPLY TO THE SPECIFIC QUESTIONS PUT TO HIM BY KING HUSSEIN ON 12 JULY (AMMAN TELEGRAM NO 843). INSTEAD, WE SENT THE LINES OF A SUGGESTED REPLY TO YOU (MY TELEGRAM NO 7915) FOR DISCUSSION WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT. ROSTOW SEEMS TO HAVE MADE NO REFERENCE TO THIS ASPECT OF THE SITUATION WHEN SPEAKING TO YOU YESTERDAY. AM I TO ASSUME THAT THE AMERICANS DO NOT MUCH CARE WHAT WE SAY TO HUSSEIN AND PERHAPS REGARD IT AS OF MINOR IMPORTANCE?

SOSFA SENT 1108Z/22 JULY 1967

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SSSSS SECRET

T O P S E C R E T - G U A R D

CYPHER/CAT A
FLASH WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NO.2433 22 JULY 1967
TOP SECRET AND GUARD.
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO.2433 OF 22 JULY 1967
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO AMMAN TEL AVIV UKMIS NEW YORK.
YOUR TELEGRAM NO.8169: JORDAN/ISRAEL.

I HAVE JUST SPOKEN IN STRONG TERMS TO GENE ROSTOW ABOUT THE ADMINISTRATION'S BEHAVIOUR IN GOING AHEAD WITHOUT CONSULTING US IN SPITE OF THE ASSURANCES WHICH HAD BEEN GIVEN TO ME TO THE CONTRARY. ROSTOW WAS EXTREMELY APOLOGETIC AND ASKED YOU TO ACCEPT HIS PERSONAL AND OFFICIAL APOLOGIES ON BEHALF OF MR. RUSK FOR THIS FAILURE OF COMMUNICATION. HE SAID THAT THE PRESIDENTIAL DECISION HAD ONLY BEEN FINALLY TAKEN SHORTLY BEFORE I WAS SUMMONED AND THAT I HAD BEEN TOLD AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. ROSTOW THEN SAID THAT HE WOULD BE WILLING TO DELAY TAKING ACTION WITH KING HUSSEIN FOR TWENTY-FOUR HOURS AND FOR THIS PURPOSE TO PROLONG BURNS' STAY IN LONDON IN ORDER TO GIVE TIME FOR ANY FURTHER CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN US AND FOR YOU TO SEND INSTRUCTIONS TO HM AMBASSADOR AMMAN.

2. ON THIS LATTER POINT I IMMEDIATELY CONSULTED BRENCHLEY BY TELEPHONE WHO INFORMED ME THAT HE WOULD BE RECOMMENDING TO YOU THAT YOU SHOULD NOT TAKE UP THIS OFFER. I THEREFORE THANKED ROSTOW FOR HIS OFFER AND EXPLAINED TO HIM THAT UNLESS HE HEARD TO THE CONTRARY WE SAW NO REASON TO ASK THAT BURNS SHOULD BE DELAYED IN LONDON FOR LONGER THAN HE ALREADY INTENDED. I UNDERSTAND THAT HE WILL BE LEAVING TOMORROW MORNING AND WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR CONSULTATION IF REQUIRED UP TILL THEN.

3. AFTER HAVING DEALT WITH THE ABOVE MATTER, I HAD SOME FURTHER DISCUSSION WITH ROSTOW ABOUT THE SUBSTANCE. HE TOLD ME THAT, ACCORDING TO THE MOST RECENT INFORMATION FROM AMMAN, KING HUSSEIN WAS PREPARED IF POSSIBLE TO REACH AN AGREEMENT WITH THE ISRAELIS WHICH, IN ADDITION TO ABOLISHING BELLIGERENCY BETWEEN THEM, WOULD ESTABLISH PEACE AND LEAD TO THE EXCHANGE OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES

/ 4.

WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO. 2433 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

4. ROSTOW SAID THAT THERE WERE THREE POINTS WHICH STRONGLY INFLUENCED THE PRESIDENT IN TAKING HIS DECISION TO INSTRUCT BURNS TO SPEAK TO THE KING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. FIRST, THE AMERICANS AND SPECIALLY BURNS WERE INCREASINGLY IMPRESSED WITH THE RISKS TO HUSSEIN'S POSITION OF FURTHER DELAY. BURNS FELT STRONGLY THAT THE KING SHOULD NOT LEAVE JORDAN NOW: MANY DECISIONS HAD TO BE TAKEN URGENTLY AND WHEN HE WAS OUT OF JORDAN THINGS WERE ALLOWED TO DRIFT. SECONDLY, THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAD NOT YET APPARENTLY MADE UP ITS MIND ON THE CONDITIONS FOR A SETTLEMENT AND THE AMERICANS THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE FAR BETTER FOR THE LONGER TERM OUTLOOK IN THE MIDDLE EAST FOR THE ISRAELI DECISIONS TO BE TAKEN IN THE CONTEXT OF A NEGOTIATION WITH JORDAN RATHER THAN BEFORE. THIRDLY, THE ISRAELIS WERE PRESSING THE US GOVERNMENT VERY HARD TO SUPPLY AIRCRAFT. THEY COULD NO LONGER GET THEM FROM THE FRENCH AND CLAIMED TO HAVE ONLY EIGHT ATTACK BOMBERS LEFT SEMICOLON THE US GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT THIS REQUEST ON A POLITICAL RATHER THAN A STRICTLY MILITARY BASIS AND WISHED TO BRING IT INTO THE GENERAL PICTURE.

5. I MUCH REGRET THAT, IN SPITE OF CONSTANT REMINDERS FROM MY STAFF AND MYSELF, THE STATE DEPT HAVE LET YOU (AND US) DOWN SO BADLY IN RUSHING AHEAD WITHOUT PROPER CONSULTATION. I DO NOT THINK THAT THERE IS ANYTHING SINISTER IN THIS. IT IS DUE, I AM SURE. TO THE DISORDERLY WAY IN WHICH MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS ARE HANDLED BETWEEN DESK OFFICERS (WHO SEEM TO BE KEPT ENTIRELY IN THE DARK), GENE ROSTOW WHO HAS HIS OWN IDEAS AND THE WHITE HOUSE WITH WHOM ROSTOW APPEARS TO BE IN TOUCH ONLY SPASMODICALLY.

F.O. PASS IMMEDIATE AMMAN 72 TEL AVIV 84.

SIR P. DEAN

SENT 1858Z/22
RECD 1859Z/22

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

FILES

ADVANCE COPIES SENT

EASTERN DEPT.
D.D. & P.U.S.D.

SSSSS

Cypher/Cat.A

IMMEDIATE AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 902 23 July 1967

TOP SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 902 of 23 July. Repeated for information to Tel Aviv, Washington and UKMis.New York.

GUARD

Washington telegram No. 2453: Jordan/Israel.

Counsellor and I saw King Hussein this afternoon. I told him that I expected to be visiting London this week and hoped then to learn your answers to his recent enquiries. He confirmed that he expects to see my United States colleague tomorrow.

2. We formed the impression that the King is by no means certain that Jordan should try to start negotiations now. Since I saw him on 12 July he has been impressed by accumulating evidence that the Soviets are trying to restrain the Arab extremists and he now finds their position much closer to that of the Western Powers. The Soviet Ambassador had told him his government believed all Arab States should and could get together "in a realistic way" and he was now thinking of paying a series of visits to the Arab leaders who did not participate in the series of Cairo talks and also to other friendly Moslem States such as Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. He hopes for some measure of support from them. He still doubts whether an Arab Summit conference would achieve anything at this stage, and he expects no positive results from the projected meeting of Foreign Ministers at Khartoum.

3. He was, he said, toying with the idea of paying a visit to Moscow in order to explore current Soviet thinking and incidentally wipe the eyes of Boumedienne and Co. We urged him not to count too much on current Soviet professions of friendship and suggested the Arab States might misunderstand his motives in visiting the Soviet Union.

4. Asked about the Iraqi troops in Jordan the King said that Areh had replied to his message saying that he would like to visit Amman within the next few days. He was proposing to await this before pursuing the question of withdrawal. Meanwhile the Iraqis were concentrated in the Mafraq - H.5. area - i.e. on the road to Baghdad.

5. Turning to the domestic scene King Hussein said he was seeing many groups of citizens in order to explain the realities of the situation to them. He thought they were beginning to emerge from their dazed condition. There would only be minor government changes. One of his difficulties in Cabinet building was that he had "lived in this country too long and knew them all too well".

/6. The King

6. The King also admitted to great difficulties arising from the occupation of the West Bank. He seemed fairly satisfied with the political attitude of the Palestinians but said that real trouble was arising from the financial and economic situation and he was at a loss about how to overcome it.

7. Our conclusion is that the King is still confused and uncertain. But he has had some time to consider the options open to him and as he studies them he probably sees the hazards more clearly. He therefore seems less anxious than he was 10 days ago to "go it alone". In what he said to us there was no indication that his thinking had reached the point of being prepared to reach an agreement with the Israelis such as that described in paragraph 3 of Washington telegram under reference. But he seemed more confident about the internal stability of the country and about the prospects of attracting the sympathy and perhaps support of moderates elsewhere. He seems to see some hope in the indications that the Soviet Union and the West are not so far apart in their thinking about a solution to the Middle East crisis. He believes therefore that they may be able to press their clients in the Middle East to come closer together - not only the Arabs and Israel, but the extremist and moderate Arabs.

Foreign Office pass Immediate to Tel Aviv 180, Washington 164 and UKMis.New York 111.

Mr. Adams

Sent 1715Z/23 July 1967

Recd. 1851Z/23 July 1967

[Repeated as requested]

F I L E S

ADVANCE COPIES SENT

Eastern Dept.
D.D. & P.U.S.D.

17[29]

TOP SECRET

CYPHER/CAT A
FLASH WASHINGTON
TEL NO 2438

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
23 JULY, 1967.

TOP SECRET
ADDSD TO FOREIGN OFFICE TEL NO 2438 OF 23 JULY, REPTD FOR INFMN TO AMMAN TEL AVIV AND UKMIS NEW YORK.
MY TEL NO 2433: JORDAN/ISRAEL.

GENE ROSTOW ASKED THE MINISTER TO CALL URGENTLY AT LUNCHTIME TODAY. HE SAID THAT HE HAD NOW HEARD FROM THE U.S. EMBASSY IN LONDON. HE REPEATED HIS PREVIOUS APOLOGIES FOR THE FAILURE OF THE AMERICANS TO CONSULT US BEFORE THE DESPATCH OF INSTRUCTIONS TO MR. BURNS (HE EXPLAINED THAT THE LATTER WAS ALREADY ON HIS WAY TO LONDON BEFORE THE PRESIDENT MADE HIS DECISION) AND EMPHASIZED HIS DESIRE TO KEEP IN STEP WITH US THROUGHOUT THE WHOLE OF THIS OPERATION.

2. ROSTOW THEN READ OUT THE ESSENTIAL PASSAGES OF THE INSTRUCTIONS TO BURNS WHICH WERE TO THE FOLLOWING EFFECT. BURNS SHOULD OPEN VERY CAUTIOUSLY, WARNING THE KING OF THE DIFFICULTIES. HOWEVER THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WERE IN FAVOUR OF NEGOTIATIONS SOON BECAUSE IN THEIR VIEW SOME ACTION WAS URGENTLY NEEDED SINCE THE JORDANIAN POSITION INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY WAS DETERIORATING FAST (THE LATEST AMERICAN INFORMATION FROM AMMAN CONFIRMED THAT JORDANIAN OPINION WAS IN GENERAL IN FAVOUR OF NEGOTIATION). IF THE KING MOVED WHILE THE ISRAELI CABINET WAS DIVIDED, THE ISRAELIS MIGHT ADOPT A MORE FLEXIBLE NEGOTIATING POSITION. THEY HAD ALREADY INDICATED THEIR DESIRE TO TALK TO THE JORDANIANS. THE AMERICANS DID NOT KNOW WHAT THEIR TERMS WERE, BUT THOUGHT THAT THEY WOULD BE RIGID ON JERUSALEM WHILE OFFERING SOME CONCESSIONS OVER THE MOSLEM HOLY PLACES. NASSER, BOUMEDIENNE AND ATASSI WERE NOT TO BE TRUSTED.

3. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION IN WHICH THE MINISTER REMINDED ROSTOW AND BATTLE OF YOUR THINKING AS SET OUT IN YOUR TEL NO 7915 AND ESPECIALLY OF PARAGRAPH 5, WHICH HE EMPHASIZED REMAINED YOUR VIEW, HE POINTED OUT THAT THE IMPRESSION PERSISTED IN LONDON THAT IN SPITE OF OUR REPRESENTATIONS THERE WAS A GAP BETWEEN THE AMERICANS

/ AND OURSELVES

TOP SECRET

AND OURSELVES BOTH ON TIMING AND ON METHOD. THE AMERICANS WANTED TO GO FASTER THAN WE DID AND SEEMED INCLINED TO ADVISE THE KING IN FAVOUR OF NEGOTIATIONS RATHER THAN LEAVE THE DECISION TO HIM IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE RELEVANT FACTORS. ALL OUR SOUNDINGS IN THE MODERATE ARAB CAPITALS CONFIRMED OUR OPINION THAT WE SHOULD DO IMMENSE HARM TO OUR INTERESTS IF OUR ADVICE TO JORDAN PROVED WRONG.

4. ROSTOW, PROTESTING HIS DESIRE TO ACT IN CLOSE CONCERT, THEN OFFERED:

A) TO INSTRUCT THE U.S. AMBASSADOR IN AMMAN TO HOLD UP ACTION UNTIL YOU HAD HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS YOUR VIEWS (HE WAS SUPPOSED TO SEE THE KING ON MONDAY), AND

B) TO SEND A FURTHER TELEGRAM OF INSTRUCTIONS EMPHASIZING THAT IT MUST BE MADE CRYSTAL CLEAR TO THE KING THAT IT WAS HIS OWN DECISION. THE NEED FOR THE UTMOST SECRECY WOULD ALSO BE IMPRESSED ON KING HUSSEIN, SINCE THERE WAS A DANGER THAT ONCE NEGOTIATIONS WERE ENGAGED A LEAK COULD PRECIPITATE HIS DOWNFALL. HE WAS INCIDENTALLY RATHER CRITICAL ABOUT THE LEAKS WHICH ARE ALREADY COMING FROM JORDANIAN SOURCES IN AMMAN AND ELSEWHERE.

5. THE MINISTER THANKED ROSTOW FOR THE OFFER TO HOLD UP ACTION AND UNDERTOOK TO CONVEY IT TO YOU IMMEDIATELY. SPEAKING PERSONALLY HE SAID THAT THE U.S. POSITION AS NOW DESCRIBED SEEMED TO BE VERY CLOSE TO THAT SET OUT IN YOUR TELEGRAM NO 7915 AND THAT THE NEED FOR THE AMERICANS TO DELAY ACTION IN ORDER TO PERMIT FURTHER CONSULTATION SEEMED CORRESPONDINGLY TO HAVE DECLINED. BUT HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE WHICH YOU ATTACHED TO CONTINUED CONSULTATION WITH A VIEW TO ACHIEVING JOINT POSITION IN THE LONG HAUL AHEAD. ROSTOW AGREED AND SAID THAT HE HOPED VERY MUCH THAT H.M. AMBASSADOR IN AMMAN COULD BE INSTRUCTED TO SPEAK TO THE KING SHORTLY AFTER MR. BURNS TO REINFORCE WHAT HE HAD SAID. HE ADDED THAT KING HUSSEIN NEEDED ALL THE MORAL SUPPORT HE COULD GET AT THIS MOMENT AND THIS WAS ONE OF THE REASONS FOR WHICH BURNS HAD HASTENED HIS RETURN TO AMMAN.

FO PASS IMMEDIATE TO AMMAN 73 AND PRIORITY TEL AVIV 86.

SIR P. DEAN SENT: 2134Z/23 JULY.
RECD: 2134Z/23 JULY.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

F I L E S

EASTERN DEPT.
D.D. & P.U.S.D.

ADVANCE COPY SENT

AA

Mr Palliser

SECRET

COPY NO. 6

CYPHER/CAT A & BY BAG

FLASH FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

TELNO 8212 24 JULY, 1967

SECRET

ADDRESSED TO WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO 8212 OF 24 JULY, REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO AMMAN AND TEL AVIV AND SAVING TO UK MISSION, NEW YORK.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 2433: JORDAN/ISRAEL.

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM ME TO DEAN RUSK. BEGINS.

EBAN PASSED THROUGH LONDON YESTERDAY ON HIS WAY BACK TO ISRAEL AND I HAD A LONG TALK WITH HIM LATE LAST NIGHT. WHAT HE SAID INCREASED THE DOUBTS I ALREADY HAD ABOUT WHETHER IT WOULD BE RIGHT TO ADVISE KING HUSSEIN TO NEGOTIATE WITH ISRAEL SEPARATELY FROM THE OTHER ARABS. IT ALSO STRONGLY SUGGESTED THAT, BEFORE GIVING HIM ANY DEFINITIVE ADVICE AT ALL, IT WOULD BE WISE TO WAIT A FEW MORE DAYS FOR ISRAELI POLICY TO CLARIFY.

2. EBAN TOLD ME THAT THE READINESS HE HAD INDICATED TO NEGOTIATE SEPARATELY WITH JORDAN AROSE MERELY FROM THE POSITION ISRAEL HAD ALWAYS TAKEN UP, THAT SHE WAS READY TO TALK TO ANYONE AT ANY TIME. BUT HE HAD LIMITED THE DISCUSSION SO FAR TO PROBINGS ABOUT PROCEDURES FOR NEGOTIATING FOR THE GOOD REASON THAT THERE WAS NO FIRM ISRAELI GOVERNMENT DECISION ABOUT THE TERMS THAT COULD BE OFFERED TO HUSSEIN. NOR EVEN WHETHER IT WAS IN ISRAEL'S INTERESTS TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY WITH HIM AT ALL. ALL THIS WOULD BE THRASHED OUT AT CABINET MEETINGS AFTER HIS RETURN.

3. HE EXPLAINED THAT THERE WERE TWO MAIN ATTITUDES ON THIS SUBJECT IN THE CABINET, HELD BY WHAT HE CALLED THE QUOTE SECURITY UNQUOTE MEN AND THE QUOTE POLITICIANS UNQUOTE RESPECTIVELY.

/THE

SECRET

THE FORMER SAW THE JORDAN RIVER AS AN EXCELLENT FRONTIER TO DEFEND AND WERE CONFIDENT THAT WITH THIS FRONTIER IT WOULD NOT MATTER TO THEM WHO WAS IN CONTROL OF THE OTHER BANK OF THE RIVER. IT FOLLOWED THAT THEY HAD NO GREAT INTEREST IN KEEPING THE HASHEMITE REGIME IN BEING OR INDEED IN PREVENTING JORDAN FROM BEING SWALLOWED UP BY IRAQ OR SYRIA. THEY WERE OPPOSED TO PAYING ANY TERRITORIAL PRICE FOR A SETTLEMENT WITH HUSSEIN.

4. THE POLITICIANS, ON THE OTHER HAND, RECOGNISED THE STRENGTH OF THE SECURITY ARGUMENT BUT ALSO SAW THE DIFFICULTIES FOR ISRAEL OF TRYING TO ABSORB THE ARAB POPULATION OF THE WEST BANK. SOME OF THEM FAVOURED THE IDEA OF AN AUTONOMOUS ARAB PALESTINE UNDER ISRAELI CONTROL FORMED OUT OF THE WEST BANK AND THE GAZA STRIP. BUT OTHERS, INCLUDING EBAN HIMSELF, HELD THAT AUTONOMY WAS BOUND TO DEVELOP INTO A DEMAND FOR INDEPENDENCE WHICH THE UNITED NATIONS, AFTER ADMITTING SO MANY MINI-STATES, WERE SURE TO FAVOUR. THEY MIGHT END UP WITH A FOURTEENTH ARAB STATE MORE HOSTILE TO ISRAEL THAN ANY OF THE OTHER THIRTEEN. THOSE WHO ARGUED THIS WAY SAW GREATER ADVANTAGES IN RETURNING A LARGE PART OF THE WEST BANK TO JORDAN IN RETURN FOR AN OTHERWISE SATISFACTORY SETTLEMENT.

5. EBAN WENT ON TO SAY THAT EVEN THIS SECTION OF THE QUOTE POLITICIANS UNQUOTE WERE NOT READY TO PAY A HIGH PRICE FOR SUCH A SETTLEMENT. THE AMMAN PRESS REPORTS THAT ISRAEL SO DESPERATELY NEEDED A SETTLEMENT WITH JORDAN THAT SHE WAS READY TO RETURN ALL OF THE WEST BANK VIRTUALLY WITHOUT CONDITIONS WERE UTTER NONSENSE. THE FAVOURABLE ATTITUDE TOWARDS JORDAN AND TOWARDS HUSSEIN PERSONALLY WHICH HAD ONCE PREVAILED IN ISRAEL HAD BEEN SHATTERED BY THE EVENTS OF THE WAR. THIS WAS DUE PARTLY TO DISILLUSION ARISING FROM DISAPPOINTED HOPES AND PARTLY TO AN EMOTIONAL REACTION TO THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGE THE JORDANIANS HAD DONE IN THE FIGHTING AND THE NUMBER OF CASUALTIES, INCLUDING CIVILIAN CASUALTIES, THEY HAD INFLICTED. SO NO-ONE AT ALL IN ISRAEL WAS READY TO RETURN ALL OF JORDAN'S TERRITORIES. THEY WOULD NOT RE-DIVIDE JERUSALEM NOR WOULD THEY AGAIN EXPOSE ISRAEL'S NARROW WAIST TO THE DANGER OF SHELLING FROM JORDANIAN GUNS.

/6.

SECRET

FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 8212 TO WASHINGTON

-3-

6. ON THE OTHER HAND, THOSE WHO FAVOURED A SETTLEMENT WITH HUSSEIN WERE READY TO OFFER HIM ECONOMIC COMPENSATIONS, E.G. ACCESS TO A MEDITERRANEAN PORT, JOINT DEVELOPMENT OF THE EILAT-AQABA AREA AND JOINT PROJECTS IN THE DEAD SEA REGION, ON A KIND OF BENELUX BASIS. THEY MIGHT ALSO OFFER HIM A SPECIAL PERSONAL ROLE IN JERUSALEM AS GUARDIAN OF THE MUSLIM HOLY PLACES, BUT THIS WOULD GIVE HIM A QUOTE DIPLOMATIC UNQUOTE POSITION, NOT JORDANIAN SOVEREIGNTY.

7. I TOLD EBAN THAT I WOULD BE HAVING TALKS IN LONDON WITH MY AMBASSADORS FROM AMMAN AND TEL AVIV ON 27 - 28 JULY AND ASKED HIM TO LET ME KNOW BY THEN HOW THE DISCUSSIONS WERE GOING IN THE ISRAEL CABINET. HE PROMISED TO DO SO.

8. ALL OF THIS DRIVES ME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT IF HUSSEIN EMBARKS ON SEPARATE NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL AT THIS MOMENT, THROUGH WHATEVER CHANNEL AND HOWEVER DISCREETLY, THE ODDS ARE THAT HE WILL NOT GET A SETTLEMENT HE COULD LIVE WITH AND MAY WELL DESTROY HIMSELF AND HIS REGIME IN THE PROCESS OF TRYING TO NEGOTIATE. I THINK THE ONLY HONEST THING WE COULD SAY TO HIM NOW WOULD BE THAT ALTHOUGH THE ISRAELIS SAY THEY ARE READY IN PRINCIPLE TO NEGOTIATE SEPARATELY WITH JORDAN THEY HAVE NOT YET IN FACT DECIDED WHETHER OR NOT TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY WITH HIM: SIMILARLY, IT WILL PROBABLY BE ANOTHER WEEK BEFORE WE CAN ESTIMATE WHAT TERMS HE MIGHT GET OUT OF THE ISRAELIS, BUT PRESENT INDICATIONS ARE THAT THEY ARE LIKELY TO BE TOUGHER THAN HE COULD ACCEPT.

9. I SHOULD ALSO TELL YOU THAT EBAN* SURPRISED ME BY BRINGING OUT THAT SOME PEOPLE IN ISRAEL ARE CONSIDERING WHETHER THE BEST TACTICS WOULD NOT BE TO MAKE A SEPARATE NEGOTIATION WITH NASSER THE PRIORITY. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH HUSSEIN ARE CLEAR ENOUGH. INDEED, HE WENT INTO SOME DETAIL ABOUT THE TERMS WHICH THEY MIGHT BE ABLE TO OFFER EGYPT. HE ALSO GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY HAD GOT FURTHER IN THEIR THINKING ON THIS ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM THAN THEY HAD ON THE TERMS OF A SETTLEMENT WITH JORDAN. THIS WAS PARTLY, BUT ONLY PARTLY, /BECAUSE

* This is surely not very surprising - it would be from Israeli viewpoint - if they can get an agreement with Nasser, which else would follow.

FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 8212 TO WASHINGTON

BECAUSE THE SHAPE OF A NEGOTIATION WITH EGYPT (WHERE THERE IS AN INTERNATIONAL BORDER RATHER THAN AN ARMISTICE LINE) WOULD BE SIMPLER.

10. INCIDENTALLY I AGREED WITH EBAN NOT TO GIVE ANY CIRCULATION TO OUR CONVERSATION AND I SHOULD THEREFORE BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD RESTRICT KNOWLEDGE OF IT TO YOUR CLOSEST ADVISERS.

11. I AM GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR HAVING DELAYED ACTION BY AMBASSADOR BURNS IN AMMAN FOR LONG ENOUGH TO GIVE ME TIME TO SEND YOU THIS MESSAGE. I SHALL NOT BE ABLE TO ANSWER HUSSEIN'S QUESTIONS ADDRESSED TO US IN A WAY WHICH WILL GIVE HIM ANY ENCOURAGEMENT TO EMBARK FOLLOWING WORD UNDERLINED NOW ON A SEPARATE NEGOTIATION WITH ISRAEL. I AM SURE THAT YOU FOR YOUR PART WILL UNDERSTAND THIS, ESPECIALLY IN THE LIGHT OF WHAT EBAN HAS NOW SAID TO ME. MY STRONG PREFERENCE IS FOR AN INTERIM ANSWER ONLY TO HUSSEIN AT THIS STAGE, FOLLOWED BY A CONSIDERED ANSWER, PROBABLY NEXT WEEK, WHEN WE HAVE SOME CLEARER IDEA HOW THINKING IS GOING IN THE ISRAEL CABINET. ENDS.

SOSFA SENT 1725Z 24 JULY

PRISEC (F.O.)

Mr Palliser.

COPY NO. ..6.....

SECRET

CYPHER/CAT.A.
IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2250
SECRET

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
DATED 24TH JULY 1967

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 2250 OF 24 JULY 67
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO AMMAN, TEL AVIV AND SAVING TO UKMIS NEW YORK.
YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 8212: JORDAN/ISRAEL. FOR ATTENTION VERY EARLY TUESDAY MORNING.
THE FOLLOWING IS TO CONFIRM COVERSATION MAITLAND/TOMKINS.
GENE ROSTOW TELEPHONED THIS AFTERNOON TO SAY THAT URGENT CONSIDERATION WAS BEING GIVEN TO YOUR MESSAGE BUT THAT AT FIRST SIGHT IT DID NOT SEEM THAT THERE WAS ANY MATERIAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE AMERICANS AND OURSELVES. ROSTOW'S PRESENT INCLINATION WAS TO RECOMMEND TO MR. RUSK TO INSTRUCT THE U.S. AMBASSADOR IN AMMAN TO SEE THE KING IN THE MORNING AND TO GIVE HIM AN INTERIM REPLY AS SUGGESTED IN THE LAST SENTENCE OF YOUR MESSAGE. A MEETING HAD ALREADY BEEN ARRANGED AND IT WOULD BE VERY AWKWARD IF IT HAD TO BE PUT OFF. ROSTOW SAID THAT HE VERY MUCH HOPED THAT WE WOULD CONCUR IN THIS SUGGESTION AND AGAIN MADE THE POINT THAT IN THE AMERICAN VIEW THERE WOULD BE A BETTER CHANCE OF GETTING THE RIGHT ANSWER EVENTUALLY FROM THE ISRAELIS IF THE DECISION WAS TAKEN IN THE CONTEXT OF NEGOTIATIONS AND WHILE THE POSITION WAS STILL FLUID. HE EMPHASISED, HOWEVER, THE INTERIM NATURE OF THE PROPOSED DEMARCHE. AFTER CONSULTING THE PRIVATE SECRETARY I HAVE INFORMED ROSTOW THAT WE AGREE.

/2. ROSTOW

SECRET

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WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO. 2250 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

-2-

2. ROSTOW HAS JUST TELEPHONED TO SAY THAT RUSK AGREES WITH THE DEPARTMENTS RECOMMENDATIONS AND THAT HE WILL INSTRUCT THE U.S. AMBASSADOR TO GO AHEAD ON THE GENERAL LINES OF THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF YOUR MESSAGE TO MR. RUSK. RUSK WILL TELEGRAPH TO YOU A REPLY, THE DRAFT OF WHICH HE READ ME, TO YOUR MESSAGE. THIS SEEMED GENERALLY SATISFACTORY AND THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OUR VIEWS AND THOSE OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT NOW REALLY SEEM VERY SMALL

F.O. PASS IMMEDIATE TO AMMAN 74 AND TEL AVIV 8/
SIR. P. DEAN. SENT AT 25/0103Z JULY
RECD AT 25/0103Z JULY

RMC

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

P R I S E C (F.O.)

SSSSS SECRET

SECRET

Mr Palliser

COPY NO. 11

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

TELNO 8238 25 JULY, 1967

SECRET.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM MR. RUSK TO ME DELIVERED BY THE U.S. EMBASSY ON 25 JULY, 1967

I APPRECIATE YOUR THOUGHTFUL MESSAGE ON THE WAY IN WHICH WE SHOULD HANDLE THE QUESTIONS KING HUSSEIN HAS ADDRESSED TO BOTH OF US. I AM GOING FORWARD ON THE BASIS OF THE TELEPHONE MESSAGE PAT DEAN HAS JUST TRANSMITTED IN YOUR BEHALF.

OF COURSE I WANT TO GO AHEAD IN THIS AS IN OTHER MATTERS ON THE BASIS OF FULL AGREEMENT WITH YOU. I AM NOT CLEAR THAT THERE IS ANY SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN US. WE AGREE THAT WE CANNOT TAKE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF REFUSING TO TRANSMIT TO THE KING THE ANSWER EBAN AUTHORIZED IS TO TRANSMIT TEN DAYS AGO. WE AGREE THAT THE KING MUST MAKE HIS OWN DECISION AS TO WHEN AND HOW HE SHOULD MAKE CONTACT WITH THE ISRAELIS. WE AGREE THAT WE SHOULD NOT TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENCOURAGING OR DISCOURAGING HIM. WE AGREE THAT WHILE THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE POSSIBLE BARGAIN SHOULD BE FEASIBLE, IN THE LIGHT OF WHAT EBAN TOLD US BOTH, THE ISSUE OF JERUSALEM WILL CERTAINLY BE THE MOST DIFFICULT FEATURE OF THE NEGOTIATION, PERHAPS THE BREAKING POINT FROM HUSSEIN'S TALK WITH OUR AMBASSADORS, I DO NOT CONCLUDE THAT SUITABLE MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK ARE BEYOND REACH OF NEGOTIATION. THE KING SEEMS TO ASSUME THAT THAT AREA WOULD BE EFFECTIVELY DEMILITARIZED.

WE ARE OF THE VIEW, WHICH AMBASSADOR BARBOUR CONFIRMS, THAT IF WE ASK THE ISRAELIS TO STATE THEIR BARGAINING POSITION FIRMLY NOW, IN THE ABSTRACT, WE ARE LIKELY TO GET ANSWERS THAT NEITHER WE NOR

/HUSSEIN

FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 8238 TO WASHINGTON

HUSSEIN COULD LIVE WITH. BARBOUR'S JUDGMENT IS THAT IN THE END THE ISRAELIS WILL WANT HUSSEIN AND NOT THE SYRIANS OR THE IRAQI ON THEIR LONG FRONTIER WITH JORDAN, AND THAT, ALTHOUGH IT WILL BE DIFFICULT, IT IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE THAT IN THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATION THEY WILL BE ABLE TO REACH AN AGREEMENT WITH HUSSEIN WHICH WILL ALSO BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE WORLD COMMUNITY.

IF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN JORDAN AND ISRAEL DO NOT BEGIN SOON, THERE IS A REAL RISK THAT THE REGIME WILL FOUNDER. THERE ARE GREAT RISKS OF COURSE EVEN IF NEGOTIATIONS DO BEGIN, AT A PACE WHICH THE KING CAN CONTROL. HE MAY FOUNDER EITHER WAY.

I FULLY AGREE WITH THE STAGING AND SUPPORT OF NEGOTIATIONS PRESENT AN INTRICATE PROBLEM. ALL WE ARE PROPOSING NOW, AS I HAVE REVIEWED OUR PAPERS, IS THAT AMBASSADOR BURNS GO AHEAD ALONG THE LINES OF THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF YOUR MESSAGE, TO TRANSMIT AN INTERIM REPLY TO THE KING, WHICH WE COULD SUPPLEMENT AS WE RECEIVE MORE INFORMATION ABOUT THE ISRAELI POSITION.

I DO NOT THINK WE CAN TAKE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR DELAYING ANY LONGER TRANSMITTING TO THE KING THE ESSENCE OF THE ANSWERS TO HIS QUESTIONS WHICH EBAN AUTHORIZED ME TO FORWARD. I AM PLEASED, AFTER THE EXCHANGES OF THE LAST TWO DAYS, THAT YOU AGREE.

I APPRECIATE YOUR THANKS FOR OUR ACTION IN DELAYING THE EXECUTION OF AMBASSADOR BURNS' INSTRUCTIONS. OF COURSE IRONING OUT POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDINGS BETWEEN US TAKE FIRST PRIORITY.

SOSFA SENT 1256Z 25 JULY

PRISEC (F.O.)

5 of 5.
Add. to Mr Brenchley
" " Eastern Dept to enter.

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EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
LONDON

Copied to W'ton.
No. 10.

July 25, 1967

25
7

The Rt. Hon. George Brown, M.P.
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Foreign Office
Downing Street
London, S.W.1

Dear George:

Secretary Rusk has asked me to transmit the enclosed message to you.

Sincerely,

David.

David Bruce

Enclosure:

As stated.

SECRET

Dear George:

I appreciate your thoughtful message on the way in which we should handle the questions King Hussein has addressed to both of us. I am going forward on the basis of the telephone message Pat Dean has just transmitted in your behalf.

Of course I want to go ahead in this as in other matters on the basis of full agreement with you. I am not clear that there is any substantive difference between us. We agree that we cannot take the responsibility of refusing to transmit to the King the answer Eban authorized us to transmit ten days ago. We agree that the King must make his own decision as to when and how he should make contact with the Israelis. We agree that we should not take responsibility for encouraging or discouraging him. We agree that while the economic aspects of the possible bargain should be feasible, in the light of what Eban told us both, the issue of Jerusalem will certainly be the most difficult feature of the negotiation, perhaps the breaking point. From Hussein's talk with our Ambassadors, I do not conclude that suitable military arrangements on the West Bank are beyond reach of negotiation. The King seems to assume that that area would be effectively demilitarized.

We are of the view, which Ambassador Barbour confirms, that if we ask the Israelis to state their bargaining position firmly now, in the abstract, we are likely to get answers that neither we nor Hussein could live with. Barbour's judgment is that in the end the Israelis will want Hussein and not the Syrians or the Iraqi on their long frontier with Jordan, and that, although it will be difficult, it is not impossible that in the course of negotiation they will be able to reach an agreement with Hussein which will also be acceptable to the world community.

If negotiations between Jordan and Israel do not begin soon, there is a real risk that the regime will founder. There are great risks of course even if negotiations do begin, at a pace which the King can control. He may founder either way.

I fully agree with the staging and support of negotiations present an intricate problem. All we are proposing now, as I have reviewed our papers, is that Ambassador Burns go ahead along the lines of the last paragraph of your message, to transmit an interim reply to the King, which we could supplement as we receive more information about the Israeli position.

I do not think we can take the responsibility for delaying any longer transmitting to the King the essence of the answers to his questions which Eban authorized me to forward. I am pleased, after the exchanges of the last two days, that you agree.

I appreciate your thanks for our action in delaying the execution of Ambassador Burns' instructions. Of course ironing out possible misunderstandings between us takes first priority.

Yours sincerely,

Dean

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SECRET

CYPHER/CAT A
PRIORITY WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2465

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
26 JULY 1967

SECRET
ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 2465 OF 26 JULY
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO MOSCOW UKMIS NEW YORK AMMAN
TEL AVIV AND SAVING TO UKDEL NATO AND PARIS.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 2202 TO MOSCOW: MIDDLE EAST.

GENE ROSTOW TOLD ME TODAY THAT MR. RUSK HAD HAD LUNCH WITH THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR YESTERDAY, IN THE COURSE OF WHICH DOBRYNIN HAD HANDED OVER AN INFORMAL MEMORANDUM FROM GROMYKO ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST (WHICH FROM ROSTOW'S ACCOUNT APPEARED TO BE RATHER LESS PROPAGANDISTIC THAN THAT HANDED OVER TO YOU BY SMIRNOVSKY). DOBRYNIN HAD ALSO SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD LIKE TO CONTINUE THE TALKS WITH THE UNITED STATES BEGUN AT THE END OF THE LAST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO GIVE ROSTOW AN ACCOUNT OF YOUR TALK TO SMIRNOVSKY, FOR WHICH HE WAS VERY GRATEFUL.

2. DOBRYNIN HAD SPOKEN OPENLY TO MR. RUSK OF THE EXISTENCE OF ''ULTRA EXTREMIST ARAB CIRCLES'' WHO DID NOT WISH TO ACCEPT EVEN THE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL. HE INDICATED THAT THE RUSSIANS COULD HAVE HAD EIGHT OR NINE VOTES FROM THE MODERATE ARABS FOR A RESOLUTION ON THE LINES PUT FORWARD BY THE LATIN AMERICANS IF IT HAD NOT BEEN FOR THE OPPOSITION OF THE EXREMISTS. WHEN MR. RUSK ASKED HIM IF RECOGNITION OF THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF EXISTING MIDDLE EAST STATES WAS NOT AN ESSENTIAL CONDITION FOR A SETTLEMENT, DOBRYNIN SAID THAT IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR THE RUSSIANS TO TALK IN THIS WAY TO THE EGYPTIANS. ROSTOW COMMENTED THAT IT RATHER LOOKED AS IF THEY WERE AT THE BEGINNING OF A U.S./SOVIET DISCUSSION ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

3. DOBRYNIN WAS RETURNING TO MOSCOW SHORTLY FOR A MONTH. FOY KOHLER WOULD BE SEEING HIM TOMORROW AND WOULD SAY THAT THE AMERICANS WERE ALWAYS GLAD TO TALK TO THE RUSSIANS. BUT KOHLER WOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT, WHILE THE U.S. APPROACH WAS FLEXIBLE,

/THEIR

SECRET

THEIR BASIC POSITION ON THE CONDITIONS FOR A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT WERE FIRM AND NOT TO BE WHITTLED AWAY.

4. ROSTOW SAID THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD PROBABLY USE THESE EXCHANGES TO EXPRESS THEIR CONCERN AT THE PRESENT RATE OF BUILD UP OF ARMS AND TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE THEY ATTACHED TO BRINGING AN END TO THE MIDDLE EAST ARMS RACE. THEY WOULD ALSO SAY THAT THEY HAD NO WISH TO REFER THE MATTER BACK TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. ROSTOW ADDED THAT WHILE CLEARLY THERE WAS LITTLE TO BE DONE IN THE WAY OF ARMS CONTROL UNLESS THE RUSSIANS WOULD PLAY, THESE TALKS WOULD PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION WITH THE RUSSIANS IN THE MOST PRIVATE WAY.

5. ROSTOW SAID THE AMERICANS WERE ANXIOUS TO PUT OFF DISCUSSION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE, TO GIVE TIME FOR A NUMBER OF DIPLOMATIC PROBES OUTSIDE THE UNITED NATIONS. BUT THEY WOULD LIKE A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION APPOINTING A UNITED NATIONS MEDIATOR. I SAID I THOUGHT WE AGREED WITH THEM ON BOTH THESE POINTS.

6. ROSTOW REFERRED TO DISCUSSIONS IN LONDON ON REGISTRATION OF ARMS SALES UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS. THE AMERICANS WERE IN GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE POINTS WE HAD MADE AND HAD NO WISH TO CAUSE US EMBARRASSMENT. THEY HAD NOT YET ADOPTED ANY FINAL POSITION ON THE MATTER BUT WERE ANXIOUS TO KEEP THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE IN MOTION.

7. ROSTOW ALSO REFERRED TO A REPORT FROM NORWEGIAN SOURCES TO THE EFFECT THAT SOVIET DIPLOMATS IN CAIRO WERE TALKING IN TERMS OF A ''MASSIVE U.N.E.F. PRESENCE'' IN SINAI AS A MEANS OF SECURING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.

F O PASS PRIORITY MOSCOW 176 ROUTINE AMMAN 76 AND TEL AVIV 89 AND SAVING UKDEL NATO 87 AND PARIS 126.

SIR P DEAN

SENT AT 26/2341Z JULY
RECD AT 26/2341Z JULY

RMC

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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(SOVIET SECTION)

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File

CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat A

CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 756 25 July, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 756 of 25 July. Repeated for information to: Washington, U.K.Mission New York, Ottawa, Moscow, Paris, New Delhi, Ankara and certain Arab Posts (as necessary)

Reference my telegram No. 745 (not to all): Arab-Israel.

Nothing much more definite has emerged about what the Arab leaders said in Cairo. Much of their discussion was completely private. The following is based on Press reactions, President Nasser's spech of 23 July and what diplomats and others have learned or speculated.

2. It seems the general view that the Russians declined to support any early resumption of war against Israel or even to consider military re-equipment on more than a defensive scale. Boumedienne is thought to have tried without success to persuade them to see things in terms of a joint U.A.R.-Algeria-Syria-Iraq-Sudan offensive. On the other hand Boumedienne himself is suspected of having his own world role more in mind than the fortunes of the Palestinians. The Turkish Ambassador claims to know that President Aref was interested in the annexation of the East Bank of the Jordan, and that the Syrians are as hostile to King Hussein as ever.

3. Only President Azhari and King Hussein are thought to have been enthusiastic about an Arab summit, but President Nasser and the U.A.R. Press have now confirmed that the U.A.R. will attend the summit provided that a united front can be assured beforehand. Although on 23 July President Nasser attacked Saudi Arabia he talked of "King Feisal's Press and radio" rather than the King himself and in a comparatively mild tone (for him). The U.A.R. Press has been very quiet recently about the shortcomings of the "non-progressive" Arab Governments. Both President and Press have been careful to explain that Cairo meetings were not (repeat not) a "progressive" summit or a divisive move. The Arab League Headquarters are reported as saying that it is agreed to hold a boycott conference after the summit meeting.

4. It looks therefore as though the best the leaders could do in Cairo was to agree that a summit should be tried, though it is generally thought that neither Boumedienne nor Atassi favours it.

5. Nothing in this suggests that President Nasser feels himself in any strong position in the Arab world, or that he was able to play the role of leader in the Cairo meetings for all his valiant language.

6. Meanwhile, the only suggestion of any concession that the U.A.R. would be prepared to make to Israel in return for withdrawal

/is free

is free navigation through the Straits of Tiran. It is apparently the Eastern Bloc missions who are saying that this would be accepted, adding that the return of UNEF could be the obvious way to achieve it.

Foreign Office pass Washington 95, U.K.Mission New York 66, Ottawa 17, Moscow 22, Paris 19, New Delhi 7, Ankara 4 and certain Arab Posts as necessary.

Mr. Tesh

Sent 0845Z 25 July
Recd. 1125Z 25 July

[Repetition to Moscow referred for departmental decision, repeated as requested to Washington, U.K.Mission New York, Ottawa, Paris, Ankara and New Delhi]

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Eastern Dept.

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PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister.

Possible Israel-Jordan Negotiations

The Foreign Secretary would like to have an evening in London.

Your way can be arranged - chronologically just the top. Some strong US American disorganisation and then a failure to consult. This methods are sometimes quite frightening.

(Incidentally, it is also a story of F.O. failure to tell us! I had been aware of these before? asked Fr. Ormsby-Gore today)

25/7

SECRET AND PERSONAL.

A. M. Palliser, Esq., CMG.,
10, Downing Street

With the compliments of

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1

25 JUL 1967

SECRET

Mr Pallises 34A

COPY NO. ..1!....

SECRET - GUARD

Cypher/Cat A

PRIORITY TEL AVIV TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Tel. No. 868 26 July, 1967

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 868 of 26 July. Repeated for information to Washington, Amman and Saving to UKMIS New York.

GUARD

Your telegram No. 8212 to Washington: Jordan/Israel.

I saw Eban yesterday evening in Jerusalem before receipt of your telegram under reference. He gave me his version of his talk with you which closely followed the line of your record. There were, however, two divergencies.

2. In the first place he did not talk at all about the possibility of separate negotiations with Nasser.

3. Second, my impression of what the Israel Cabinet discussions are to be about is somewhat different. They will not relate specifically to whether a negotiation with Hussein should be accepted, should he make the offer. Nor will they necessarily come to conclusions about what actual terms the Israelis are prepared to offer. Eban made it very clear that the Israel Government realize that King Hussein's present manoeuvrings really amount to trying to get the Americans or us to extract from the Israelis certain concessions before the negotiations are embarked upon. He said, "We are not anxious to have a game of chess with you and the Americans first to be followed by a second game of chess with Hussein with half our pieces missing and with two Big Brothers breathing down our necks while we play with him." I should therefore be very surprised if we get anything at all concrete from the Israelis in the way of inducements to Hussein to enter into a negotiation.

4. Finally, it became pretty clear to me from the way Eban talked that the Americans at the top level have kept the Israelis very fully informed of the state of the game between the United States and King Hussein. He asked me whether we ourselves were as closely engaged as the Americans in this whole operation with the Jordanians. I replied that, all I knew was that King Hussein had asked us certain questions, on which I was not prepared to elaborate: that we were considering these questions and had not made up our minds on them yet and that I presumed my journey to London was connected with consultations mainly in regard to Jordan.

Foreign Office pass Washington 199, Amman 233 and Saving UKMIS New York 14.

Mr. Hadow

Sent 1001Z/26 July
Recd. 1208Z/26 July

[Repeated as requested]

PRISEC (F.O.)

XXXXX

SECRET - GUARD

CONFIDENTIAL

AMENDMENT SLIP

Washington telegram No. 2250 of 24 July to Foreign Office
[Jordan/Israel]

Please re-number as 2450.

COMMUNICATIONS DEPARTMENT
26 July, 1967

PRISEC (F.O.)

CONFIDENTIAL

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PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister.

This is the reply to your enquiry. It is no bad thing how you made it!

This will be on O.P.D. Agenda for Friday.

DR
28/7

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER

PM/67/79

Suez Canal

Your minute No. M 93/67 of 20 July.

2. Towards the end of June we estimated that the physical task of clearing the Canal might take two months. Since then the U.A.R. Minister in charge of Canal Affairs has said in conversation with the Swedish Ambassador in Cairo that while the purely engineering job might take only from six to eight weeks, the whole task would require six months if one took into account the time needed to discuss "modalities" and responsibility for payment. I have no reason to believe that M. Younis was exaggerating.

3. The Egyptians' intention is evidently to keep the Canal closed so long as the presence of Israeli troops gives them an excuse for doing so: they evidently think

/that

that the Canal is the strongest card they have to play in recovering from their recent defeat. But the Canal is one of their three main sources of foreign exchange, and they are currently losing £6 to £8 million a month through its continued closure. Their material interests thus coincide with those of the users. We have also had several indications that the Russians would like to see the Canal reopened. I would expect these pressures to take effect within a matter of months. But we should still have to reckon with the six-month period foreseen by M. Younis; and there is the possibility that the Egyptians may attempt to deny the Canal to us and the Americans while reopening it to others. Therefore for planning purposes I think we must consider the possibility that the Canal may remain closed to us for up to a year from now.

4. We ourselves are not well placed either to bring direct pressure to bear on the Egyptians or to take the lead in international action. The Americans have no moves in mind

/at

at present: they believe that the U.A.R. is not yet willing to give up any part of its prime bargaining counter, and that a Great Power approach would be counter-productive.

5. At present it is also difficult to visualise any Israeli withdrawal except on terms that the Egyptians would not be prepared to concede, although it is just possible that if the United Nations Observers on the east bank could be expanded into a kind of Emergency Force the Israelis might be persuaded that there would be advantages for them in their withdrawing at least a short distance from the Canal.

6. My assessment is thus a pessimistic one. I agree that it would be useful for officials to examine the implications for our interests. This might be done under the following heads:-

(a) the effect on our oil supplies;

(b) the effect on imports other than oil;

(c) the effect on our exports;

/(d)

(d) the effect on invisibles;

(e) the effects for our shipping industry;

(f) the effect on our balance of payments in the light of the above studies.

I agree that officials should also examine ways of reducing our dependence on the Canal.

7. I am sending copies of this minute to our colleagues on the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee and to the President of the Board of Trade, the Minister of Power, the Lord Privy Seal, the Minister of Overseas Development, the Minister without Portfolio (Lord Shackleton), the Paymaster-General and Sir Burke Trend.

Yan.

26 July, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A & BY BAG

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO MOSCOW

TELNO 2202 26 JULY, 1967 (E)

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO MOSCOW TELNO 2202 OF 26 JULY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK TEL AVIV AND AMMAN AND SAVING TO UKDEL NATO AND PARIS.

YOUR TELNO 1299: MIDDLE EAST.

THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR CALLED ON ME YESTERDAY AFTERNOON TO DELIVER A COPY OF WHAT APPEARS TO BE THE SAME SOVIET GOVERNMENT STATEMENT REFERRED TO IN YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE (COPY OF TEXT FOLLOWS BY BAG). ON HANDING OVER THE STATEMENT MR. SMIRNOVSKY EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM WOULD COOPERATE WITH OTHERS IN ELIMINATING THE CONSEQUENCES OF ISRAEL'S AGGRESSION.

2. I READ THROUGH THE STATEMENT AND TOOK MR. SMIRNOVSKY UP ON THE VARIOUS REFERENCES IN IT TO THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PRESENT SITUATION OF STATES SUPPORTING ISRAEL. I MADE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT I OBJECTED TO THESE VEILED ACCUSATIONS AGAINST THE UNITED KINGDOM, WHICH MESSRS. KOSYGIN, PODGORNY AND GROMYKO ALL KNEW WELL TO BE UNFOUNDED. I POINTED OUT THAT AT THE END OF THE SPECIAL SESSION BOTH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AND WE WERE WORKING ON THE SAME LINES. WE WERE BOTH TRYING TO OBTAIN ACCEPTANCE FOR A RESOLUTION LINKING THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL TROOPS WITH THE ENDING OF BELLIGERENCY. I FIRMLY REPUDIATED A SUGGESTION BY MR. SMIRNOVSKY THAT THE PRESENT TROUBLES WERE DUE TO OUR FAILURE TO VOTE FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. I REMINDED HIM THAT WE HAD VOTED FOR WITHDRAWAL, LINKED REALISTICALLY TO THE ENDING OF BELLIGERENCY, AND THAT I HAD MADE IT VERY CLEAR PUBLICLY IN MY SPEECH AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND ALSO IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS THAT IN OUR VIEW ANY SETTLEMENT WOULD HAVE TO INCLUDE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. I SAID THAT WHAT WAS NEEDED NOW WAS THAT BOTH OUR GOVERNMENTS SHOULD WORK TOWARDS A SENSIBLE ARRANGEMENT WHICH WOULD INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING THREE POINTS:-

(I) CONTROL AND LIMITATION OF ARMS DELIVERIES TO THE AREA SEMICOLON

../(II) BRINGING

(II) BRINGING OUR INFLUENCE TO BEAR ON BOTH SIDES TO AVOID A FURTHER OUTBREAK OF WAR WHICH COULD DO NO GOOD TO EITHER OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES SEMI COLON

(III) MAKING BOTH SIDES UNDERSTAND THAT WITHDRAWAL AND ENDING OF BELLIGERENCY MUST BE LINKED.

I WOULD USE ALL MY INFLUENCE IN THIS DIRECTION AND I HOPED THAT MR. GROMYKO WOULD DO THE SAME.

3. I SAID THAT I COULD NOT SEE THE POINT OF DELIVERING TO US A PURELY PROPAGANDIST STATEMENT OF THIS KIND AT THIS STAGE. DURING THE CLOSING STAGES OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY THERE HAD SEEMED TO BE VERY LITTLE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN US ON THE MAIN ISSUE AND WE OUGHT TO CONCENTRATE ON THIS IDENTITY OF VIEW. I WOULD ACCEPT THE STATEMENT ON THE BASIS THAT I KNEW IT TO HAVE A PURELY PROPAGANDIST PURPOSE. THOUGH I COULD EASILY DO SO, I WOULD AVOID MAKING ANY SIMILAR PROPAGANDIST REPLY. I HOPED THAT MR. SMIRNOVSKY WOULD MAKE MY VIEWS ON ALL THIS CLEAR TO MR. GROMYKO. HE UNDERTOOK TO DO SO, BUT CLAIMED RATHER LAMELY THAT THE STATEMENT REPRESENTED THE BASIC POSITION OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT THROUGHOUT WHICH HAD NOT CHANGED.

4. THOUGH I SPOKE ROBUSTLY TO MR. SMIRNOVSKY, THE TONE OF OUR EXCHANGES WAS GOOD HUMOURED THROUGHOUT.

SOSFA SENT 1215Z 26 JULY

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION

EASTERN DEPT.

Israel PM 6

E.R.

PRIME MINISTER

Middle East: Suez Canal

The Foreign Secretary's minute of 26th July is pessimistic about the prospect of an early re-opening of the Suez Canal, particularly in so far as it suggests that we should not count on its being re-opened to our shipping or to that of the United States for up to a year, even if it is opened to others earlier than this.

2. The logic of this assessment is perhaps arguable. For example, we have been told that a main reason for our inability to mobilise the maritime Powers to join with us in action to get the Canal re-opened is that we are easily the largest users of it. If so, however, the Egyptians will continue to lose heavily if our shipping is denied passage, even if the Canal is re-opened to others. But, whether or not the assessment proves right and whatever opportunities may arise as time passes to speed up the re-opening of the Canal, it would clearly be right for the Committee to agree now that officials should carry out the examination proposed in paragraph 6 of the Foreign Secretary's minute. The Official Committee on Economic Policy (which is chaired by DEA) would be the appropriate body to oversee the study; and it would be right, given the unlikelihood of long-term stability in the Middle East, for particular emphasis to be given to reducing our dependence on the Suez Canal.

3. If it were possible for this study to be completed (at least in the form of a preliminary or interim report) by early September; this might be helpful, since it could then be taken into account when SEP resume consideration of the economic prospect for 1968 and the measures to be taken in that regard.

Bruce (SEN)

27th July, 1967

35A

SECRET

This is 1G Telegram to be retained in Foreign Secretary's O.P.D.

CYPHER/CAT.A.
IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2480
SECRET

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
27 JULY 1967

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 2480 OF 27 JULY 1967
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO MOSCOW, UKMIS NEW YORK, AMMAN, TEL AVIV, AND SAVING TEL TO UKDEL NATO, PARIS.
FOR ATTENTION EARLY FRIDAY MORNING. MY TELS NOS. 2465 AND 2477:
MIDDLE EAST.

I CALLED ON MR. RUSK THIS EVENING AND ASKED HIM WHAT HE THOUGHT MIGHT COME OF THE EXCHANGES WHICH HE HAD HAD WITH DOBRYNIN AND GROMYKO.

2. RUSK SHOWED ME GROMYKO'S INFORMAL MEMORANDUM WHICH HE SAID HAD BEEN DICTATED AT KENNEDY AIRPORT JUST BEFORE GROMYKO LEFT NEW YORK. IT WAS RATHER LONGER THAN I HAD BEEN LED TO BELIEVE. I COULD NOT TAKE NOTES BUT THE GIST WAS AS FOLLOWS: THE MEMORANDUM BEGAN BY REITERATING THE SOVIET POSITION ON ISRAEL'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE OUTBREAK OF WAR AND AGGRESSION AGAINST THE ARAB STATES. THE US GOVERNMENT WOULD BE MISTAKEN IN INTERPRETING THE SOVIET EFFORTS AT RECONCILIATION AT THE END OF THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE G.A. AS INDICATING ANY DEPARTURE FROM THE BASIC SOVIET ATTITUDE. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HOPED HOWEVER THAT THE US GOVERNMENT HAD TAKEN NOTE OF THE INITIATIVES MADE BY GROMYKO AND DOBRYNIN TOWARDS THE END OF THE SPECIAL ASSEMBLY TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD PRESERVE THE BASIC POSITION OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT BUT WHICH MIGHT MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO MOVE FORWARD. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WERE NOT VERY PLEASED WITH THE US GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO THIS EFFORT AND THEY HAD ENCOUNTERED DIFFICULTIES FROM THE ''ULTRA EXTREMIST ARAB CIRCLES'' WHO DENIED EVEN THE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ASSUMED THAT THE US GOVERNMENT DID NOT WANT MATTERS TO GET WORSE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND IF THE US GOVERNMENT WERE PREPARED TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ABOUT HOW TO PRODUCE A RELAXATION OF TENSION, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WOULD BE READY TO KEEP UP THESE CONTACTS. (I AM AFRAID THIS IS RATHER AN INCOMPLETE SUMMARY BUT I HAD ONLY A FEW MOMENTS TO LOOK AT THE TEXT SOME OF WHICH WAS IN VERY BAD ENGLISH.)

/3. RUSK

SECRET

3. RUSK ALSO SHOWED ME AN ACCOUNT OF WHAT APPEARED TO BE A FAIRLY LONG CONVERSATION WITH DOBRYNIN ON 25 JULY WHICH WAS FOLLOWED BY ANOTHER CONVERSATION ON THE EVENING OF 26 JULY, WHICH ALSO LASTED FOR 3 HOURS, BUT WAS MAINLY DEVOTED TO SUBJECTS OTHER THAN THE MIDDLE EAST. THERE HAS ALSO BEEN A FURTHER CONVERSATION BETWEEN KOHLER AND DOBRYNIN TODAY ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST AND I WILL TRY TO GET AN ACCOUNT OF THIS TOMORROW. THE CONVERSATION WAS FRIENDLY AND DOBRYNIN HAD SAID QUITE CLEARLY THAT ALGERIA AND SYRIA HAD WRECKED THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S HOPES OF ACHIEVING SOMETHING AT THE SPECIAL ASSEMBLY OF THE G.A. ACCORDING TO DOBRYNIN THE UAR HAD BEEN READY TO CONSIDER A COMPROMISE AND AT LEAST EIGHT OR NINE OTHER ARAB STATES WOULD HAVE GONE ALONG WITH THE LAST RUSSIAN DRAFT RESOLUTION. DOBRYNIN ASKED A CERTAIN NUMBER OF PROBING QUESTIONS ABOUT THE US GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS JORDAN AND HAD PARTICULARLY PRESSED RUSK ON THE QUESTION WHY HE THOUGHT JERUSALEM WOULD PROVE SO DIFFICULT. RUSK HAD MADE SOME PURELY PERSONAL SUGGESTIONS ABOUT COMPARATIVELY SMALL STEPS WHICH MIGHT REDUCE THE IMMEDIATE TENSION AND WHICH MIGHT BE TAKEN AS A FORERUNNER FOR WIDER AGREEMENT LATER ON. FOR INSTANCE, RUSK HAD SPOKEN OF THE POSSIBILITY OF OPENING THE STRAITS OF TIRAN WHICH MIGHT IN TURN MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE ISRAELIS TO WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES SOME CONSIDERABLE WAY IN SINAI. DOBRYNIN MADE NO SUGGESTIONS FROM HIS SIDE BUT CONFINED HIMSELF TO ASKING FAIRLY CONSTRUCTIVE QUESTIONS.

4. IN FURTHER CONVERSATION, RUSK SAID TO ME THAT HE DID NOT KNOW QUITE WHAT TO MAKE OF GROMYKO'S MESSAGE BUT THAT HE WOULD CERTAINLY BE READY TO FOLLOW IT UP. HE THOUGHT THAT WE COULD NOT ASSUME THAT TIME WOULD WORK CONSTRUCTIVELY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE THOUGHT THE RUSSIANS WOULD IN ALL PROBABILITY PULL SOME SURPRISES OUT OF THE BAG: THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN JORDAN AND LIBYA WAS VERY CRITICAL AND THERE WERE CONSIDERABLE DANGERS AHEAD. HE THOUGHT THAT WE MUST FIND SOME SMALL STEPS WHICH WOULD HELP TO MOVE MATTERS IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION AND NOT SIT ABOUT WAITING FOR MIRACLES TO OCCUR. WE MIGHT EASILY FIND ANY MORNING THAT THE MODERATE REGIMES IN LIBYA AND JORDAN HAD BEEN REPLACED BY EXTREMISTS. VARIOUS SMALL STEPS MIGHT BE POSSIBLE, E.G. SOMETHING ON THE STRAITS OF TIRAN

/ (CF HIS

(CF HIS REMARKS IN PARAGRAPH 3 ABOVE).

5. RUSK ALSO TOLD ME THAT, ACCORDING TO HIS INFORMATION, THE ARABS DID NOT WANT THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO MEET FOR PERHAPS TWO OR THREE WEEKS AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD BE PREPARED TO WAIT. I ASKED HIM WHETHER HE THOUGHT THE ARAB WORLD GENERALLY WOULD RALLY TO THE MODERATES RATHER THAN TO EXTREMISTS AND HE ADMITTED THAT HE HAD NO GROUNDS FOR OPTIMISM AND THE DANGER WAS THAT WHENEVER THE ARABS MET THE EXTREMISTS ALWAYS HAD THEIR WAY. RUSK SUGGESTED THAT WE SHOULD TAKE ANY OPPORTUNITY WE COULD WITH THE MODERATES TO URGE THEM TO URGE MODERATION ON THEIR FELLOW ARABS. RUSK SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY WOULD FEEL FAIRLY CONFIDENT ABOUT A REASONABLE SOLUTION BEING FOUND IF IT WERE NOT FOR JERUSALEM WHICH WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT.

F.O. PASS MOSCOW 178 AMMAN 79 TEL AVIV 92, AND SAVING TO UKDEL NATO 89 PARIS 128
SIR. P. DEAN

SENT 28/0600Z
RECD 28/0601Z

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW, TEL AVIV REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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SSSSS

BUA

Â. M. Palliser, Esq. CMG

With the compliments of

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

1/8.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1

1.8.67
R

Israel (Pt 1)

.om The Israel Ambassador

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
2 PALACE GREEN
LONDON, W.8
WESTERN 8091

28 July 1967

Advance.
Copy

Mr Thomson
Sir D. Allen
Eastern Dept

שגרירות ישראל
לונדון

28/7

Dear George.

Abba Eban has asked me to inform you that the main discussions of the Government concerning the subjects we talked about during his visit will take place only next week. He cannot, therefore, give you any additional information to that which he expressed during the talks here.

I shall be leaving for Israel on Tuesday morning, 1 August, for a conference together with our Ambassadors in Washington, the United Nations and Paris. I assume this will form part of the general consultations on the pertinent points we discussed.

If, as a result of your own discussions here, you would like to convey any information or suggestions, I would be at your disposal any time between now and Monday night.

Yours sincerely
Aharon.

Aharon Remez

The Rt. Hon. George Brown, M.P.,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
Foreign Office,
Downing Street,
London S.W.1

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

TELNO 8365 28 JULY 1967 (UN)

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NUMBER 8365 OF 28 JULY AND TO UKMIS NEW YORK REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO MOSCOW TEL AVIV AMMAN.

MIDDLE EAST: UNITED NATIONS.

I HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING WHAT ACTION WE SHOULD NOW TAKE IN THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS IN THE LIGHT OF OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS. OUR MOST URGENT NEED IS THE REOPENING OF THE SUEZ CANAL. THIS NEED IS NOT ONLY RELATED TO THE FINANCIAL COST TO US OF ITS CLOSURE, BUT ALSO TO THE FACT THAT OPENING IT WOULD HELP THE MODERATE ARABS: ONCE NASSER HAD TAKEN THE STEP OF OPENING THE CANAL, THEY WOULD NO LONGER FEEL THE SAME NECESSITY FOR HOLDING BACK ON THE SHIPMENT OF OIL. OUR EFFORTS MUST THEREFORE BE DIRECTED TO THIS PURPOSE. IN PUBLIC OF COURSE, WE MUST CONTINUE TO SHOW QUOTE A STIFF UPPER LIP UNQUOTE AND CONCEAL OUR REAL CONCERN AT THE CANAL SITUATION.

2. I HAVE CONCLUDED THAT IT IS THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS THAT OUR BEST CHANCE OF SUCCESS LIES. OUR IMMEDIATE AIM MUST THEREFORE BE A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION WHICH AT BEST WILL SECURE THE REOPENING OR, AT WORST, WILL BRING IT APPRECIABLY NEARER. I KNOW THIS IS A DIFFICULT PROPOSITION AND MADE NO EASIER BY THE FACT THAT OUR URGENT NEED FOR THE CANAL IS NOT SHARED IN ANYTHING LIKE THE SAME DEGREE BY THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, ESPECIALLY NOT BY THE U.S.A. WE MUST, THEREFORE, MAKE THE RUNNING ON THIS IN PRIVATE, (BUT, AT ANY RATE AT PRESENT, NOT IN PUBLIC) AND IN PARTICULAR WE MUST TRY TO GET THE AMERICANS TO GIVE FULL WEIGHT TO OUR INTERESTS.

3. IN TERMS OF ACTION AT THE UNITED NATIONS, THIS MEANS THAT WE SHOULD GO FOR A SUBSTANTIVE RESOLUTION ON THE LINES WE HAVE SUPPORTED ALL ALONG, I.E. COVERING THE TWO MAIN POINTS OF WITHDRAWAL AND THE END TO THE CLAIM TO BELLIGERENCY. WE SHOULD HAVE TO BE SURE THAT ALL CONCERNED ACCEPTED THAT AN END OF BELLIGERENCY ENTAILED;

/ THE

THE CANAL BEING OPENED. THE DOBRYNIN DRAFTS (PARTICULARLY PARA. 2 AT UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NUMBER 1833) COULD BE USED AS A BASIS BUT THE LANGUAGE ON FREEDOM OF INNOCENT PASSAGE WOULD HAVE TO BE STRENGTHENED TO AVOID THE RISK OF PROTRACTED ARGUMENT AND NO ACTION. THERE SHOULD ALSO BE PROVISION FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

4. WE RECOGNISE THAT THE ARAB REACTION TO THE DOBRYNIN DRAFTS MAY MAKE THE RUSSIANS DRAW BACK SOMEWHAT. I NOTE THAT MR. RUSK IS UNDECIDED HOW TO INTERPRET GROMYKO'S MESSAGE (YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 2480). UNTIL IT IS PROVED OTHERWISE, WE WOULD SEE ADVANTAGE IN PROCEEDING ON THE HYPOTHESIS THAT THIS MESSAGE WAS INTENDED TO POINT TO THE DOBRYNIN DRAFTS AS PROVIDING A BASIS FOR FURTHER NEGOTIATION, ALTHOUGH OFFICIALLY THE RUSSIAN STANCE MUST BE THAT THERE IS NO CHANGE IN THEIR POSITION. THERE SEEMS EVERYTHING TO BE SAID FOR BUILDING ON THE QUITE CONSIDERABLE AREA OF AGREEMENT REACHED BETWEEN THE U.S. AND U.S.S.R. AT THE END OF THE EMERGENCY SESSION, IF THIS IS AT ALL POSSIBLE. I WOULD WELCOME ADVICE AS TO WHETHER DISCUSSIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS SHOULD BEST BE LEFT SOLELY TO THE AMERICANS OR WHETHER (AS I WOULD PREFER) IT WOULD NOT BE USEFUL FOR US ALSO TO TELL THE RUSSIANS WE ARE ATTRACTED TO THEIR TEXTS.

5. IF THE RUSSIANS NOW WITHDRAW FROM THE DOBRYNIN DRAFTS (PARA 3 ABOVE), IT MIGHT BE WORTH CONSIDERING PUTTING THE TWO MAIN PURPOSES -WITHDRAWAL AND ENDING THE CLAIM TO BELLIGERENCY-IN THE PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPHS OF ANY RESOLUTION. THE OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS WOULD APPOINT THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND DEFINE HIS TASK IN TERMS OF THESE PURPOSES.
ALTHOUGH THIS WOULD OF COURSE BE LESS FORCEFUL THAN HAVING THE MEAT IN THE OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS, IT MIGHT BE ALMOST AS EFFECTIVE AS A DIRECTIVE TO THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE (OR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL) AND WOULD CERTAINLY BE BETTER THAN NO RESOLUTION.

6. A FURTHER POINT, WHICH IT MIGHT BE WORTH EXPLORING WITH THE AMERICANS, EMERGES FROM YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 2465, PARAGRAPH 7 AND

/ CAIRO

CAIRO TELEGRAM NUMBER 756, PARAGRAPH 6, BOTH OF WHICH SHOW THAT THE COMMUNIST BLOC REPRESENTATIVES IN CAIRO ARE PUTTING IT ABOUT THAT UNEF MIGHT BE RECONSTITUTED AND USED TO OPEN THE STRAITS OF TIRAN. HAVE THE AMERICANS PROBED AT ALL TO DISCOVER WHETHER THERE HAS REALLY BEEN A MAJOR CHANGE OF ATTITUDE ON THE PART OF THE RUSSIANS TOWARDS UNEF? IF NOT SHOULD WE NOT PURSUE THE SOVIET HINTS?

7. IT SEEMS MOST DESIRABLE THAT THE U.N. SHOULD AT THIS STAGE BE SEEN TO BE ACTIVE TO BE BUILDING UPON SUCH FOUNDATIONS AS WERE LAID AT THE EMERGENCY SESSION. BUT IT MAY PROVE DIFFICULT TO TAKE THE FIRST STEP TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE MOST HOPEFUL IDEA WHICH HAS OCCURRED TO US IS THAT I SHOULD ASK THE SECRETARY GENERAL WHETHER HE WOULD NOT VISIT THE AREA HIMSELF, AS A RECONNAISSANCE PERHAPS LEADING TO THE APPOINTMENT OF A REPRESENTATIVE. HIS WELCOME INITIATIVE OVER STATIONING UNTSO OBSERVERS ON THE SUEZ CANAL SUGGESTS HE MIGHT BE READY TO PLAY A MORE ACTIVE PART. WE ARE, HOWEVER, NOT VERY OPTIMISTIC AND ASSUME U THANT WOULD NOT GO UNLESS HE HAD THE AGREEMENT OF ALL CONCERNED IN AND OUT OF THE AREA AND PROBABLY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. BUT WHETHER HE AGREES TO GO OR NOT, THERE WOULD BE VALUE IN GETTING HIS OWN VIEW OF WHAT SHOULD HAPPEN NOW. I WOULD BE GLAD TO KNOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WHETHER THE STATE DEPARTMENT WOULD AGREE THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR ME TO SEND THE MESSAGE IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL.

8. AS TO THE TIMING, I AGREE THAT A PAUSE FOR BEHIND THE SCENES NEGOTIATION WILL BE VALUABLE BUT THINK WE SHOULD TRY TO GET A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE END OF AUGUST. TO ALLOW THINGS TO DRIFT WOULD SOLIDIFY POSITIONS AND MAKE MATTERS WORSE. WE ARE CONSIDERING WHETHER ANY PRELIMINARY APPROACHES IN CAPITALS, INCLUDING THE MIDDLE EAST AND LEADING SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS, SUCH / AS

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FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 8365 TO WASHINGTON

AS INDIA, WOULD BE USEFUL AND WOULD BE GLAD TO KNOW WHAT THE AMERICANS ARE UNDERTAKING IN THIS REGARD.

9. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF, IN CONSULTATION WITH SIR L. GLASS, YOU COULD NOW APPROACH MR. RUSK TO DISCUSS THESE IDEAS. YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT, ACCORDING TO CANADA HOUSE, THE CANADIAN IDEAS ARE VERY CLOSE TO OUR OWN.

SOSFA SENT 2025Z 28 JULY 1967

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IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

TELNO 8366 28 JULY 1967 (UP/EASTERN)

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ADDRESSED TO WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO 8366 OF 28 JULY AND TO UKMIS NEW YORK REPEATED FOR INFMN TO MOSCOW TEL AVIV AND AMMAN.

MIDDLE EAST: SECURITY COUNCIL.

MIPT.

FOLLOWING IS PROPOSED TEXT OF MY MESSAGE TO SECRETARY-GENERAL.

NOW THAT THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY HAS COME TO AN END I BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD ALL CONSIDER URGENTLY WHAT CAN BE DONE TO MOVE FORWARD FROM THE PRESENT PRECARIOUS CEASEFIRE IN THE MIDDLE EAST TO A MORE STABLE SITUATION IN WHICH PROGRESS TOWARDS A REAL SETTLEMENT MIGHT BECOME POSSIBLE.

ALTHOUGH THE SPECIAL SESSION DID NOT IN THE END PASS A RESOLUTION ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE MAIN QUESTION BEFORE IT, WE WERE ENCOURAGED BY THE MORE CONSTRUCTIVE ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH IT ENDED IN MARKED CONTRAST TO THE PURELY POLEMICAL TONE OF THE BEGINNING. WE NOTED WITH SATISFACTION THE LARGE MEASURE OF AGREEMENT INCLUDING THAT OF THE MOST POWERFUL PERMANENT MEMBERS ON THE ELEMENTS WHICH SHOULD GO INTO A SETTLEMENT AND IN PARTICULAR ON THE NECESSITY FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL BALANCED BY THE ENDING OF BELLIGERENCY ON THE PART OF THE ARABS.

WE ARE IMPRESSED HOWEVER BY THE RISKS OF NOT MOVING ON FROM THE POSITION NOW REACHED TO MAKE SOME PROGRESS TOWARDS THE OBJECTIVES WHICH MOST OF US AGREE TO BE DESIRABLE. WE SEE GRAVE DANGERS IN ALLOWING THE PRESENT SITUATION TO TAKE ON A PERMANENT CHARACTER SIMPLY BECAUSE IT EXISTS. IT IS IN OUR VIEW ALTOGETHER TOO DANGEROUS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO ALLOW THIS UNEASY AND PRECARIOUS ARMED TRUCE TO CONTINUE IN WHICH OPPOSING FORCES FACE EACH OTHER WITH INCREASING BITTERNESS IN THEIR HEARTS. SOME TRIVIAL INCIDENT LET US SAY ON THE SUEZ CANAL COULD SO EASILY TRIGGER OFF A RENEWAL OF THE FIGHTING BRINGING UNTOLD FURTHER MISERY IN ITS TRAIN.

WE ARE IMPRESSED BY THE IMPORTANT INITIATIVE WHICH YOU YOURSELF HAVE TAKEN IN OBTAINING AGREEMENT TO THE STATIONING OF UNTSO OBSERVERS ON THE CANAL. WE WELCOME THIS MOST VALUABLE STEP AND WE BELIEVE THAT THESE OBSERVERS HAVE ALREADY CONTRIBUTED TO THE PRESENT LULL IN ARMED CLASHES AT THE SUEZ CANAL. BUT I AM SURE

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THAT YOU WILL AGREE THAT WE MUST MOVE ON FROM THIS TO A FURTHER DE-FUSING OF THE PERILOUS SITUATION.

IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES I SHOULD WELCOME YOUR EXCELLENCY'S COMMENTS ON HOW YOU THINK WE AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL MIGHT HELP. WE SHALL OF COURSE BE READY TO WORK TOGETHER WITH OUR COLLEAGUES THERE IN FINDING EARLY PRACTICAL ANSWERS TO THE OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS. THE HARDEST STEP MAY BE THE FIRST AND I MYSELF HAVE WONDERED WHETHER YOU ARE NOT YOURSELF UNIQUELY PLACED TO TAKE ANOTHER INITIATIVE IN THE INTERESTS OF PEACE IN THE AREA. WOULD YOU YOURSELF CONSIDER GOING TO THE AREA TO ASSESS THE SITUATION IN THE LIGHT OF EVENTS IN THE PAST FEW WEEKS? YOUR OWN VISIT MIGHT INDEED BE THE PRELUDE TO THE APPOINTMENT BY YOU OF A MORE PERMANENT CONSILIATOR WHO COULD FOLLOW UP EVERY LEAD WHICH COULD LOOSEN THE PRESENT LOG-JAM. CLEARLY PROGRESS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT WILL TAKE TIME BUT A VISIT BY YOU COULD OPEN THE WAY.

WHETHER OR NOL YOU SEE MERIT IN THIS SUGGESTION I SHOULD WELCOME YOUR EXCELLENCY'S VIEWS ON WHAT MIGHT PRACTICABLY BE DONE AT THIS STAGE.

SOSFA

SENT 2243 28 JULY 1967

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IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

TELNO 8380 28 JULY 1967 (EASTERN)

SECRET

ADDRESSED TO WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO 8380 OF 28 JULY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO AMMAN TEL AVIV NEW YORK

YOUR TEL NO 2479 OF 27 JULY: JORDAN/ISRAEL

I HAVE NOW HAD THE OPPORTUNITY OF DISCUSSING THE SITUATION WITH H M AMBASSADORS AMMAN AND TEL AVIV. TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THESE DISCUSSIONS TOGETHER WITH REPORTS ON KING HUSSEIN'S REACTION TO THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY THE UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR (YOUR TEL UNDER REF AND AMMAN TELS NOS 921 AND 922), AND OUR LATEST THOUGHTS ON THE BEST NEXT STEPS AT THE UNITED NATIONS (MY TEL NO 8365) I NOW PROPOSE TO INSTRUCT H M AMBASSADORS AMMAN AND TEL AVIV TO SPEAK TO KING HUSSEIN AND THE ISRAEL FOREIGN MINISTER RESPECTIVELY ON THE FOLLOWING LINES.

2. H M AMBASSADOR AMMAN:

(A) I HAVE HEARD THAT KING HUSSEIN HAS CONCLUDED THAT IT IS NOT AT PRESENT FEASIBLE TO PURSUE THE IDEA OF A BILATERAL AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL AND THAT HE IS PROPOSING TO STRENGTHEN HIS RELATIONS WITH THE MODERATE ARAB GOVERNMENTS AND OTHER FRIENDLY STATES IN THE AREA BEFORE DECIDING WHETHER TO TAKE FURTHER STEPS IN THIS DIRECTION. I RESPECT HIS JUDGMENT ON THIS. IN THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE AREA, AND FROM OUR KNOWLEDGE OF PRESENT ISRAEL VIEWS ON JERUSALEM WE THINK THERE WOULD BE CONSIDERABLE RISKS AT THE MOMENT IN HIS TAKING THE INITIATIVE TO SEEK A BILATERAL SETTLEMENT AND THAT HE WOULD BE WISER TO KEEP HIS HEAD DOWN.

(B) WE HOPE THAT THERE WILL BEFORE LONG BE SOME CONSTRUCTIVE MOVES TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT AT THE UNITED NATIONS E G, THROUGH THE DESPATCH OF A MEDIATORY TO THE AREA. THE ADVANTAGE OF THIS COURSE IS THAT IT DOES NOT INVOLVE JORDAN GETTING OUT IN FRONT OF THE OTHER ARABS.

(C) MEANWHILE WE THINK THAT KING HUSSEIN WOULD BE WELL ADVISED TO PROTECT HIS POSITION AT HOME BY STRENGTHENING HIS GOVERNMENT AND GETTING THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT TO WITHDRAW IRAQI TROOPS FROM JORDAN.

/ (D)

(D) WE RECOGNISE THE PROBLEM OF AIR FORCE MORALE AND ARE CONSIDERING WHAT WE CAN DO TO HELP WITH THE PROVISION OF SOME HUNTERS, THOUGH THE PROSPECTS ARE NOT GOOD.

3. H M AMBASSADOR TEL AVIV:

(A) FROM MY CONVERSATIONS WITH MR EBAN ON 23 JULY, AND WITH MR HADOW, IT IS MY JUDGMENT THAT THE TERMS WHICH THE ISRAELIS ARE LIKELY TO OFFER IN THEIR PRESENT MOOD ARE SO UNATTRACTIVE THAT KING HUSSEIN WOULD BE UNWISE TO STICK HIS NECK OUT BY SEEKING TO ENTER INTO BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS. WE ARE ACCORDINGLY ADVISING HIM TO KEEP HIS HEAD DOWN.

(B) MR EBAN GAVE ME TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT WERE UNCERTAIN WHETHER THE SURVIVAL OF THE PRESENT REGIME IN JORDAN WAS TO THEIR ADVANTAGE OR A MATTER OF INDIFFERENCE TO THEM. I SHOULD LIKE HIM TO BE IN NO DOUBT OF MY OWN OPINION THAT THIS IS A SHORT-SIGHTED ATTITUDE. IF AN EXTREMIST REGIME TOOK OVER IN JORDAN THERE WOULD BE INCREASED DANGER THAT THE ARABS WOULD PREPARE AND THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD SUPPORT THEM IN PREPARING, FOR ANOTHER ROUND, AND THE FIRST STRIKE MIGHT NOT ON THAT OCCASION BE MADE BY ISRAEL. IN ANY CASE, BRITISH AND OTHER WESTERN INTERESTS IN THE AREA AS A WHOLE WOULD SUFFER FROM THE COLLAPSE OF THE PRESENT REGIME SINCE WE HAVE AN INTEREST IN THE SURVIVAL OF A MODERATE GROUP OF ARAB GOVERNMENTS.

(C) AS REGARDS JERUSALEM THE ISRAELIS SHOULD NOT MISUNDERSTAND OUR POSITION. THIS QUESTION SEEMS TO US TO BE THE GREATEST OBSTACLE TO A POSSIBLE SETTLEMENT. WE ARE READY TO SUPPORT THEM, AND HAVE SUPPORTED THEM, ON MANY ISSUES, BUT WE CANNOT SUPPORT THEM ON THIS. IN THE LONG TERM THE EMOTIONAL AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT OF JEWISH COMMUNITIES IN THE WORLD WILL BE NO SUBSTITUTE FOR THE SOLID SUPPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND ACCEPTANCE OF THEIR EXISTENCE BY THEIR NEIGHBOURS WHICH WILL BE FORTHCOMING ONLY IF THEY ARE PREPARED TO BE REASONABLE OVER JERUSALEM. WHEN THE QUESTION SHOULD BE RAISED, AND WHAT WOULD CONSTITUTE A REASONABLE SETTLEMENT ARE

/OTHER

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FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 8380 TO WASHINGTON

-3-

OTHER QUESTIONS BUT IF AT THIS STAGE ISRAEL SEEKS TO EXCLUDE JERUSALEM FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS DISCUSSIONS MAY NOT GET STARTED AT ALL.

4. PLEASE INFORM THE AMERICANS.

SOSFA SENT 2359Z/28 JULY 1967

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F I L E S
EASTERN DEPT.
P.S. (F.O.)
P.P'S DEPT.
MR. THOMSON
P.U.S.
SIR D. ALLEN
MR. BRENCHLEY

S E C R E T

FFFFF

Middle East (War)

Pt. 6

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IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2498

TO FOREIGN OFFICE
29 JULY 1967.

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ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO.2498 OF 29 JULY, REPEATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO UKMIS NY AND PRIORITY TO AMMAN MOSCOW AND TEL AVIV.

YOUR TELEGRAM 8365: UNITED NATIONS AND THE MIDDLE EAST.

AS I HAD HEARD MR. RUSK WAS HEAVILY ENGAGED OVER THIS WEEKEND, I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY LAST NIGHT TO GIVE AN OUTLINE OF THE PROPOSALS IN YOUR TELNO.8365 TO GENE ROSTOW. (AT THAT TIME YOUR TELEGRAM NO.8366 HAD NOT YET COME IN). ROSTOW DISCUSSED YOUR SUGGESTIONS WITH MR. RUSK THIS MORNING AND I THEN SAW ROSTOW AND LUKE BATTLE TOGETHER IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS AND LEFT WITH THEM A COPY OF THE PROPOSED MESSAGE TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL.

2. WHILE THE AMERICANS WISH TO GIVE ALL THIS FURTHER THOUGHT AND THEN DISCUSS IT WITH US AGAIN EARLY NEXT WEEK, THEY ARE IN GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH YOUR SUGGESTION THAT WE SHOULD TRY TO SECURE THE ADOPTION OF A SUBSTANTIVE RESOLUTION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE LINES PROPOSED IN YOUR PARAGRAPH 3 BEFORE THE END OF AUGUST.

3. YOUR PARAGRAPH 4. ROSTOW SAID THERE WOULD CERTAINLY BE NO U.S. OBJECTION TO OUR TALKING TO THE RUSSIANS DIRECT ABOUT ALL THIS: SUCH TALKS COULD NOT BUT BE CONSTRUCTIVE AS LONG AS QUOTE WE WERE ALONG THE SAME TRACK UNQUOTE.

4. YOUR PARAGRAPH 6. THE AMERICANS ARE A LITTLE AFRAID OF THE IDEA OF A LARGER RECONSTITUTED UNEF, IN VIEW OF ITS UNHAPPY PAST HISTORY. THEY HOPED THAT SOME AGREEMENT ON DEMILITARISATION OF SINAI (SEE PARAGRAPH 8 BELOW) MIGHT MAKE THIS UNECCESSARY.

5. YOUR PARAGRAPH 7. ROSTOW SAID THEY WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS

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THIS FURTHER WITHIN THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND PARTICULARLY WITH SISCO, THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR UNITED NATIONS' AFFAIRS (AT PRESENT AWAY SICK). ROSTOW SAID THAT HE HAD DOUBTS ABOUT U THANT GOING HIMSELF. THEY WANTED A MEDIATOR AND PREFERABLY ONE CLOAKED WITH THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL, BUT THEY WOULD PREFER SOMEONE WITH A BETTER CHANCE OF PULLING THINGS OFF THAN U THANT. IN DISCUSSIONS AT THE UNITED NATIONS LAST MONTH, THE RUSSIANS HAD SEEMED QUITE WELL DISPOSED TOWARDS JARRING AND HE SEEMED A POSSIBLE STARTER. ROSTOW LATER TELEPHONED ME TO SAY THAT ALTHOUGH THEY STILL HAD SERIOUS DOUBTS ABOUT TRYING TO GET U THANT TO GO IN PERSON THEY WERE MUCH IN FAVOUR OF BRINGING HIM INTO THE ACT AND THAT IT MIGHT HELP TO FORTIFY HIM IF YOU WERE TO SUGGEST TO HIM THAT HE SHOULD CONSULT WITH THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL WITH A VIEW TO GETTING THEIR CONSENT TO SEND OUT A REPRESENTATIVE.

6. ROSTOW SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD KEPT IN VERY CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE TURKS THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS AND WERE NOW THINKING OF ASKING THEM TO PROBE THE CHANCES OF OBTAINING UAR AGREEMENT TO A RESOLUTION ALONG THE LINES OF THE U.S./SOVIET DRAFT. ALTERNATIVELY, THEY MIGHT ASK THE TURKS TO SUGGEST TO THE EGYPTIANS THAT THEY DO SOMETHING ABOUT THE CANAL ITSELF. ROSTOW THOUGHT THE AMERICANS MIGHT ALSO APPROACH THE INDIANS AND IT WOULD BE A GOOD THING IF WE SPOKE TO THEM TOO.

7. BATTLE ALSO THREW OUT A SUGGESTION THAT WE MIGHT WISH TO CONSIDER GETTING IN TOUCH WITH THE PRINCIPAL USERS OF THE CANAL, E.G. THE NORWEGIANS, LIBERIANS. INDIANS, AND FRENCH. THEY MIGHT BE BETTER PLACED THAN THE UNITED STATES OR OURSELVES TO MAKE A DIRECT APPROACH TO THE UAR. OF THE PRINCIPAL USERS IT WAS THE INDIANS WHO WERE BEING HURT THE MOST AND WHO HAD THE MOST LEVERAGE IN CAIRO.

8. ROSTOW ALSO INSTRUCTED BATTLE TO ADD A FURTHER PARAGRAPH TO THE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE US AMBASSADOR IN TEL AVIV (WHICH HAVE APPARENTLY

/STILL

STILL NOT GONE OFF), ASKING BARBER TO ENQUIRE IF THE ISRAELIS HAD YET MADE A DIRECT APPROACH TO THE UAR AS EBAN HAD SAID THEY INTENDED. ISRAELI TERMS FOR A SETTLEMENT WITH THE UAR WERE QUITE SIMPLE: DEMILITARISATION OF SINAI, AN END TO THE STATE OF BELIGERENCY AND FREE PASSAGE THROUGH THE CANAL AND THE STRAITS OF TIRAN. DEMILITARISATION OF SINAI WOULD OF COURSE MAKE A UNEF FORCE UNNECESSARY.

F O PSE PASS PRIORITY AMMAN 82, MOSCOW 183 AND TEL AVIV 95.

SIR P DEAN

Sent: 0040Z 30 JULY
Recd: 0041Z 30 JULY

[REPETITION TO MOSCOW/TEL AVIV REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS.]

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